

Journal of Eurasian Affairs

ISSN 2307-8286

Volume 2, Number 1, 2014

FOUNDED IN 2013

BY International Social Movement "Eurasian Movement"

ISSUED BIANNUALLY



EDITOR

Leonid Savin

LAY-OUT

Vyacheslav Altukhov

CORRECTOR

Andrew Korybko

COVER ART

Sergey Zhigalkin

<http://www.eurasianaffairs.net>

info@eurasianaffairs.net

Tel. + 7 495 514 65 16

Fax +7 499 271 10 15

Russia 121087, Moscow, Bagrationovskiy proezd 7, bul. 20 "B", office 405

Printed with financial aid of the Tempbank (Russia)

Advisory board

Dr. Alexandr Dugin, Professor of the Moscow State University, Russia.

Dr. Mikhail Fiodorov, Rector of the Ural State Economic University, Russia.

Dr. Viktor Stepanyuk, Dean of the Dept. of international Relations and Political Sciences, Institute of International Relations, Moldova.

Dr. Ilie Badescu, Director of the Institute of Sociology of the Romanian Academy of Sciences, Romania.

Dr. Jamal Wakim, Professor of International Relations at Lebanese International University, Lebanon.

Dr. Christof Lehmann, Editor in Chief of the nsmbc international, USA.

Dr. Guzel Maitdinova, Director of the Centre of Geopolitical Research of the Russian-Tajik Slavonic University, Tajikistan.

Dr. Mateusz Piskorski, Director of the European Centre of Geopolitical Analysis, Poland.

Dr. Alberto Buela, Professor of the Technical University of Buenos Aires, Argentina.

CONTEXT:

THE MULTIPOLAR WORLD AND THE POSTMODERN.....	8
Alexander Dugin	
SOME THOUGHTS ON THE CREATION OF INTELLECTUAL EURASIANISM	13
Gábor Vona	
THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN RUSSIA TODAY.....	17
Evgeniy Fyodorov	
CYBERGEOPOLITICS: EMERGENT SET OF PRACTICES, PHENOMENON AND DISCIPLINE	26
Leonid Savin	
US PRESENCE IN EURASIA AND ITS IMPACT ON SECURITY AND MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS OF THIS REGION.....	32
Seyyede Motahhareh Hosseini Asghar Shokri Moqaddam	
AN APPEAL FOR JUSTICE: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN 5	37
Alicia Jrapko	
A SUSPENDED DEMOCRACY UNDER THE ATLANTICIST EYE “STAY BEHIND”: THE ITALIAN CASE.....	42
Andrea Fais	
NATIONAL IDENTITY IN TRANSNISTRIA: A GLOBAL HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE FORMATION AND EVOLUTION OF A ‘RESISTANCE IDENTITY’	50
Joris Wagemakers	
FAR EASTERN REGIONAL IDENTITY AS A CONTEMPORARY INDIGENEITY: HISTORIC AND CONTEMPORARY DISCOURSE.....	56
Ivan Zolotukhin	
RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES: INCOMPATIBILITY OF IDENTITIES OR GREAT POWER COMPETITION? ..	63
Andrew Korybko	
HOW DID HEZBOLLAH RESPOND TO THE ARAB TRANSFORMATIONS?..	74
Hosam Matar	
THE RISE AND FALL OF NEO-OTTOMANISM IN SYRIA	81
Kevork Almassian	
SELF-DETERMINATION VS. STATE SOVEREIGNTY — CONTEMPORARY LESSONS FROM THE 1938 MUNICH CONFERENCE	84
Stevan Gajić	
MULTIPOLARISM AND GLOBALISM, THE TWO GEOPOLITICAL COSMOVISIONS AND THEIR SPIRITUAL BACKGROUNDS.....	90
Felix Alemán	
HEIDEGGER, LEFT AND RIGHT: DIFFERENTIAL POLITICAL ONTOLOGY AND FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL ONTOLOGY COMPARED	94
Michael Miller	
TEN MAJOR SIGNS OF THE LAST DAY — HAS ONE JUST OCCURRED?.....	105
Shaykh Imran Nazar Hosein	
GENDERED IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSNATIONAL CAPITAL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINIAN MIGRANT FAMILIES.....	112
Alissa Tolstokorova	

EDITORIAL

The Journal of Eurasian Affairs is a new international journal founded by the Russian NGO International Social Movement "Eurasian Movement". It is dedicated to different issues such as Eurasianism in its different aspects (from philosophy to integration process on post-Soviet space), geopolitics, international relations, war and peace studies, globalization, multipolarity and new emerging theories in fields of politics and humanitarian sciences.

Because of its title covered themes are about processes in Eurasia, but not limited by continental boundaries. Eurasia as an idea and Eurasianism as an outlook are international by its essence.

In some sense the Journal of Eurasian Affairs is a interdisciplinary one where ideas cross from different schools, trends and sets that makes it a broad platform for discussion and forum for meetings of academic researchers, political activists, philosophers, independent scholars, experts and decision makers.

The red line of the Journal of Eurasian Affairs is a critical approach to (neo)liberalism and its derivatives manifested in realpolitik as well as in large scale of activities dealing with the human being itself. The need to develop an alternative is the second task, put before the founders of the Journal and core thinkers of the "Eurasian Movement".

We believe that writers from all over the globe will join us for the development (and revival) of these kind of ideas that will promote and establish a new model of global affairs and of political systems paying respect to all nations, peoples, groups, beliefs, cultures and traditions.

The Journal of Eurasian Affairs invites contributors to send articles, essays and reviews.

Leonid Savin, Editor.



Alexander Dugin

Professor of the Moscow State University, Doctor of political sciences, founder of the contemporary Russian school of Geopolitics, leader of the International Social Movement "Eurasian Movement", Moscow, Russian Federation.

THE MULTIPOLAR WORLD AND THE POSTMODERN

Alexander Dugin

1. MULTIPOLARISM AS A VISION OF THE FUTURE AND LAND IN THE POSTMODERN ERA

Multipolarism as an Innovative Mold-Breaking Concept

The Multipolar Theory represents a unique direction that cannot be qualified simply in terms of "progress/conservatism", "old/new", "development/stagnation", etc. The unipolar and globalist view on history imagines the historical process as a linear motion from the worse to the better, from the underdeveloped to the developed, and so on and so forth. In this case, globalization is seen as the horizon of a universal future, and everything that impedes globalization is simply seen as the inertia of the past, atavism, or a striving to blindly preserve the "status quo" at all costs. In virtue of such a percept, globalism and "The Sea Power" are also trying to interpret Multipolarism as exclusively being a conservative position opposing the "inevitable change". If globalization is the Postmodern (the global society), Multipolarism appears to be resistance to the Postmodern (containing elements of the Modern and even Pre-Modern).

Alas, it is indeed possible to consider things under a different visual angle and set aside the dogmatics of linear progress¹ or the "monotonous process"². The idea of time as a sociological category of the philosophy of Multipolarism is based on interpreting the general paradigm of Multipolarism through the view of an absolutely different system.

Multipolarism, in comparison with unipolarity and globalism, is not just an appeal to the old or a call for preserving everything as it is. Multipolarism does not insist either on preserving national states (the Westphalian world) or on restoring the bipolar model (the Yalta world), nor on freezing that transitional state where international life is currently positioned. Multipolarism is a look into the future (that which has not yet been), a project of organization of the world order on absolutely new principles and elements, and thus, a serious revision of the ideological, philosophical, and sociological axioms that modernity rests upon.

Multipolarism, as well as unipolarity and globalization, is oriented towards the construction of that which has never been before it, to the creative strain of free spirit, the philosophical search and the striving for building a better, more absolute, fair, harmonious, and happy society. What is different, however, is that the character of this society, its principles and values, and also the methods to construct its foundation, are seen in a radically different way when compared to the globalists' vision. Multipolarism sees the future to be multiple, full of variety, differentiated, dissimilar, and preserving a wide palette of collective and individual self-identification choices. There are also undertones of frontier societies that experience the influence of different identification matrices. This

¹ Alain de Benoist. *Protiv liberalizma*. SPb, 2009.

² Dugin A. *Protiv modernizacii*// Odnako, 2010. №10 (26).

is a model of the “flourishing complexity” of the world, where a multitude of places combines with a multitude of times, where multiscale collective and individual actors engage in a dialogue, and thus figuring out and sometimes transforming their identity in the course of such a conversation. The West’s culture, philosophy, policy, economy, and technology are seen in this future world to be just one of many local phenomena, in no way excelling the culture, philosophy, policy, economy, and technology of the Asiatic societies and even the archaic tribes. All that we deal with in the form of different ethnoses, peoples, nations, and civilizations are equitable variations of “human societies” (“Menschliche Gesellschaft”¹). Some of them are “disenchanted” (M. Weber) and materially developed, while others are poor and plain, though still “enchanted” (M. Eliade), sacred, and living in harmony and equilibrium with their ambient existence. Multipolarism accepts whichever choice society makes, but any choice becomes sensible only in the context of space and a historical moment, and hence, it remains local. The most that Western culture, perceived as something local, can do for others is be a source of admiration and arouse delight, but a claim for universalism and separation from the historical context turns it into a simulacrum, into a Quasi-West, into a cartoon and kitsch. To some extent, this has already happened in regards to American culture’s influence over Europe, where it is still easy to recognize Europe, but this Europe is hypertrophic, sterilized, and deprived of internal harmony and proportions, charm, and tradition. It is a Europe of the universalist project and it is no longer organic, taking on the characteristics of a complex, paradoxical, dramatic, tragic, and contradictory historical and spatial phenomenon.

Multipolarism as the Postmodern

If we refer to the past, we will easily find out that the Multipolar World, the international order based upon the principle of Multipolarism, never existed. Multipolarism is therefore a project, plan, and strategy of the future, not a mere inertia or sluggish resistance to globalization. Multipolarism observes the future, but sees it in a radically different way than the proponents of unipolarity, universalism, and globalization do, and it strives to bring its vision into life.

These considerations demonstrate that, in a certain sense, Multipolarism is also the Postmodern (not the

¹ Thurnwald R. Die menschliche Gesellschaft in ihren ethno-soziologischen Grundlagen, 5 B. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1931-1934.

Modern or Premodern), but simply different from the Postmodern visions of globalism and unipolarity. In this special sense, the Multipolar Philosophy agrees that the present world order, and also that of the past (national or bipolar), is imperfect and demands a radical alteration. The Multipolar World is not an assertion of K. Schmitt’s Second or Third Nomos of the Earth, but a battle for the Fourth Nomos that must come in place of the present and the past. As well, Multipolarism is not rejection of the Postmodern, but the establishment of a radically different Postmodern than the version suggested by the globalists and proponents of the unipolar world; different in relation to the neo-liberal dominating version, and in relation to the critical antiglobalist and alterglobalist position, it will be based upon the same universalism as neo-liberalism, but only with the reverse sign. The Multipolar Postmodern therefore represents something altogether different from the Modern or Pre-Modern neo-liberal globalism or unipolar America-centric imperialism, or leftist antiglobalist or alterglobalist ideas. Therefore, in the case of the formalization of Multipolarism into a systemized ideology, the conversation drifts precisely to “The Fourth Political Theory”.

The Multipolar Idea recognizes that national states do not correspond with the challenges of history, and moreover, they are merely a preparatory stage for globalization. Therefore, it supports integration processes in specific regions, insisting that their borders consider the civilizational peculiarities of the societies historically developed in these territories. This is a positive feature of postmodernism.

The Multipolar Idea posits that the significance of new non-state actors must increase in international politics, but these actors must be, first of all, original historically developed organic societies (such as ethnoses) having an established relationship to their space of activity. This is also a postmodernist feature.

The Multipolar Idea rejects the universal “Great Narratives” (stories), European logocentrism, rigid power hierarchies, and an assumable normative patriarchy. Instead of this, it supports the value of local, multifaceted, and asymmetrical identities reflecting the spirit of each specific culture, whatever it is and however alien and execrable it seems to the rest. This is yet another postmodernist feature.

The Multipolar Idea rejects the mechanistic approach to reality and the Descartes division into the subject and

the object. It does this by affirming integrity, holism, and an integral approach to the world, one that is organic and balanced, based rather upon the "geometry of nature" (B. Mandelbrot) than on the "geometry of the machine". This yields ecologism for the Multipolar World, rejection of the "subjugation of nature" concept (F. Bacon), and transition to "a dialogue with nature". This is an even better postmodern feature.

The Multipolar Postmodern against the Unipolar (Globalist/Antiglobalist) Postmodern

When the conversation drifts to the measure of things in the future world, serious contradictions begin to arise between the Multipolar Theory and Postmodernism. Liberal and Neo-Marxist Postmodernism operate with the basic concepts of the "individual" and linear "progress", conceived in the prospect of the "liberation of the individual" and, on the last stage, in the prospect of "liberation from the individual" and a transition to the postman, be it a cyborg, mutant, rhizome, or clone. Moreover, it is the principle of individuality that they consider universal. Here, the Multipolar Idea sharply diverges with the main line of Postmodernism and posits the society¹, collective personality, collective consciousness (E. Durkheim), and the collective unconsciousness (K. G. Jung) as the center of things. Society is a matrix of existence; it creates individuals, people, languages, cultures, economies, political systems, time, and space. In the Multipolar Idea, there is not just one society, as societies are many, and they are all incommensurable with one other. An individual has become "the measure of things" in such an absolute and accomplished form only in one type of society (Western European), and in all other societies, he has not and will not become so. This is because they are structured in an absolutely different way. One must acknowledge the inalienable right for each society to be such as it wants to be and to create reality by its own means, be it through assigning an individual and man a superior value or not assigning them any.

The same idea concerns the issue of "progress". Since time is a social phenomenon², it is structured in a different way in each society. In some societies, it bears in itself an increase in the role of the individual in history, while in others it does not. Therefore, there is no determining factor across societies concerning the concepts of individualism and post-humanity. The fate of the West

will likely continue to proceed towards these aforementioned directions, as this path is connected with the logic of its history. The West's embrace of individualism and post-humanity has the potential to inflict collateral damage to other societies and nations, as even if these ideas are already somewhat present in their culture, it is as a rule usually in the form of externally enforced colonial precepts that are aligned paradigms for the local societies themselves. It is this colonial imperialist universalism of the West that is the main challenge for the Multipolar Idea.

By using the terms of geopolitics, it can be said that Multipolarism is the land, continental, tellurocratic version of the Postmodern, whereas globalism (as well as antiglobalism) is its sea and thalassocratic version.

2. MULTIPOLARISM AND GLOBALIZATION THEORIES

Multipolarism against the Global Policy

From the position of Multipolarism, let us now consider the basic theories of globalization and how they relate to one another.

The World Polity Theory (J. Meyer, J. Boli, etc.) presumes the creation of an integrated global state, and with the support of individual citizens, it is maximally opposite to Multipolarism and represents its formal antithesis. It is similar to the theses of "the end of history" (rapid or gradual) by F. Fukuyama and all the other rigidly globalist unipolar projects that describe a desirable and probable future that completely contradicts the Multipolar one. In this case, between Multipolarism and the theory of globalization, there exists a relation of plus and minus, black and white, etc. As an example, there is a radical antagonism of ultimatums: either "The World Polity" or Multipolarism.

Multipolarism and the Global Culture (in Defense of Localization)

The case study of relations is more difficult to conduct with the World Culture Theory (R. Robertson) and "transformationists" concepts (E. Giddens, etc.). Critical appraisals of globalization in the spirit of S. Huntington can also be referred to here. In these theories, they analyze the balance of two trends — universalization (pure globalism) and localization (R. Robertson) — or the new appearance of civilization contours (S. Huntington). If the attitude of the Multipolar Theory

¹ Dugin A. The sociology of the imaginary. The introduction into the structural sociology. M., 2010

² Ibid.

to universalization is unambiguously antagonistic, a number of phenomena that manifest themselves as secondary effects in the course of globalization can, on the contrary, be appraised positively. The weakening of the sociopolitical context of national states in these theories is demonstrated from two sides: partially, their functions are transferred to global entities, and partially, they turn out to be in the hands of some new, local actors. On the other hand, due to the fragility and looseness of national states, civilizational and religious factors assume ever greater importance. It is this set of phenomena that accompany globalization, and they are consequences of the weakening of previous state and ideological world models that deserve positive attention and become elements of the Multipolar Theory.

The secondary effects of globalization return societies to a specific spatial, cultural, and occasionally, religious context. This leads to the reinforcement of the role of ethnic identity, an increase in the importance of the confessional factor, and increased attention to local communities and problems. In summarizing these phenomena, they can be realized as strategic positions of the Multipolar World Order that must be fixed, fastened, and supported. Within the "glocalization" described by Robertson, Multipolarism is interested in "localization", being in complete solidarity with it. Robertson himself believes that the processes of "glocalization" are not predetermined and can sway to one side or another. Accepting this analysis, the supporters of the Multipolar World must consciously apply their efforts so that the processes sway to the "local" side and outweigh the "global" one.

Multipolar Conclusions from the Analysis of the World-System Theory

The World-System Theory by I. Wallerstein is interesting for the Multipolar Theory due to the fact that it adequately describes the economic, political, and sociological algorithm of globalization. Wallerstein's "World System" represents the global capitalist elite as huddling around "The Core", even if its representatives come from the "periphery" countries. "The world proletariat" that gradually transits from a national identity to a class-based (international) one personifies the "periphery" not just geographically, but also socially. National states are no more than sites where one and the same mechanical process takes place. This is the enrichment of oligarchs and their integration in the supranational (global) "Core" and the pauperization of the masses, which gradually interfuse

with the working class of other nations in the course of migration processes.

From the point of view of the Multipolar Theory, this analysis does not consider geopolitics or the cultural and civilizational factor. The latter is the disregard for the topic inherent in Marxism as a whole, which is first of all focused on the disclosure of the economic mechanics of society's organization. In the present world, "The Second World" (i.e. regional integration formations or "Great Spaces") is situated between "The Core" and "the Periphery". Under I. Wallerstein's logic, their existence changes nothing in the general structure of the world-system, and they merely represent a step in the direction of complete globalization — the integration of the elites in "The Core" and the "internationalization of the masses" occur more rapidly here than in the context of national states. But under the logic of the Multipolar Theory, the presence of "The Second World" radically changes it all. Between the elites and masses existing in the various integration structures within the limits of "The Second World", there can arise a model of relations other than the liberal or Marxist analysis forecast. S. Huntington called it "modernization without Westernization"¹. The essence of this phenomenon is that, while obtaining a Western education and mastering Western technologies, the elites of the periphery countries often act in the following way: they do not integrate into the global elite, but instead return to their society, confirm their socialization and collective identity within it, and put their mastered skills to service for their own countries, thereby not following the West, and even opposing it. The factor of cultural identity (often religion) and civilizational affiliation turns out to be stronger than the universalist algorithm presented in the technology of modernization and the very medium that begot it.

The process of societies' stratification and the elite's Westernization as described by Wallerstein definitely takes place, but a different process may also take place — "modernization without Westernization". Together with regional integration without global integration, these processes represent a tendency which I. Wallerstein himself ignores, but which his analysis ironically allows one to be able to clearly see and describe. This becomes a very important element and program thesis for the Multipolar Theory.

¹ Huntington Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

As for the global horizon, all societies now have to confront most of the theories of globalization firsthand, and the Multipolar Theory can propose the following principles.

The true completeness and integrity of the world is objectively real, but it can only be properly perceived once one removes the surrounding banality which obscures his pure understanding of it. Heidegger called this the "authentic existing of Dasein"¹. Grasping the world as a whole can only be possible through the modification of existence, not through the accumulation of ever new data, expressions, meetings, conversations, information, and knowledge. According to Heidegger, man is spurred on to study new places and landscapes in order to escape from genuine existence, and this concept is personified in the figure of Das Man, i.e. an impersonal and abstract, yet concrete, living form that finds various substitutes to replace the true experience of existing. Das Man, having an inauthentic existence, dissolves the concentration of his own consciousness through "curiosity" and "gossip", two of the various forms non-authentic existence². The simpler that communications in the global world are, the more senseless they become. The more saturated the information flows are, the less people are able to reason and decode their meaning. Therefore, globalization in no way contributes to one acquiring experience of the whole world, but on the contrary, misleads from it by dispersing the attention in an infinite series of meaningless puzzles where the parts are not attributes of the unified whole, i.e. they exist as unrelated fragments of existence. The global horizon is not reached in globalization — it is comprehended in a profound existential experience of a place.

Therefore, different societies do not collide in the global horizon, but with the challenge of globalism as an ideology and practice that attacks every society and challenges all local communities, they could find a common ground in rejecting the enemy that menaces all peoples and cultures without discrimination. The Multipolar Theory recognizes the universalism of this challenge, but holds that it must be repulsed just as universally in order to stave off a forthcoming catastrophe, disaster, or tragedy.

¹ Dugin A. Martin Heidegger and philosopgiya drugogo nachala. M., 2010.

² Heidegger called globalism with the term "Planeter Idiotism" having in mind the original Greek meaning of the word ἰδιότης that implies a polis inhabitant deprived of civil identity, i.e., of affiliation to a phyle, caste, trade, cult, etc. See Dugin A. Martin Heidegger and philosopgiya drugogo nachala. Op. cit.

The horizon of globalism is conceived as something that must be defeated, overcome, and abolished. Each society will do it in its own way, but the Multipolar Theory suggests generalizing, consolidating, and coordinating all the forms of opposition to the globalization challenge. As global as the challenge of globalization is, so too must be its rejection, but the structure of this rejection, so as to be full-fledged, independent, and prospective, must be multipolar and suggest a clear and distinct project of what should be put in place of globalization.

3. FROM A POISON TO A CURE

Saddling the Tiger of Globalization: the Multipolar Network

The construction of the Multipolar World demands the developing of a special attitude to all basic aspects of the globalization process. We have seen that although Multipolarism opposes unipolarity and globalization, the question is not simply about the rejection of all the transformations that surround modernity, but about selecting the multipolar format for these transformations, to influence them, and to guide the process to the pattern seen as being the most desirable and optimal. Therefore, Multipolarism in certain situations is not so much meant to directly oppose globalization as it is to recapture the initiative and allow the processes to go along a new trajectory, thereby turning "a poison into a cure" ("to saddle the tiger"³, to use a traditional Chinese expression). Such a strategy repeats the logic of "modernization without Westernization", but on a more generalized and systemized level. Some separate societies in a regional culture borrow Western technologies so as to reinforce themselves and repulse the pressure of the West at certain times. Multipolarism suggests comprehending such a strategy as a system that can serve as a general algorithm for most different non-Western societies.

Let us give some examples of such a reinterpretation of separate aspects of globalism through the multipolar perspective.

Let us take the network and network space phenomenon. By itself, this phenomenon is not neutral. It represents the result of a series of gradual transformations in the sociological understanding of space in the context of "The Sea Power" on the path of ever greater information medium dilution — from the sea through the air to

³ Evola J. Cavalcare la tigre. R, 2001.

the infosphere. Along with it, the network represents a structure that perceives the presence of relations between the system elements not in the organic, but in the mechanic, way. The network can be constructed between separate individual elements that initially are not connect with each other and have no common collective identity. As it evolves, the network phenomenon presents the prospect of overcoming humanity and entering into the post-human age. This is because the centrality of man becomes ever more and more relative (N. Luhmann, M. Castells, etc.) in the very functioning of self-organizing systems like the network. From this point of view, the network represents a reality that is cardinally "Sea", Atlantist, and globalist.

In classical geopolitics, we can see that the positions of the Land and Sea are connected not so much by the presence of one element or another, but with the sociological, cultural, philosophical, and only then, strategic conclusions different societies make from their contact with the Sea. K. Schmitt emphasizes¹ that in spite of creating a global empire based upon navigation, Spanish society continued preserving its strictly land-based identity, which also particularly manifested itself in the social organization of the colonies and in the difference between the future destinies of Latin and Anglo-Saxon America. The presence of developed navigation does not necessarily make a power a sea one in the geopolitical sense of this term. Moreover, the objective of the Land Power and, in particular, of the Heartland, is to obtain access to the seas, break the financial blockade on the part of the thalassocracy, and begin to compete with it in its own element.

The situation with the network space is the same. The Multipolar camp needs to master the structure of the network processes and their technologies, learn the rules and regularities of network behavior, and then gain a possibility to realize its objectives and goals in this new element. The network space opens new possibilities for smaller actors: after all, the locations of a huge planetary level transnational corporation, a great power, or an individual minimally mastering programming skills are in no way different from each other, and in a certain sense, they appear to occur in similar conditions. The same can be said for social networks and blogs. Globalization banks that code diffusion into a multitude of network participants will one way or another install them in a context, whose basic parameters will be con-

trolled by owners of physical servers, domain name registrars, providers, and hardware monopolists. But in the antiglobalist theories by Negri and Hardt, we have seen how leftist-anarchist theorists suggest coopting this circumstance for their interests while preparing a "rebellion of multitudes" that is called for to overthrow the control of the "empire"². Something analogical can also be suggested in the Multipolar prospect, but the question is not about conducting a chaotic sabotage of the globalists plans through the use of the "multitudes", but about constructing virtual network civilizations tied to a specific historical and geographical place and possessing a common cultural code. A virtual civilization can be considered a projection of the civilization as such in the network medium, assuming that the lines of force and the identification perceptions that are dominant in a corresponding cultural medium are consolidated there. This is already used by different religious, ethnic, and political forces that are in no way globalist or even antiglobalist, and they coordinate their activities and propagate their views and ideas with the help of different instruments of the Internet Network.

National domains and the development of network communications in local language systems are another form. With effective operation in this medium, this can contribute to the reinforcement of the youth's cultural identity, as they are naturally predisposed to the allure of new technologies.

The example of the "Chinese Internet" (where access is legally and physical limited) can, according to the opinion of some Chinese governmental experts, damage the security of Chinese society. On the reverse, in the political, social, and moral fields, this example demonstrates that purely restrictive measures can also exercise some positive effect for the reinforcement of Multipolarism.

The global network can turn into a multipolar one, namely, into an aggregate of intersecting but independent "virtual continents". Thus, instead of the singular network, there will appear many networks, each being a virtual expression of a specific qualitative space. All together, these continents can be integrated in a common multipolar network, differentiated and moderated on the grounds of the multipolar network paradigm. Eventually, the content of what is in the network will be

¹ Schmitt C. Die planetarische Spannung zwischen Ost und West (1959)/Schmittiana — III von prof. Piet Tommissen. Brussel, 1991.

² Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Harvard University Press, 2000..

a reflection of human imagination structures¹. If actualizing these structures in a multipolar way (i.e. as those just making sense in a specific qualitative historical space), it is not difficult to imagine what the Internet (or its future analogue) could be in the Multipolar World.

On a practical level, under the present conditions, a network can already be considered as a means of consolidating active social groups, personalities, and societies under the aegis of promoting Multipolarism, i.e. gradual multipolar network construction.

Network Wars of the Multipolar World

Network wars are one more phenomenon of the globalization period. One should also be armed with the methodology of network wars — both in the common theoretical and application aspects — in constructing the Multipolar World. In this sense, the Network-centric Principle adapted during the reorganization of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation represents an absolutely justified decision, addressed to reinforce the Heartland's positions and increase the performance of the army that constitutes one of the main elements in the multipolar configuration.

The Network-centric Principle of warfare has some technical and principal aspects to it. The equipping of separate units of the Russian Army with network attributes (tracking devices, operative two-way communication devices, interactive technical means, etc.) is a self-evident side of the issue, demanding no special geopolitical grounds. What is much more important is in considering another more common aspect of network warfare.

A network war, as it appears from its theorists' actions, is constantly waged in all directions — against enemies, allies, and neutral forces. In the same way, network operations must be evolved in all directions and on the part of the center (or some centers) for the Multipolar World construction to succeed. If we assume that the actor pursuing a network war is not a state, but a non-state entity targeting the creation of the Multipolar World (like those that the US network war targets in order to establish the unipolar world), we will see that waging this war by different poles (e.g. Russia, China, India, Iran, etc.) will create interference and resonances and multiply the reinforcement and effectiveness of network strategies. By constructing the Multipolar World, each pole is interest-

ed in reinforcing the other poles, but also in weakening the hyperpower's global hegemony. Thus, a network war waged by the Multipolar World can represent a spontaneous convergence of effort with structural ramifications that can be extremely effective. The reinforcement of China is beneficial for Russia, just as the security of Iran is beneficial for India. The independence of Pakistan from the US will positively redound upon the situation in Afghanistan and Central Asia, among other places.

By directing networks, information, and image flows that are associated with the multipolar idea in each and every direction, a network war can become extremely effective, as the securing of the interests of one Multipolar World actor automatically furthers the interests of another. In this case, coordination must only occur on the highest level — on the level of the countries' representatives in the multipolar club (as a rule, these are heads of states) where the common multipolar paradigm will be exactly coordinated. Network war processes will bring this common strategy into life.

The second important part of the Network-centric War theory is in emphasizing the increased sensibility to initial conditions. These initial factors that affect the end result are the point in which the possible conflict starts, the position that other participating countries take up, and the information medium that broadcasts the conflict's developments. Therefore, higher priority attention should be paid to preparing the medium — the local and global one. If the correlation of forces, a computation of the consequences of the various steps taken in the information field, and the preliminary preparation of image presentation are made correctly, this can make a conflict situation impossible by persuading a potential opponent of the hopelessness of resistance or armed escalation. This concerns traditional warfare as well as information wars, where the fight is waged for influence upon public opinion.

Therefore, the countries declaring their orientation to Multipolarism can and must actively use the theories and practices of network-centric operations for their interests. The theorists of network wars fairly consider them to be a crucial strategic instrument of waging a war in the Postmodernist conditions. Multipolarism undertakes the challenge of the Postmodern and begins a battle for its direction. Network-centric operations represent one of the most important territories to wage this battle.

¹ Dugin A. The sociology of the imaginary. The introduction into the structural sociology. M., 2010.

Multipolarism and the Dialectics of Chaos

Another example where a strategy of turning “a poison into a cure” can be found is in the chaos phenomenon. Chaos ever more frequently figures into modern geopolitical texts¹, as well as in globalization theories. Proponents of the rigid unipolar approach (such as S. Mann²) suggest manipulating chaos in favor of “The Core” (i.e., the US). Antiglobalists and postmodernists welcome chaos in its literal sense — as anarchy and disorder. Other authors try to see buds of order in the chaotic reality.

The Multipolar Approach treats the problem of chaos as follows:

First, the mythological concept of “chaos” as a condition opposing “order” is predominantly a product of Greek (i.e. European) culture. This opposition is initially based upon the exclusiveness of order, and subsequently, as philosophy develops and order is identified with rationality, chaos has entirely turned into a purely negative concept, a synonym of irrationality, darkness, and inanity. It is also possible to approach this problem in another way, however, in a less exclusivist sense, and then chaos will discover itself to us as an entity not opposing order, but instead preceding its strained logical expression. Chaos is not nonsense, but a matrix from where sense is begotten³.

In Western European culture, chaos is an unambiguous “evil”, but this is not the case in other cultures. Multipolarism refuses to consider Western European culture as being universal, and hence, chaos itself loses its unambiguous negative image, and the order correlated with it attains a positive image. Multipolarism does not reason in terms of chaos or order, but it demands explanations every time — what chaos and what order, and in what sense does a specific culture hold one or another term? We approximately know how chaos and order are comprehended by Western culture, but how does the Chinese one comprehend it, for example? Indeed, the idea of “Tao” that is crucial for Chinese philosophy (“The Way”) is described in many texts in terms that strikingly remind one of the descriptions of chaos. Therefore,

the multipolar approach states that the understanding of chaos and order is relative to civilizations, and the Western conception is not universal by any means.

Firstly, globalists often understand “chaos” in the geopolitical sense as being anything that does not correlate with their perceptions of ordered sociopolitical and economic structures and that counters the establishment of their subjective global and “universal” values. In this case, everything that is valuable for the construction of the Multipolar World, including the insistence on other forms of identity, consequently bears within itself the seeds of the Multipolar Order and thus falls within the class of “chaos”. Per this example, “chaos” supports the construction of the Multipolar World and is its life-bearing origin.

Finally, chaos, in the manner that it is understood as being pure disorder or weakly organized spontaneous processes taking place in a society, can also be considered from the position of Multipolarism. Whenever a chaotic situation (conflict, disturbance, collision, etc.) arises in a natural or artificial way, it is necessary to learn to control it, i.e. master the art of chaos moderation. Being against ordered structures by their very nature, chaotic processes do not lend themselves to a straightforward logic, but it does not mean they do not have it at all. Chaos does have logic, but it is more complex and comprehensive than the algorithms of non-chaotic processes. At the same time, it lends itself to scientific research and it is actively studied by modern physicists and mathematicians. From the point of view of geopolitical application, it can well become one of the most effective instruments for constructing the Multipolar World.

¹ Ramonet I. *Géo-politique du chaos*. Paris: Galilée, 1997; Idem. *Guerres du xxi^e siècle — Peurs et menaces nouvelles*. Paris: Galilée, 2002.

² Mann St. R. *Chaos Theory and Strategic Thought//Parameters*. 1992. Autumn. № 55.

³ Dugin A. *Martin Heidegger and the possibility of the Russian Philosophy*. Op. cit.



Gábor Vona

Leader of the Hungarian political party
"Jobbik" (For Better Hungary).

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE CREATION OF INTELLECTUAL EURASIANISM

Gábor Vona

"Actually, the truth is that the West really is in great need of »defense«, but only against itself and its own tendencies, which, if they are pushed to their conclusion, will lead inevitably to its ruin and destruction; it is therefore »reform« of the West that is called for instead of »defense against the East«, and if this reform were what it should be---that is to say, a restoration of tradition---it would entail as a natural consequence an understanding with the East." — René Guénon¹

1. EUROATLANTISM AND ANTI-TRADITIONALISM

Today's globalized world is in crisis. That is a fact. However, it is not quite clear what this crisis is. In order to get an answer, first we need to define what globalization means. For us, it does not mean the kind of public misconception which says that the borders between the world's various economic and cultural spheres will gradually disappear and the planet becomes an organic network built upon billions of interactions. Those who believe in this also add that history is thus no longer a parallel development of great spheres, but the great common development of the entire world. Needless to say, this interpretation considers globalization as a positive and organic process from the aspect of historical development.

From our aspect, however, globalization is an explicitly negative, anti-traditionalist process. Perhaps we can understand this statement better if we break it down into components. Who is the actor, and what is the action and the object of globalization? The actor of globalization — and thus crisis production — is the Euro-Atlantic region, by which we mean the United States and the great economic-political powers of Western Europe. Economically speaking, the action of globalization is the colonization of the entire world; ideologically speaking, it means safeguarding the monopolistic, dictatorial power of liberalism; while politically speaking, it is the violent export of democracy. Finally, the object of globalization is the entire globe. To sum it up in one sentence: globalization is the effort of the Euro-Atlantic region to control the whole world physically and intellectually. As processes are fundamentally defined by their actors that actually cause them, we will hereinafter name globalization as Euroatlantism. The reason for that is to clearly indicate that we are not talking about a kind of global dialogue and organic cooperation developing among the world's different regions, continents, religions, cultures, and traditions, as the neutrally positive expression of "globalization" attempts to imply, but about a minor part of the world (in particular the Euro-Atlantic region) which is striving to impose its own economic, political, and intellectual model upon the rest of the world in an inorganic manner, by direct and indirect force, and with a clear intention to dominate it.

As we indicated at the beginning of this essay, this effort of Euroatlantism has brought a crisis upon the entire world. Now we can define the crisis itself. Unlike

¹ René Guénon: *The Crisis of the Modern World* Translated by Marco Pallis, Arthur Osborne, and Richard C. Nicholson. Sophia Perennis: Hillsdale, New York. 2004. Pg. 31-32.

what is suggested by the news and the majority of public opinion, this crisis is not primarily an economic one. The problem is not that we cannot justly distribute the assets produced. Although it is true, it is not the cause of the problem and the crisis; it is rather the consequence of it. Neither is this crisis a political one, that is to say: the root cause is not that the great powers and international institutions fail to establish a liveable and harmonious status quo for the whole world; it is just a consequence as well. Nor does this crisis result from the clashes of cultures and religions, as some strategists believe; the problem lies deeper than that. The world's current crisis is an intellectual one. It is a crisis of the human intellect, and it can be characterized as a conflict between traditional values (meaning conventional, normal, human) and anti-traditionalism (meaning modern, abnormal, subhuman), which is now increasingly dominating the world. From this aspect, Euroatlantism — that is to say, globalism — can be greatly identified with anti-traditionalism. So the situation is that the Euro-Atlantic region, which we can simply but correctly call the West, is the crisis itself; in other words, it carries the crisis within, so when it colonizes the world, it in fact spreads an intellectual virus as well. So this is the anti-traditionalist aspect of the world's ongoing processes, but does a traditionalist pole exist, and if it does, where can we find it?

2. EURASIANISM AS A GEOPOLITICAL CONCEPT

Geographically speaking, Eurasia means the continental unity of Europe and Asia, which stretches from the Atlantic to the Pacific. As a cultural notion, Eurasianism was a concept conceived by Russian emigrants in the early 20th century. It proved to be a fertile framework, since it has been reinterpreted several times and will surely continue to be so in the future as well. Nicolai Sergeyevich Trubetskoy is widely considered as the founder of Eurasianism, while Alexandr Dugin is referred to as the key ideologist of the concept. Trubetskoy was one of the greatest thinkers of the Russian emigration in the early 20th century, who attempted to redefine Russia's role in the turbulent post-World War I times, looking for new goals, perspectives, and meanings. On the one hand, he rejected Pan-Slavism and replaced the Slavophile ideology with a kind of "Turanophile" one, as Lajos Pálfalvi put it in an essay.¹ He tore Russian thinking out of the Eastern Slavic framework and found Genghis Khan as a powerful antetype, the founder of a Eurasian

state. Trubetskoy says that it was the Khan's framework left behind that Moscow's Tsars filled with a new Orthodox sense of mission after the Mongol occupation. In his view, the European and Western orientation of Peter the Great is a negative disruption of this process, a cultural disaster, while the desirable goal for Russia is to awaken as a part of Eurasia.

So Eurasianism was born as a uniquely Russian concept but not at all for Russia only, even though it is often criticized for being a kind of Great Russia concept in a cultural-geopolitical disguise. Ukrainian author Mikola Ryabchuk goes as far as to say that whoever uses this notion, for whatever reason, is basically doing nothing but revitalizing the Russian political dominance, tearing the former Soviet sphere out of the "European political and cultural project".² Ryabchuk adds that there is a certain intellectual civil war going on in the region, particularly in Russia and also in Turkey about the acceptance of Western values. So those who utter the word "Eurasianism" in this situation are indirectly siding with Russia. The author is clearly presenting his views from a pro-West and anti-Russian aspect, but his thoughts are worth looking at from our angle as well.

As a cultural idea, Eurasianism was indeed created to oppose the Western, or to put it in our terms, the Euro-Atlantic values. It indeed supposes an opposition to such values and finds a certain kind of geopolitical reference for it. We must also emphasize that being wary of the "European political and cultural project" is justified from the economic, political, and cultural aspects as well. If a national community does not wish to comply, let's say, with the role assigned by the European Union, it is not a negative thing at all; in fact, it is the sign of a sort of caution and immunity in this particular case. It is especially so, if it is not done for some economic or nationalistic reason, but as a result of a different cultural-intellectual approach. Rendering Euro-Atlantic "values" absolute and indisputable means an utter intellectual damage, especially in the light of the first point of our essay. So the opposition of Eurasianism to the Euro-Atlantic world is undeniably positive for us. However, if we interpreted Eurasianism as mere anti-Euro-Atlantism, we would vulgarly simplify it, and we would completely fail to present an alternative to the anti-traditionalist globalization outlined above.

¹ Lajos Pálfalvi: Nicolai Trubetskoy's impossible Eurasian mission. In Nicolai Sergeyevich Trubetskoy: *Genghis Khan's heritage*. (in Hungarian) Máriabesnyő, 2011, Attraktor Publishing, p. 152.

² Mikola Ryabchuk: Western "Eurasianism" and the "new Eastern Europe": a discourse of exclusion. (in Hungarian) *Szépirodalmi Figyelő* 4/2012

What we need is much more than just a reciprocal pole or an alternative framework for globalization. Not only do we want to oppose globalization horizontally but, first and foremost, also vertically. We want to demonstrate an intellectual superiority to it. That is to say, when establishing our own Eurasia concept, we must point out that it means much more for us than a simple geographical notion or a geopolitical idea that intends to oppose Euro-Atlantism on the grounds of some tactical or strategic power game. Such speculations are valueless for me, regardless of whether they have some underlying, latent Russian effort for dominance or not. Eurasianism is basically a geographical and/or political framework, therefore, it does not have a normative meaning or intellectual centre. It is the task of its interpretation and interpreter to furnish it with such features.

3. INTELLECTUAL EURASIANISM — THEORIES AND PRACTICE

We have stated that we cannot be content with anti-Euro-Atlantism. Neither can we be content with a simple geographical and geopolitical alternative, so we demand an intellectual Eurasianism. If we fail to provide this intellectual centre, this meta-political source, then our concept remains nothing but a different political, economic, military, or administrative idea which would indeed represent a structural difference but not a qualitative breakthrough compared to Western globalization. Politically speaking, it would be a reciprocal pole, but not of a superior quality. This could lay the foundations for a new cold or world war, where two anti-traditionalist forces confront each other, like the Soviet Union and the United States did, but it surely won't be able to challenge the historical process of the spread of anti-traditionalism. However, such challenge is exactly what we consider indispensable. A struggle between one globalization and another is nonsensical from our point of view. Our problem with Euro-Atlantism is not its Euro-Atlantic but its anti-traditionalist nature. Contrary to that, our goal is not to construct another anti-traditionalist framework, but to present a supranational and traditionalist response to the international crisis. Using Julius Evola's ingenious term, we can say that Eurasianism must be able to pass the air test.¹

At this point, we must look into the question of why we can't give a traditionalist answer within a Euro-Atlantic framework. Theoretically speaking, the question is rea-

sonable since the Western world was also developing within a traditional framework until the dawn of the modern age, but this opportunity must be excluded for several reasons. Firstly, it is no accident that anti-traditionalist modernism developed in the West and that is where it started going global from. The framework of this essay is too small for a detailed presentation of the multi-century process of how modernism took roots in and grew out of the original traditionalist texture of Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian thinking and culture, developing into today's liberal Euroatlantism. For now, let us state that the anti-traditionalist turn of the West had a high historical probability. This also means that the East was laid on much stronger traditionalist foundations and still is, albeit it is gradually weakening. In other words, when we are seeking out a geopolitical framework for our historic struggle, our choice for Eurasianism is not in the least arbitrary. The reality is that the establishment of a truly supranational traditionalist framework can only come from the East. This is where we can still have a chance to involve the leading political-cultural spheres. The more we go West, the weaker the centripetal power of Eurasianism is, so it can only expect to have small groups of supporters but no major backing from the society.

The other important question is why we consider traditionalism as the only intellectual centre that can fecundate Eurasianism. The question "Why Eurasia?" can be answered much more accurately than "Why the metaphysical Tradition?". We admit that our answer is rather intuitive, but we can be reassured by the fact that René Guénon, Julius Evola, or Frithjof Schuon, the key figures in the restoration of traditionalist philosophy, were the ones who had the deepest and clearest understanding of the transcendental, metaphysical unity of Eastern and Western religions and cultures. Their teaching reaches back to such ancient intellectual sources that can provide a sense of communion for awakening Western Christian, Orthodox, Muslim, Hindu, or Buddhist people. These two things are exactly what are necessary for the success of Eurasianism: a foundation that can ensure supranational and supra-religious perspectives as well as an intellectual centrality. The metaphysical Tradition can ensure these two: universality and quality. At that moment, Eurasianism is no longer a mere geopolitical alternative, a new yet equally crisis-infected (and thus also infectious) globalization process, but a traditionalist response.

¹ See: Julius Evola: *Handbook of Rightist Youth*. (in Hungarian) Debrecen, 2012, Kvintesszencia Publishing House, pp. 45–48

We cannot overemphasize the superior quality of intellectual Eurasianism. However, it is important to note here that the acquisition of an intellectual superiority ensured by the traditionalist approach would not at all mean that our confrontation with Euroatlantism would remain at a spiritual-intellectual level only, thus giving up our intentions to create a counterbalance or even dominance in the practical areas, such as the political, diplomatic, economic, military, and cultural spheres. We can be satisfied with neither a vulgar Eurasianism (lacking a philosophical centre) nor a theoretical one (lacking practicability). The only adequate form for us is such a Eurasianism that is rooted in the intellectual centre of traditionalism and is elaborated for practical implementation as well. To sum up in one sentence: there must be a traditionalist Eurasianism standing in opposition to an anti-traditionalist Euroatlantism.

The above also means that geopolitical and geographical positions are strategically important, but not at all exclusive, factors in identifying the enemy-ally coordinates. A group that has a traditionalist intellectual base (thus being intellectually Eurasian) is our ally even if it is located in a Euro-Atlantic zone, while a geographically Eurasian but anti-traditionalist force (thus being intellectually Euro-Atlantic) would be an enemy, even if it is a great power.

4. HOMOGENEOUSNESS AND HETEROGENEOUSNESS

If it is truly built upon the intellectual centre of metaphysical Tradition, intellectual Eurasianism has such a common base that it is relevant regardless of geographical position, thus giving the necessary homogeneity to the entire concept. On the other hand, the tremendous size and the versatility of cultures and ancient traditions of the Eurasian area do not allow for a complete theoretical uniformity. However, this is just a barrier to overcome, an intellectual challenge that we must all meet, but it is not a preventive factor. Each region, nation, and country must find their own form that can organically and harmoniously fit into its own traditions and the traditionalist philosophical approach of intellectual Eurasianism as well. Simply put, we can say that each one must form their own Eurasianism within the large unit.

As we said above, this is an intellectual challenge that requires an able intellectual elite in each region and country who understand and take this challenge and are in a constructive relationship with the other, similar elites.

These elites together could provide the international intellectual force that is destined to elaborate the Eurasian framework itself. The sentences above throw a light on the greatest hiatus (and greatest challenge) lying in the establishment of intellectual Eurasianism. This challenge is to develop and empower traditionalist intellectual elites operating in different geographical areas, as well as to establish and improve their supranational relations. Geographically and nationally speaking, intellectual Eurasianism is heterogeneous, while it is homogeneous in the continental and essential sense.

However, the heterogeneousness of Eurasianism must not be mistaken for the multiculturalism of Euroatlantism. In the former, allies form a supranational and supra-cultural unit while also preserving their own traditions, whereas the latter aims to create a sub-cultural and sub-national unit, forgetting and rejecting traditions. This also means that intellectual Eurasianism is against and rejects all mass migrations, learning from the West's current disaster caused by such events. We believe that geographical position and environment is closely related to the existence and unique features of the particular religious, social, and cultural tradition, and any sudden, inorganic, and violent social movement ignoring such factors will inevitably result in a state of dysfunction and conflicts. Intellectual Eurasianism promotes self-realization and the achievement of intellectual missions for all nations and cultures in their own place.

5. CLOSING THOUGHTS

The aim of this short essay is to outline the basis and lay the foundations for an ambitious and intellectual Eurasianism by raising fundamental issues. We based our argumentation on the obvious fact that the world is in crisis, and that this crisis is caused by liberal globalization, which we identified as Euroatlantism. We believe that the counter-effect needs to be vertical and traditionalist, not horizontal and vulgar. We called this counter-effect Eurasianism, some core ideas of which were explained here. We hope that this essay will have a fecundating impact, thus truly contributing to the further elaboration of intellectual Eurasianism, both from a universal and a Hungarian aspect.



Evgeniy Fyodorov

Member of the Russian Parliament, Head of the Inter-fractional Parliament's Group "For Sovereignty", Coordinator of the National Liberation Movement.



THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN RUSSIA TODAY¹

Evgeniy Fyodorov

The National Liberation Movement in Russia has only one goal that unites everyone regardless of their political views: the restoration of the sovereignty of the country and liberation from its occupiers. The inhabitants of Russia must break free from their chains of slavery and become free citizens in a free (non-occupied) country.

To achieve these goals, the government should become ours, i.e. we must completely change the nature of the state, including through amending the Constitution. Society is a broader concept, and in fact, it should feel necessary to partake in this goal because the national liberation struggle is a struggle of the society for the restoration of sovereign control over Russia, including control over state institutions. Today, the state in Russia, as in any colony, works for the occupier under the rules established by it, placing it under the rulers' direct control. This provision is captured in the existing Constitution. Every day the main task of those millions of officials who go to work is to improve living standards and solve the problems of the American and European peoples. That is their main function today. At the level of daily activity, it is hard to recognize this without desire and sufficient time for the conceptualization of our historical facts and the current state of affairs in the country as a whole. The following are the tasks of the existing mechanisms of the state in Russia today:

- assist in the permanent migration abroad of healthy and mostly gifted young people, scientists, children, and everyone else of importance in terms of the labour force (in the same manner as Hitler, who exported labour forces from the occupied territory of the USSR);
- ensure an uninterrupted supply of tribute and free material resources for Europe and U.S.A. (that is what the Central Bank is engaged in);
- work towards the strategic tasks of eliminating Russia, the Russian nation, and the Russian people. Such a task exists, and it was publicly identified by the leaders of the USA to the Russian state. This task is also performed by migration flows organized in a special way as to create social tensions and polarization between the citizens. Also, this objective is fulfilled through the absence of a clear policy and real actions in the development of weaker regions of the country, such as what we are now seeing in the Trans-Baikal, the Far East, and the Extreme North. Putin struggles against the cultural destruction of the concept of "Russian", despite American demands to stop such attempts. Nobody is going to obey any orders of the President concerning school education;
- and a common history textbook. Besides that, they publicly say, "We will not do this, we have our own chief in Washington, and he gave us other orders." And the state apparatus obeys these "other orders" of Washington.

¹ This is piece of the book titled "National Liberation Movement. the Russian code of development" issued in the Russian language in 2014.

These are the three main goals that the American occupants have set about to achieve in the Russian state: 1) elimination of the Russian ethnicity and the Russian man as a cultural phenomenon, including; 2) payment of tribute with money and resources; 3) strategic elimination of the Russian state in the same format as it is.

This has made for easier colonial management in accordance with the principle of "Divide and Rule". It is also a typical practice for all colonies. The British divided all their colonies into parts, which resulted in easing the convenience in conducting the management process. Technologically, they created projects for this purpose, i. e. a political project of Liquidators — Alexey Navalny and the political environment of grant receivers, followed by the terrorists and castigators, which for the present moment are temporarily sent to Syria until they are given work to carry out in Russia. Then they will come back and slaughter people in Russia when Navalny and the terrorists prepare the system for this, just as is happening in Syria. After all, there also were "navalnys" at first, who paved the way in people's minds and prepared the system, then the terrorists came, followed by the castigators on the terrorists' backs. In order to destroy the Syrian people there or the Russian people here, it is necessary that the smiling people lead the way, as missionaries, politicians, grant receivers, "navalnys", etc. They should create the conditions to make it possible to introduce terrorism when the time is right.

RUSSIA AS A COLONY

Nonetheless, there have been attempts to remove the system of external control, for example, the rebellion of Korzhakov and the secret service officers, which was suppressed in 1996. As a result, the Khasavyurt Accord was signed, according to which Russia was subject to liquidation within three years. But Putin had time to destroy the oligarchic system and cancel the agreement on the elimination of Russia. For me, it is clear that all the decisions that Putin has to take are prepared by a system of the state apparatus controlled by the USA in accordance with the Russian Constitution and its laws. Besides, attempts to eliminate the field of Russian science were recently made, namely, the situation surrounding the Academy of Sciences, and the formation of an innovative type of economy that Putin has spoken about for ten years has already been prohibited. There are still no such institutions and nobody is going to create them. It turns out that the deputies, as the legislative power, take anti-national laws under the dictation of the metropole

country, and as a result, Putin is blamed. All the more, the censorship against him works quite diligently. Through placing the Russian media under external control, the USA filters all the information about the struggle for sovereignty being waged today in Russia. But the information blockade is occasionally broken, and the national liberation movement becomes a more and more noticeable force that intends to solve the problem of sovereignty.

NATIONALIZATION OF THE CENTRAL BANK

The Central Bank of Russia is independent and does not report either to the President or to the State, and it wastes rubles by buying foreign currency totalling almost 1 trillion rubles a year. Therefore, most of the problems of Russia are particularly related to the "Law on the Central Bank", written by American advisors, which allows the USA not only to buy up all the available resources of the country, but to also influence its internal processes as well. By forcing the bank to work for the state, it would be possible to immediately redirect the money from the reserves (which, in fact, are spent on buying the U.S. debt obligations) to industry and infrastructure, thus initializing the new industrialization which Putin spoke about at the Saint Petersburg Economic Forum. "I want all of us to clearly understand that the coming years will be crucial, and maybe even a critical time not only for us, but for almost the entire world which enters an era of radical changes, and maybe even shocks" — Putin said. Thanks to the re-emergence of industrialization, the economy, industry, infrastructure, and even Russia's domestic policy will dramatically change, and that will lead to its accelerated development.

The Eurasian Union will finally form a new political system independent of the USA and UK.

THE COLD WAR IN THE LATENT PHASE

There are indications that the Cold War did not end with the collapse of the Soviet Union and is still being waged against Russia. NGOs (namely, foreign-funded foreign agents) create a false picture of what is happening inside the country and thereby intentionally distort the essence of Putin's actions. And that is all because a time of serious changes has come to the USA. The Bankers' Empire is collapsing. The debts grow, entire cities come to bankruptcy, and they simply cannot survive without the resources of Russia. The situation in Syria and about Snowden simply showed their true colours to the world.

In general, there is one important rule: if someone scolds Russia, then Putin is doing everything right. When Putin left the Federal Security Service of Russia for the post of Prime Minister, he said to his colleagues at parting: "The first stage of the infiltration mission is completed. I start the second stage — the elimination of the gang". After the defeat of the USSR in the Cold War, we were not allowed to have a national elite. Taking into account that we live in a market paradigm of relationships, under national elites, we understand the wealthy people, the major possessors of significant assets, and their consequent impact on the business and social environment. Today, all the richest people that have business in Russia, the ones who the "Forbes" magazine writes its publications for, are, in fact, foreign entrepreneurs. That is to say, all their major assets are in a foreign jurisdiction, and therefore, the businessmen themselves are controlled by the USA through a mechanism of pressure. The privatization process took place in the 1990s. How was it? According to the lists prepared by the CIA and the U.S. State Department officers, all the major objects of ownership have been transferred to the oligarchs, who have agreed to hold them under certain conditions. One of the conditions was the transfer of property in the Anglo-Saxon jurisdiction, provided that the control over all major industrial and infrastructure facilities in Russia will be retained by the USA, and the oligarchs were used as a cover for this mechanism. Thus, all the major property objects passed under the control of the United States and its comprador elites that emerged in Russia since the national ones were prohibited. Over the years of the development of modern Russia, a major national business could not be formed, as we have no conditions for its development. Take at the very least the availability of credit. The Central Bank keeps the refinancing rate at 8.25% and, having other opportunities to influence the banking system, deliberately creates a situation in which the cost of the end credit reaches 15-30%. If the company is in a foreign jurisdiction, it can be credited abroad under the rates of 3-5%. It is clear that even according to this sole parameter, national business cannot develop because it becomes non-competitive.

Let's add a terrible tax system that is served by a huge staff of state officials and the corruption that is systematically created and controlled by the Americans. After all, hundreds of thousands of corrupt officials of all shades, having stolen their money in Russia, later obtained political asylum in Britain. And being under foreign jurisdiction, the businessman decides to solve these problems and gets access to cheap credit, but becomes control-

lable by the USA and acts for their benefit. Thus, in the absence of full state sovereignty in modern Russia, there are no major business and national elites.

CHANGING THE STATUS OF NATIONAL BUSINESS

In the system of the national liberation movement, the Committee on the Strengthening of Economic Sovereignty (CES), whose task was to create conditions for the development of national business and the formation of national elites, was created. The "For Sovereignty" interfactional group of deputies of the State Duma introduced a draft of Federal Law "On the status of National Business", developed by CES. The core of the draft law was to create conditions for the development of national business. A national register of business will be created in which all the companies located in the Russian jurisdiction can enter. Furthermore, they will have access to cheap credit of 3-5%, which will result in the creation of Central Bank parallel credit rates for national businesses. And not only access to credit, but also a pre-emptive right to participate in privatization, land allocation, government subsidies, preferential tax regimes, and more will emerge. Therefore, we invite all entrepreneurs who want to see a free and prosperous Russia, who want to develop their business and leave it to their children, to join the national liberation movement and to participate actively in the activities of CES.

IS IT POSSIBLE TO CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION WITHOUT NATIONAL SUPPORT?

A frequently asked question is: "Why can't we change the Constitution without grassroots support?" To understand the answer to this, simply look at the Constitution of the Russian Federation itself. Chapter 9 regulates Constitutional amendments and the revision of the Constitution. Let's start reading.

Thus, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Art. 135 of the Constitution, the Federal Assembly (the State Duma and the Federation Council) cannot revise Chapters 1, 2, 9 of the Constitution. And we know that Chapter 1 contains a prohibition against the imposition of a state ideology (Art. 13), Chapter 2 pertains to the formalized prohibition of censorship (Art. 29), and Chapter 9 establishes the procedure for amending the Constitution. As such, the Parliament is not able to change the key Chapters. These provisions can be changed during the Constitutional Assembly if 3/5 of the members of the Federal Assembly vote for their amendment.

Furthermore, the Charter of the occupied territory reads: "The Constitutional Assembly shall either confirm the invariability of the Constitution or draft a new Constitution which will be adopted by the Constitutional Assembly by two thirds of the total number of its members, or submitted to a referendum". The work of the Constitutional Assembly shall be determined by the Federal Constitutional Law "On the Constitutional Assembly" which has not yet been adopted. Thus, in practice, it is impossible to change the Constitution. It is necessary to pass this law, but of course the occupant's entire administrative machine will be opposed to such a decision. And here again we are confronted with the need of grassroots support for V. Putin's national policy, because only through this mechanism can the national leader acquire the powers to partake in tougher action which ultimately will lead to the victory of the national liberation movement and change the Constitution back to a sovereign one. That is why participation in the National Liberation Movement's street protests is the duty of every citizen of Russia who does not want to be a slave or to liquidate his homeland.

WHAT DESTINY DOES THE U.S. HAVE IN STORE FOR RUSSIA?

The USA is an oppressive colonial power openly proclaiming its colonial interests. The USA solves its internal problems by means of war at the expense of others, and nothing has changed for centuries — except for the technology used to carry out the murders. Accordingly, for the last 20 years, this country has provoked and unleashed the greatest number of wars. Perhaps only Nazi Germany in the XX century has surpassed the USA in a twenty-year period of time. But on the larger timeline, the USA has left the Nazis far behind. They significantly expanded their interventions — Iraq, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq again, Libya, and finally they reached for Syria, to say nothing of the participation of the USA in some of the conflicts in Africa. This applies not only to the aforementioned countries, but to the entire world — there are no exceptions for America. They have a "maniac" confidence that all are indebted to them, and that only their rules should govern the world. It is obvious that America has never said goodbye to the cult of power and, moreover, is not going to do so. Let's take, for example, Madeleine Albright, one of the most famous figures of the U.S. Democratic Party. In her interview to Lesley Stahl near the end of 1996, she gave a very ambiguous answer about the impact of the sanctions against Iraq. Lesley Stahl asked her: "We have heard that half a million children have died. I mean, that's more children than

died in Hiroshima... and... do you know whether it was worth it?" Albright said, "I think it's a very difficult choice, but the price — we think it was worth it." For them, democracy is when they scalp the living. They have one course, and history, as we know, tends to repeat itself. So, about 8,000 children were killed during the war in Syria. Another 9,000 children are still held by terrorists in high-security prisons, but the methods of killing children in Syria are diverse. About 300 children were killed with knives during the mass punitive actions in such districts as al Ghul and Karmaz Zaytun in the province of Homs. Many were shot by non-governmental forces as they fired into crowds of demonstrators, used by them as "human shields", executed them, or killed them as they were being tortured. Syrians are shot by weapons that have killed Palestinians and Lebanese in the past. The so-called opposition that has already seized power in Libya rushes into power in Syria, and everything will repeat as it had in Iraq in recent years. Shiites kill Sunnis, Sunni kill Shiites, and both kill Christians ... Syria will become the third Iraq if the pro-American gangs calling themselves the Syrian National Council (SNC) win there. American advisers of current "oppositionists" are apparently the same ones who led the Libyan rebels. They changed the first word in the title and now a new opposition group is ready. Well, what will it cost them to organize a RNS (Russian National Council), especially when our country possesses 30% of the world's coal reserves, 40% of oil, 45% of gas, 50% of shale energy, 44% of the world's reserves of iron ore, 30% of chrome ore, 74% of manganese ore, 40% of rare earth ores, 28% of world diamond production, and 30% of all gemstones? And in order to have the puzzle put together in the overall picture, I want to remind one of the "masters" words. Let's start from the 42nd President of the United States, Bill Clinton: "For the last ten years the policy in relation to the USSR and its allies has convincingly proved the correctness of our strategy to eliminate one of the strongest powers in the world as well as the most powerful military bloc ... we got a raw-material appendage — the state not destroyed by atom which would be difficult to create. Yes, we spent many billions of dollars for this, but they are already close to that which the Russians call self-repayment. For four years, we and our allies have received various strategic raw materials for the amount of 15 billion dollars, hundreds of tons of gold, precious stones, etc. Having loosened the ideological foundations of the USSR, we have been able to bloodlessly remove the state which was the main competitor to America in the war for world domination ... In the next decade, the solution of the following problems is expected: the dismember-

ment of Russia into small states by interregional wars, such as those that have been organized in Yugoslavia; the final collapse of the military-industrial complex of Russia and the army; establishing of regimes in the republics detached from Russian that we need. Yes, we have allowed Russia to be a state, but only one country will be the empire — the USA,” (October 25, 1995). Mrs. Madeleine Albright: “Siberia is too large a territory to belong to one state”. Let’s also remember Zbigniew Brzezinski, who is undoubtedly one of the key figures of the Cold War: “Russia is the defeated power. It lost a titanic struggle. And to say “it was not Russia, but the Soviet Union” means to escape from reality. It was Russia, called the Soviet Union. It challenged the United States. It was defeated. Now we should not sustain illusions about a great power of Russia. It is necessary to discourage this way of thinking ... Russia will be fragmented and be under guardianship.”

Talking about the system of recruitment, we must mention the selection of the nomenclature. This function is an element of strategic management, as the personnel are “cultivated” over the years. For example, a person should grow to the level of Minister within 10-15 years and he needs to be controlled during this entire time. If he performs his responsibilities well, he will be allowed to pass on to the next level. Such a right in the Soviet Union was entrenched in the CPSU Central Committee and the Politburo. A Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet was a technical executive who endorsed all appointments. Today’s President of Russia has powers much less than that of the President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet (see table on p. 199).

All the more, the Russian President has no powers to carry out the nomenclatures’ selection. This function is in the hands of the occupant. The Americans, through their political consultants, identify promising young people, and the work is carried out with those who satisfy the interests of the United States.

In order to make a political career in modern Russia, you have to belong to one of the following groups:

- 1) U.S. agent;
- 2) corruptionist;
- 3) grant receiver.

The agent is generally esteemed as “sacred” by the Americans. The agent is given the “green light” in all regards, and in case of a favourable combination of cir-

cumstances, the agent will necessarily rise to the level of minister or his deputy.

The corruptionists are somewhat of a lower level than the agent, but also has a “green corridor”, as he is vulnerable in terms of blackmail material, and therefore, is manageable. Additionally, his moral uncleanness guarantees his loyalty to the occupier. The grant receiver is of yet an even lower level, but in general, also receives support and has all the chances to make a successful career. In addition to this, we must understand that one of ten grant receivers is recruited as an agent. If you or your relatives do not belong to any of the above categories, then forget about a political career in modern Russia. This is important to know because people often ask: “Why does Putin not dismiss this or that official and take another one in their place?” The answer is obvious: the list of candidates submitted for approval will not include people other than those who underwent the occupational filter. This is because since 1991, after the defeat of our country in the Cold War, the personnel selection system is controlled by the occupant.

Therefore, only in the case of a victory of the National Liberation Movement will Russia have the right to exercise the nomenclature’s selection in terms of its national interests. Today, a lively debate which is linked to the theme of “ancestral homes” is taking place. Its core comes down to the following: is it possible today to live in total isolation from civilization, and if so, then why should the people who are going to go to the hinterland of Russia participate in the National Liberation Movement? It is necessary to emphasize at once that no one argues with the fact that living in harmony with nature, in the absence of the big cities’ stress factors, is, of course, more comfortable in many ways. But let’s think WHETHER IT IS AT ALL POSSIBLE TO LIVE surrounded by forests and lakes if the National Liberation Movement does not succeed? Let’s suppose that a man makes products and provides for himself. He has the cattle, the poultry, the land that gives fruits and vegetables, and a firewood-heated furnace from late autumn until spring. But excuse me, will he also make himself the matches or other means of starting a fire? Or will he wait in winter for a sunny day to make a fire using a magnifying glass? Let’s start at least from the construction of the house. If he wants to build a brick house, it is unlikely that this man will open a brick factory, and if he opens one anyway, he will have to take materials from somewhere: sand, cement, gravel, etc. And this is only the beginning of the stretch of our

imagination, but the above is enough to understand that it is impossible to live absolutely independently.

Let's consider the other option: using the benefits of civilization, we build houses and other necessary buildings, stock equipment, salt, matches, and all necessary goods and live for our good. But the question again arises: what shall we do if we get sick, because someone who can at least perform the duties for us on the farm and help us has to be around. And in general, man is a social being, and it will be dullish to live alone, all the more, it is necessary to start a family and have children. Then it is necessary to take care of them. Therefore, the question arises, who will do it? Let's solve this issue as follows: we settle not alone, but collectively, each one has his own piece of land and there are teachers, doctors, and building experts among us (all of them brought books, textbooks, medicine, building materials, and equipment), and there are other people with special knowledge and skills that we need. But the question once more arises: what if something happens, someone harmed someone else or offended another's wife? Shall we also have to create our own governmental authorities, law enforcement, and judicial systems on a micro scale? Well, problems have arisen among our settlers, and what if a similar settlement appears nearby and they decide to take away land or other things from us? In such a way, we shall sink to tribal relations.

Therefore, even with a cursory analysis of the issue at hand, it becomes obvious that it is impossible to absolutely break away from civilization and the state in today's world. But, indeed, it is quite possible to live at a distance, occasionally visiting the city to sell one's own products and buy the products of others. If you have a pension or other source of income, then it would be just fine to live in harmony with nature. But all this is IMPOSSIBLE should the National Liberation Movement be defeated. After all, it would mean the elimination of Russia, the country's division into several parts, the unleashing of civil wars, and the genocide of the Russian people. Therefore, there will be no pension, you will not be able to sell your products, and if you come to the city from the forest, you will be killed by scummy cutthroats that are in association with rebel detachments, many of which will scour in our vasts and deal death and chaos as they see fit. By the way, they are being trained today, and some recruited Russian citizens passed their advanced courses in Syria, killing women there and roasting their children on the fire. And then they will come to us. The prospect is not bright, isn't it? But you will not be lucky to

sit quietly in the woods: NATO aircraft will drop a bomb on your little farm, then rebels will gather for a barbecue and all your settlement will be sadistically killed and possibly eaten (because we saw how the pro-NATO groups devour the hearts of those killed in Syria).

You may justify your cowardice and unwillingness to fight for the Motherland in any way, including by striving for harmony with nature. During the Great Patriotic War, the deserters also went into the woods, though for some reason, no one stopped to consider them traitors to the Motherland, even taking into account the fact that they lived in harmony with the forest surrounding them. Today it is up to us whether we have a future, or few years later, if we will all be killed throughout the country. Each citizen of Russia must decide whether he is a traitor, a deserter, and a slave, and therefore will not defend his Motherland and will dishonour his great ancestors, or whether he is a free man that wants to live in dignity, and then he will deliberately join the ranks of the National Liberation Movement. We have repeatedly stated that the government of today's Russia does not have the goal of improving the life of the population. This occurs due to the fact that having lost the Cold War, we lost the right to national self-determination. Our jurisdiction has no strategic body that would manage the country. The Tsar did it in Tsarist Russia, and the General Secretary and Politburo in the Soviet Union. Today, the strategic management of our country is carried out by the international organizations controlled by the United States. The International Monetary Fund gives commands to carry out the reforms in the sphere of the Russian economy, and these reforms are developed by non-profit organizations that receive foreign funding. Then the draft laws designed by the occupiers' headquarters (664 NGOs) are introduced by the Government of the Russian Federation and accepted by the State Duma deputies. Therefore, the task of the state power of modern Russia is the realization of the interests of the United States.

What are these interests? First of all, it is the national security of the American nation. Strengthening the sovereignty of Russia begins the processes of discontinuing the payment of tribute to the USA, not only by Russia, but also by other colonies. This will reduce the standard of living within the United States and, ultimately, lead to the collapse of the American Empire.

Therefore, pragmatic Americans, on the basis of their interests, set about the following tasks to their Russian proxies:

- implementation of the genocide of the Russian people and the elimination of Russian culture;
- payment of tribute;
- elimination of the Russian state and its division into “banana republics”.
- If we look at the processes occurring in Russia from this part, no one will be surprised by what has now become obvious. The genocide of the population is realized through the following mechanisms:
 - the decline in fertility through the propaganda of immorality, gay marriage, open relationships, orientation of the youth towards their own individual and personal success, creation of the opinion that children are a burden, creation of social and economic problems, etc.;
 - heroin war against Russia. According to the Deputy Director of the Federal Drug Control Service, since U.S. troops entered Afghanistan, heroin production there has increased by 40 times (!), and almost all of it comes to us and kills about 100,000 people a year;
 - alcoholization of the population is carried out by means of the promotion of the use of alcohol through market advertisements that target minors, the repeating of the myth that Russians are a native drinking people, and through the pricing policy that has resulted in the increased accessibility of alcohol (today a bottle of vodka is 10 times cheaper than it was in the USSR);
 - migration policy. Our society, by means of its migration policy, is saturated with ethnic crime, which in turn works to further the recruitment of a U.S. invasion-sponsored irregular army of rebels from this medium and the implementation of the military component of the plan to eliminate Russia. The payment of tribute is performed through the mechanism of wasting the ruble, about which we earlier spoke in detail (about 1 billion dollars a day or 365 billion dollars a year). Tribute is also paid directly through the budget rule. On top of this, the \$500 billion that is annually earned by foreign companies operating in Russia is withdrawn from the country and transferred to the U.S. economy. But the tribute is paid not only with money, as our children are sold to the metropoly. A prohibition of the child slave-

trade (The Dima Yakovlev Law) caused an outburst of indignation in the mass media because all the major mass media organs serve the U.S.' geopolitical interests. The tribute is paid to scientists and labour forces there. Recently, the universities that supplied the greatest number of slaves to the metropole received 9 billion rubles from the American agent and Minister of Education, Mr. Livanov

LIQUIDATION OR DEVELOPMENT?

Obviously, the liquidation of the Russian state is a cherished goal of the Western “democracies.” This goal was set by the occupants earlier, and I must say, they have already implemented this goal on paper, because the Khasavyurt Accord — a peace treaty with Chechnya — was signed. Under this Agreement, the latter had the right to secede from the Russian Federation, which would initiate the liquidation of Russia and would plunge our Motherland into a series of civil wars. Only thanks to the national leader, Vladimir Putin, the signed documents were not implemented in practice. But this does not mean that the occupants have changed their goals. Russia must be liquidated, which is why the Syrian scenario is being prepared for our country. It also includes the plot against Putin from the American-controlled business elites who do business in Russia and the dynamic actions of American agents in power, as well as the street component (accomplices of the occupant, Navalny and company), which will then be strengthened by the terrorists and, later, by the castigators who are trained in Syria today.

I must say that the plans of the Americans are not something unique to Russia. Hitler had the same aims because the logic of a certain worldview leads to these decisions. A large area, great history, ambitious people — all this creates high risks for the metropole, so from their point of view, we need to be liquidated. But our goal is to establish national legal control over all important institutions of the state and society. This must be done in order for the state machine, the mass media, and the financial system to begin to work for the benefit of the Russian nation, not the U.S. as it is today. We have a national leader who has a clear plan of action, but to make this plan work, it is necessary to give enhanced legal powers to Vladimir Putin.

After all, ultimately, everything depends on amending the Constitution, and it would be a coup without the mass support of the people on the street because the

President of Russia is the guarantor of the Constitution, and he has no right to amend it himself. By taking to the streets in support of national policies, we allow Putin to shift from the status of the guarantor of the occupational Constitution to the status of the national leader — the system reformer. Only with active grassroots support can the mechanisms to liquidate the American agents in power and strengthen our sovereignty work. Therefore, the support of every citizen is important today, which is why it is necessary to participate in nationwide movements, because these actions are more or less a socio-political battle against the occupants.

Our grandfathers fought with arms for the sovereignty of the Motherland in Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk, to name but a few. We are their descendants, and is it possible that we do not even have the strength within ourselves to carry out actions less significant than the feats of our ancestors? Is it possible that we cannot sacrifice our personal time and take part in street protests to contribute to the noble struggle for the independence of our Motherland? We often hear the question of what is better: socialism or capitalism? Let's study this matter. The origins of its popularity lie in the dissatisfaction of the majority of our citizens with the flawed system that has evolved as a result of Russia's defeat in the Cold War. Dissatisfaction with "wild capitalism", market relations, democracy, privatization, and corruption is expressed by many. But occupational propaganda exists just for this purpose, and its task is to direct the logic of people to the wrong track. There is only one problem, and it is that Russia is a U.S. colony, and therefore, the state apparatus in our country has no right to make decisions for the benefit of the Russian nation. Hence, all the problems we currently have, because they are nothing but the elements of external control that we talked about many times. It's hard to recognize, but this is an objective reality. The businessmen from the "Forbes" list who run the major assets in Russia are in a foreign jurisdiction and fulfil the will of the United States, carrying out the colonial policy in the economic sphere. That is why we are seeing such a gap between the rich and the poor, and that is why major businesses do not invest in the development of Russia, but instead withdraw their money and place it into the Anglo-Saxon jurisdiction.

Only the restoration of sovereignty will give us the right to debug the mechanisms of control over the major businesses in order to make them work for the benefit of our Motherland. Sovereign power will put the major businesses under national control and, having obtained an order for social justice, it will allow for the liquidation

of the unjustified gap between the rich and the poor and the development of the middle class. Within 5-8 years after the restoration of the sovereignty of Russia, we have calculated that the Russian economy would grow by a factor of 24 times. Just through these processes, the massive growth of the middle class will happen, and this will liquidate that enormous gap between the rich and the poor that exists today under the colonial status of our country.

Thus, the victory of the National Liberation Movement removes the above item from the agenda because it eliminates the negative processes that, in fact, cause the indignation of the citizens. But if we are still going to continue the discussion on the liquidation of capitalist relations, another issue remains, which is the issue of private property, because it is the key problem. Do we want to liquidate all private property in general? Do we really need it? Let's try to think a little about this. The implementation of this idea for the individual means the loss of one's ownership over their housing, land, country house, car, etc. Isn't it better to follow another way? Isn't it better to give citizens the opportunity to live in dignity due to the economic growth and equitable distribution of GDP among the population? If we look at this matter from the point of view of the state, it is obvious that the matter of private property is a matter of the national elites. It is the management system in Russia that is the most vulnerable point on which our geopolitical rivals attacked us throughout the centuries. Solving the problem of sovereignty, we put the major businesses under national control and created the conditions for the formation of national-oriented elites. And then, perhaps, it would be more useful to think about how to do this most effectively using the experience of our ancestors, and not to set up another experiment on the Russian nation which can result in millions of victims, as had unfortunately happened many times in our history.

Without an understanding of what happened in 1991, we shall not understand the problems that exist at the moment and which Russia will soon have to confront. First of all, one of the most important problems concerns the Constitution, because without its modification, the state will not become sovereign. And if you believe the opposite, then maybe you will tell us about which "civilized" countries have a Constitutional clause about the priority of international law over domestic legislation? Well, while the "non-believers" prove the opposite, the participants of the National Liberation Movement should pursue the following objectives independent of their political views, as their fulfilment has the possibility of uniting them all.

These are the restoration of the country's sovereignty, its liberation from occupation, and change of status from being a resident of an enslaved country to the status of being citizens of a free country. Obviously for this purpose, the state should in the first place become ours, i.e. we should completely change the nature of the state, including by passing amendments to the Constitution. Society should do it, because the national liberation struggle is a struggle for the restoration of the national society's control over Russia, including over state institutions that work for the occupier, like what happens in any colony. The only way for success is for the entire country to march to restore sovereignty and liberation. Do you think that there are other options? The only way in the war is to go to the battlefield and defend the independence of the Motherland. And now we are under occupation, and it is the same war, but a Cold War. And so long as the people do not want to be free, no one will give them their sovereignty. Now it can be done without much effort and without risk, yet the outcome is still uncertain and irreversible changes did not happen. Somebody should participate 5-10 times in monthly meetings and daily pickets, while someone else comes to do the same in Moscow. And all this is in order to change the Constitution, establish sovereignty, and free the country from victimization.

A significant part of the people in Russia are unconsciously ready to betray their country, i.e. betray their grandfathers, great-grandfathers, and that historical experience on which it was always based. This betrayal would be very costly for these people, because the Americans will still be here and start the terror in Russia, as they have already done in Syria, Libya, and other countries. They have no other options, and this is the only way to maintain control over the colonies. We can stop this punitive machine only by opposing it. Today the discussion of various methods of military intervention in Syria persists. The U.S. leadership makes contradictory statements, and this is clear. Indeed, on the one hand, America, following the imperial logic, has to retain its status, which requires it to ruthlessly suppress the processes of the national liberation movements of the colonies. On the other hand, the U.S. government, knowing history, is afraid of becoming the "Hitler of the world." With their actions, they every day sink even deeper in Hitler's footsteps, which entails a certain logic.

This calls for the emergence of an "anti-Hitler coalition", which in today's environment would be "anti-American." Here, we must recall that Hitler did not immediately become the devil incarnate in the eyes of the world, moreover, in 1938, he was named a Man of the Year by the

"Time" magazine. A few years later, he became the epitome of evil in the eyes of millions of people. Nobel laureate Obama is well aware of this, as well is the rest of the U.S. government. They want to achieve the same goals as Hitler, but not to step across a certain line. However, the options to achieve these solutions are reduced daily, and they are making it more likely that the U.S. will embark on an uncontested military solution to the problem. Ultimately, the U.S. will step across the line and start waging total terror in the territories of the colonies, including Russia. Only Russian people can stop this terror on their land. To do this, they will have to do what our ancestors repeatedly did, to defend the Motherland! Today it is possible to do it in the socio-political vein while the world is in transitional state. But if we do not do it, terror will begin in Russia.

Judging by the lack of massive street support for the National Liberation Movement, we can conclude that a large number of people do not believe in the seriousness of the consequences of political apathy that leads to the betrayal of their Motherland. They do not want to fight for it, do not want to defend it. The talk that the USA acts with a logic different from that which is dictated by historical necessity can only come from evildoers. These are the laws of life, the laws of international competition, and today the U.S. is starting a third world war to suppress the resistance in the colonies, even at the expense of some of their own interests. There is no time left, we are at the end of our rope, and today we have to defend our Motherland or tomorrow we will be killed by the same Russian citizens that are being trained in Syria today.

The run-up to an American invasion of Syria is for us a signal of the beginning of the military component of the suppression of the National Liberation Movement in Russia, and if someone now hesitates to defend his Motherland, he will automatically become a traitor. Under these conditions, we no longer have the right to put too fine a point upon American agents working in the Russian state authorities, media, business, or financial sector today. In regards these accomplices of the occupiers, we must firstly introduce legal prosecution mechanisms in order to eliminate the "fifth column" in important state institutions, but in order for the national leader to begin to act quickly and decisively, the grassroots component and hundreds of thousands of people on the streets are needed. Therefore, it is necessary to wake up from the lull of enemy propaganda and rise to defend the Motherland by participating in the street protests of the National Liberation Movement!

CYBERGEOPOLITICS: EMERGENT SET OF PRACTICES, PHENOMENON AND DISCIPLINE

Leonid Savin

In recent times, we hear about the increasing role of cyberspace as a political tool or domain where confrontation takes place between the various political organizations, countries, and even alliances of states. Edward Snowden's case is indicative of the fact of how Internet communication and the interdependence of the social environment with politics, economics, and the military sector has become important and affects both the current agenda and the strategic planning of the leaders of the major world powers.

If geopolitics already developed a scientific apparatus and definitions which are used by politicians, experts, and scholars, cyberspace in some sense is a "terra incognita", and there is an active struggle for the domination of this space. Extremely significant in this confrontation are the positions of different states on the regulation of the Internet domain. A dichotomy in this field literally repeats the mega-civilizational break that runs through the countries and peoples belonging to the Sea and Land Powers. The U.S., EU countries, and their satellites are in favor of a free Internet service that is obvious hypocritical (because of the hidden manipulations with social networks, the PRISM program, and so on), while Russia, Iran, China, India, and some other states require that the Internet be a sovereign space and under the jurisdiction of international law, precisely the International Telecommunication Union under the United Nations. The Summit on Cyberspace held in December 2012 in Dubai showcased the exacerbated contradictions of international telecommunications when the United States refused to sign the new treaty regulating the right of all states to engage in management of the Internet. This separation clearly fits into the scheme of Carl Schmitt, which is a reliable indicator of the politically dual categories of friend or foe. These categories are not moral, but technical, features that manifested themselves in the positions over the view of the functioning of the Internet space.

GEOGRAPHY OF CYBERSPACE

First, we need to define the term cyberspace. Researchers attributed the authorship of this word to science fiction writer William Gibson, who used it in the story "Burning Chrome", published in 1982, and two years later, he developed this theme in his famous 1984 cyberpunk novel "Neuromancer", where the author described cyberspace as a "consensual hallucination"¹. Cyberspace has a significant difference from the land, sea, air, and space — it was created not by nature, but as an artificial construct that has components that may change over time. Different countries have their own definition of cyberspace. In the U.S. 2003 paper "The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace", it was stated that "Our nation's critical infrastructures are composed of public and private institutions in the sectors of agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services, government, defense industrial base, information and telecommunications, energy,



Leonid Savin

Head Administrator of the International Social Movement "Eurasian Movement", Editor-in-chief of the magazine 'Geopolitika' and web-portal Geopolitica.ru, Expert at the Center for Conservative Research (in the Sociology Faculty, Moscow State University), author of several books on geopolitics, conflicts and international relations, Moscow, Russian Federation.

¹ William Gibson, *Neuromancer*. New York: Ace Books, 1984

transportation, banking and finance, chemicals and hazardous materials, and postal and shipping. Cyberspace is their nervous system—the control system of our country. Cyberspace is composed of hundreds of thousands of interconnected computers, servers, routers, switches, and fiber optic cables that allow our critical infrastructures to work. Thus, the healthy functioning of cyberspace is essential to our economy and our national security”¹.

In the “National Cyber Security Framework Manual” issued by NATO in 2012, we can read that “cyberspace is more than the internet, including not only hardware, software and information systems, but also people and social interaction within these networks”².

Hence, it is clear that cyberspace is directly related to actual geography, which, together with politics (or the governance of power), is a key element of the science of geopolitics.

First, all the routes of communication and technical server nodes that are an essential part of the Internet are geographically localized. Secondly, cyber domains have a national identity in the sense of domain zones, state control, and the language used. Third, cyberspace emphasizes physical geography in a special way — sensors of various services, navigation devices, technical gadgets, and mobile devices embody an interactive map from the cross-flow of information, technology, and people.

Cyberspace fixes and homogenizes the physical space in a particular way — thus, globalization, with the assistance of GPS technology and other tools, permeates the most secluded corners of the planet.

As such, digital technologies reconfigured the mapping experience into something altogether different that Bruno Latour and his colleagues called “the navigation platform”, characterized by the presence of:

- Databanks;
- Some interface for data handling, i.e. calculation, treatment, and retrieval;

- A dashboard for mutual interfacing between users;
- Many different outputs tailored to a great variety of users — one of the outputs being paper print-outs.³

The traditional role of the map is revised, there are various emerging schools associated with the description of the political and institutional relations of mapping, the map becomes performance-based, and it is understood as having emerged through a diverse set of practices.

Mapping the Internet space becomes a priority for a number of research centers and universities. There are enough in limited quantities, but every year we have more and more specialized publications, the works of governmental departments, scholarly institutions, and divisions in various think tanks that have been monitoring cyberspace and recording its changes — whether it is the emergence of new technical nodes, the issue of new laws, or criminal activities in the network.

Based on the above, we see that cyberspace is not uniform and has several levels. David Clark has proposed a model in which there are four levels of cyberspace.

From the top down in order of importance:

- The people who participate in the cyber experience — who communicate, work with information, make decisions, and carry out plans, and who themselves transform the nature of cyberspace by working with its component services and capabilities.
- The information that is stored, transmitted, and transformed in cyberspace.
- The logical building blocks that make up the services and support the platform nature of cyberspace.
- The physical foundations that support the logical elements.⁴

¹ The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, Washington, DC: White House, 2003.

² Alexander Klimburg (Ed.), National Cyber Security Framework Manual, NATO CCD COE Publication, Tallinn 2012 P. 8 <http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/books/NationalCyberSecurityFrameworkManual.pdf>

³ Valerie November, Eduardo Camacho-Hubner, Bruno Latour. Entering a risky territory: space in the age of digital navigation. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2010, volume 28, p.583.

⁴ David Clark, Characterizing cyberspace: past, present and future, MIT/CSAIL Working Paper, March 2010, P.1

Actually, the people's (social) layer includes government, the private sector, and civil society actors, as well as subjects of the technical community. Nevertheless, they all share the traits of people in the "real" world (outside of cyberspace), in that they can ultimately be identified by their unique DNA codes, thereby making the attribution of the network much more difficult (inside cyberspace). In contrast to the "carnal" world, people in cyberspace facilitate the creation of multiple identities for the user, resulting in a virtual personality that can have multiple human users (e.g. the same online office account of the newspaper "The New York Times" is used by different employees). This is not only important in terms of safety or the protection of copyrights, but also raises interesting questions about how the cyber world is affecting the real world¹.

In addition, the terminology previously used in cybernetics is also adequate for the geopolitics of cyberspace. Until now, it was decided to talk only about two types of cybernetics — the first and second order. If first-order cybernetics has been associated with the observed systems, the second-order cybernetics is the actual observing of the systems².

This remark indicates a high organizational nature of a new wave of cybernetics, although some definitions are quite reminiscent of geopolitical theory and disciplines about power.

INTERNET GOVERNANCE

If we talk about cyberspace as a political activity, there are two main models related to this new area of human activity at the moment. The first is e-government. This term should be understood as the implementation of special services which facilitate relations between the authorities and citizens and provides different services such as electronic payments, virtual receptions, and processing queries through remote access. All of these actions are designed to facilitate and simplify the lives of taxpayers in the country where the use of post-modern communication technologies is prevalent.

The second is the use of cyberspace as a medium and a tool for the dissemination of certain political cultures. Highly significant in this respect are the efforts by the

U.S., where the government uses the Internet as a new means to achieve their goals. This is furthered not only by the civilian sector, but also via different law enforcement organizations and special agencies.

In 2011, it became known that the U.S. military launched a program associated with the manipulation of social networks. As the British "Guardian" noted: "The discovery that the US military is developing false online personalities — known to users of social media as "sock puppets" — could also encourage other governments, private companies and non-government organisations to do the same. Centcom spokesman Commander Bill Speaks said: "The technology supports classified blogging activities on foreign-language websites to enable Centcom to counter violent extremist and enemy propaganda outside the US."³

At the end of 2011, the White House announced the creation of a virtual embassy in Iran for "strengthening ties with the Iranian people"⁴: <http://iran.usembassy.gov/>. It is significant that at the same time, the U.S. Congress had taken various measures to ease ties with Iranian officials and the imposition of sanctions is damaging the Iranian economy. Before that, the United States had opened a virtual consulate for Gaza.⁵

Actually, there are several terms used by the U.S. government to designate innovative ways to influence a foreign society through the Internet: digital diplomacy, Internet diplomacy, Twitter diplomacy, public diplomacy, and Web 2.0. The most common term among the establishment of the United States engaged in foreign policy issues and determining influence over other countries is the latest one.

The technology of Web 2.0 unleashed for the interaction of political activists by Internet technologies was effective during the mass protests in Tunisia and Egypt, as well as for coordination and self-organization of various opposition political groups in Russia.

THREATS OF CYBERSPACE

As we can see, cyberspace is not a utopia, as earlier science fiction writers had claimed. This is a new domain of

¹ Alexander Klimburg, Philipp Mirtl. Cyberspace and Governance — A Primer. The Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Working Paper 65 / September 2012

² Heinz von Foerster. Cybernetics of Cybernetics. University of Illinois, Urbana 1979

³ <http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/mar/17/us-spy-operation-social-networks>

⁴ Mutter, Paul. Few Virtues to "Virtual Embassy in Iran". December 23, 2011. http://www.fpif.org/blog/few_virtues_to_virtual_embassy_in_iran

⁵ http://gaza.usvpp.gov/about_econsulate.html

human activity where there are limitations, disasters, epidemics, and flaws, although they do not directly affect people's lives — it all depends on the choice of the individual. If someone is so carried away playing computer games that they become unable to adequately perceive reality, does this not make the scourge of cyberspace the virtual equivalent of real-world drug addiction¹?

Cyber dependence is linked not only with professional duty or entertainment; it is the very nature of the Internet. The American contemporary philosopher of anarcho-primitivism John Zerzan, for example, noted that the human psyche, after having used the Internet at least once, is subject to irreversible consequences.²

The same concept can be applied to "disease" in this "world". In 1983, Fred Cohen deliberately developed a program that can infect other programs by modifying them so that they evolve their possible evolutionary copy, as he noted in his dissertation. Based on a biological analogy, he called this new program a "virus".

The term "worm" was coined by John Brunner in his novel "Shockwave Rider", issued in 1975. While viruses are just an infected computer program (or file), worms "crawl" forward and copy themselves between systems. Using the vulnerability of computers known as the back doors, worms spread without the help of inconsiderate users. In 1988, the Morris worm penetrated and infected about 60,000 hosts of the Arpanet nascent network, which was the prototype of the current Internet. Robert Morris himself, the creator of the worm, was the first person prosecuted and convicted in accordance with the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986³.

If we have quarantine measures against dangerous diseases in the physical world and there are even international conflicts involving epidemics or deliberate infections (biological weapons), should this not be the case in cyberspace? The history of the last decade demonstrates such phenomenon. The most illustrative cases were:

- Cyber attacks in 2007 on Estonian government websites;

- Actions of hacktivists in August 2008 during the attack of Georgia on South Ossetia and the peace-keeping operation of Russia;
- Impact of the Stuxnet worm on computer systems of Iran's nuclear power plant;
- Numerous actions of hacktivist groups such as Anonymous, Syrian Cyber Army, etc.;
- Leaks carried out by Julian Assange and Edward Snowden, with an indirect impact on U.S. and international politics.

According to experts, the number of such attacks will only increase and the methods of hackers will improve in the future. This is forcing many governments to reconsider their policies regarding the Internet and take special measures to protect this domain.

CYBERCONFLICTS

Of course, cyberspace is both a medium for conflict and a tool. If classical geopolitics uses the concepts of power by the sea (Sea Power) and power by the land (Land Power), and Air Power and Space Power developed in their wake, then Cyber Power is the most recently talked about new domain of control. The U.S. military places special significance upon it.

Robert M. Lee from the US Air Force wrote that "Cyber power will be as revolutionary to warfare as airpower, but the current vectoring of the domain will determine which nation will hold cyber dominance and to what effect. In the early years of the cyberspace domain, the United States primarily considered cyber power a means of establishing broad command and control across the war-fighting domains. Cyberspace focused on communication; indeed, operational success depended upon maintaining the lines of communication. As the domain grew, it assumed additional roles to provide a support force to traditional military operations while experts explored other roles—a process that occurred at the highest levels of secrecy. Many of the first cyberspace leaders realized that cyber assets offered a number of options for attack, defense, and exploitation never before afforded to military commanders. In a highly connected world where substantial advancements in technology were common, the capabilities and weapons in cyberspace became even more impressive"⁴.

¹ Dene Grigar. Lara Croft: Cyber Heroine. Leonardo June 2006, Vol. 39, No. 3, Pages 269-270.

² John Zerzan. Twilight of the Machines, 2008

³ A Better Way to Battle Malware. November 22, 2011. Winter 2011, Issue 65. <http://www.strategy-business.com/article/11403?pg=all>

⁴ Robert M. Lee. The Interim Years of Cyberspace.// Air & Space Power Journal, January–February 2013, P. 58

Cyber operations can be carried out in all areas of warfare: in the air, space, cyberspace, and on land and sea. Furthermore, despite the immaturity of operational doctrines for cyberspace, doctrines for air and space remain relevant and applicable to the field of cyberspace. In other words "cyber operations are just another set of tools from the arsenal of a commander".¹

U.S. Cyber Command was first created in 2010, although attention was paid to this new domain earlier than that. For example, in December 2005, cyber operations were included in the basic manual about the service and the mission of the U.S. Air Force.²

China, Iran, and other countries rushed to develop their own cyber military capabilities with relevant doctrines and strategies. Budgets for cyber security also begin to increase rapidly. U.S. Cyber Command stated in January 2013 that its staff of personnel will be increased by five times. Britain also hurried to upgrade its cyber arsenal and argued that the country needs network security due to the fact that 6% of Britain's GDP is earned through transactions that are somehow connected to the Internet.

John Arquilla, the famous expert on network wars, writes that the "exploits of cyberwars on a small scale may eventually reach large sizes, given the clear vulnerability of advanced military and various communication systems that every day more and more cover the world. He believes that cyberwar is destined to play a more prominent role in future wars."³

Arquilla believes that there is an opportunity to possibly develop a certain code of conduct, e.g. the prohibition of cyberattacks against purely civilian targets, at least between states. Some shadow networks, i.e. radical political groups, may also follow a certain code. The second thesis is hardly likely, as in the case of terrorist actions, the aim of such groups is to intimidate the population in order to achieve their political goals, and cyberspace is a prime opportunity for this.

Because cyberpower can quickly hit networks and information systems worldwide in a special war, eroding

¹ Eric D. Trias, Bryan M. Bell. *Cyber This, Cyber That . . . So What?* Air & Space Power Journal. Spring 2010, P. 91

² Hon. Michael W. Wynne, *Flying and Fighting in Cyberspace*, Air and Space Power Journal 21, no. 1, Spring 2007: 3, <http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj07/spr07/spr07.pdf>

³ Arquilla J. *Cyberwar Is Already Upon Us*. March/April 2012. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar_is_already_upon_us

the frontline of combat, this feature, combined with its destructive power, generates fear among the population because cyberpower's capabilities may be as strong as those experienced from terrorist attacks.⁴

Therefore, to underestimate its power to influence public opinion and politics would be a serious mistake. Even if we consider only the military aspect of cyber conflict, it still differs greatly from the war on land, sea, air, and space. Freedom of action is a characteristic of superiority in cyberspace. A rough summary for supremacy in cyberspace can be "freedom of action during the time of attack" (i.e. the ability to act, even during and after the attack).⁵

But there is another point of view, according to which, on the contrary, cyber assets utilized in conflicts actually "soften" their nature and minimize the damage to the enemy and the costs incurred on the attacking side. Naval Postgraduate School Defense Analysis Distinguished Professor Dorothy Denning believes that "if you can achieve the same effects with a cyber weapon versus a kinetic weapon, often that option is ethically preferable ... If an operation is morally justifiable, than a cyber route is likely preferable, because it causes less harm".⁶

On the question of ethics in cyberspace, we can address the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, which have become the subject of public debate in the United States and other countries. Proponents of a massive use of drones in the U.S. suggest three main reasons why this industry needs to be developed: (1) UAVs can carry out tasks that people are not capable of due to psychological constraints (e.g. duration of operations and extreme maneuvers); (2) the preservation of the pilot's life during hazardous missions and a reduced political risk (which would be heightened in the case that a downed pilot is captured); (3) reduction of costs incurred in connection with the systems required to maintain the functions of the pilot (oxygen, climate control, ejection seats, etc.) and the possibility of using a more basic design than the one that is needed for aircraft designed for on-board team operations.⁷ There is a tendency that drones in the

⁴ Robert M. Lee. *The Interim Years of Cyberspace*.// Air & Space Power Journal, January–February 2013, P. 63

⁵ Eric D. Trias, Bryan M. Bell. *Cyber This, Cyber That . . . So What?* Air & Space Power Journal. Spring 2010, P. 96-67

⁶ Kenneth Stewart. *Cyber Security Hall of Famer Discusses Ethics of Cyber Warfare*. America's Navy, 6/4/2013 http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=74613

⁷ Policy Options for Unmanned Aircraft Systems. A CBO Study. June 2011. Congress of U.S. Congressional Budget Office. P. 3.

future may even replace actual strategic bombers in the U.S. Air Force.

Another part believes that the use of drones violates international law and leads to a large number of civilian casualties. The report of the New American Foundation stated that for the first two years that Obama was president, he ordered four times as many UAV bombings than George W. Bush did during his eight year tenure. This report gives the approximate number of people killed in Pakistan as being between 1489 to 2297 (April 2012).¹

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism also shows interactive maps on its website that mark the spot where U.S. drone attacks occurred, as well as statistical data such as the names of the killed civilians.²

All in all, the deadliest man-machine interface (the UAV) is the most visible demonstration of how cyber asserts can be utilized for military purposes.

CONCLUSION

All these factors suggest that geopolitics has gained a cybernetic factor in which the basic axioms still apply, but at the same time, which is also another level of reality with entirely new rules.

Careful analysis and monitoring of cyberspace and the development of appropriate rules are imperative for today. This requires a revision of classical political categories and a revaluation from the current moment. We must remember that cybernetics is a word first created thousands of years ago, but its meaning was somewhat different. The word "cybernetics" (κυβερνητική) was first mentioned by Plato in his work "Laws".³ It is translated as "the art of the helmsman". In his third to last book, believed to be the most solid in terms of the arrangement of the works of the ancient Greek philosopher, the state is compared with a ship, and its helmsmen are God, fate, and good time. Despite the enthusiastic attempts from the first creators of the Internet to make cyberspace a zone of free creativity without political interference, cyberspace remains political and the thesis of Plato is still actual and relevant.

¹ Masters, Jonathan. Targeted Killings.// CFR, April 25, 2012. http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627?cid=nlc-dailybrief-daily_news_brief-link14-20120426

² Interactive map. August 10th, 2011 <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2011/08/10/google-map/>

³ Plato: Laws, Books 1-6 (Loeb Classical Library No. 187) by Plato and R. G. Bury, 1926

US PRESENCE IN EURASIA AND ITS IMPACT ON SECURITY AND MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS OF THIS REGION

Seyyedeh Motahhareh Hosseini
Asghar Shokri Moqaddam

INTRODUCTION

Four major components delineate the overall security approach that the United States has adopted in its international relations. They include recognition of the enemy and the risk posed by “others” (including the former Soviet Union, Communism, Muslims, China, and so forth), geopolitics, strategy, and realism.¹ These components have been highlighted by a great number of experts in international relations.² They construct a framework for the United States’ international relations in which such principles as the definitive existence of the enemy and the need to confront it on the basis of the formulated laws of the United States and the West, in general, create the bedrock for the establishment of relations with other countries.³ At the present time, the United States, in particular, and the West, in general, are moving their strategic focus toward the main heartland of the earth, or Eurasia. However, in its core, this sensitive region is host to two major perceived enemies of the United States, i.e. China and Russia, as well as smaller enemies, including India and the World of Islam.

Eurasia accounts for more than 70% of the population, gross national product (GNP), and economic exchanges of the world.⁴ This region also contains what is being described in economic and security arguments as the new Silk Road. It is also home to different routes used for economic exchanges, transfers of energy, and the establishment of security, as well as promoting cultural and tourism exchanges, especially with Asia tourism as its main axis.⁵ In view of the specific conditions that currently govern this region, it is expected in less than 10 years from now to become the main focus of international politics and take the center stage in future political conquests by the West.

US Presence in the Region: Reasons and Tools

The Eurasian region has been gaining in importance due to a variety of reasons. These reasons can be divided into the three main categories of economics, military — security (including strategic and geopolitical), and the international envi-



Seyyedeh Motahhareh Hosseini

Ph.D. in Political Science (Political sociology) from University of Tehran; Faculty Member of Department of Political Science, Payam Noor University, I.R. of Iran.



Asghar Shokri Moqaddam

Master's Degree in Political Science, Iran Review Analyst, I.R. of Iran

¹ Dalby, Simon. American security discourse: the persistence of geopolitics. *Political Geography Quarterly*, Volume 9, Issue 2, April 1990, p. 171-188

² Acharya, Amitav, The Relevance of Regions, ASEAN, and Western IR's false universalisms, August 10, 2011, www.theory-talks.org/2011/08/theory-talk-42.html; Grovogui, Siba. IR as Theology, Reading Kant Badly, and the Incapacity of Western Political Theory to Travel very far in Non-Western Contexts. August 29, 2013. www.theory-talks.org/2013/08/theory-talk-57.html

³ Xuetong, Yan. Chinese Realism, the Tsinghua School of International Relations, and the Impossibility of Harmony. November 28, 2012. www.theory-talks.org/2012/11/theory-talk-51.html

⁴ Brzezinski, Zbigniew. (1997) *Geostrategy for Eurasia*, 76 Foreign Affairs. p. 50

⁵ Hosseini, S. M., *New Silk Roads*, Policy Paper; Institute for Humanities Research affiliated with Academic Center for Education, Culture and Research; 2011

ronment. Here is a list of the reasons behind this and the tools being used to promote the US presence in Eurasia:

- **BRICS:** The group of countries known as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) is considered to be one of the most securitized areas of political economics in the world, as its member states are collectively expected to account for 20% of the economic output of the world during the next 20 years. Three of the countries that constitute the BRICS group, i.e. India, China, and Russia, are located in Eurasia.¹
- **Oil reserves:** The United States has started to boost its domestic oil and gas production. As a result, it will have no need to import exogenous oil in the future and, as a result, future fluctuations in global energy prices will not be able to have a rapid and direct impact on the US economy.² As a result, the United States will have a winning trump card in its hand and will certainly use it against the European Union and China.
- **NATO:** Continued expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into Eurasia will further increase the influence of the United States in the heartland of the world and, thus, pave the way for an increased military presence of the United States and the European Union in this region.
- **Islamism:** After Samuel Huntington and a number of other Western thinkers offered their theories in the 1980s about the ideological threats posed to Western civilization by Islam and other Eastern rites and religions, especially the Chinese Shinto³, the West, in general, and Europe, in particular, started to pay more attention to this part of the world. As a result, the Western countries have been waging military conflicts in the Middle East while getting engaged in an economic confrontation with the countries of East Asia. The popular uprisings in the Arab world have led to the establishment of national states in many Islamic and Arab countries in the Middle East and triggered new waves of the institutionalism of political Islam. Therefore, at the moment, the modern and secular states in Eurasia are

not solely faced with the liberal-democratic model of the West, but see in front of them a complete set of various models of governance. The political developments that followed the Arab Spring and, finally, the crisis in Syria have shown that instrumental use of religious radicalism can work as a double-edged sword that may even target the national interests of the European countries as well. This is why the West has been making revisions in its previous plans to use fundamentalism against China in the Eurasian region.

- **Russia:** The ability that Russia has for knocking major international equations off balance, especially in continental Europe, has caused that country to be perceived by the West as a major threat against the new international order.

MILITARY AND SECURITY ISSUES IN EURASIA

The United States implements its supervision over various countries in the world through an integrated network of military bases and their related facilities that are scattered all across the globe. The United States is currently running 737 bases in which its Air Force, naval forces, and the US Army, as well as Washington's intelligence and espionage activities, are managed throughout the world.⁴ On the whole, a total of 255,065 US military personnel are currently deployed to various countries. In Eurasia, the United States is running operational bases in the Middle East, Central Asia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Japan. Most of these bases are used for the purpose of espionage activities and collecting intelligence. The largest portion of the US' military forces outside the United States is stationed in Washington's military bases in Southeast Asia. In Central Asia, about 1,000 people are now posted at the US airbase in Manas (Kyrgyzstan), and 38 people are manning the US' Krtsanisi base in Georgia.

As put by the secretary of the World Peace Council (WPC), in Central Asia, the *raison d'être* for the establishment of the United States' military bases is not to use them simply to achieve Washington's military goals or directly intervene in other countries. These bases, on the other hand, have always been used to promote the economic and political goals of the capitalistic system that rules the United States of America, he added. The American companies, as well as the US administration, have shown keen interest in the establishment of a safe corridor for

¹ Jerry Cohen, Benjamin. *Currency Wars and Reviving the 'Political' in International Political Economy*. 5.9.2008. www.theotytalk.org

² Sieminski, Adam. *International Energy Outlook*. EIA, July 25, 2013

³ Huntington, Samuel, *Clash of Civilizations Theory: Huntington and His Critics*, translated by Mojtaba AmiriVahid, Tehran, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005

⁴ *Dismantling the Empire: America's Last Best Hope* (American Empire Project), Metropolitan Books, 2010

the transfer of oil from US-controlled reserves in order to guarantee that they will be taken advantage of in the long run. They have shown this interest by embarking on the construction of oil and natural gas transfer pipelines which are supposed to carry oil and gas resources of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia through Afghanistan and Pakistan onwards to the Arabian Sea. This region (Central Asia and Caspian Sea) is home to more than 6% of the proven oil reserves of the world, as well as about 40% of global natural gas resources.¹

Map 1: Oil and War in the Middle East and Central Asia



The distribution of the US military bases in the region is such that they have practically surrounded the Middle East region. Situated at the center of that siege is the Islamic Republic of Iran as the heartland of the Middle East. This deployment of forces is currently moving toward the mainland of Russia and China. If the existing US military bases in Eastern Asia were added to the above list, we would see that the US military has actually laid siege to an entire region, that is, Eurasia, which contains all the modern energy transfer and economic routes. The US Navy has also been used to support this siege.

GLOBAL DEFENSE EXPENSES

The highest level of defense expenses in the world can be seen in the North America region, which accounts for 42% of the total defense expenses in the world. Russia and

¹ www.yjc.ir/fa/news/4291513; Dufour, Jules. The Worldwide Network of US Military Bases, The Global Deployment of US Military Personnel. Global Research, December 24, 2013. www.globalresearch.ca/the-worldwide-network-of-us-military-bases/5564



Map 2: US Bases in Central Asia

Eurasia collectively account for only 4.4% of the world's defense expenses.

Graphical representation of global defense expenses sorted by regions in 2013 (the military balance, 2013)²

North America 42%

Europe 17.6%

Russia and Eurasia 4.4%

Asia & Australia 19.9%

Top Countries of the World in Terms of the Number of Military Staff

In terms of the number of military personnel, China, the United States, India, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, Pakistan, Turkey, and Vietnam are the top nine countries of this ranking in the world. Also, in terms of the total number of military personnel, China ranks the first with a wide margin as compared to the next eight countries on the list. China is followed by the United States and India, which have almost similar numbers of military personnel and respectively rank the second and third in this regard.

According to figures released by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the United States is credited for having the world's largest military budget, which accounts for about 48% of the total money spent on military affairs in the world. According to the latest figures, the total annual military budget of the United States stands at \$711 billion.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has announced that the United States, China, Russia, Britain, Japan, India, France, Germany, Italy, and

² The Military Balance, 2013

Saudi Arabia are the world's ten top countries in terms of the volume of their military budgets. However, the United States is still far ahead of the other countries in terms of military spending, as its military budget is four times higher than that of China and more than the total military budgets of the next nine countries that succeed the United States on this list. Of course, the United States has been trying to reduce its military budget in recent years as a direct result of the budget deficit that has hit the country during the past few years. On the other hand, major European military powers such as Italy, France, and Britain have been also reducing their military budgets as well. On the contrary, however, the military spending in China has moved in an opposite direction to major global trends between 2011 and 2012. As a result, it has increased about 8% during that period and has risen more than 47% since 2008. The military budget of China saw an increase of 10.7% in 2013 to hit \$119 billion. The country's military budget had already seen an 11% increase in 2012 as well.¹

NEW MILITARY AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN EURASIA

Underlying Advantages of Big Regional Armies

The sharp increase in the military budgets of China, Russia, and other Asian countries is not only due to an economic factor, but it is also an outcome of their threat perception of their immediate neighbors. Another important factor that has prompted these countries to increase their military spending is the presence of superpowers, in addition to NATO forces, in their surrounding environment.

It should be noted that NATO and American forces rely more on naval and air forces, which are in turn backed by marine and land bases. Also, according to a prominent theory of international relations, one of the main reasons behind the rise of the Western powers since the 1400s has been the expansion of their naval forces and the subsequent rise in their power and ability to conquer new colonies. This was firstly true about the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Britain, followed by the United States, which greatly expanded its military might following the end of World War I. As a result, marine geopolitics has played a great role in the expansionist efforts of these governments. Therefore, in order to compare the military and strategic powers of different countries, especially with a futuristic approach, most analyses focus on the historical background of these countries and the tools that they use to enforce their maritime power.

¹ <http://new.trib.ir/print.aspx?newsid=29339>

It should be noted that during the recent wars it has waged in the region, the United States has scored military victories through the efficient use of its powerful Air Force, which enjoys strong logistical support, as well as the behind-the-scenes support of its advanced intelligence and espionage facilities and equipment. It was due to this heavy reliance on the Air Force that the US Army did not have to deploy infantry forces to engage in land wars. The US Air Force, for its part, is supported by the country's naval ships and destroyers, which are positioned in free waters, as well as in common territorial waters and air bases. It also has the advantage of using advanced and heavy military equipment in its operations. It is well known that the American military is quite capable of scoring rapid victories in wars, but is not similarly capable of winning in peace, meaning that it is not capable of maintaining the territories it has conquered.

At the same time, the Russian and Chinese armies are more focused on land forces and, therefore, enjoy powerful infantry forces, as well as special equipment that has been engineered to perform well in land wars on both large and small scales (including guerrilla warfare). The main advantage of the Russian army is its extensive use of missile technology, which has posed a serious challenge to the military might of rival countries by producing some of the most modern air defense weapons. The main advantage of the US military is the use of integrated intelligence and reconnaissance systems which provide the ground for better management of the war theater. More than anything else, China is known for the great number of its military forces. As a result, and due to the renovation of the Chinese army and its equipment in recent decades, the country has been rising as a serious military force at the global level during the past years.

Reliance on the Navy

The Eurasian regional powers' increased attention to the seas has been quite evident. There has been remarkable competition and differences between Japan and China over adjacent seas and disputed islands. Such competition and disputes have also existed between Japan and Russia, Russia and China, and among the Southeast Asian Tigers (which include South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia). Military experts and analysts of geopolitical issues are of the opinion that the extensive military activities by the powerful Chinese Navy in the South China Sea, as well as in the East China Sea, which contains the islands that are disputed with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, have prompted the United States to send more naval forces to this restive part of the world. The new tug of

war between the two military superpowers of the world, i.e. the United States and China, has turned the Southeast Asian waters into a live and permanent exhibition of both countries' naval forces.

During the past two decades, China has taken great strides to strengthen its national army, especially its naval forces, so that the Chinese Navy is now among the most powerful naval forces in the world.

Many analysts are now concerned that the US effort to establish its domination over the entire Southeast Asia region and the rivalry that exists in this regard between Washington and Beijing will finally lead to escalation of the situation in that region and even end in all-out naval warfare.

Regional the Powers and Role of Regionalism

Modern international relations are more and more moving toward regionalism. The main outcome of this trend in Eurasia has been the increasing importance of regional powers. Apart from Russia and China, which have been established as dominant powers in this region, the roles played by such countries as India, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey should not be easily ignored. The promotion of regionalism in Eurasia will be characterized with a dominant role for Russia as the main regional hegemonic power, which will also play a very important role in the formation of regional alliances. Iran will also play a prominent security and anti-security role, especially through the challenge that it poses to this regional hegemonic power, as well as to other regional and transregional hegemonic powers.

The regional role played by China has gone well beyond a purely economic role and has taken on serious security and military aspects, especially following the establishment of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). On the whole, regional countries will move toward the conclusion of a collective regional security treaty¹, which was previously hoped to be negotiated within the framework of the SCO. However, this organization has been already challenged by Russia and Turkey. Russia is of the opinion that a "collective security treaty" should be aimed to serve as a counterbalance to NATO. Unlike the SCO, which is characterized by the dominant role of China and is being managed ac-

cording to this pattern, such a proposed security treaty would be based on the regional influence of Russia.²

In the meantime, the political activities of another major regional power, namely, Turkey, should not be ignored. Using various means, Turkey is trying to increase its influence on the geopolitical arrangement of Eurasia. Following the rise of the idea of Neo-Ottomanism, Turkey has been trying to organize its regional and transregional plans and strengthen them by encouraging the signing of pacts among various states.³ The establishment of the Organization of the Eurasian Law Enforcement Agencies with Military Status in 2013, which has Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, the Azerbaijani Republic, and Mongolia as its members; the establishment of the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States in 2009, whose members are the Azerbaijani Republic, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkey; as well as the introduction of the Eurasia Army, which includes the military forces of the Azerbaijani Republic, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, and Mongolia, and which is supposed to replace the Association of the European and Mediterranean Police Forces and Gendarmeries with Military Status, are among the major efforts made by Turkey in this regard.⁴

On the whole, Eurasia will experience a remarkable spurt in the military and security fields during the next decade. A collection of economic, military, and security forces have come together in this region, which is also seeing an increasing presence of the superpowers as well. The rise of the Eastern powers has also drawn more attention to the revival of the cultural and historical identities of the countries located in this region and, therefore, this region is expected to become a focus for international attention in the near future. Islamism, Orientalism, traditionalism, Indigenism, fundamentalism, native nationalism, and emerging identities, in addition to the continued growth of the middle class in the Eurasian countries, have given, and will continue to give, birth to powerful social and political currents. From the military and security viewpoints, under the influence of these issues and historical events, and as a result of the experiences gained in the past few decades, major regional powers such as the governments of Russia and China, as well as other regional powers like India, Turkey, and Iran, will be playing a more prominent role compared to the past and this will increase the need for the establishment of new regional security treaties.

² http://persian.ruvr.ru/_print/124421072.html

³ Hosseini S. M. et al, *European Union in Foreign Policy of Turkey under Justice and Development Party; Central Eurasia Research Center, Fall and Winter 2012-2013*, pp. 21-38

⁴ www.trtpersian.com/trtworld/fa/newsDetail.aspx?HaberKodu=25c349cd-c386-43ee-9c76-149c87318f44

¹ Allison, Roy. Regionalism, Regional Structures and Security Management in Central Asia. *International Affairs*. Volume 80, Issue 3, May 2004. pp 463-483



Alicia Jrapko

Coordinator in the United States of the International Committee for the Freedom of the Cuban 5.

AN APPEAL FOR JUSTICE: THE CASE OF THE CUBAN 5

Alicia Jrapko

For half a century, Cuba has been a victim of U.S. aggressions and terrorist actions. During all that time, 5,577 Cubans have either lost their lives or have been left maimed. U.S. official declassified documents show that between October 1960 and April 1961, the CIA smuggled 75 tons of explosives into Cuba during 30 clandestine air operations and infiltrated 45 tons of weapons and explosives during 31 sea incursions. Also during that short seven-month time span, the CIA carried out 110 attacks with dynamite, planted 200 bombs, derailed six trains, and burned 150 factories and 800 plantations.

Between 1959 and 1997, the United States carried out 5,780 terrorist actions against Cuba — 804 of them considered terrorist attacks of significant magnitude, including 78 bombings against the civilian population.

Between 1959 and 2003, there were 61 hijackings of planes or boats. Between 1961 and 1996, there were 58 attacks from the sea against 67 economic targets and the population. In 1971, after a biological attack, half a million pigs had to be killed to prevent the spreading of swine fever. In 1981, the introduction of dengue fever caused 344,203 victims and killed 158, of whom 101 were children. On July 6th, 1982, 11,400 cases were registered in one day alone.

The CIA has directed and supported over 4,000 individuals in 299 paramilitary groups. They are responsible for 549 murders and thousands of people wounded.

Most of these aggressions were planned in and executed from Florida by CIA-trained extreme right-wing groups of Cuban origin.

Luis Posada Carriles, considered by the FBI to be “the worst terrorist of the hemisphere,” enjoys total impunity and currently lives free in Miami. He is responsible for many terrorist attacks, including the blowing up in mid-air of a Cuban civilian airline in 1976 with 73 people on board. All 48 passengers and 25 crew aboard the plane died: 57 Cubans, 11 Guyanese, and five North Koreans. Among the dead were all 24 members of the 1975 national Cuban Fencing team that had just won all the gold medals in the Central American and Caribbean Championship. Many were teenagers.

Thirty-seven years later, the families of the victims of that atrocious crime, known as the Barbados crime, are still asking for justice. Venezuela continues demanding Posada Carriles’ extradition because he escaped from a Venezuela prison while awaiting trial. Despite all the evidence against Posada Carriles, and in flagrant violation of international law, past administrations and now the Obama administration have continued to provide safe haven for this dangerous international terrorist.

Orlando Bosch, another notorious terrorist, and an accomplice with Posada Carriles of the Barbados crime of 1976, is also responsible for dozens of terrorist

attacks. On June 23, 1989, the U.S. Justice Department stated in a report that Bosch's presence in the United States was inadmissible. Shortly afterwards, after he was condemned for having committed terrorist actions, Bosch was granted an amnesty by Bush, Sr.

Immediately after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Cuba entered an extremely severe economic crisis, worse than the Great Depression of 1929 in the U.S. It was precisely the time chosen by the U.S. to strengthen its economic blockade, as reflected in the Torricelli Amendment (1992) and the Helms-Burton Act (1996). The trio — Torricelli, Helms and Burton— replying to those objecting to the illegal extraterritorial legislations, assured their colleagues that it was the last year of the government led by Fidel Castro.

Paradoxically, in September 1994 and May 1995 (under the Clinton administration), Cuba and the U.S. succeeded in negotiating new migration accords in an exercise of quiet private diplomacy that involved the commitment to move towards the lifting of the embargo and a promise to curb terrorist actions against Cuba. Right-wing groups in the Cuban exile community in Miami were not happy with the new developments.

Some, unsatisfied with what they perceived as Washington's insufficient aggressiveness, tried to make a final assault on the island nation.

It was then that José Basulto from Brothers to the Rescue and his cohorts ramped up their airborne incursions. Basulto was very open in explaining his intentions. The alleged "humanitarian" nature of their previous flights — to help undocumented Cubans to enter the U.S. — had disappeared with the new U.S. policy, in practice since May 2, 1995, to send Cubans back to the island. From that day on, as recognized by Basulto, the flights would continue and be multiplied with a subversive purpose. Almost daily, he was in the media announcing the next provocation and proclaiming that Cuba was so weakened by the economic crisis that it could not protect its borders or even impede him from flying over downtown Havana, as he did on more than one occasion. Between May 1995 and February 1996, at least 25 illegal incursions over Cuba aerospace coming from Miami were registered; the U.S. authorities were well aware of these violations of Cuban sovereignty.

In 1995 and early 1996, Cuba asked Washington to stop those completely illicit air provocations. They asked the

U.S. Administration to respect international law and abide by its own domestic laws and regulations. A rather intense wave of official communications took place between the authorities of both countries. The U.S. explicitly recognized the illegal character of the flights and initiated, with Cuban cooperation, administrative proceedings against the transgressors.

Cuba warned time and again, at the highest level, both U.S. civilian and military authorities. Fidel Castro was personally involved in those efforts. He spent many hours with U.S. visitors, some of whom had clear White House endorsement. He warned that the flyovers must stop or the Cuban military would be left with no alternative but to shoot down the planes. Cuba finally succeeded in getting a very specific commitment from President Clinton that the planes would cease violating Cuban airspace.

Everything indicated that President Clinton gave specific instructions to fulfill his commitment, but in Miami, the U.S. Commander in Chief's orders are not always obeyed. Despite the President's instructions, the provocateurs organized yet another flight into Cuban airspace. On February 24, 1996, Cuba shot down two of the Brothers to the Rescue planes as they violated Cuban airspace. What would the U.S. government do if, after many warnings, a plane from an "enemy" country would persist in violating its airspace?

Interestingly enough, President Clinton reacted as if he knew nothing about the shooting down of the planes in 1996 and rushed to sign the Helms-Burton Act in a ceremony at the White House, surrounded by some of the very individuals who had defied him. It was a presidential election year and Clinton won easily in Miami. One of the Cuban 5, Gerardo Hernandez, who at that time was living in Miami and had nothing to do with the justified actions of the Cuban government to defend its airspace, was charged with conspiracy to commit murder.

In the early 90s, following the fall of the Soviet Union, Cuba was trying to establish a tourism industry. Soon thereafter, the right-wing exile groups in Miami started a violent campaign targeting tourist hotels and resorts, buses, airports, and other facilities to discourage foreigners from visiting the island nation.

Bombs exploded in the Melia Cohiba Hotel in Havana, the Capri, and the famed Hotel Nacional. Other bombs exploded in the Sol Palmeras Hotel, the Tritón, Chateau Miramar, and Copacabana hotels. The explosion in the

latter killed Fabio Di Celmo, a young Italian tourist. That same day, another bomb went off in La Bodeguita del Medio, a restaurant popular with tourists, including international journalists and Americans on special visas.

The Cuban Government arrested Raúl Cruz León, a citizen of El Salvador, for allegedly planting six of the bombs, including the one that killed the Italian tourist. Cruz León admitted that he had been paid US\$ 4,500 for each bomb. As a response to this wave of attacks against tourist installations, the Miami press published a statement by the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) giving unconditional support to terrorist bomb attacks on civilian and tourist targets in Cuba. The president of CANF stated that “We do not consider these to be terrorist acts” and added that any action against Cuba was “legitimate.”

This is the climate in which Cuba sent the Cuban 5 to Miami to monitor the organizations perpetrating these acts of violence. The idea was to gather information about similar acts in their planning stages in order to give that information to U.S. authorities in the hopes that the said authorities would impede any further acts of terrorism against Cuba. The Five were able to establish evidence implicating specific Miami exile groups and individuals in the attacks.

In 1998, President Fidel Castro sent a personal emissary to Washington to deliver a hand-written note to President Bill Clinton asking that the United States indict and prosecute those who committed crimes against Cuba. In his letter to Clinton, Castro said, among other things, that “If you really want to do so, you can put a stop to this new form of terrorism. It is impossible to stop this terrorism without United States involvement . . . Unless it is stopped now, in the future any country could be victimized by this new terrorism.” President Castro’s personal emissary was Gabriel García Márquez, the Noble Prize Laureate. At the time, President Clinton was out of town, and after waiting for him for several days, García Márquez finally met with White House Chief of Staff Mac McLarty on May 6, 1998, and gave him the letter.

In the wake of the García Márquez’s visit, the United States sent an FBI team to Havana to discuss collaboration with Cuba on stopping acts of aggression emanating from Miami. At the meeting, Cuba handed over 64 files containing the results of its investigation into 31 different terrorist acts and plans against the island in the decade of the 1990s. The Cuban government enclosed

details of the operations against Cuba, including photographs of the explosives used.

On June 16-17, 1998, the Cuban government gave two FBI officials documents containing copious evidence pertaining to the dangerousness of 40 people deeply involved in terrorist activities who lived in Florida. To this day, in spite of having enough evidence, the U.S. authorities have done nothing in regard to these people.

Three months later, on September 12, 1998, instead of arresting those who were planning aggressions against Cuba, the FBI arrested the Five. The information provided by these five men to the Cuban government has thwarted an estimated 170 terrorist attacks against Cuba.

After their arrest, the Five spent 17 months in solitary confinement cells. The trial took place in Miami — the only city in the United States where five men accused of being agents of the Cuban government could not have a fair trial — and lasted 7 months. The Cuban 5 were charged with 26 counts of violating federal law of the United States; 24 of those charges were technical and minor offenses, and the other 2 were conspiracy charges.

None of the charges reflected violence against the United States, use of weapons, or property damage. They made no threats or injury to anyone, and there was no transfer of U.S. Government documents or classified material. Nevertheless, they were originally sentenced to four life sentences and 77 years collectively in U.S. prisons. As the late U.S. filmmaker and writer Saul Landau once said “The Cuban Five had the same chance of getting a fair trial in Miami that a Jew would have gotten in Berlin in 1938”.

During the trial, the defense lawyers asked the judge several times for a change of venue, even just to another city in Florida, but the request was repeatedly denied.

In August 2005, a three-judge panel of the 11th Federal Circuit unanimously overturned all the convictions of the Cuban 5 and ordered a new trial, citing the impossibility for the Cuban 5 to receive a fair trial in Miami due to various violent Cuban exile groups and paramilitary camps that operate in the Miami area. But U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales directly intervened on the U.S. government’s behalf to set aside the opinion of the 11th Circuit three judge panel. As a result, in June 2008, the full 11th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the guilty verdict and the panel ratified the sentences of Rene Gonzalez and Gerardo Hernandez. In the cases of Ramon Labañino,

Antonio Guerrero, and Fernando Gonzalez, they were sent back for re-sentencing in the same court that convicted them in Miami because of technical mistakes in the original trial.

The case made it all the way to the Supreme Court. To make the case of their innocence and show unprecedented support, in March 2009, 12 Amicus Briefs were presented before the U.S. Supreme Court in support of the Cuban 5, including from 10 Nobel Prize winners, intellectuals, and members of Parliaments and organizations from all over the world. These were the most Amicus Briefs ever attached to a Supreme Court criminal case. But in June of the same year, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its decision, without providing any explanation, that it would not review the case of the Cuban 5.

Three of the Five were resented: Antonio Guerrero was resented to 21 years and 10 months, Ramon Labañino to 30 years, and Fernando Gonzalez was resented to 17 years plus nine months.

In October 7, 2011, after Rene Gonzalez completed his sentence, the judge ordered him to remain in Southern Florida for 3 more years of strict supervised parole. During that time, his wife Olga Salanueva was denied a visa to see him. Also during these years of unnecessary supervised probation in the United States, Rene Gonzalez lost his brother Roberto Gonzalez and his father Cándido Rene Gonzalez. It was finally when Rene returned to Cuba to attend his father's funeral that the judge definitively allowed him to stay in Cuba under the condition that he renounces his U.S. citizenship. Rene Gonzalez is now finally back in his country with his family and friends.

Fernando Gonzalez is scheduled to end his sentence on February 27, 2014, but there is a chance he may have to go to an immigration prison for an undetermined amount of time before he can be deported to Cuba. Antonio Guerrero's release date is scheduled for 2017, but because he is also an American citizen, he could be forced to remain in the U.S. for up to 5 additional years of supervised probation. Ramón Labañino's release date is not until 2024, and Gerardo Hernandez, the most punished of all, has no date to return because he was sentenced to two life sentences. The intention of the U.S. Government is that he dies in prison.

In June 2010, the case of the Cuban 5's legal team filed a Habeas Corpus before the Federal Court of Miami, and in August 2011, the legal team of Gerardo Hernandez filed an appeal before the Miami court of Judge Joan Lenard. Among the documents submitted by Gerardo's lawyers on this occasion are three appendices with a sworn statement by Attorney Paul McKenna, in which he admits that legal errors were made in Gerardo's initial defense.

The extraordinary Habeas Corpus appeal filed by the defense remains unanswered. The outrageous payments by the U.S. Government to journalists to create an atmosphere of anti-Cuba hysteria and presumed guilt before and during the trial remain unanswered for.

In the mean time, the case of the Cuban 5 continued to enjoy the support of a number of personalities and thousands of people around the world. At this time, there are hundreds of committees fighting for justice in practically every corner of the planet, including in the United States.

On May 27, 2005, the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions found the detention of the Cuban 5 to be in "contravention of Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights", and they requested that the United States Government adopt the necessary steps to remedy the situation in conformity with the principles stated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

In October 2010, Amnesty International issued a report stating, "Should the legal appeals process not provide a timely remedy, and given the long prison terms imposed and length of time the prisoners have already served, Amnesty International is supporting calls for a review of the case by the U.S. executive authorities through the clemency process or other appropriate means".

In an interview in Havana in March 2011, former President Jimmy Carter stated... "So in every way, in my private report with Obama when I return to the United States, in my public statements like today, in my previous conversations with American leaders, I've called for the release of the Cuban Five. One of the reasons is that, guilty or not, they've served a long prison sentence already, more than 12 years, and the fact that they've been punished adequately, even if they are guilty."

Gerardo Hernandez, who is serving two life sentences in a maximum security prison in Victorville, California, once said "Justice will be done when dictated by a jury of millions"

In order to reach out to that jury of millions, the International Committee for the Freedom of the Cuban 5 in the United States (www.thecuban5.org) has organized a number of events to raise awareness about the case of the Cuban 5. In 2010, the Committee organized a new campaign, "U.S. Actors and Artists United for the Freedom of the Cuban 5". The campaign resulted in a letter to President Obama signed by 23 U.S. actors and artists.

Other activities organized by the committee include a concert in New York on the 10th anniversary of the Cuban 5's arrests, four book tours, art exhibits, events with known personalities such as Noam Chomsky, Howard Zinn, Saul Landau, Wayne Smith, Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, Danny Glover, and many others.

More recently in May-June of this year, the Committee organized the Second "5 Days for the Cuban 5" in Washington DC. Representatives of 22 countries participated in the series of events, including 7 members of parliaments from Latin America and Europe. Known intellectuals such as Ignacio Ramonet and book writers like Fernando Morais, Arnold August, and Stephen Kimber joined in the actions with US personalities such as former Chief of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana Wayne Smith, Angela Davis, former US Attorney General Ramsey Clark, historian Jane Franklin, and attorneys Martin Garbus, Peter Schey and Dolores Huerta. During these five days, the activists and parliamentarians, along with personalities from all over the world, visited 43 offices on Capitol Hill to talk about the case of the Cuban 5. After the success of these 5 days of activities, the Committee is now organizing the third "5 Days for the Cuban 5" in Washington DC from June 4th to June 11, 2014.

The case of the Cuban 5, more than any other case, exposes the double standard and contradictions of the United States' so-called "War on Terror". On the one hand, they imprison anti-terrorist fighters, while on the other hand, they allow people who have confessed to crimes against humanity to walk free on U.S. soil.

The case of the Cuban 5 cannot be seen as an isolated issue, but rather as part of the failed U.S. policy towards Cuba. As complicated as the case may seem, it could be resolved by the stroke of a pen by President Obama. That is if the current administration is willing to hear the voices from all over the world telling him "enough is enough", it is time for a change of policy towards Cuba, it is time to free the Cuban 5.

A SUSPENDED DEMOCRACY UNDER THE ATLANTICIST EYE “STAY BEHIND”: THE ITALIAN CASE

Andrea Fais

Since the end of Second World War, Italy has become the land of plots. A huge mass of investigations, books, reports, and articles has produced never ending public debates about military structures, the relationships between national economic elites and stranger lobbies, and the origins of crime organizations and political terrorist cells. During the Cold War, Italy was for sure the most unstable and stormy country in the West: a formal democracy characterized by frequent political crisis, violence, social fear, and manipulation of the media. According to many historians, this particular situation was due to the so-called three Italian exceptions:

The relative gap between the North and South of Italy

The Italian Kingdom was born relatively late, in 1861, as an expansion of the House of Savoy, based in Turin, to the rest of the country. Before the rising of the Fascist dictatorship in 1924, an effective unification of the country was very hard to realize. For a long time, industrialization and modernization were unknown factors in the South, where poverty, underdevelopment, and crime dramatically remained, determining very negative economic and political consequences up until today.

The presence of the greatest communist party in the West

The Italian Communist Party (PCI) was born due to a schism with the Italian Socialist Party in 1921. It was banned by the Fascist regime, but after the war it rapidly became the second largest political party in the country thanks to the support of the Northern working classes and the millions of peasants all over the country. After the defeat of innering anti-Soviet members (Amadeo Bordiga and his followers), under the guiding line of Palmiro Togliatti, the Party became absolutely loyal to the USSR until the early 1970s. The elevation of Enrico Berlinguer as general secretary in 1973 produced a significant change in the Party's international trend, reorienting it toward Euro-communism.

The geographic position of Italy inside the Mediterranean Sea

The Italian landscape extends along the Mediterranean from North to South with a total coastal territory of 7,456 km. The Sardinia and Sicily islands are directly overlooking North Africa and part of the Middle East. This relative strategic potential was immediately exploited by the US Army, which built more than 100 military bases or installations in Italy from 1949 to 1990.

One year after the fascist military loss and the execution of Benito Mussolini, the Italian Monarchy was defeated through a popular vote⁽¹⁾. However, the new republic was weak and unstable, without a democratic constitution (published just in 1948), and built on the compromise among parties who had been fighting as partisans against Fascism during the second part of the war (the Resistance).



Andrea Fais

Journalist and Freelancer based in Perugia, Italy. He is the editor for the Italian magazine of geopolitics "Eurasia" and a contributor to the Italian magazine "Affarinternazionali" (linked to the Italian Foreign Affairs Ministry) and the Chinese daily-tabloid "Global Times".

There were communists, Catholics, socialists, liberals, and conservatives, especially from the Army. The first and most popular party was Christian Democracy (DC), linked to the Vatican and representing both the upper classes from the industrial sector and the middle classes of the South. It feared the Communist Party's economic policy and atheism. Nevertheless, the Italian Communist Party was never violently atheist, and its leaders preferred to keep its targets on economic and international issues: agricultural reform to give land to the peasants, the nationalization of great farms and strategic sectors, and the boycotting of NATO.

During the war, another factor contributed to make the gap between North and South even bigger: antifascism. After Mussolini had been betrayed by his officials in July 1943 and arrested by the King's police, he escaped from prison with German help and founded a new fascist republican state in Northern Italy, the so-called Italian Social Republic, supported by Nazi Germany and its allies. So after the rising of the antifascist resistance, mainly led by the communist brigades, the war became extremely difficult in the North, which saw massacres and retaliations. On the contrary, Southern Italy was completely controlled by Monarchy and US-British troops.

Italy was divided in two parts through the Gustav Line built by the German Army after the US landing in Salerno in September 1943. Unlike in the North, Southern Italy had never known a popular antifascist resistance and rapidly became a Trojan horse for anticommunist and anti-Soviet propaganda, creating a strong connection between political Catholicism, local landowners, criminal organizations (mafia), and US intelligence. In particular, Sicily became a place of conflict between the communists and Christian-Democrats. This Italian island had been deeply strategic for the US Army during military operations against Germany in Europe, and the connection between American mafia families and their relatives in Sicily was a determinant that helped the Allied troops land in Italy(2).

Even after the war, the local political climate was heavily influenced by this situation. It is common opinion in Italy that the massacre in Portella della Ginestra, a little town near Palermo, had signaled the beginning of the Strategy of Tension. Some bandits in cahoots with the mafia, landowners, and conservative politicians opened fire against workers and peasants during the Workers' Day celebration. More than 15 people were killed and about 65 were injured. It was May 1st, 1947. Some weeks before, the

temporary Italian Prime Minister, the Christian-Democrat Alcide De Gasperi, was invited by the US government in Washington to debate about the Marshall Plan and the Italian "extraordinary situation", namely the presence of left-wing parties (socialists and communists) inside his temporary government. The Sicilian massacre in Portella della Ginestra signaled a breakthrough. Republican antifascist cooperation among different parties was over, and the "Italian Cold War" was ready to begin.

FROM THE MARSHALL PLAN TO THE FOUNDATION OF NATO

When Franklin Roosevelt announced his famous Four Freedoms speech in 1941, Italy was allied with Germany and Japan, and it was engaged in war against Great Britain and France. The Pact of Steel seemed to be invincible, and the blitzkrieg conducted by Nazi armored divisions was extending Hitler's hegemony in Europe as he prepared a plan to invade the USSR. Two years later, after the end of the Battle of Stalingrad, the situation completely changed and Germany paid the cost of its aggressions with a catastrophic failure. However, Hitler's failure was not just the failure of one man or one country, but the failure of all of Europe, which was unable to find peaceful unity after one century of efforts (the Concert of Europe) and a war as terrible and devastating as the First World War. Starting from this objective reality, the Marshall Plan thought up by Harry Truman's administration returned the spirit of Roosevelt's idea with the will to extend it to Europe. In Italy, freedom of worship and freedom from want were slowly ensured, although amidst large early difficulties, but unfortunately, it is impossible to say the same about freedom from fear and freedom of speech.

The first Italian elections with universal suffrage occurred on April 18th, 1948. The political hegemony of the Christian Democracy Party was challenged by the Democratic Popular Front, composed of the Communist Party and the Socialist Party. The Catholic party won with 48% of the total vote while the Popular Front consensus was contained within 30.9%, mainly because of Saragat and Lombardo's earlier Social-Democratic schism from the Socialist Party in late 1947.

Some documents, declassified by the CIA in 1992 and 1993, have proven US interference in that first national election. According to these documents, Washington was worried by the so-called "red danger", from which to defend itself «it took into account the possibility to manipulate the 1948 electoral process and even to suspend

the counting of votes with military means»(3). The pre-existing connection between the Vatican hierarchy and US diplomacy helped the Christian-Democracy Party to establish good relationships with the White House. Harry Truman's doctrine conferred the highest importance to the defense of the Mediterranean region from any possible Soviet interference: Italy, France, Greece, and Turkey were the most carefully "observed" countries in those times.

In the summer of 1948, the political climate became very hot, especially because of the beginning of the De Gasperi government's agreements with Washington. Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti was absolutely set on using both parliamentary and popular means to boycott the processes of the Atlanticist integration of the country. Communist opposition to the Marshall Plan and NATO had already made the US State Department so furious that Italy rapidly started to be divided in two big fronts, just like the rest of the world. The Italian Cold War immediately appeared as a conflict inside of a bigger one. Just three years after the end of World War II, newfound tension and hatred returned like dark clouds over the Italian skies. On July 14th, 1948 Togliatti was the victim of an attempted murder: a young liberal Sicilian student, Antonio Pallante, shot the Italian communist leader near Montecitorio (the Chamber of Deputies) in Rome. Some hours later, violent riots exploded in Rome, Milan, Genoa, Turin, Florence, and many other Italian towns. Police headquarters, Christian-Democracy political offices, and editorial offices of rightist and Catholic newspapers were assaulted by thousands of communist militants. In those days, Italy was going to fall into another civil war. Pallante was arrested by police and condemned to 13 years of prison in the first stage of the process, which was later reduced to 7 years in the second stage, further reduced to less than 6 years by the Supreme Court of Cassation, then completely annulled by a general amnesty in the end of 1953. He had never repented for his assassination attempt, and he always defended himself in having done the «right thing», because in his opinion, «the death of Togliatti would have saved Italy from Communism»(4).

In 1949, the Italian political situation was still dangerous. The Communists and Socialists were determined to create a huge popular consensus around their foreign policy platform, hoping to involve not just their militants and electors, but also some supporters from the popular Catholic associations, the Army, and former leftist Fascists led by Giuseppe Landi and Stanis Ruinas(5) in opposi-

tion to Atlanticist integration. On February 20th, 1949, Pope Pius XII decided to intervene with a public speech in Saint Peter's Square and used all his moral authority and charm on the Italian people to persuade the citizens about the importance of NATO in preventing any possible Soviet invasion. Political debate in Parliament was very intense from the very first moments. Pietro Nenni, leader of the Socialist Party, clearly said in his public speech: «The Atlanticist Pact destroys the collective security system, it contains a strong aggressive meaning against the country which defended Stalingrad six years ago and, doing this, it defended the whole Europe and the whole world at the same time [...] This Pact irreparably compromises our security and independence»(6).

On 18 March, 1949, the two Chambers of the Italian Parliament announced their final vote about the entrance of Italy inside the Atlantic Pact: 342 votes in favor, 170 votes against, and 19 abstained at the Chamber of Deputies; 183 votes in favor, 112 against, and 8 abstained at the Senate.

THE HOLY CRUSADE AGAINST RUSSIA

If the US and UK have often criticized Russian Tsarism as an illiberal autocracy or Russian bolshevism as a form of dictatorship, anti-Russian prejudice in Central and Southern Europe was mainly founded on old religious and territorial disputes. Catholic influence in Italy, Spain, France, Portugal, Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and a relevant part of Germany have historically favored the spreading of anti-Orthodox feelings. The East-West Schism (1054) had definitively divided European Christianity into two opposite parts. Since that time, any idea of reconciliation became impossible and unacceptable. One century later, Catholic pressure against the Orthodox territories became even stronger: the Siege of Constantinople (1204) and the Teutonic invasion of Novgorod (1242) showed the real face of the Vatican's imperialism that aimed to convert the Eastern peoples to the Latin Rite.

In Nazi Germany, this old religious hatred inherited from the Holy Roman Empire met the nineteenth-century racial chauvinist conception which accords that Slavic peoples are ethnically inferior to Western Europeans. Of course, this is historically false because

- Slavs fully belong to the Indo-European ethno-linguistic family, just as Germans do

- The first Russian form of civilization (Kievan Rus') was born due out of the fusion of some Scandinavian Normans (Varyags) and indigenous Slavic tribes, which henceforth began the Rurik Dynasty
- The German-led Central Powers — Prussia and Austria — reached their highest prestige after they had absorbed Slavic peoples such as the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Kashubians, Slovenians, and Croatians.

Nevertheless, European fascist imperialism needed a geopolitical conception to justify its mission in the East, and the Vatican played a central role in this operation.

On July 12th, 1941, German Foreign Affairs Minister von Ribbentrop wrote a secret document entitled Report on Pope Activities. This report contains a dispute between a US representative in the Vatican, Mr. Harold Tittman, and Eugenio Pacelli, namely Pope Pius XII. Pacelli said: «The US should understand the Vatican's opinion. A Russian-German war is going to begin. The Vatican do everything possible to accelerate this military escalation and to persuade Hitler to go on, with the promise of moral support. Germany should defeat Russia, but in the end, it will be so weakened that the US and UK could approach Germany in a totally different way»(7).

So the Catholic Church sustained Nazi Germany with a dual aim: on one side, the Pope hoped Bolshevism was annihilated, while on the other, he believed that the war could weaken the Third Reich so much as to force Germany into a compromise with the Western powers. Another German secret document, sent by diplomat von Barmen on February 23rd, 1943 (three weeks after the end of the Battle of Stalingrad), reported that «the Pope was disappointed by the Russian military achievements and the possible German collapse which would pave the way to Bolshevism in Europe»(8). During World War II, the Vatican saw Bolshevism as the worst danger and Russia as its first target. The Vatican strategy in the Balkans has shown the most terrible and aggressive face of the Catholics, going beyond every possible comprehension. After having seen the Croatian leader Pavelić's military crimes against Serbs, even some Nazi and Fascist generals were shocked by the horrors and violence committed by Ustasha extremists(9), while Catholic priests «were proud to have been part of this fight for the purity of Croatian land»(10). Pius XII had no hesitations to support Ante Pavelić's regime and Cardinal Stepinac's archbishopric. At the same time, he showed the same moral

brutality and intransigence against a country as far away as Russia. Why? Because:

- Catholics believed that Marxism-Leninism would promote atheism and anti-religious propaganda all over Europe, destroying Vatican power and its moral and political influence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America
- Stalin was determined to make the USSR a superpower as the only way to impose its role as the motherland of world Socialism, according to the trends that emerged in the Third International and the publication of his "Socialism in One Country" doctrine
- The October Revolution and the subsequent radical regime change had given the Vatican the unique chance to exploit a situation of spiritual and traditional "emptiness" to attempt a cultural penetration in Russia through the promotion of Uniatism, an aim since 1929 when Pope Pius XI founded Collegium Russicum(11).

Russia was historically the "forbidden land" which Western Christian armies, both Catholic and Protestant, have never been able to conquer and defeat. Since the reformation of Moscow as a new Constantinople, established by Ivan the Third in 1453, the Latin Church was often worried by the expansion of the Russian Empire. After the agreements between Stalin and Orthodox metropolitans in September 1943, the Kremlin decision was not something simply tactic, but a clear political choice to consider Soviet power as an expression of the Russian-Slavic form of civilization. In a note published on September 8th, 1943, Stalin wrote: «Since the most ancient times, the Russian people were pervaded by religious sentiment. After the beginning of military operations against Germany, the Church has shown itself in its best light [...] Our Party cannot deprive people of its churches and freedom of worship anymore»(12).

The personal story of Pius XII still divides Italian public opinion. A large part of leftist politicians have always considered this Pope as a partner of Nazi Germany, a guilty party to the Jewish genocide. Nevertheless, Western concept of the Holocaust forgets to mention that more than 30 million Slavs of different nationalities lost their lives during World War II, approximately about 42.36% of world victims. All of this shows that Alfred Rosenberg's Nazi racial theory and Catholic anti-orthodox religious

prejudice were probably even much more significant than anti-communism and anti-semitism. Christian-Democracy and other small rightist parties such as the Liberal Party, Republican Party, and the populist Common Man's Front used their propaganda to describe communists as "servants of a stranger power" through impressive posters representing Soviet soldiers as evil monsters and Italian communists as dangerous enemies of freedom and independence.

Catholics were able to exploit their dominant position in society to shape a new form of nationalism very different from the old Fascist fanatic version, but equally imbued with the strong anticommunist ideological component that US overall strategy needed. This soft nationalism was built on a liberal, conservative, and essentially, Western idea of society inspired by the US Fordist capitalist model partially mitigated by the rehabilitation of Catholic social doctrine⁽¹³⁾. Christian-Democratic leaders present their Party as a defender of private property, a warrantor of freedom of economic initiative, and the only possible builder of social prosperity. In truth, this party was also significantly linked to the State-owned strategic industrial sector inherited from the Fascist era, and it was often compromised of Mafia crime families from the South. The contradictions were obvious since they tried to recreate the North American model in a country like Italy, which had a social and economic history totally different from that of the US.

«SILENDO LIBERTATEM SERVO», THE AMERICAN GLADIATORS

Such an Italian version of Abundance Society ideology contributed in sending the Italian people a message of confidence from the West and to underline the artificial international brand of the US Army as the "Army of Freedom". During the afternoon of March 17th, 1949, the US government officially released the whole text of the North Atlantic Treaty: in particular, its Article 5 (14) assured European allied governments about the peaceful and cooperative intentions of Washington. According to this interpretation, North Atlantic internationalism was aimed at peace, freedom, and cooperation among the different forms of democratic nationalism. This propaganda was clearly created not just to persuade public opinion in general, but also to attract and involve some military sectors still ideologically linked to reactionary nationalism that emerged inside the old Fascist far-right environments.

This was the background scenario from which NATO created the so-called "Stay Behind" operation. Stay Behind was an undercover intelligence web composed of professional soldiers and civilians under the command of NATO's SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe) in Western Europe. These secret forces were aimed to prevent a Soviet invasion and organize guerrilla warfare against the Red Army before US intervention in the case of invasion. Nevertheless, such official tasks were arbitrarily defined so that they also included sabotage and intimidation activities against communists and pro-Soviet socialists. The year when Stay Behind was officially activated in Italy with the code name "Gladio" is considered to be 1964. However, after several years of investigations conducted by Italian judge Felice Casson in the 80s and the publication of the report released by former Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti in early 1991, it is possible to assert reliable conclusions.

- A relevant Atlanticist network had already been created by US intelligence during the Second World War. In Northern Italy, several leaders of the anti-fascist partisan brigades, as were the "red" Giuseppe Gozzer (Garibaldi Brigades) and the "white" Giuliano Dell'Antonio (Osoppo Brigades), were linked to the American OSS (Office of Strategic Service) and British SOE (Special Operations Executive). This military cooperation was aimed at the creation of an efficient structure able to act behind enemy lines and represented the tactical-operative background on which Gladio was built. The presence of former "white" partisan Giuliano Dell'Antonio inside the Gladio members list published by Andreotti in 1991 (15) is a clear demonstration.

- According to the parliamentary official report about Gladio, released by Italian PM Giulio Andreotti on December 24th 1990 and sent to the Head of State on February 26th 1991, «on November 26th, 1956 Italian Special Forces (SIFAR) and the CIA made an agreement for cooperation concerning the organization and activities of the post-occupation undercover structure usually called "Stay-Behind", which established the creation of resistance networks ready to operate, in case of enemy invasion of the territory, in the following fields: information gathering, sabotage, guerrilla warfare, propaganda, and exfiltration»⁽¹⁶⁾.

- Italian Special Forces (SIFAR) and the SHAPE signed a cooperation agreement in June of 1959⁽¹⁷⁾.

Until the end of 1990, the Italian people had never heard about Stay Behind or Gladio, and the military structure had remained absolutely undercover for almost 40 years. Nevertheless, the first suspicions started to emerge in 1972 after a terrorist attack against three Italian policemen. In the evening of May 31, 1972, a local police station in Carabinieri received an anonymous phone call which reported the presence of a suspicious car in the little town of Peteano di Sagrado, near Gorizia, in Friuli Venezia-Giulia Region. Five police officers went to inspect that little car, but when one of them opened the trunk, a huge explosion killed three of them and seriously injured the other two.

Three years before, Italy has been already shocked by a terrorist attack in Piazza Fontana, in the heart of Milan. It was the first one in a long and dramatic series of political terrorist acts continued until the early 80s. The massacre of Peteano still remains one of the most horrible moments during that black decade but, in a certain sense, it was also extremely important to generating suspicions about the existence of a parallel secret army inside the actual army. At the beginning of the inquiry, investigators believed that the responsibility lay with Lotta Continua, a far-left organization, but shortly afterwards, this interpretation had lost its consistency. Many elements came together to create the suspicion that far-rightist activists could be behind the Peteano attack, but investigators preferred to follow the hypothesis of local criminal organizations being the culprits. After twelve years of mistakes (and probably having been deliberately thrown off track), in 1984, far-right terrorist Vincenzo Vinciguerra, member of the neo-fascist illegal organization Ordine Nuovo and imprisoned since 1979 for another terrorist episode, decided to spontaneously confess his responsibility to the Peteano massacre. In front of the judges, Vinciguerra said: «I take full, complete, and total responsibility for have planned, organized and materially executed the attack in Peteano, which is included inside a plan for carrying out the strategy followed at that time by political forces that I considered as revolutionary, so called rightists, while instead they were just following a strategy led by national and international lobbies placed in the heads of the state [...] The political aim of these attacks is very clear: to generate a popular angry reaction through serious provocations and to use this reaction to promote a new repression. The final highest aim was to establish special laws or even a state of emergency. In this way, it would have been possible to realize a fortification of political power that feared the loss of its dominion at every moment»(18).

Vinciguerra was condemned with his former partner Carlo Cicutini, while the third man, Ivan Boccaccio, was already dead after a gunfight against police in October 1972, some months after the Peteano attack. Vinciguerra had never asked for a sentence reduction or for privileges in exchange for his confessions, he just wanted to show his sincere will to let the historic truth emerge. In an interview for the British newspaper *The Guardian* in 1990, Vinciguerra said: «The terrorist line was followed by camouflaged people, people belonging to the security apparatus or those linked to the state apparatus through rapport or collaboration. I say that every single outrage that followed from 1969 fitted into a single, organized matrix... Avanguardia Nazionale, like Ordine Nuovo (the main right-wing terrorist group active during the 1970s), were being mobilized into the battle as part of an anti-communist strategy originating not with organizations deviant from the institutions of power, but from within the state itself, and specifically from within the ambit of the state's relations within the Atlantic Alliance»(19). More specifically, Vinciguerra explained: «With the massacre of Peteano, and with all those that have followed, the knowledge should by now be clear that there existed a real live structure, occult and hidden, with the capacity of giving a strategic direction to the outrages...[it] lies within the state itself...There exists in Italy a secret force parallel to the armed forces, composed of civilians and military men, in an anti-Soviet capacity that is, to organize a resistance on Italian soil against a Russian army... A secret organization, a super-organization with a network of communications, arms, and explosives, and men trained to use them... A super-organization which, lacking a Soviet military invasion which might not happen, took up the task, on NATO's behalf, of preventing a slip to the left in the political balance of the country. This they did, with the assistance of the official secret services and the political and military forces»(20).

These shocking confessions opened a new era in Italian history and significantly contributed to piercing the veil of secrecy placed over decades of terrorist attacks that often remained unpunished. The Gladio-terrorism connection was de-facto denied by the judges of the Rome Prosecutor's Office in 2001 when they decided to absolve Admiral Fulvio Martini, former director of Italian military secret service (SISMI), General Paolo Inzerilli, former Chief of Staff, and Giovanni Invernizzi, former director of 7th SISMI division, previously accused to have lied about the possible links between Italian Stay-Behind and political crime organizations. However, this sentence just establishes that the three accused officials had said

the truth about what they did know, not in general, and doesn't clarify three main issues.

- The history of the far-right movement Ordine Nuovo starts in 1956 when it was founded as a cultural association by Pino Rauti. In 1969, Rauti decided to come back to the neo-fascist official party Italian Social Movement (MSI), but some of his comrades didn't agree with his choice, having considered MSI to be a corrupted and bourgeois party which had betrayed the so called "Third Position". After this division, Ordine Nuovo officially became a militant group dangerously contiguous to political terrorism. Vincenzo Vinciguerra was the leader of Ordine Nuovo in Friuli Venezia-Giulia since 1969. During the Cold War, NATO's SHAPE generals considered this region very important from the strategic point of view because it bordered Austria and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Even if Tito had broken his ties with USSR in 1948 and Yugoslavia became part of the non-aligned countries, the Italian Northeastern border was anyway considered "the front line": first of all, Austria was neutral and directly bordered the Warsaw Pact countries; second, ethnic clashes with Yugoslavian partisans during the Second World War had generated a deep anti-communist sentiment among the local community which was able to unite soldiers and civilians, former fascists and liberals, nationalists and Catholics; third, Yugoslavia, after all, was officially a communist country.

- According to the official Gladio members list published by Andreotti in 1991, SHAPE had disseminated 251 agents in Friuli Venezia-Giulia Region, the highest number among all the Italian regions (98 in Lombardy, 25 in Lazio, 51 in Veneto, 45 in Piedmont, 50 in Sardinia and so on...). Vinciguerra and his comrades had the very concrete possibility to keep in touch with one or more of them.

- According to Andreotti's report, since 1956, US intelligence started to send CAG (Centro Addestramento Guastatori) operative materials «destined to be the first equipment stocks for nucleuses and first-use unities, and to be hidden, since peacetime, in special interred hideaways in various areas of possible operations»(21). These weapons dumps were called Nasco, and Andreotti so wrote: «Nascos were placed in the following way: 100 in Friuli Venezia-Giulia, 7 in Veneto, 5 in Trentino-Alto

Adige, 11 in Lombardy, 7 in Piedmont, 4 in Liguria, 2 in Emilia-Romagna, 1 in Campania and 2 in Apulia [...] Material kept inside Nascos was composed of weapons, munitions, explosives, grenades, daggers, knives, snipers, radio transmitters, binoculars, and various utilities»(22). Judge Felice Casson demonstrated that the explosive materials used in the Peteano massacre was C4, a kind of explosive owned solely by NATO at that time. In Friuli Venezia-Giulia, there was a huge availability of weapons and explosives, but in places known only to Gladio.

CONCLUSIONS

After the end of the Cold War, Italy remained a "special observed" nation. The US promise about a possible Finlandization of Europe was denied and even humiliated by the huge increasing of their military expenditures and strategic investment in Europe. The last twenty years have shown the European people that the reunification of Germany was an annexation of the eastern part of the country by NATO. In the same way, all the other former allies of Moscow in the Warsaw Pact were incorporated by Washington and Brussels inside the Atlantic Alliance one by one: Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland in 1999; Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia in 2004; and Albania and Croatia in 2009. Moreover, the three newly independent Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, with their NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCD-COE), represent a permanent menace to the Russian Federation. As the Syrian crisis has demonstrated, the European Union does not have common foreign and strategic policies. Every country follows its own trend, but the union as a whole is alone in its choice, and therefore, it is much too weak to express a dominant position in the European region.

After 1991, the Italian political and economic structure has significantly changed. Liberalizations of important public sectors and new free-market parameters were introduced, and the old welfare and social security system was progressively reduced until the recent crisis that started in 2009, which, in the name of a rigid austerity, is devastating the social and economic conditions of workers, merchants, and small-medium sized enterprises. Nevertheless, governments never reduced military expenditures for international missions abroad and never put in discussion the Italian role inside of NATO. The recent "Datagate" scandal is slowly changing the perception of US policy in Italian public opinion, but without a serious change in the political leading class, there will be

no space for a serious debate about the future of Italy and its prospects for a strategic independence.

NOTES

1. Italian constitutional referendum took place on June 2nd 1946 and consisted of a direct electoral choice by universal suffrage: monarchy or republic. Republicanism won with 12,718,641 votes (54.3 per cent) while monarchism obtained just 10,718,502 votes (45.7 per cent). The geographical distribution of preferences remarked the rigid political difference from North, where republicanism was clearly dominant, to South, where monarchism obtained the majority of preferences almost everywhere.

2. «[...] We should organize and prepare dissident elements to use them as fighters in the active resistance: a) we should establish links with independentist militants, with tired workers, with illegal radical groups (for example, mafia) with the aim to give them all necessary support and assistance [...]», Special military plan for psychological warfare in Sicily, Tna/Pro — Wo 204/3701, Department of War, Washington DC, April 9th 1943.

«[...] But before "Husky Operation" there was a secret prologue, which Michele Pantaleone da Villalba, a historian of mafia, wrote several times about in the past. He had gathered irrefutable witnesses and documents, confirmed by Italian Anti-Mafia Parliamentary Commission on February 4th 1976. In fact this Commission ascertained that a relevant number of US Army emissaries were preemptively sent to Sicily to "psychologically prepare" the island for the landing and to get in touch with members of "Cosa Nostra". At the same time Kefauver Commission ascertained that lawyer Moses Polakoff, defense attorney of American boss Mayer Lansky, got in touch not just with the latter but even with Sicilian boss Lucky Luciano who was in prison at that time. Luciano has given detailed informations about his native region, Sicily, and put in touch US General Command with the mastermind of Sicilian mafia Don Calogero Vizzini da Villalba, as Michele Pantaleone had already demonstrated [...]», R. Lo Cicero, *Quando la mafia autotizzò lo Sbarco in Sicilia degli alleati*, Monreale Press, July 10th 2013.

3. L. Annunziata, *La CIA voleva "truccare" le elezioni del 1948*, Corriere della Sera, October 25th 1993.

4. A. Bolzoni, Pallante, l'uomo che vuol farsi dimenticare, *La Repubblica*, July 14th 1998.

5. G. Parlato, *La Sinistra Fascista. Storia di un Progetto Mancato*, Ed. Il Mulino, Bologna, 2000, pp. 332-341.

6. Leonardo.it, *Cronologia, Italia — Anno 1949*.

7. G. Casarrubea — M.J. Cereghino, *Pio XII: Sotto il cielo (nero) di Roma*, October 31st 2010, <http://casarrubea.wordpress.com>.

8. Ibidem.

9. Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations, Europa, 1995, p. 91.

10. The New Encyclopedia Britannica, 1986, Macropedia, Vol. 27, p. 467.

11. The Collegium Russicum (Pontificium Collegium Russicum Sanctae Theresiae A Iesu Infante) is a Catholic college founded in Rome in 1929 dealing with studies of Russian culture and spirituality, which promotes unification of Eastern Orthodox Churches under Roman Catholic Church guide.

12. A. Roccucci, *Stalin e il patriarca. La Chiesa ortodossa e il potere sovietico*, Einaudi, Turin, 2011, pp.

13. Pontifical Council of Justice and Peace, *Compendio della Dottrina Sociale della Chiesa*, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, State of the Vatican, 2009.

14. «The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security», North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5, Washington DC, April 4th 1949.

15. On. G. Andreotti, *Relazione sulla vicenda «Gladio»*, Official Parliamentary Acts, Chamber of Deputies of the Republic of Italy, Doc. XXVII no. 6, Rome, February 26th 1991, p. 52.

16. Ibidem, p. 12.

17. Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Italy, *Le "forze speciali" del SIFAR e l'Operazione Gladio* (declassified document), Information Service of Armed Forces, General Staff of Defense, Rome, June 1st 1959.

18. A. Frigerio, *La Strage di Peteano, un giallo con trama di matrice nera e...*, <http://www.storiain.net>.

19. Ed Vuillamy, *Secret agents, freemasons, fascists... and a top-level campaign of political 'destabilisation'*, *The Guardian*, December 5th 1990.

20. Ibidem.

21. On. G. Andreotti, *Relazione sulla vicenda «Gladio»*, Official Parliamentary Acts, Chamber of Deputies of the Republic of Italy, Doc. XXVII no. 6, Rome, February 26th 1991, p. 22.

22. Ibidem, p. 23.

NATIONAL IDENTITY IN TRANSNISTRIA: A GLOBAL HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE FORMATION AND EVOLUTION OF A 'RESISTANCE IDENTITY'

Joris Wagemakers

The defacto state of 'Transnistria' is often depicted as an 'informational and economic black hole', a 'mafia state', and a 'Soviet open-air museum' by the mainstream media.¹ Such cliché-ridden and sensationalist coverage, however, neglects or ignores the realities in the area and the stark societal and political changes that occurred within Transnistria since it acquired defacto independence in fall 1990, and more precisely, during the last three to five years. The election of a new Transnistrian president, political pressure in the so-called '5+2 negotiations', the stronger willingness for economic cooperation with Moldova and the EU, the increasing importance of the internet as a source of information, and the overall global political climate are all elements that contributed to a new political orientation and new narratives of Transnistrian nation-building.

This article provides a concise historical overview of national identity formation in Transnistria, which evolved from a regional identification over a civic one to processes of state and nation-building. We will use a social constructivism paradigm, arguing that identities are constructed through historical social processes, influenced and sometimes manipulated by leaders for instrumental objectives.² Rather than focusing solely on elite narratives of identity construction, we will link historical social processes to feelings of national identity. We will argue that narratives about Moldova and 'Greater Romania', formerly used to legitimize Transnistrian secessionism, have been replaced by narratives about and against Western, and more specifically what is seen as 'American', values and practices.

IDENTIFICATION IN A CONFLICT CONTEXT

In the early stages of the conflict, during the 1990-92 period, the Transnistrian movement did not have a classical ethno-nationalist character, at least not openly. Initially, mobilisation was mainly based on a regional and a civic identity. Present-day Transnistria, a narrow strip of land situated east of the Dniestr river, was integrated into the greater Russian imperial space in 1792 and for a long-time remained part of a disputed frontier area. In the year 1940, by then already in the USSR, it became the 'embryo', so to say, of what was eventually to become the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic after Romania had officially ceded

¹ Although the republic's official name is Cisnistrian Moldavian Republic (Приднестровская Молдавская Республика, in Russian), over the years, the name 'Transnistria' has entered the English language as the main term to designate the de-facto state. Also, geographically as well as psychologically, looking at it from the West, where we are based, the area is literally situated *beyond* the Dniestr river. Therefore, and to avoid confusion, we decided to use the name 'Transnistria' in this English article. It does not reflect a political choice nor any taking of sides.

² Stewart, F. (2009). 'Religion and ethnicity as a source of mobilization: are there differences?', MICROCON Research Working Paper №18, Oxford: University of Oxford.



Joris Wagemakers

holds a degree in Sociology from the University of Antwerp and in Conflict and Development Studies from Ghent University, in Belgium. He lived for one year in Moldova, and visited Transnistria in the framework of his thesis, of which this is a summary article, and which he wrote for the latter degree under the tutorship of Bruno De Cordier.

Bessarabia (right-bank Moldova) to the USSR in 1947.¹ Transnistria, which already had some industries and a Slavic population before the formation of the USSR, was to provide an industrial base for the new Moldovan SSR. It developed an economic structure based on industry and urbanization quite distinctive from that of 'right bank Moldova' which remained mainly rural and agricultural.²

Russian and other Slavic immigrants moved to the region to staff the industries, and the region's Soviet power elites created solid links with the Soviet centre because of the presence of defense industries in Transnistria that were under central control from Moscow. Although Transnistria had no autonomous status in the Moldovan SSR, the area's Russian-speaking politico-economic elites in this historical frontier area gained power through their peculiar interaction with the centre. The Moldovan claim to be part of the historical Bessarabia region, associated with present-day Romania and right bank Moldova, triggered the Russian speakers and the Slavic population strata in Transnistria to identify themselves on the basis of a regional as well as of a Soviet identity. This reactive nationalism was enforced by the Moldovan SSR's 1989 language law which changed the use of Cyrillic to a modified Latin alphabet for the Moldovan language — which is very similar to Romanian, albeit with more Slavic loanwords — and the adoption of a tricolor Moldovan national flag quite similar to that of Romania in 1990. These Moldovan national symbols, created before the country's independence from the USSR in late 1991, were supplemented in 1994 by a national anthem called *Limbanoastră*, a plea for the national emancipation of Bessarabia.

These steps were perceived by many native Russian speakers, not only by members of the power elites and opinion leaders but also at the grassroots level, as a step closer towards the restitution of a 'fascist-ruled Greater

Romania' — of which Bessarabia indeed used to be part of between 1941 and 1944 — as well as a way to marginalize the Russian speakers in the country.³ In the first stage of the Moldovan-Transnistrian conflict, the Transnistrian movement and region were thus defined on the basis of elements and realities which made it different from right bank Moldova and Romania. This so-called 'negative identity' transformed into what Castells calls a resistance identity.⁴ As a way to resist domination by Moldovan policies and culture, a (cultural) identity opposed to that of the dominant society is constructed. Framed by familiar Soviet-internationalist rhetoric about the friendship of peoples (*дружба народов*), the Transnistrian civic identity was created and oriented against an image of a pro-Romanian identity of Moldova. The Transnistrian entity was initially constituted as a multi-ethnic state, opposed to the Moldovan state that was allegedly discriminating citizens not only of Slavic descent, but also the Turks in the enclave of Gagauzia in southern Moldova. A Transnistrian state was constructed and legitimated as the only possible way to resist Moldovan domination and to defend the rights of minority groups.

THE PHYSICAL CONSOLIDATION OF ASPIRED NATIONHOOD

Although the civic identity was meant to be ethnically neutral, during years of nation building, ethnicity became more salient as an identity marker. Transnistrian identity is largely based on an interpretation of Soviet, which is in the first place Russian values and language, and is partly constructed by stereotyping Moldovan-Romanian language and culture.⁵ The need to construct a homogenous Transnistrian identity came at the expense of an emphasis on multi-ethnicity.⁶ Consequently, the construction of a national identity can be seen as a next step in maintaining defacto independence and legitimising secessionist claims. Transnistria has estab-

¹ Waters, T. (1997), 'Problems, progress and prospects in a post-Soviet borderland: the Republic of Moldova', *International Boundaries and Research Unit Boundary and Security Bulletin*.

² The term 'right bank Moldova' that one often finds in publications and discourse is used to designate the Moldovan state without the Transnistrian region, while 'left bank Moldova' comprises the territory of Transnistria. Transnistria's territory is about 4,163 km² large and officially had 509,400 inhabitants in 2012. Again according to the official figures, the population consisted of 31.9 % of ethnic Moldovans, 30.4% Russians, 28.8% of Ukrainians and for 2.5% of Bulgarians, Byelorussians and others. Государственная служба статистики Приднестровской Молдавской Республики, «Статистический ежегодник 2013 г.», www.mepmr.org/pechatnye-izdaniya/statisticheskij-ezhegodnik-pmr

³ Blakkisrud, H., Kolstø (2011). 'From secessionist conflict toward a functioning state: processes of state- and nation-building in Transnistria', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 27 (2), 187-210. Contrary to the Moldovan SSR where it was boycotted under nationalist pressure, the regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia held the all-Soviet referendum of 17 March 1990 on the preservation of the USSR, and officially voted 98 and 97% respectively in favor of the union's preservation.

⁴ Castells, M. (2010). 'The power of identity: the information age, economy, society, and culture', vol. II, West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing.

⁵ Troebst, S. (2003). 'The 'Transdnistrian Moldovan Republic': from conflict-driven state-building to state-driven nation-building', *European Yearbook of Minority Issues*, 3 (9), 5-30.

⁶ Note in this regard that Transnistria has three official languages. Besides Russian, these are Ukrainian and 'Soviet Moldovan', that is, the Moldovan still written in an adapted Cyrillic alphabet as it was used in the Moldovan SSR until 1989.

lished its own state-like structures with in own constitution, an elected president and a parliament, a judicial system, police and border guards, its own national bank and currency, a national flag which is almost identical to that of the former Moldovan SSR, and an anthem and coat of arms. In this way, a Transnistrian state and nation could be visually imagined and seen in daily life by its citizens.

A limited form of statehood is a prerequisite for constructing nationhood. Clearly demarcated borders and border control physically create a Transnistrian region, while different kinds of events, monuments, and memorials create a subjective feeling of belonging to a Transnistrian state. Events like Victory Day (День Победы) on 9 May and various museums and monuments dedicated to the remembrance of the Great Patriotic War, as the Second World War is called not only in Transnistria but all over the former USSR except the Baltics, reinforce the identification with the greatness of the Soviet past. This Soviet affiliation has been further preserved and extended by Transnistrian narratives of history that have been taught in schools and spread by the local official, or at least pro-government, media. These narratives have been juxtaposed to the ones being taught in right bank Moldova by minimising Moldova's link to Greater Romania and instead focusing on its history within the former USSR.

Many symbols of Transnistrian national identity can be seen as a juxtaposition against a Moldovan state with Romanian, and increasingly 'EU', affiliations. Even the locally produced cognac, depicted on one of Transnistria's banknotes and as such one of the symbols of Transnistrian nationhood, has been juxtaposed to Moldovan wine. High taxes for the import of wine and other products from Moldova have been intended to encourage an affiliation with Transnistrian products and, consequently, Transnistrian nationhood.¹ Other symbols and celebrations can be considered as a way to forge a unique Transnistrian identity. The most important celebration in this regard is Independence Day on 2 September, but also monuments and memories about the Moldovan-Transnistrian War of 1992 and subsequent narratives about an alleged 'fascist-Moldovan aggression' have been institutionalised in creating a Transnistrian idea and identity.²

¹ For a more detailed discussion on Transnistria's post-secession economy, coping strategy, and economic stakeholders, see Parmentier, F. (2010), 'Construction étatique et 'capitalisme de contrebande' en Transnistrie', *Transitions*, XLV №1, 135-151.

² Bobick, M. (2011), 'Profits of disorder: images of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic', *Global Crime*, 12 (4), 239-265.

TRANSNISTRIA'S PRESENT IDENTITY

Strong references to the USSR, for which there exists sincere and understandable popular nostalgia, have certainly forged an identification at the grassroots level with the Transnistrian state, at least among the Slavic population. Another important factor in explaining the success of Transnistrian nation building, however, has been the physical and informational isolation of its citizens from the other side of the Dniestr. As shown in one study, access to information other than local Transnistrian and Russian sources has been largely limited during the years of de-facto independence.³ The strict border controls which were established in 1997-99 are perceived to have enhanced the informational isolation. But in either case, the strong identification with the Russian language among the majority of Transnistria's inhabitants made it so that the latter were psychologically oriented much more toward the Russian sphere in the first place. In recent years, however, Transnistria's border controls have been relaxed. If before hardly any foreigners, least of all Westerners, were allowed to enter Transnistria, now foreign journalists can make documentaries about life in this peculiar entity. Yet, Moldovan television channels still can't work or film in Transnistria, although negotiations have been initiated on this matter too.⁴

These changes reflect a political shift in Transnistria. In late 2010, after two decades in power, President Igor N. Smirnov, Transnistria's first president and personification, ceded power after elections to Yevgeni V. Shevchuk of the opposition Republican Renewal Party (Республиканская партия «Обновление»). The policies of the new head of the de-facto state seem to emphasize more cooperation with Moldova and the EU and, at the same time, the consolidation of Transnistrian state- and nationhood. Physical and informational isolation as a strategy of nation building isn't feasible in the current context any longer because of the increasing importance of internet and satellite TV as sources of information, the large number of Transnistrians working or studying abroad, and the demands among part of Transnistria's citizens for economic and institutional reforms.

At the same time, as we also notice from our observations in Transnistria, such a strategy of nation building

³ Promo-LEX (2012), 'The media market and the access to media on the left bank of the Nistru', www.promolex.md/upload/publications/en/doc_1340371914.pdf.

⁴ Since right bank Moldova was not willing to air Transnistrian television, the latter also refused to air productions and channels of the former.

isn't really necessary anymore, since most citizens, not in the least the younger population segments who were born in the late 1980s and early 1990s and grew up and were acculturated in the state, recognize Transnistrian nationhood and identify with it. Similarly, narratives about Moldova's affiliations with (Greater) Romania have become less effective as a way to forge a Transnistrian resistance identity, since nationalists striving for unification with Romania have been largely marginalised as a political force in Moldova itself. Instead, for the last three years, a pro-EU coalition has won a majority over the Communist Party of Moldova, making the juxtaposition between a EU- or Western-oriented Moldova and a Russia- or Eurasia-oriented Transnistria a much more interesting and realistic paradigm for the creation of a resistance identity.

In order to investigate which narratives people and opinion leaders living in Transnistria use in forging their national identity, we conducted some twenty interviews in spring 2013 with Transnistrian youth in Tiraspol. The respondents which we met and spoke to were between 18 and 30 years old, and as such have no childhood memories or even no active memories of life in the Moldovan SSR. We interviewed respondents from different ethnic backgrounds, thus making comparisons between ethnic groups possible. Our research confirms the findings of Chamberlain-Creangă that mark different positions towards the Transnistrian state.¹ While Transnistrian citizens of an ethnic Moldovan background are generally more negative and skeptical vis-à-vis Transnistrian statehood, those of Slavic ethnicity and background are clearly most supportive and claim to be Transnistrian citizens. All of our respondents from an ethnic Moldovan background mentioned the illegal and fictional character of the state. As one said, "Transnistria is an invented people, and not like a country, it's a product of Soviet colonisation and propaganda."²

When explaining the differences between Moldova and Transnistria, and consequently formulating their image of a Transnistrian state- and nationhood, seven respondents of Slavic background referred to the costs of living. According to three respondents, the cost of electricity and gas is ten times more expensive in Moldova. One respondent mentioned gas being six times cheaper in Transnistria than in Moldova. Also, reference was made

to pensions being higher in Transnistria, better social services and roads — as we could observe ourselves — in Transnistria, although public transport was considered to be of better quality in right bank Moldova. Economic performance and job opportunities are another aspect upon which Transnistrians define their feelings of national identity. Initially, Transnistria was economically better off, with employment opportunities in its factories and the economic support of Russia. Currently, however, most factories are closed mainly due to a lack of export possibilities, and Russian economic support of the region is declining. In the interviews we performed, we did also notice a positive connotation towards the 'EU', be it mainly related to the perspective of, or hopes for, economic development and employment in the region.³

Respondents also mentioned the greater political stability in their republic. According to two respondents, the electoral victory of the current president clearly shows that Transnistria is a democracy and that it has a functioning state system. Another respondent stated that "at least Transnistria has a president", thereby making reference to the political instability of right bank Moldova, during which the country didn't have a president for more than a year. This means that Transnistrian narratives stating to be more democratic and stable than right bank Moldova, as described by Caspersen in 2012, find resonance among Transnistrians.⁴

FROM MICRO-REGIONAL TO GLOBAL COLLISION?

Although state performances in public transport, social services, the creation of job opportunities and political stability, or more correctly the perception of state performance in these fields, has an important impact on how Transnistrians describe their feelings of belonging towards the Transnistrian and Moldovan state, identity issues in Moldova are most often described in cultural terms. Eleven respondents stated that the main difference between both banks of the Dniestr is Moldova's lean towards the EU and Transnistria's affiliations with Russia and Russian culture. Transnistria is defined as be-

³ According to a study of Bobcova, 90% of respondents from both sides of the river bank stated that the economic situation in their country is difficult or unbearable and 81% would approve a greater cooperation between both river banks for economic development. Bobcova, E. (2009). 'Development patterns for Moldova and Transnistria in the post-conflict period', Institute for Public Policy — Black Sea Peacebuilding Network, www.ipp.md/public/files/Proiecte/blacksee/eng/BobcovaENG.pdf.

⁴ Caspersen, (2012), 'Democracy, nationalism and (lack of) sovereignty: the complex dynamics of democratization in unrecognized states', *Nations and nationalism*, 17 (2), 337-356.

¹ Chamberlain-Creangă, R. A. (2006). 'The 'Transnistrian people': citizenship and imaginings of 'the state' in an unrecognized country', *Ablimperio*, 4 (2006), 1-29.

² Interview with a female respondent, aged 20, Tiraspol, 10 April 2013.

ing more anchored in the former USSR while Moldova is defined as “wanting to be like Europe”. Nine respondents named the difference in language, that is, Russian versus Moldovan or Romanian, as one of the main differences between the two river banks.

Remarkably, no reference was made to Transnistrian values of multi-ethnicity or to Moldova’s perceived connections with Greater Romania, nor did any of our respondents use Transnistrian narratives of victimization and ‘fascist-Moldovan aggression’ related to the Transnistrian-Moldovan War of 1992 in order to define Transnistrian state- and nationhood. Instead, a rigid West-against-Russia dichotomy was applied. Positive or negative feelings towards the Moldovan or the Transnistrian state and subsequent identity have been formulated on the basis of a connection to the European-Western or the Russian-Eurasian world. Both respondents of Moldovan and Slavic background expressed negative feelings towards the Western world in general and specifically the US and its society, although respondents from ethnic Russian background were the most critical.

As one stated “Nothing good comes from the West. The internet is bad for children. Now we have child prostitution in Transnistria because people watch movies from the West. Alcohol and drugs now have become the norm in Transnistria. In the USSR all was better.”¹ Five respondents claimed not to like Western consumerism and the greed that they perceive to be connected with it. One young man among our interviewees, for example, stated not to understand the need to buy a new smartphone every year. Similarly, one young woman was critical about clothing trends coming from the West, more specifically the need to wear makeup and jewelry. She believes that this is superficial and imported by ‘the West’. Another respondent noted, “We are not like the West where people buy products and don’t believe in anything. Yet on TV they propagandise this.”²

Superficiality, consumerism, greed, the (failing) capitalistic system, and individualism figured among the terms most commonly used by our respondents in order to describe Western and more specifically American society that is perceived to be the core and the role model of the first. Interestingly, these negative connotations towards what is seen as Western culture and symbols are often opposed with a Transnistrian or Russian value or prac-

tice. When talking negatively about Western culture and its capitalistic system, they mentioned the former Soviet societal system to be better. When discussing unhealthy food habits, like the consumption of pre-fabricated foods or genetically modified vegetables, respondents referred to natural Transnistrian foods and local cuisine. Western values like hyper-individualism, greed, and homosexuality have been juxtaposed by Transnistrian and Russian values like hospitality, camaraderie, humanity, and manhood. This way, Transnistrian identity can still be understood as a resistance identity. This time, though, it is not one that is opposed to Moldovan culture, whether or not linked to the history and notion of Greater Romania, but opposed to the Western world, into which Moldova is assumed to be integrating and compromising its own identity.

FINAL CONCLUSIONS

Narratives upon which the citizens of the Transnistrian entity have forged their national identity have changed significantly during the now more than two decades of de-facto independence. Rather than only looking at elite narratives and strategies of identity construction by leading sectors of society, we interviewed young people currently living in Transnistria and looked at recent developments. First, we found that the economic performance of the state, or more precisely a perception on state performance in this field, is an important aspect for respondents in evaluating Transnistrian statehood. In a situation where economic cooperation with Moldova and the EU is considered to be necessary and desirable by the incumbent head of state and its population, a strategy of factional isolation seems to be infeasible for forging a local identity. Second, in a context where access to external sources of information is facilitated by an increasing importance of the internet as a source of information and eased border control policies, a strategy of informational isolation seems to be infeasible as well.

And third, a resistance identity based on Moldova’s affiliations with Romania has become largely irrelevant since Moldovan nationalists and irredentists are currently a fringe fraction in the country. Within the framework of Moldovan-European cooperation in the EU neighbourhood policy, ‘right bank Moldova’, like the Baltic countries before it, is, by many Transnistrians, perceived as integrating if not selling out to the EU, ‘Western culture’, and the Western societal model. In the context of these societal changes, a resistance identity formerly oriented against ‘Moldova’ and ‘Greater Romania’ has mutated

¹ Interview with a male respondent, aged 22, Tiraspol, 12 April 2013.

² Interview with a female respondent, aged 25, Tiraspol, 12 April 2013.

into a resistance identity against the Western world in general and what is seen as American culture specifically. But at the end of the day, this merely reflects, on a micro-regional scale, the changing global paradigm in which Western hegemony and its neoliberal and globalist societal model are increasingly being contested from the Russian and other emerging spheres.



Transnistria Map

FAR EASTERN REGIONAL IDENTITY AS A CONTEMPORARY INDIGENEITY: HISTORIC AND CONTEMPORARY DISCOURSE

Ivan Zolotukhin

INTRODUCTION

This article seeks to emphasize further aspects. Firstly, the Russian State plays an important role in the origin of Far Eastern identity, as it impacts the socio-cultural processes on the East, as well as introduces new forms of economic structures, controls migrant flows, and develops the necessary military and transport infrastructure to hold the territory together and prevent possible outside invasion.

Secondly, because of the geographic remoteness of the Far East, the state implemented different measures to overcome the sense of alienation among the newcomers and migrants from the central parts of the Russian Empire and USSR, intending to turn the Far East into a buffer.

However, weak population density, as well as the unsuccessful performance of infrastructural and transport objectives, led to a severe miscalculation in Far Eastern development and, as a result of the frequent exacerbation in the socio-cultural structure, the threat of the gradual secession the Far Eastern territory from the Russian mainland.

Finally, the contemporary attempts of the Russian Government to realize strategic projects, which refer to the significance of the Far East as a probable core center of Asia-Pacific integration, collide with the risks of depopulation and both illegal and unqualified labor migration. The data reflects contradictions and differences among federal and regional interests and challenges as well as the transformation of regional Far Eastern identity.

The resulting conclusion reflects changes in perception of the Far Eastern territory as a possible locality of new identity. It may lead in turn to the emergence of a new indigenusness, not unlike that of local minorities.

TERRITORY AND COLONIZATION

The destiny of the Russian Far East is closely related to the destiny of the whole of Russia. The entire history of Russia is a motion north- and eastward, to the coasts of the two oceans — the Pacific and Arctic ones.

In the beginning of the twenty first century, the senior political leadership of the country has taken a course on the major increase of an active presence of Russia in the Asia Pacific. Further decisions have shown that the national leadership of our country, as a minimum, has plans to increase the general level of development of the Far Eastern territories.

In accordance with the program adopted in 2007 to boost economic and social development of the Russian Far East and Baikal Region through the year 2013, the federal budget has allocated some 400 billion Russian rubles (approx-



Ivan Zolotukhin

*Ph.D., Far Eastern State University,
Vladivostok, Russia.*

imately \$14 billion) to build new, and modernize existing, transportation and energy networks, as well as other infrastructure, and to create new industrial production. To implement the federal program of development of the Russian Far East and Baikal Region (adopted in 2009) with the time range through 2025, the authorities have pledged to provide some 3.7 trillion rubles (more than \$120 billion) from the federal budget for the duration of 11 years.¹

The success of the implementation of these projects is largely dependent on their perception by the local population. Previous federal programs have shown their poor effectiveness: none of them was fully completed. It is important to keep in mind that if until recently the human resource flows were moving from the West to the East of the country, now they reverted and move from the East to the West. All attempts to change the direction of this flow did not bring any meaningful results, as the population of the Russian Far East, while not being large to begin with, continues to shrink. However, it is the people who are the main resource of exploration and development of the territory.

It was Fridrich Ratzel who pointed out that the measure of development of a culture is the level of spiritual connection that a person has to the land in which one lives. The lack of a settled lifestyle is the lack of "spiritual roots". Thus, colonization became the most important element of the government policy towards the population of the Far Eastern lands.

The settling of the lands now known as the Russian Far East started in the seventeenth century, and the first large permanent settlements have appeared in the middle of the nineteenth century; this was the time when such major cities as Khabarovsk and Vladivostok were founded. The establishment of the cities gave a new impulse to the migration processes in the Russian Far East.

The buildup of military forces, including first of all the Cossacks of Transbaikalia and the Urals, allowed the establishing of an administrative authority in the region. Those who were transferred to the army reserve and who were willing to settle in the Russian Far East were recipients of certain benefits, which encouraged an allocation of the labor force to the economy of the region. Settlement was also encouraged by the impeded com-

munications. Besides, an important role was played by the relocation of the peasantry during 1861-1907.

The inflow of migrants was also boosted by the organization of a maritime communication route between Odessa and Vladivostok. Another meaningful factor affecting the migration flow was forced settlement, which occurred when settlers who had been political and criminal prisoners in the past were forbidden to come back to their native lands; very often these were highly educated and active members of the various ethnic, religious, and cultural communities.

The ethnic composition of the migrants was also diverse, however, the dominant factions of these were migrants from the Ukrainian provinces who made over 70% of the total figures. For instance, in the Soviet period, they constituted the majority of the population of the Primorsky Krai province.

A breakthrough of migration took place when the Trans-Siberian railroad was completed and when Russia has lost the Russo-Japanese war. The appearance of railroad communication towards the Russian Far East encouraged the development of ethnic processes, which before that were characterized as sluggish. An additional factor became the development of the Russian Pacific Navy.

The success of the migration policy in Siberia can be explained by the fact that it relied on free folk colonization, while the government implemented its plans relying on free folk migration. There was a geopolitical task of its own embedded into this process. Petr Semyonov-Tyan-Shansky describes this shift of ethnographic borderline between Europe and Asia in a way of moving it further to the East, which came as a result of the Russian colonization.²

The peasants' colonization was intentionally planned as a much needed supplement to military expansion. The imperial authorities have tried to "along with the military service, also create a migration service. Thus, intentionally or unintentionally, the peasants' colonization was becoming an important component of the imperial policy, while the peasants themselves were becoming an effective conduit of such an imperial policy. In the ideas of the imperial politicians, those were the peasants who

¹ See *Dalniy Vostok: Programma Razvitiya do 2025 goda* (The Russian Far East: The Program of Development through year 2025), <http://kapital-rus.ru/articles/article/225259/> (accessed 26 May 2013).

² Nikolay Nartov, *Geopolitika* (Geopolitics) (Moscow: Aspekt-press, 2003), 119.

should have created bonding constructions of the imperial space.”¹

In the Russian colonization model, the expansion of the empire was a synonym of the acquisition of the Eastern periphery by Russia. Russia was growing at the expense of the new lands. Contemporary researcher Leonid Gorizontov sees this through the lens of the “dual expansion” of the Russian Empire: territorial growth of the empire was accompanied by the gravitation of the adjacent periphery into the orbit of influence of the Russian “imperial nucleus.”²

However, the Russian imperial project, which made provisions for a gradual acquisition of Siberia and the Russian Far East by the imperial nucleus, had put forward not so much economic, but rather, political tasks. It was a difficult and long process to turn the Siberian and the Far Eastern territories into Russia itself.

As Benedict Anderson points out, the “Russification” of the diverse ethnic communities of the tsar’s territories was in essence a forced and intended merger of the two opposing political orders, one of which was ancient, while the other one was completely new.”³

This should have given the empire a greater stability and should have provided the Russian imperial build-up an important internal impulse, thus giving the empire a national future. Not only in the Russian, but also in the Ukrainian and the Byelorussian provinces, one could see a strategic reserve of expansion of the imperial nucleus of the West and the Southwest, to Siberia and the Russian Far East, where Ukrainians and Byelorussians,

along with Russians, could successfully build “a great Russian nation.”⁴

CONSTRUCTING NEW INDIGENOUSNESS

Migrants have kept their historical memory via preserved features of their culture and the names of thousands upon thousands of towns and villages (such as Chernigovka, Novokievka, Poltavka, etc.) While being detached from the socio-cultural environment that they were so much used to, they would enter into completely different natural and environmental conditions, so they therefore would need to change their professions and trades at the point of experiencing the culture of the Orient. They would realize that their “Russianness” rubbed off on all their local cultural features, which they had so passionately preserved in their former native lands.⁵

However, the composition of the Slavic population of Siberia and the Russian Far East was complex, not only ethnically (the Russians, the Ukrainians, and the Byelorussians), religiously (the Orthodox, the Old-believers, the sectarians) and socially (the peasants, the Cossacks, the deportees, the retired soldiers and sailors), but also by the regional characteristics of their place of origin. The preserved regional and ethno-cultural differences, frequent inter-ethnic marriages, ethno-cultural contacts and economic cooperation, and close interaction with the non-Slavic religious environment have pushed Slavic peoples towards consolidation based on the Russian ethnicity and discouraged the formation of clearly defined Ukrainian and Byelorussian enclaves in the Russian Far East.⁶

However, in Siberia and the Russian Far East, a new challenge to the imperial policy was arising, which was the formation of a feeling of the territorial isolation of the local population. Besides populating the territories with colonists desirable for Russian statehood, it was also important to strengthen imperial unity.

The collapse of the Russian Empire did not bring about the independence of Siberia and the Russian Far East (even the Far Eastern Republic was rather a political for-

¹ See Anatoliy Remnyov, *Sdelat Sibir i Dalniy Vostok russkimi. K voprosu o politicheskoi motivatsii kolonizatsionnykh protsessov XIX-nachala XX veka* (To Make Siberia and the Far East Russian. On the issue of Political Motivation of the Processes of Colonization (XIX-early XX century)), <http://www.panasia.ru/main/182/4.html> (accessed 3 June 2013).

² Leonid Gorizontov, «Bolshaya russkaya natsiya» v imperskoy I regionalnoy strategiyah samodержaviya («Great Russian Nation» in Imperial and Regional Strategies of Autocracy), in B.V. Ananich and S.I. Barzilov, eds., *Prostranstvo vlasti: Istoricheskiy opyt Rossii i vyzovy sovremennosti* (Moscow: Moskovskiy obshchestvenniy nauchnyy fond, 2001), 129-151.

³ Benedict Anderson, *Voobrazhaemye soobshchestva. Razmyshleniya ob istokakh I rasprostraneni natsionalizma* (Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism) (Moscow: Kanon-press, 2001), 108.

⁴ Aleksey Miller, «Ukrainskiy vopros» v politike vlastey i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii (vtoraya polovina XIX veka) (“The Ukrainian Issue” in the Government’s Policy and in the Russia’s Public Opinion (sec. half of the XIXth Century)) (Saint-Petersburg: «Aletaya», 2000), 31-41.

⁵ Remnyov, *Sdelat Sibir i Dalniy Vostok russkimi*.

⁶ Ibid.

mation, a buffer state against Japan) due to the preservation of the close political, economic, and cultural links and existence of the Trans-Siberian railroad that served as an important connection with the center. As Dominique Liven suggests, "[...] if Siberians would get their liberty and regional representative institutions, around which their regional patriotism could form, they could have created their own identity, which similarly to Australia and Canada might have grown into an independent nation-state."¹

The next generations of migrants were forming a feeling of the territory as a land of their own; this was the relationship with their new homeland.

In the Soviet period, the structure of the inflow of the population included the former prisoners of the GULAG and those who remained in the settlements after they were discharged: the military servicemen, the workers, the young party activists, those who participated in the grand socialist construction projects, and college students who were offered employment opportunities far away from their homes after graduation, as well as the representatives of ethnic minorities. This inflow of migrants was characterized by the diversity of ethnicities, social origins, and educational and cultural backgrounds.

The factors that encouraged an active inter-ethnic cooperation between the migrants who arrived in the Russian Far East are identified as follows: ethnic diversity; sufficient autonomy of the Russian Far East that was caused by the remoteness of the transportation communication lines; presence of their own transportation links with the major states of the East; partial localization of production; autonomous facilitation of education and reproduction of culture; insufficiency of the population and a lowered competition in all industries and areas of human activities; presence of threats on a national scale; and uniqueness of natural. New behavior stereotypes and cultural values were formed, which in turn allowed those who lived here to call themselves Far-Easterners, all of that while they still preserved their affiliation with their smaller territorial communities — those of Primorye, Magadan, of Sakhalin Island, Khabarovsk, and Kamchatka, along with their ethnic affiliation since they

¹ Domenik Liven, *Rossiia kak imperiia: sravnitel'naya perspektiva* (Russia as Empire: Comparative Prospect), in A.O. Chubar'ian, eds., *Evropeiskii opyt i prepodavanie istorii v postsovetsoy Rossii* (Moscow: IVI-RAN, 1999), 273.

remained Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Uzbeks, Jews, Koreans, etc.²

REGIONAL IDENTITY OF THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST

It is important to mention that the retention of colonization as a priority did not go through any transformations, even during the times of the USSR, as the government policy was directed at the exploration and exploitation of the Far Eastern territories, and not turning "the far away periphery" into "the new frontier".

For nearly 400 years, both the Imperial and Soviet governments exploited Siberia's fabulous resources, treating it as a colony. The pattern of development included the creation of military outposts and the fur trade, followed by the colonization by peasants and government resettlement policies. In the twentieth century, the Far East and Siberia were the most "Soviet" regions of the country, as far as its economy (defense industry and extraction of raw materials), social structure, and way of life were concerned.³ This was also the land of GULAG.⁴

After the collapse of the USSR, some dramatic transformations on the political space took place, which brought about changes in the self-consciousness and hierarchy of the group identities. While in the majority of the "ethnic" republics of the Russian Federation the ethnic identities were coming to the forefront, the "Russian" constituencies of the Federation promoted their regional identities.⁵

In the 1990s, the process of the formation of regional identities rose to a new level that could be explained by the "sovereignization" of the ethnic autonomies, as it also boosted a similar process in the Russian regions. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, regional identity became a prominent factor of social life for the Russian Far East, which accompanied the escalation of the issue

² See Andrey Kuminov, *Dalnevostochniki kak novaya etnicheskaya sushchnost* (Far-easterners as a New Ethnic Essence), <http://www.clubdv.ru/forum/index.php?showtopic=161> (accessed 4 June 2013).

³ Sergey Karaganov, *Strategiya dlya Rossii: Povestka dnya dlya Prezidenta-2000* (The Strategy for Russia: Agenda for President-2000) (Moscow: Vagrius, 2000), 67.

⁴ Dmitri Trenin, *The End of Eurasia. Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001), 208.

⁵ See Valeriy Achkasov, *Regionalnaya identichnost v rossiyskom politicheskom prostranstve* (Regional Identity in Russian Political Space), <http://www.politex.info/content/view/90/30/> (accessed 29 May 2013).

of Center-Region relations in the complex of security challenges.

Andrey Kuminov highlights the existence of the Far Eastern identity that is based on a sense of ethnic belonging, as he says that "far eastern ethnicity is a reality, which has not yet led to self-consciousness due to the fact that the Russian Far East is currently a subsidized region."¹

In many ways, the formation of the Far Eastern regional identity was the outcome of government policy. As was noted by S.B. Pereslegin, "Russian's exploration of Siberia and the Russian Far East used to be of a colonial character. Here we speak about... exploitation, hawkish exploitation of natural resources... The situation has changed in recent years due to indifference demonstrated by Moscow regarding the destiny of eastern and northern lands. The Russian Far East ceased to remain a colony, as Moscow would no longer need it."²

An analysis of the socio-cultural situation of the Russian Far East suggests that the routine life of far-easterners is different from the routine life of those who live in Central Russia. Very often, regional collisions and differences are over-exaggerated by local politicians.³

It is obvious that the "problem of the Russian Far East" exists, as there exist three components that constitute it: (1) historically brief period of time of being an integral part of Russia, its insufficient cultural and psychological sense of "belonging", and the relatively low "rootedness" of the population; (2) remoteness from "native Russia", which nurtures an image of the colonial character of the region; (3) borderline proximity to foreign centers of economic gravitation and geopolitical activity; this proximity is related to the sensation of inter-civilizational separation, which manifests itself as closeness to Another.⁴

A Research Project of the National Political Agency (an autonomous non-governmental organization of information and analysis programs) conducted a study that identified the following data about the Russian Far

Eastern population: some 57.1% of respondents agreed with an existence of a "the far-eastern character"; 42.4% associate themselves with "the citizens of Russia"; and 27.6% associate themselves with the "citizens of the region". To the question "Are you proud to live in the Russian Far East?" 38.4% answered "quite proud" and 19.7% answered "very proud". At the same time, this patriotism appears to have an idealistic character. Not all of the interviewees think of their region as advanced and future-oriented. Furthermore, answering the question, "Does the Russian Far East need changes?", the majority of respondents — some 56.9% of them — chose to answer, "The Russian Far East needs deep, principal changes".

Hence, the perception of their status originates from the following positions: "I am proud to live in the Russian Far East, but much needs to be changed here", or "I am proud of my region, but I poorly evaluate the current socio-economic situation of the Russian Far East."⁵

A major grievance towards the center is not even that the Russian Far East is "abandoned", but it is about the fact that the center does not have any clear rules of the game or any consistent policy towards the region. This policy is reactive and makes the population unsatisfied, as it imposes the "wrong" way of development for the region.⁶

PROGRAMS OF DEVELOPMENT AS PLANS OF KEEPING INDIGENOUSNESS

At the end of 2009, the Strategy of socio-economic development of the Russian Far East and Baikal Region for a period of time through the year 2025 was adapted. It indicates that "a strategic goal of the development of the Russian Far East and Baikal Region is an implementation of a geopolitical goal of retaining the population [of these regions] by means of the formation of a developed economy and comfortable environment for life of people in the constituencies of the Russian Federation located on this territory, as well as their achievement of Russia's average level of socio-economic development."⁷

⁵ Ibid., 51-56.

⁶ Ibid., 27.

⁷ Strategiya sotsialno-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Dalnego Vostoka i Baikalskogo regiona na period do 2025 goda (The Strategy of Social and Economic Development of the Far East and Baikal Region through year 2025), http://www.minregion.ru/activities/territorial_planning/strategy/federal_development/346/ (accessed 30 May 2013).

¹ Kuminov, *Dalnevostochniki kak novaya etnicheskaya sushchnost*

² Sergey Pereslegin, *Samouchitel igry na mirovoy shakhmatnoy doske* (Tutorial for Playing on the Global Chessboard) (Moscow: AST, 2005), 428-429.

³ Proekt nomer 166 «Naselenie rossiyskogo Dalnego Vostoka: identichnost, patriotism, stsennari budushchego» (Noyabr 2009) (Project #166 «The Russian Far East Population: Identity, Patriotism, Scenarios for the Future») (November, 2009) (Uglich-Moscow: Natsionalnoe politicheskoe agentstvo, 2009), 25.

⁴ Ibid., 25.

The Program stipulates a complex development of the region through personnel training, the solution of social issues, and development of education, healthcare, retention of the population — all of which is described in 12 sub-programs. Besides, the program now includes two designated federal programs, “The Russian Far East and Baikal Region” (through 2018) and “Development of the Kuril Islands” (through 2015). It plans to change the very structure of the economy of the Russian Far East. From a raw material-supplying appendage, it should transform into a competitive region.¹ Victor Ishayev, the Federal Minister for the Development of the Russian Far East, believes that the Russian Far East and Baikal Region, in the course of the implementation of the created program of development of the macro-region, will switch from the “catching-up model of development” to “advanced one” by 2025.²

October 2012 marked the formation of the Ministry of Development of the Russian Far East, which became an indication of the serious intent of the government in relation to the eastern territories. Scholarly and popular discourses witness the emergence of a new expression, “Pacific Russia”, which sounds promising not only to the citizens of the Russian Far East, but also for the whole of Russia and its neighbors.

However, the level of socio-economic development of the territories of the Russian Far East, by many indicators, is far behind the European regions of Russia. The level and the quality of life here is lower, and the infrastructure is less developed. The population figures are decreasing at a faster pace (among the reasons is the flow of the population away from the provinces of the Russian Far East) than Russia’s average, which creates risks of depopulation and the reduction of the far eastern territories into an anthropological desert. According to the data from the all-Russia census of 2010, the whole of the Far Eastern Federal District was the home for 6.3 million people, and within 8 years (as compared to the figures of the previous census), the population has shrunk by 400,000 people. The most populated territory is now Primorsky Krai, which is currently home to 2 million people.

¹ Dalniy Vostok: programma razvitiya do 2025 goda

² See Po mneniyu glavy Ministerstva Dalnego Vostoka Viktora Ishaeva, DFO i Baikalskiy region do 2025 goda pereydet k operezhaiushchey modeli razvitiia (According to opinion of Viktor Ishaev (the Head of the Ministry of Far East Development), the Russian Far Eastern and Baikal Region will move to the advanced model of development). RIA-Novosti, <http://dv.ria.ru/economy/20130114/82182052.html> (accessed 14 January 2013).

The Far Eastern community is distinguished by a higher level of crime rates. Among the factors that produce such rates are a lower level of culture (independent of social class) and higher levels of population marginalization. The unwillingness of highly trained personnel to live and to work on the territory of the Russian Far East, along with an inflow of a poorly trained labor force from Central Asia (under conditions of quota elimination), will cause social disruption and cleavages in the region due to the fact that labor and other migrants, in terms of the ethnicity and culture, continue to be aliens (and they very often also remain a marginal part of society).

In many ways, the implementation of large-scale projects initiated and financed by the federal center becomes a major factor affecting the increase of the level of development of the Russian Far East since it also creates the conditions for effective international integration. At the same time, participation in international integration processes, at its minimum, implies a perception of the Far Eastern territories by the Russian political elite not simply as a zone for development projects, but also as an object of strategic interest of the state with consideration to the existing threats and opportunities.

Among major threats is a relative weakness of the geopolitical position of Russia in the region, a low competitiveness of the Russian Far East on the level of the quality of life as compared to the other regions of Russia, and the peripheral positioning of Russia’s Pacific coast in regards to the integration processes ongoing in the Asia-Pacific region. It is also important to keep in mind a significant inter-civilizational gap between the population of the Russian Far East and the peoples of the neighboring nations. One of the major challenges is the infrastructural insufficiency of the Far Eastern territories. For example, the level of socio-economic development of Primorsky Krai province, on average, is not keeping up with similar levels observed in the province’s capital, the city of Vladivostok, which in the conditions of an increasing drain of the populations, can lead to the breaking of connections with the center.

At the same time, amongst the conditions favorable to the development of the Russian Far East, one could speak of the meaningful geopolitical weight of Russia in the world. This generally encourages national unity as a common interest for all members of our country, as well as a positive perception and sense of attractiveness for Vladivostok as the easternmost largest Russian city, an intriguing image of Vladivostok as “Europe in

Asia", and its proximity to the Asia-Pacific nations. In 2009, Vladivostok started building APEC-2012 Summit venue facilities, including among many others, a brand new campus for the Far Eastern Federal University on Russky island, the world's largest cable-stayed bridges in Vladivostok, a new oil terminal and a refinery near Nakhodka, a gas pipeline from the Sakhalin Island to the Primorsky krai province, etc.

The accelerated development of Vladivostok is aimed at the necessity to compete with such Asia-Pacific centers as Hong Kong, Tokyo, Seoul, San Francisco, and Shanghai. The capital of the Primorsky Krai province is a major center of diplomatic cooperation: here one can find eight general, and 11 honorary, consulates of foreign nations. The city has established sister relations with 12 foreign cities and one autonomous region, as well as having concluded friendship and cooperation agreements with cities in China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam.

Vladivostok actively develops trade relations with its neighbors throughout the region while being a venue for economic forums and programs of cultural cooperation, as well as remaining a major tourist destination for the Russian Far East. Among existing transportation hubs, there exists a base point for the Trans-Siberian railroad, a large sea port with a cargo turnover of 10 million tons per year, and a new international airport.

According to the opinion of Igor Romanov, a Russian scholar who deals with migration problems, the territories of Siberia and the Russian Far East conceal a potential that provides Russia with its only option to reach a new level of development, yet even today there is the prioritization of a material component: the resources of the region and its economic development. However, the first thing that should look at is the social and cultural situation of the examined society. The colonial treatment of the Russian Far East should be rejected, and one should start looking at it anew as a major point of development for Russia.¹

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we may acknowledge that despite the existing threats of possibly losing the Far Eastern frontier territory that the Russian government currently faces, the further development of this region, as a component

of the Russian territorial identity, becomes evident in one two scenarios: on the one hand, it is likely to be integrated both with Central Russia and the Asia-Pacific; on the other hand, taking into account the failure of government's development projects, it will become a desolate periphery with a decrepit infrastructure, which would await its abandonment while remaining in neglect. Therefore, the prospective concept of the Far Eastern territory's development is still being formulated, but that concept would depend not only on the coherency of Moscow interests, but also on the processes that occur inside the land that is twice as big as the European part of Russia.

¹ See Igor Romanov, *Dalnevostochnaya strategiya* (The Far Eastern Strategy), <http://beregrus.ru/?p=150515.02.2013> (accessed 31 May 2013).



Andrew Korybko

Graduate Student at MGIMO's Governance and Global Affairs Program, from Brook Park, OH (Cleveland), lives in Moscow, Russian Federation

RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES: INCOMPATIBILITY OF IDENTITIES OR GREAT POWER COMPETITION?

Andrew Korybko

INTRODUCTION

Russia and the United States are clearly engaged in great power competition in the current international climate, although the extent of such competition, and whether or not it is surmountable, remains up for debate. The two countries have distinct national identities and perspectives on international relations, thereby presenting an obstacle to future long-term strategic cooperation. It is even possible that such divergent identities and perspectives may be inherently incompatible¹, and without any revolutionary changes therein, the two states may be doomed to a perpetual rivalry that could one day presuppose a serious crisis in bilateral affairs. An analysis of the state of Russia and the United States' great power competition will reveal that its underlying nature in fact lies in the aforementioned incompatibility of identities, and that a continuance of the current status quo will only lead to increasingly uncontrollable rivalry in all spheres.

The great power competition between Russia and the United States can be divided into three distinct categories:

- The Role of International Law
- Approaches to Sovereignty
- Military Solutions as Opposed to Diplomatic/Political Solutions to International Crises

Particular examples from each category will be examined, followed by an analysis of the distinct identities of both Russia and the United States. Next, the concept of incompatible identities will be tied in with the three categories in order to prove how it is truly the cause for the great power competition. Finally, a forecast on the future state of relations between Russia and the US will conclude the research.

I THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Russia and the US both have contradictory approaches to the role of international law in global affairs. Whereas the EU represents the ideal example of maintaining equal respect for domestic and international law, Russia and the US swerve to different directions. Russia still has internal problems that hinder its efficient application of domestic law, but it holds international law to the highest of esteems. The US is the opposite, and although effectively applying

¹ Shakleina, Tatiana. "US-Russian Engagement in Global Issues." RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Selected papers. Moscow: Website of the Chair of Applied Research of International Problems, 2013. 38. PDF.

domestic law, it selectively chooses when and where to apply international law¹. Examples of Russia's heralding of international law include its opposition and criticism to the bombing of Serbia and subsequent recognition of Kosovar Albanian independence, the 2003 Iraq War, the overstepping of UNSC 1973 by the US and its NATO allies, and the US' 2013 push for war in Syria. The reverse of the previous examples can be seen as the US' disregard for the concept of international law.

II APPROACHES TO SOVEREIGNTY

Continuing off the tangent of international law, both countries have differing views on the concept of state sovereignty. Russia feels that each national government is sovereign within its own territory and has the right to conduct its internal affairs without interference. It is not in favor of any kind of unrequested foreign involvement in the domestic activities of an internationally recognized sovereign state. Russia has remained consistent in this regard ever since the 1999 bombing of Serbia. The US sometimes shares the Russian view, but sometimes it does not. In this sense, it selectively approaches the topic of sovereignty in order to advance its subjective interests. Sovereignty is important to the US when, for example, it deals with the European/NATO diversification of pipelines from Russia, but it is completely ignored when the United States wants to 'advance democracy' through military or covert ('Color Revolution' and NGO) means.

Ironically, the US cites 'sovereignty' as its justification for 'going it alone' in military campaigns, as well as its refusal to abide by or sign/ratify certain international documents. Such documents that the US has not signed/ratified or, as in one instance, unilaterally pulled out of, include the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Where Russia is predictable in its approach to sovereignty, the United States is not. Its only predictability is that it will perform whatever action it deems necessary to uphold its interests and allow it to retain a dominant position, and abiding by international norms is always secondary to this objective.

¹ Yurievna, Tatiana. "National and Regional Dimension of Global Security." MGIMO. Russian Federation, Moscow. 02 Oct 2013. Lecture.

III MILITARY SOLUTIONS VS DIPLOMATIC/POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO CRISES

The approach to international crises is markedly differently between Russia and the US. Russia always prefers for such crises to be settled through diplomatic and political means. This further underscores Russia's previously mentioned commitment to state sovereignty. The extenuating exception may be seen in Russia's 2008 military campaign to 'force Georgia to peace', but even in that case, Russia was protecting its citizens under the pretense of existing international law. It also limited major combat operations to the de-facto independent republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Russia eventually recognized as independent states anyhow following the conflict. With the internationally (to the West) controversial 2008 exception being the outlier, Russia has maintained a strong consistency towards the principle of diplomatic and political solutions towards solving crises. The recent case in point can be seen with the Moscow-originated plan² to eliminate Syria's chemical weapons in order to prevent an American military intervention.

The US is of the opposite disposition in that it either engages in the use of force to resolve such crises, or at the very least, it militarily positions itself in order to intervene at a moment's notice. This demonstrates the US' inclination for dictating its preferences from a position of strength³. Therefore, threats and bellicose language reign supreme in the American method of crisis resolution. The possible use of force is commonly discussed, and should American-initiated violence not come to pass, as in the case with Sudan per the Darfur crisis or Iran and their nuclear energy question, then sanctions are enacted. Either way, the United States resorts to using some type of threatening leverage in order to achieve its ends. More often than not, the utilization of such leverage often has humanitarian consequences for the civilians living in the targeted state, and very rarely does it affect the government that the US publicly states it is working to undermine. The strongest example in this case can be evidenced by the decades-long blockade against Cuba, as it has utterly failed to remove the Communist Party from power, but it succeeded in con-

² "SECURITY COUNCIL REQUIRES SCHEDULED DESTRUCTION OF SYRIA'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS, UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTING RESOLUTION 2118 (2013)." *Security Council, United Nations*. Department of Public Information, News and Media Division, New York, 27 Sept 2013. Web. 29 Oct 2013.

³ Bogaturov, Alexei. "The Sources of American Conduct." *Russia in Global Affairs*. Russia in Global Affairs, 09 Feb 2005. Web. 30 Oct 2013

tributing to the relative impoverishment of the island's citizens well into the 21st century.

IV IDEOLOGY

The common thread linking together Russia and the US' approaches to the role of international law, sovereignty, and preferred methods of crises resolution is ideology. Russia's ideology tends to be more conservative to long-established international norms and structures and favorable towards a gradual transition to a multipolar world¹; the US' is more 'creative' in subjectively altering the dynamic of international relations and endeavouring to retain its prized position in a transitional world order. These two ideologies are inherently incompatible with one another, and each of them has other contributing factors that explain their genesis.

1a) Support of State Sovereignty

Russia places immense value upon the concept of state sovereignty in international relations in determining its identity, both in the foreign and domestic realm. In terms of foreign policy, this can be seen in sections 15, 28, and 31-B of Russia's 2013 Foreign Policy Concept². Russia actively supports international sovereignty when it speaks out against foreign involvement in Syria's domestic political crisis³. Domestically speaking, the Russian government has been standing in strong defense of recent legislation that has been sharply criticized by Western states⁴. Such legislation includes the anti-homosexual propaganda law, the mandated labeling of foreign-funded NGOs as 'foreign agents', and the ban on adoptions to homosexual couples. On the international front, Russia supports domestic sovereignty by shrugging off Western criticism of its allies' national elections and political processes, with the instance of Belarus being a prime example⁵. A suspicious attitude towards 'Color Revolutions' also shows Russia's unease towards

what it believes to be foreign meddling in the domestic political processes of other states⁶.

Russia's conservative commitment to state sovereignty is especially noticeable when one analyses the language of the charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), of which Russia is a founding signatory. The charter explicitly proclaims its members' opposition to terrorism, extremism, and separatism⁷. It is logical that any state would be against terrorism, but Russia's vehement rejection of extremism and separatism deserves a closer analysis. By being against extremism, this could be interpreted as being both religious and political extremism. In this sense, Russia is against any political developments that could 'shake the system', both domestically and internationally. As for the former, Russia is not supportive of extreme opposition movements that support radical changes in Russian social life and political policy (Pussy Riot), and in regards to the later, this could be seen as Russia's rejection of the Western-inspired revolutionary concepts of 'Humanitarian Intervention/Responsibility to Protect' and the spreading of democracy (oftentimes by force)⁸. Russia's fear of separatism is driven in part by its own domestic vulnerability to such threats, with the Northern Caucasus being its Achilles' heel⁹. Diplomatic assistance provided to Serbia during Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008 further demonstrates Russia's dedication to preserve the international status quo.

1b) Civilizationalism/Eurasianism

Perhaps one of the most important aspects of Russia's ideology is the idea that civilizations, especially its own unique one, are fulfilling a unique role in contemporary international relations. The Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2013 specifically makes mention that "for the first time in modern history, global competition takes on a civilizational level", and that "the major states of the world...should be representative in geographical and civilizational terms"¹⁰. It can be interpreted that Russia is

¹ Shakleina, Tatiana. "Russian-American Relations in Retrospect." *RUS-SIA AND THE UNITED STATES IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*, Selected papers. Moscow: Website of the Chair of Applied Research of International Problems, 2013. 66. PDF.

² "Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation." The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. 12 Feb 2013. Web. 27 Oct 2013.

³ "Why Russia is Standing by Syria's Assad." BBC News. BBC, 15 Jun 2012. Web. 29 Oct 2013.

⁴ Guillory, Sean. "Repression and Gay Rights in Russia." *The Nation*. The Nation, 26 Sept 2013. Web. 29 Oct 2013.

⁵ "Russia's Medvedev congratulates Belarus President Lukashenko on reelection." *RIA Novosti*. *RIA Novosti*, 25 Dec 2010. Web. 29 Oct 2013.

⁶ "No 'Color Revolutions' in Russia — Security Council Chief." *RIANovosti*. *RIA Novosti*, 18 Dec 2012. Web. 29 Oct 2013.

⁷ "Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Charter." *China Daily*. China Daily Information Co, 06 Dec 2006. Web. 29 Oct 2013.

⁸ Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.", Op. Cit., 31-B.

⁹ Rosenberg, Steve. "Inside Russia's Caucasus cauldron." *BBC News*. BBC, 08 Jun 2006. Web. 29 Oct 2013.

¹⁰ Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Op. Cit., 13, 30.

now viewing civilizations as a new type of actor in international relations, and that they are seen as positively contributing towards the establishment of a multipolar world order. This ideological breakthrough necessitates Russia to advocate that others respect the sovereignty of each civilization as well. Nowhere is this more clearly expressed in the Foreign Policy Concept than in point 14, where it is written that “a priority for world politics (is) to prevent civilizational fault line clashes and to intensify efforts to forge partnership of cultures, religions and civilizations in order to ensure a harmonious development of mankind. In these circumstances, imposing one’s own hierarchy of values can only provoke a rise in xenophobia, intolerance and tensions in international relations leading eventually to chaos in world affairs”¹. This is a thinly veiled rebuke of what Russia views to be the most dangerous pattern and trend of American international foreign policy in the 21st century — democracy promotion and subjective support of humanitarian interventions as justified (in the Western sense) by the right to protect ideology².

As to Russia’s civilization, it is uniquely Eurasian. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) even divides the entire Eurasian (combined Europe and Asia) landmass into three regions under point 8: “Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian, and Asia-Pacific”³. By joining Europe with the Atlantic, an oceanic community of which Russia is not part of, MID is further articulating the separateness of Russia’s identity-civilization. Although Russia is geographically a part of the Asia-Pacific region, points 54 and 56 of the Foreign Policy Concept reaffirm the “common deep-rooted civilizational ties”⁴ that make Russia “an integral and inseparable part of European civilization”⁵. If Russia is not entirely part of the Euro-Atlantic region (although it is a part of the larger European civilization through historical ties), nor could it be defined as ‘Asia-Pacific’ on the same level that one could as an example describe South Korea, then it must fall under the Eurasian region referenced in point 8.

The ramifications of such an identity are far-reaching. Advocates of the Eurasianist identity point out that Russia can reap enormous dividends, especially of an economic nature, by acting as a connecting point for “finance, transport, information, (and) trade flows” between Europe and Asia (or Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific,

to use MID’s parlance)⁶. Being comparable to a “civilizational strategy”, Eurasianism also enables Russia to develop a foreign policy for dealing with Europe, Asia, and North America⁷. Russia’s complex identity bestows it with “recognition of [the] global nature of its international behaviour”⁸. The Eurasianist ideology empowers MID to speak about the priority role of the Eurasian Union in “[serving] as an effective link between Europe and the Asia-Pacific region”, and the objective of “preserving and increasing the common and civilizational heritage [that] is an essential resource for the CIS...in the context of globalization”⁹. It is evident that the ideology and identity of Eurasianism entail the understanding of a special civilizational role for the Russian Federation, and that MID is tasked with working towards those specific ends.

2a) American Exceptionalism

Despite not officially acknowledging it, the US most certainly promotes a specific type of ideology throughout the world. The US’ actions on the international arena may seem perplexing and contradictory to some neophyte outside observers, but when placed into the context of a defined ideological system, one can more easily understand and predict its behavior. The vast majority of American foreign policy actions can be traced back to the ideology of American Exceptionalism. This concept holds that the US is an exceptional nation in world history, and through a combination of what it views as its divine mission, strategic geography, and moral authority in the world, it both consistently sets and violates international standards in order to achieve its aims¹⁰.

The idea of a divine mission for the United States has been embedded in the country’s history since its founding. The Declaration of Independence begins by stating certain inalienable rights that people are ‘endowed by their Creator’ and ends with ‘a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence’¹¹. Although the topic of religion and its role in American contemporary politics

⁶ Shakleina, Tatiana. “Russia between East and West.” *RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Selected papers*. Moscow: Website of the Chair of Applied Research of International Problems, 2013. 17-18. PDF.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid., 19.

⁹ Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Op. Cit., 44, 46.

¹⁰ Walt, Stephen M. “The Myth of American Exceptionalism.” *Foreign Policy*. Foreign Policy, 11 Oct 2011. Web. 29 Oct 2013.

¹¹ “The Declaration of Independence: A Transcription.” National Archives and Records Administration. Web. 29 Oct 2013.

¹ Ibid., 14.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., 8.

⁴ Ibid., 54.

⁵ Ibid., 56.

and society still remains a controversial issue to this day, it is clear that the Founding Fathers 'professed a belief in God' and that 'religion encouraged a moral citizenry'¹. The idea of God's direct involvement and influence over the US is prominently alluded to in the Pledge of Allegiance ('one nation under God')² and the well-known song 'America the Beautiful' ('God shed his grace on thee')³. It can be concluded that the US, as a state, has a national psychology of being in close association with God Himself, and that such a relationship makes it somewhat exceptional among all other states.

2b) Manifest Destiny

This close association has undoubtedly had its effects on American foreign policy. The idea of Manifest Destiny was one of the first large-scale demonstrations of the US' belief in its exceptional status. The driving force behind Manifest Destiny was that a divine calling of sorts was motivating the United States to expand westward to the shores of the Pacific, and quite possibly, even further⁴. America was aided in this endeavour by its beneficial and convenient physical and political geography. The US was physically removed from the conflicts ravaging Europe during this time, and politically, no strong opposition (save for Mexico during the 1848 Mexican-American War) stood in its way⁵.

After having explored the relationship that the American state believes it holds with God, it follows that such a policy would appear rational to American statesmen, especially at that time. Manifest Destiny also incorporated the argument that the US' institutions and way of life should be disseminated far and wide⁶. In some way, this could be seen as the one of the first expansionist ideologies of the modern era, and unlike French Republicanism

or Communism, it has withstood the trials of time and remains the only secular utopian universal ideology pursuing global implementation⁷. Manifest Destiny therefore built upon American Exceptionalism by imbuing it with a mission to proselytize its ideals to other societies, dually motivated by a sincere belief in its exceptionally positive 'universal'⁸ values and a calling higher than oneself⁹.

2c) Democracy Promotion/Ideological Proselytization

Given that the United States was not yet a world power, there were obvious limitations imposed upon the scope and methods of its ideological proselytization. This all changed with the successful involvement of the US in both World Wars. In the aftermath of both conflicts, the US used its strategically victorious position to attempt to reshape parts of Europe into its own image. Populist isolationism limited the US' gains after 1918¹⁰ and the Soviet Union (and by extension, the communist ideology) blocked further American inroads into Eurasia after 1945¹¹. The post-Cold War security complex immediately following the Soviet collapse allowed for an unchained unilateralist application in American exceptionalism¹². Believing in its own self-virtue and its divine right to spread its belief system (liberal democracy¹³) the world over (especially within states that were explicitly ideologically opposed to such measures), the US began to militarily engage itself in a variety of conflicts, albeit under less conspicuous official justifications than pure ideological exportation.

The purpose of democracy promotion abroad featured prominently during the Iraq War of 2003, but preceding it was the Kosovo experiment in 'humanitarian intervention'. It was during this conflict that the US and its NATO allies bombed Serbia for the proclaimed purpose of safeguarding the human rights of the ethnic Albanians that

¹ "People & Ideas: God and the Constitution." PBS. PBS, 11 Oct 2010. Web. 29 Oct 2013. <<http://www.pbs.org/godinamerica/people/god-and-the-constitution.html>>.

² "The Pledge of Allegiance." ushistory.org. Independence Hall Association. Web. 30 Oct 2013. <<http://www.ushistory.org/documents/pledge.htm>>.

³ "America, The Beautiful Lyrics by Katharine Lee Bates — 1913." USA Flag Site. USA Flag Site. Web. 30 Oct 2013. <<http://www.usa-flag-site.org/song-lyrics/america.shtml>>.

⁴ "Manifest Destiny." The History Channel. A&E Television Networks. Web. 30 Oct 2013. <<http://www.history.com/topics/manifest-destiny>>.

⁵ Lieven, Anatol. *America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism*. 1st ed. New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 30-31. Print.

⁶ Weeks, William Earl. *Building the Continental Empire: American Expansion from the Revolution to the Civil War*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1997. 61. Print.

⁷ Bogaturov, Alexei. "The Sources of American Conduct." *Russia in Global Affairs*. Op. Cit.

⁸ Lieven, Anatol. *America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism*. Op. Cit., 34.

⁹ McCrisken, Trevor B. 2002. "Exceptionalism." In *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*, vol. 2, 2nd ed., ed. Alexander DeConde et al. New York: Scribner.

¹⁰ "A SHORT HISTORY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE: A Return to Isolationism." U.S. Department of State: Office of the Historian. Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State. Web. 30 Oct 2013. <<http://history.state.gov/departments-history/short-history/return>>.

¹¹ Bogaturov, Alexei. "The Sources of American Conduct." *Russia in Global Affairs*. Op. Cit.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

were living in the Kosovo province¹. The involvement of NATO in its second conflict after Bosnia (and once more out of theater, at that) signaled that the US was on the cusp of reinventing the purpose of the trans-Atlantic alliance from an anti-communist defensive organization to an offensive-oriented guardian of Western-defined human rights². The run-up to the Iraq War saw the US raising global awareness of Saddam Hussein's prior use of chemical weapons against the Kurdish minority over a decade prior, but this did not appear to be relevant enough to galvanize the international community into collective action. Even evoking the spectre of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was not sufficient rationale to provide the US with unanimous consensus within NATO itself for a military operation against Iraq. The idea of democracy promotion also fell on relatively deaf ears during this time. Therefore, when the US decided to unilaterally invade Iraq along with its 'coalition of the willing', it was simultaneously pursuing three stated different objectives: democracy promotion, WMD elimination, and humanitarian intervention.

The failure to secure enough allied support to be able to label this a 'NATO war', like the one in Kosovo, showed that the US had not fully succeeded in reinventing the purpose of the organization. Simply fulfilling democracy promotion through the convenient argument of WMD anti-proliferation measures was not enough to convince others of the moral basis of American Exceptionalism. Nor was the case for humanitarian intervention (as it is perceived in the West) made as strong as it was during the Kosovo War. The US' actions in Iraq were thus commonly criticized as being 'imperialist' in nature³. This motivated the US to search for a new moral justification for future military interventions.

¹ Roberts, Adam. "NATO's 'Humanitarian War' over Kosovo." *Survival*. 41.3 (1999): 102-23. Web. 30 Oct. 2013. <<http://www.columbia.akadns.net/itc/sipa/S6800/courseworks/NATOhumanitarian.pdf>>.

² Nazemroaya, Mahdi Darius. *The Globalization of NATO*. Atlanta: Clarity Press, 2012. 67-113. Print.

³ Chomsky, Noam. "It's imperialism, stupid." *The Noam Chomsky Website*. Noam Chomsky, 4 Jul 2005. Web. 30 Oct 2013. <<http://www.chomsky.info/articles/20050704.htm>>.

2d) R2P

Such a justification appeared with the emergence of the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) concept in 2005. The idea holds that it is the responsibility of the international community to intervene militarily to help alleviate the violation of human rights in a state if the state's government is unable or unwilling to do so itself⁴. The emphasis on the word 'responsibility' infers that failure to act would result in a collective sense of guilt on the side of those who passively abet the humanitarian crisis by allowing it to continue. Considering that R2P involves military intervention inside a sovereign state, it also violates the state's sovereignty if the government refused to allow the intervention to proceed. But if the government became discredited (in the eyes of the potential interveners) as a result of its handling of the aforementioned humanitarian crisis, then the case could be made that that government is illegitimate⁵ and has no right to stand in the way of the said intervention. R2P could then even be used as a pretext for regime change⁷. International legal principles and the subjective understanding of what constitutes universally accepted human rights (and consequently, their violations) make R2P a highly polarizing concept.

2e) Forecast: US and NATO's Ideological Development

If a war for ulterior motives could be waged under what were perceived to be the 'selfless' grounds of simply protecting the oppressed from violations of their Creator-endowed unalienable (human) rights, (as understood by the American Declaration of Independence as specifically including life and liberty), then the moral justification would be extremely difficult to argue against. Even more, if such a 'moral justification' could be institutionalized into being perceived as a type of international norm, then states that oppose such military measures under R2P would be discredited among their peers. If

⁴ "The Responsibility to Protect." Office of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide. The United Nations. Web. 30 Oct 2013. <<http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml>>.

⁵ Condon, Stephanie. "Obama: Qaddafi has lost legitimacy and must leave." CBSNEWS. CBS Interactive, 3 Mar 2011. Web. 30 Oct 2013.

⁶ Anishcuk, Alexei, and Steve Gutterman. "Calling Assad illegitimate is 'counterproductive'—Russia." Reuters. Thompson Reuters, 16 Mar 2012. Web. 30 Oct 2013..

⁷ Breakey, Hugh. 'The Responsibility to Protect: GameChange and Regime Change.' Chap. 1 In *Norms of Protection: Responsibility to Protect, Protection of Civilians and Their Interaction*, edited by Charles Sampford, Angus Francis and Vesselin Popovski, 11-39. Geneva: United Nations University, 2012.

such opposing states were present in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and hindered a resolution authorizing military intervention under R2P pretenses, then an alternative body (perhaps NATO military proxy organizations like the African Union) would have to be tasked with implementing such unilateral (in the sense that they violate the UN Charter) actions on a regional scale¹. Stephen M. Walt writes about the necessity of 'ideological solidarity' for alliances, believing that 'a commitment to similar basic goals can help sustain an alliance long after its original rationale is gone'². In this sense, the official pronouncement of R2P military enforcement by NATO as one of its new goals could imbue the organization with a much-needed ideological stimulus to assist it in maintaining relevancy in the post-Cold War world. Taking into consideration NATO's history of 'humanitarian intervention' in Kosovo, it seems logical that the organization itself could fulfill the role of R2P enforcer on a global scale, thereby potentially reinventing its identity from Cold War alliance to 21st century champion of human rights.

Suffice to say, R2P has bestowed the US with an additional weapon to complement its arsenal of war-making arguments. The guise of R2P provides the moral legitimacy needed to cover the otherwise blatant aggression behind American foreign policy. The US can then continue its pattern of selectively applying international law, violating state sovereignty, and most importantly, promoting its ideology while plausibly maintaining international credibility and legitimacy for its actions. Conveniently, the US could also assist its NATO allies in reinventing their purpose in the 21st century, giving them an added impetus to continue subsidizing American military operations abroad through their direct participation and the support of their populations. The successful application of all of the aforementioned would be the epitome of an evolved form of American Exceptionalism.

It can now be seen that the ideology of the US involves a multiplicity of factors, but that it is driven by three primary considerations: American Exceptionalism, democracy promotion abroad, and R2P/Humanitarian Intervention support. The US feels entitled to spread democracy as a result of American Exceptionalism, and it is now moving in the direction of co-opting the idea of R2P/Humanitarian Intervention in order to provide justifiable

moral cover for its ideological aims. The idea of democracy promotion via R2P/Humanitarian Intervention also serves the purpose of reinventing the identity of NATO. It seems likely that NATO may metamorphosize into a club of democracies dedicated towards advancing their system of governance and protecting human rights (with both 'democracy' and 'human rights' being subjectively defined by the Western interpretation)³.

Such a development would lead to the formal creation of an ideological bloc, the first one of its kind since the end of the Cold War. If one is to take former President Bush's words to heart, the mantra may even aggressively evolve into 'Either you're with us or against us'⁴. As can be seen by the resistance of Serbia, Iraq, and Libya, this does seem to be the case. Relatively weak states that cannot adequately defend themselves, nor have the means to deter a Western-supported military intervention, have fallen victim to invasion and destruction in recent times.

The formal incorporation through the vehicle of American Exceptionalism of the US values of democracy promotion and R2P/Humanitarian Intervention into the NATO military alliance would destabilize the entire world. In that sense, American ideological expansionism poses a critical threat to world peace. The US' messianic mission can be seen as following a secular version of extreme militant Islam (albeit militarily supported by more modern means), as it is spread with the vociferousness of a religious zealot, and just like radical Islam, it will (or has it already?) place the US and its military allies into direct confrontation with opposing value systems and civilizations. While extreme Islam spreads recruiters to mosques to proselytize jihad, for example, the West spreads its believers via 'NGOs' and the media to proselytize its subjective standards of 'democracy' and 'human rights'. Both are disseminated via soft power and infiltration, and the introduction of such belief systems into states unaccustomed to them can lead to the fracturing of once-unified strong national identities. Militant Islam has divided Nigeria and Syria much in the same way that 'democracy' has divided Iraq and Libya. The expansion of extreme Islam may bring with it the scourge of terrorism, just as the expansion of US values may bring with it military intervention.

³ Volker, Kurt. "The Collapse -- and Rebirth? -- of Transatlantic Relations." The Elliott School of International Affairs. George Washington University, 25 Feb 2010. Web. 30 Oct 2013. <http://elliott.gwu.edu/assets/docs/news/spf_volker_022510.pdf>.

⁴ "You are either with us or against us." CNN. Cable News Network, 6 Nov 2001. Web. 30 Oct 2013.

¹ Nazemroaya, Mahdi Darius. The Globalization of NATO. Op. Cit., 249.

² Walt, Stephen M. "Alliance Futures." *Survival*. 39.1 (1997): 156-79. Web. 30 Oct. 2013. <http://polsci.colorado.edu/sites/default/files/6B_Walt.pdf>.

The imposition of unfamiliar cultural values onto a society inevitably leads to some degree of conflict, and the value systems under threat may even strengthen their identities in order to protect themselves¹. The strengthening of civilizational identity may even result in its defensive expansion. When taken on a global scale, this may herald in the fabled 'Clash of Civilizations' that Huntington prophesized in 1996, further undermining global peace and dividing the world into hostile civilization-based spheres².

V IDEOLOGY AS INFLUENCING THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Since the identities of both Russia and the US have now been firmly established and expostulated upon, it is now time to tie them in with the earlier mentioned great power competition between the two countries. In regards to their approaches over international law, Russia and the US have very little in common, and their policies are directly influenced by their identities and ideologies. Russian identity and ideology hold that the strict observance of international law as defined in the UN Charter is necessary for preserving world peace³. The precepts of such law, especially concerning the sanctioning of military force through the UNSC, feature prominently in Russian foreign policy discussions and statements, with the most recent concerning the crisis in Syria⁴. Russia wants to retain stability in the world in order to further its goal of Eurasian integration and the strengthening of its Eurasianist position between Europe and Asia. In this way, Russia can be seen as a conservative power that is not trying to revise established international norms and standards.

The US, loyally following the ideology of its own exceptionalism, selectively interprets international law as it sees fit⁵. The motions of seeking UN approval for any type of action are undertaken solely to achieve enhanced international legitimacy and justification for its own pre-determined plans. The prerogative to 'go it alone' has become a common theme in recent American history, and the country does not feel militarily restrained by the

UNSC's decisions, as recently evidenced by its escapades of destruction across Serbia, Iraq, and Libya. As one of the founding members of the UN, as well as the country which hosts the organization's headquarters, the US is ironically dismantling some of the very same international standards that it itself had created. Because the US always seeks to stay on the forefront of international developments and trends, the introduction of new norms such as R2P/Humanitarian Intervention (or the selective violation of established ones) leads to it being labelled as 'the most creative power'. The US' selective 'creativity' in the international system thereby makes it a pseudo-revisionist power.

VI IDEOLOGY AS INFLUENCING APPROACHES TO SOVEREIGNTY

1. Russia

The influence of ideology on international law seamlessly provides an explanation for the conflicting approaches to state sovereignty, as practiced by Russia and the US. *Derzhavnost*, a policy of building a strong state, is the current trend in contemporary Russian domestic politics⁶. It is justified by the concept of 'sovereign democracy'⁷, and it finds itself on the opposing end of Western-led hypocritical criticism over what is perceived as 'natural totalitarianism'⁸. Russian foreign policy projects the concept of sovereign democracy abroad through supporting the Westphalian standard of allowing a state to govern its territory and citizenry as it deems fit. The same concept also importantly applies for civilizations. The uninvited involvement of outside states or civilizations over the internal mechanisms of another is strongly opposed by Russia⁹. As is seen, Russia's approaches towards international law and sovereignty complement one another and demonstrate ideological consistency.

⁶ Merry, E. Wayne. United States. United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Helsinki Commission Hearing. Web. <http://csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContentRecords.View-Witness&ContentRecord_id=797&ContentType=D&ContentRecordType=D&ParentType=H&CFID=8401669&CFTOKEN=40432971>.

⁷ Shackleina, Tatiana. "Russia's Foreign Policy Strategy." MGIMO. Russian Federation, Moscow. 17 Sep 2013. Lecture.

⁸ Bogaturov, Alexei. "The Sources of American Conduct." Russia in Global Affairs. Op. Cit.

⁹ Shackleina, Tatiana. "Russian-American Relations in Retrospect." RUS-SIA AND THE UNITED STATES IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Selected papers. Op. Cit., 66.

¹ Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs. 72.3 (1993): 22-49. Print.

² Ibid.

³ Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation." The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Op. Cit., 4C.

⁴ "Russia made sure UNSC Syria resolution leaves no loopholes for use of force — Lavrov." RT.TV-Novosti, 29 Sep 2013. Web. 30 Oct 2013.

⁵ Scott, Shirley V. International Law, US Power: The United States' Quest for Legal Security. New York: Cambridge University Press, 20. Print. <2012>.

2. US

Paradoxically, the US also demonstrates an ideological consistency, albeit of a vastly different nature. While the US appears to support its own interpretation of sovereignty for some of its allies (Saakashvili's decision to bombard Tskhinval, Bahrain's militant crackdown on dissent, etc.), it has also demonstrated that it will strategically abandon others if it finds it politically expedient to do so. Recently, the US has repeatedly violated the sovereignty of its 'ally' Pakistan in conducting numerous drone strikes on its territory¹. The decades-long partnership with the governments of Tunisia² and Egypt³ was discarded as a result of the 'Arab Spring' and US statements in support of regime change. The National Security Strategy of 2010 specifically mentions America's commitment to supporting all peaceful democratic movements and institutions in what it subjectively terms 'fragile democracies', but the extent and limits of such support are not defined⁴. This holds open the possibility for covert activities centered around 'pro-democracy' regime change.

2a) US Patterned Approach

The dichotomy of approaches to sovereignty indicates a disturbing ideological pattern — it appears as though the US unilaterally violates the sovereignty of states that it views as non-democratic, regardless of whether or not they are allies, should it feel that the long-term goals outweigh the short-term risks. The Arab Spring provides a stunning case where the US sacrifices regional stability and long-term governmental partnerships for the sake of reshaping international architecture and norms. It should be stated that Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have thus far been spared from America's revisionist political blueprints possibly as a result of their close military cooperation with Washington (Saudi Arabia is an American military anchor on the peninsula and staging ground for involvement in the regional interior, and Bahrain hosts the US Fifth Fleet). It therefore seems that some states may retain elements of domestic political sovereignty if

¹ Almasi, Steve. "Report: U.S., Pakistan had secret agreement on dozens of drone strikes." CNN. Cable News Network, 25 Oct 2013. Web. 30 Oct 2013.

² Spencer, Richard. "Tunisia riots: Reform or be overthrown, US tells Arab states amid fresh riots." The Telegraph. Telegraph Media Group, 13 Jan 2011. Web. 30 Oct 2013.

³ "Obama Administration Urges Mubarak to Step Down." US News and World Report. US News and World Report, 04 Feb 2011. Web. 30 Oct 2013. <<http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2011/02/04/obama-administration-urges-mubarak-to-step-down>>.

⁴ United States. The White House. National Security Strategy May 2010. Washington, D.C.: , 2010. 5. Web

they subserviate their military independence to the US. Tunisia and Egypt, although partners of the US' regional military architecture, did not hold the same geopolitical weight as Saudi Arabia or Bahrain in overall grand strategy, thereby resulting in their political sacrifice for the sake of 'democracy'. By this order, it could be suggested that there is a hierarchy of sorts, dependent on the intensity of military cooperation and contemporary geopolitical/geoeconomical objectives, in determining America's 'betrayal' of allied partners and/or military/covert intervention to resolve any of their crises.

Incidentally, the 2010 National Security Strategy proclaims that 'America's commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law are essential sources of our strength and influence in the world'⁵. It also alludes to the Democratic Peace Theory by stating that 'nations that respect human rights and democratic values are more successful and stronger partners'⁶. Clearly, ideological considerations are the driving force behind America's subjective approach to sovereignty, with the greater aim of its actions being to export democratic values under the cover of human rights arguments.

VII IDEOLOGY AS INFLUENCING MILITARY OR DIPLOMATIC/ POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO CRISES

Building upon the previous, one can now segue into better understanding how conflict resolution is also tinged by ideological factors. Being a conservative actor in relation to international norms and conduct, as well as strongly supporting state sovereignty, Russia does not agree to unilateral military intervention to solve crises. Putin's 2007 Munich Speech chides the unilateral and illegitimate actions of the US that have caused new problems in the world⁷. He believes that the hyper use of military force is a dangerous and unsettling trend, and that only the UNSC can be the legitimate mechanism for making decisions about the use of force⁸. The Russian policy stands in clear opposition to American unilateralism, and no compromise can be made on this position.

The US, unlike Russia, openly engages in military force to resolve international crises, and of course, ideology plays a determining role in its decisions to do so. The

⁵ Ibid., 2.

⁶ Ibid., 5.

⁷ Putin, Vladimir. Russian Federation. Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy. 2007. Web. <http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type-82912type82914type82917type84779_118123.shtml>.

⁸ Ibid.

National Security Strategy of 2010 speaks about the rights and responsibilities that all nations have, specifically the right for their citizens to 'enjoy more freedom and opportunity', and that ambiguous consequences will be levelled against irresponsible states¹. The world is also reminded that 'there must be consequences for those nations that break the rules—whether they are nonproliferation obligations, trade agreements, or human rights commitments'(emphasis added)². Although officially shying away from imposing universal aspirations (defined as freedom and dignity) by force, recent American intervention in Kosovo and Libya proves the hypocrisy behind such a pronouncement³. Those two military actions speak louder than diplomatic words, and the US may have included such an inaccurate statement in its official strategy in order to falsely assure others that it is not as ideologically aggressive with global human rights and democracy promotion as the Soviet Union was perceived as being with the crusade of international communism.

VIII FUTURE PROJECTIONS

1. Russia

As for the future of Russia, Putin's great power pragmatism has been successful in once more catapulting Russia into high standing across the international community⁴, but the state continually retains a psychological complex of insecurity⁵. This disconnect between Russia's confidence and its feeling of insecurity further amplifies its threat perception of the US and NATO. As a result, Russia is strengthening its civilizational identity⁶ and selectively embracing globalization to meet its integrationist ends via the SCO and the Eurasian Union⁷. Russia has recently made progress in its identity formation through the implementation (although not to the full

ideological degree as elucidated by Aleksandr Dugin⁸) of Eurasianism, and has lately begun its great power resurgence. It views its role as being that of 'a Eurasian power whose existence and integrity guarantee the stability of the vast Eurasian territory'⁹. The US, however, has already voiced its displeasure with Moscow's plans by referring to them as a 'move to re-Sovietize the region', asserting that 'we know what the goal is and we are trying to figure out effective ways to slow down or prevent it'¹⁰. This sets the stage for increased future competition in the region that Tatiana Shackleina refers to as the 'Small Eurasia' subsystem¹¹.

2. US

American grand strategy can best be summed up by the current Ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul. In speaking about democracy promotion and human rights in 'The Liberty Doctrine', he confidently boasts that 'the United States must become once again a revisionist power — a country that seeks to change the international system as a means of enhancing its own national security. Moreover, this mission must be offensive in nature'¹². Putin is aware of this trend, as he noticed that 'independent legal norms are, as a matter of fact, coming increasingly closer to one state's legal system'¹³. He rhetorically questions how any state can be happy about the hegemonic imposition of American-based economic, political, cultural and educational policies' and values the world over¹⁴. Such statements illustrate why Putin believes that 'The United States has overstepped its national borders in every way'¹⁵.

⁸ Dugin, A.G. "Manifest of the Eurasist Movement." *Arctogaia*. Arctogaia, 01 Jan 2001. Web. 2 Nov 2013. <<http://arctogaia.com/public/eng/Manifesto.html>>.

⁹ Troitskiy, M. Going "Relativistic": the Changing Vision of "Just International Order" in Russian Foreign Policy. In *Russia and Globalization: Identity, Security, and Society in an Era of Change*, Op. Cit., 213.

¹⁰ Clover, Charles. "Clinton vows to thwart new Soviet Union." *Financial Times*. Financial Times, 06 Dec 2012. Web. 31 Oct 2013.

¹¹ Shackleina, Tatiana. "New Trends in Subsystem Formation in the 21st Century." *RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Selected papers*. Moscow: Website of the Chair of Applied Research of International Problems, 2013. 114, 116-19. PDF.

¹² McFaul, Michael. "The Libery Doctrine." *Policy Review*. 112 (2002). Web. 31 Oct. 2013. <<http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6187>>.

¹³ Putin, Vladimir. Russian Federation. *Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy*. Op. Cit.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹ United States. The White House. National Security Strategy May 2010. Op. Cit., 2.

² Ibid., 3.

³ Ibid., 1, 5.

⁴ Tsyvankov, Andrei P. *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity*. 2nd. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010. 25. Print.

⁵ Ibid., 5.

⁶ Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Op. Cit., 45.

⁷ Troitskiy, M. Going "Relativistic": the Changing Vision of "Just International Order" in Russian Foreign Policy. In *Russia and Globalization: Identity, Security, and Society in an Era of Change*. Blum, D.W., Ed. Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008. 225-226. Print.

The US expresses impatience towards other states' democratic transitions, even those of allies, although this is currently only selectively applied based on political, economic, and military resultant advantages¹. Alexei Bogaturov suggests that 'the concept of the freedom of action, combined with a belief in its historic calling, is embodied in America's mission, which is to carry the 'light of democracy' to all corners of the globe' and that 'democracy remains the only universal ideology aspiring to a historic victory worldwide'². This 'ideological extremism' is characterized by 'democracy by any means'³. In keeping with its values of democracy and human rights promotion, the reformulation of NATO's identity and mission to support such endeavors would logically present the alliance's most probable development.

CONCLUSION

As has been explored throughout the preceding paragraphs, Russia and the US' great power competition is based on an incompatibility of identities. Both nations have opposing views of international affairs, as well as differing approaches to international law, sovereignty, and conflict resolution, and these are all determined by ideology. Russia's ideology favors adherence to international law, the preservation of state sovereignty (preferably via a strong state), and diplomatic resolutions, whereas the US inconsistently applies all of the aforementioned in order to maximize its international standing and to promote its view of democracy and human rights. With such foundational differences being present, it is impossible for the great power rivalry to be overcome. On the contrary, it will only intensify.

American ideological expansionism and resurgent Russian resistance make for a destabilizing combination. The US is positioning itself to make inroads into the former Soviet sphere in order to sabotage Russia's integrationist projects. It is evident that the US will muster all of its resources short of direct military intervention (due to mutually assured destruction) against Russia in order to oppose it, although Moscow's nuclear second-strike defensive capability may one day become nullified with the successful construction of the global anti-missile

defense system⁴. The skyrocketing intensity of such future great power competition, as motivated by ideological criteria, may very well result in the fulfilment of Brzezinski's 'Eurasian Balkans' concept⁵. Such a 'zone of percolating violence'⁶ (as initiated by subjective democracy promotion and human rights intervention[via both overt and covert means]) would generate a Eurasian 'arc of crisis'⁷ that could pose an existential threat to the very survival of the Russian civilization.

¹ Shackleina, Tatiana. "Russia's Foreign Policy Strategy," Op. Cit.

² Bogaturov, Alexei. "The Sources of American Conduct." *Russia in Global Affairs*, Op. Cit.

³ Shackleina, Tatiana. "US-Russian Engagement in Global Issues." *RUS-SIA AND THE UNITED STATES IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*, Selected papers. Op. Cit., 40.

⁴ Nazemroaya, Mahdi Darius. "Military Encirclement and Global Domination: Russia Counters US Missile Shield from the Seas." Centre for Research on Globalization. globalresearch.ca, 04 Nov 2012. Web. 31 Oct 2013.

⁵ Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its Geostrategic Imperatives*. New York: Basic Books, 1998. 69. eBook.

⁶ Ibid., 28.

⁷ Brzezinski in 1978 defines this as being an area filled with "fragile social and political structures in a region of vital importance...threatened by fragmentation...(that) could be filled by elements...sympathetic to...enemies".

HOW DID HEZBOLLAH RESPOND TO THE ARAB TRANSFORMATIONS?

Hosam Matar

INTRODUCTION

In this moment of historical reconstruction, the Middle East is facing severe conflicts and massive transformations embodied in what is generally known as the “Arab Spring”, which has led to the fall of a few Arab regimes (Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya), inflicted minor changes in some (as Yemen), and is under way to take place in others (Syria, Bahrain). However, even in the countries with new regimes, tensions and clashes are still dominating the political scene as new movements are springing up, making it impossible to clearly define the final form of these regimes.

The entire region is going through a transitional moment, and stability won't prevail for many long months. The future of the region mainly depends on the positions of, and the policies taken by, all the major regional and international powers in response to the current changes. Consequently, due to Hezbollah's regional influence, leverage, and power, it is of great importance to understand its assessment, position, and approach towards the Arab transformations.

How did Hezbollah approach these transformations? What were the bases upon which the approach was founded? How did these transformations change the strategic environment with respect to Hezbollah's agenda of fighting Israel? What are the opportunities and threats that Hezbollah may face in such a transitional moment? This paper aims to discover Hezbollah's position towards the “Arab Spring” that began two years ago in Tunisia and then moved on to Egypt before spreading toward many other Arab countries. The paper will focus on truly understanding the variables that controlled Hezbollah's position towards such transformations, and then offer a thorough observation on how this position was, and still is, changing as the true milestones of the movements and the role of foreign powers became clearer.

1. HEZBOLLAH AND THE ARAB REGIMES: A HISTORICAL APPROACH

Before the transformations took place in the Arab world, Hezbollah's relationship with most of the Arab regimes was characterized by a state of dissonance and rivalry that was essentially due to the alliance and subordination of those regimes to the American project in the region. This project is strictly rejected by Hezbollah as being considered a plan of domination and occupation fabricated by the United States and carried out by its main ally, Israel.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Middle East has been divided between two axes; one led by the United States and including “Israel” and most Arab regimes, and the other led by Iran and containing Syria and various resistance movements in Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq. At the time, Israel waged many wars against Lebanon in general, and Hezbollah military forces in particular, with all of them being waged under direct and official Arab consent and support. The United States was likely to establish “peace” agreements in accordance with its



Hosam Matar

Lebanese researcher at the “Consultative Center For Studies & Documentation” and still completing his PhD studies at Metropolitan University Prague in International Relations and European Studies. His main fields of interest are US foreign policy in the Middle East, Iran, and regional politics.

own terms and interests to end the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union.

For example, in April 1996, the "Grapes of Wrath"¹ act of aggression was conducted under the cover of the famous International Conference in Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt, which called for a "fight against terrorism" through "the support and the cahoots at the bilateral, regional and international levels" in order to "promote the peace process in the Middle East".² But the most severe confrontation was during the July 2006 war when Israel received a direct and clear consent from the Arab officials, who in their public statements, blamed Hezbollah for the war and considered the capturing of Israeli soldiers to exchange them for Lebanese prisoners as a costly "adventure". The Arab position led to a sharp political division inside Lebanon between the forces associated with the American project on the one hand, and the national forces supporting the resistance on the other. However, it is worth noting that the majority of all sects endorsed and supported the position of Hezbollah during the war.³

Despite the hostility of the Arab regimes, Hezbollah was committed to a fixed principle that emphasized its non-interference in the internal affairs of these countries, and it did not support the opposition, fabricate and/or promote security incidents, or criticize the authoritarian practices of those regimes.

Hezbollah was keen to devote priority to its conflict with Israel and spared no effort to achieve this goal. Despite the restrictions that the Arab regimes were trying to exercise in order to isolate Hezbollah, the latter maintained the stream of communication with the Arab public through extensive relationships with Arab parties

¹ The aggression lasted for 16 days and caused the killing of 150 Lebanese civilian, 100 of which were killed when Israeli forces bombed a UN military camp in "Qana" village that civilians had been using as a shelter. During this war, Hezbollah succeeded in stopping the Israeli land forces from advancing and continued to launch rockets on Israeli settlements in Northern Occupied Palestine until the last minutes before the ceasefire agreement was applied on 27 April 1996. This military balance obliged Israel to accept the ceasefire agreement that included a condition to abstain from attacking civilian areas.

² The summit was held as the "International Summit for Peacemakers in the Middle East" on 13 March 1996, with wide international and Arab attendance, while Lebanon and Syria abstained.

³ According to one survey published in 25 August 2006 and conducted by the "Beirut Center of Researches and Information", 84,6% of Lebanese citizens believed that the war was preset by Israel and not because of Hezbollah's capturing of the two Israeli soldiers, and 72% considered that Hezbollah won the war. The full results of this survey are available on this link: <http://www.alhiwar.info/topic.asp?catID=21&Nb=100>

and prominent and influential personalities, holding regular meetings in regional political conferences and syndicalist bodies (students, scouts, workers, academics, intellectuals), and utilizing social and information networks. Hezbollah's massive military achievements and the personality of its secretary general largely contributed to the huge growth of Hezbollah's soft power, which ultimately enabled it to access and influence the minds and hearts of millions of frustrated Arabs and Muslims all over the Arab world.

Is it possible to link Hezbollah's power in the field of resistance to the Arab transitions? The post-2000 phase marked the beginning of the actual decline of the American- Israeli project in the region through Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 and then from Gaza, followed by the American predicament in Iraq, and the resounding Israeli defeat in the 2006 war in Lebanon. The 2006 War was a USA-Israeli proxy war aimed at Hezbollah in an attempt to relieve pressure from the American forces in Iraq and then create a regional balance of power to allow Washington to reactivate the American Empire Project.

The 2006 Israeli defeat marked the end of the regional system controlled and dominated by the United States since the beginning of the nineties, and one of its repercussions was the loss of the power exercised by the Arab regimes over their people. These regimes, as well as Washington, lost one of their main pillars of their existence and grew vulnerable; Bouazizi's body in Tunisia was enough to spark the flames that triggered the fire in many Arab countries. Hence, if Hezbollah, as a crucial and critical actor in the axis of the resistance in the region, had not been able to defeat the Israeli- American project in 2006, the regimes enforced by Arab officials would have remained strong, cohesive, and without doubt, strongly supported by American power.

2. THE BEGINNING OF THE TRANSFORMATIONS: TUNISIA AND EGYPT

The fall of the Tunisian regime and then Mubarak's regime in Egypt, which was vital for the security of Israel and U.S influence in the region, afforded a great opportunity for Hezbollah's advancement, and they thus expressed their support for the people-based revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt that overthrew the dictatorial pro-American regimes. Hezbollah hoped that the new regimes would support its resistance or at least be non-hostile to it, especially considering the historical

relations between Hezbollah and the main revolutionary movements (Islamic or pro-Arabism) in Egypt and Tunisia.

In the aftermath of the fall of the Tunisian regime on 14 January 2011, Hezbollah issued an official statement the next day declaring its "pride and honor in the uprising of the Tunisian people which led it towards freedom ... proved that truth comes from the people and is materialized by its free will and not by depending on external powers." Again, and by a similar statement on 11 February 2011, Hezbollah congratulated the Egyptian people for the "historical and glorious victory achieved by its pioneer revolution," and it considered Mubarak's fall to be the most important turning point in the Arab transformations. This can be noticed, for example, in a speech by Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's secretary general, where he said that Egyptians "are our hope and their position and attitude will influence not only Egypt, but both the Islamic and Arab worlds."¹

For more details about Hezbollah's position towards the Arab transformations since their beginning, it is necessary to focus on Sayyed Nasrallah's speech in the "ceremony of Solidarity with Arab peoples", namely those of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, and Libya, on 13 March 2011. Sayyed Nasrallah clearly declared the position of Hezbollah by saying that "we are with you, we support you... and ready to help and assist all your interests, and we are interested to be beside you."

First, Sayyed Nasrallah focused on denying that Washington promoted these revolutions by stating they were carried out against regimes that were in alignment with the US, regimes that served and still serve the US agenda, and which do not form any threat to US policy. Accordingly, it is illogical for Washington to change those regimes. However, if such uprisings took place in anti-American regimes, accusing Washington of causing it would be a possibility.

At this stage, Hezbollah merely focused on warning the people across the Arab world of the possibility of a hidden, foreign American hand that will grab every opportunity to influence the transitional movements and stray them away from their proper path under the guise of traditional slogans about "respecting the peoples' demands" and "the basic rights." In his speech, Sayyed Nasrallah clarified that Washington first tried to grant

¹ Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's speech in the ceremony of "Solidarity with Arab peoples" was organized by Hezbollah on 13/3/2011.

some time to its allies to crush the revolutions, but when they failed, it withdrew its support. According to Sayyed Nasrallah, there were "many goals for the US intervention: to improve its image, to manage the crisis, and to ensure appropriate alternatives if it loses an ally, or to control oil fields." Sayyed Nasrallah warned the Arabs and encouraged them to test the credibility of the US claims by looking at US's policies towards Palestine.

3. BAHRAIN AND LIBYA:

EXTERNAL INTERVENTION AND SECTARIANISM

In both cases, Hezbollah had defined positions for many subjective and specific reasons. In Libya, Hezbollah's relations with the Gaddafi regime were very troubled, especially after the regime kidnapped Sayyed Mousa Al-Sadder, who is still missing today, in Libya in 1978². Hezbollah's position was that of great support to the Libyan revolution from the beginning, however, the intervention of NATO greatly concerned Hezbollah. Even so, Hezbollah did not directly attack the people's acceptance of NATO's intervention, but rather warned them of the challenges and risks stemming from that intervention. Hezbollah called on the revolutionaries to preserve their independence and national sovereignty because they are facing "a great achievement by working to protect their wealth from being stolen by the greed of major states."³ Hezbollah was hence repeatedly accused by the Libyan regime of fighting beside the revolutionaries. These accusations were denied by Hezbollah, as Sayyed Nasrallah confirmed and emphasized on the fact that they took no part in not only Libya, but also in Yemen, Bahrain, and Egypt.⁴

In Bahrain, the case is different, as it is related to the sectarian division and the majority of the citizenry being Shia. Since the beginning of the revolution, Hezbollah declared its support and sympathy with the demands of the revolutionaries who asked for political reform (and not to change the regime as in other countries). Hezbollah asked (and is still asking) the regime to react

² Sayyed Mousa Al-Sadder is a notable Lebanese Shia cleric who held the greatest role in establishing resistance against Israel in the 1970s. During an official visit to Libya with two of his assistants, Gaddafi's regime kidnapped him, and the regime even tried to claim he left to Italy, but all the evidence proves that Gaddafi personally ordered the operation for his regional interests at that time.

³ An official declaration issued by the office of media relations of Hezbollah after the fall of Al-Qazafi regime, in 21 October 2011

⁴ Look for example, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah Speech in the ceremony of "Resistance and Liberation Day", in 25 May 2011

positively to the legitimate demands through dialogue, without the need to resort to violence.

The Bahraini regime, however, insisted on the use of violence against the peaceful protestors and even used Saudi forces to crush the revolution after portraying it as a conspiracy and a sectarian Shia revolt supported by Iran and Hezbollah.

Hezbollah repeatedly denied such accusations, as Sayyed Nasrallah referred to the movements as people-based protests representing the majority of the Bahraini people, and he considered any sectarian accusation to be a "weapon of the incompetent" in the face of the legitimate demands of the people. Even more, Hezbollah praised the protestors for insisting on only using peaceful means instead of violence, despite the excessive brutality of the regime forces.

During this phase, there are many principles that can be concluded about Hezbollah's position during the Arab Transformations:

- 1 — Supporting the Arab uprisings against the dictatorial and traitor regimes and considering such uprisings as a legitimate right.
- 2 — Encouraging peaceful means of protest and abstaining from the use of violence.
- 3 — Refusing the military intervention of foreign powers.
- 4 — Warning the people about US attempts to influence the transition process and drift it away from the people's interests towards new forms of colonization, subjection, and division.
- 5 — Encouraging mediation, whenever possible, between regimes and opposition groups through credible states and regional organizations.
- 6 — Differentiating between regimes that support the resistance and others that depend on the US. In the case of the first, Hezbollah advocates the finding of a solution between the regime and the opposition that accomplishes the popular demands and preserves the role of the regime in supporting the resistance project. This call was even in effect before the Syrian Crisis. In his speech at the ceremony of "Solidarity with Arab Peoples", Sayyed Nasrallah said "whenever there is a pro-resistance regime and

some problems occur in that country, the people of that country should be patient and try to approach the situation in a different way, by dialogue or mediation."

4. THE SYRIAN CRISIS: A STRATEGIC CHALLENGE

The eruption of the Syrian Crisis posed the most significant challenge for Hezbollah among all the other transformations in the Arab world. This is due not only to geographic location, but also to the fact that the Syrian regime is a strategic ally of Hezbollah. Syria is a main pivot in the resistance axis as it provides strategic, logistic, and political support to resistance movements in the region. Therefore, since the early start of the crisis, many American analysts have hastened to discuss the historical opportunity to take Syria out of the resistance axis and to make a major change in a country persisting to lobby allies against Washington.¹

As the protests started in mid-March 2011, Syrian anti-regime dissenters and Arab media have accused Hezbollah of sending fighters to Syria to crack down on protests and kill civilians. At the time, Hezbollah did not state any stance on the crisis.² In the beginning, Hezbollah believed that the protestors had lawful demands and that they should be dealt with through dialogue, without the use of violence. Later, Sayyed Nasrallah revealed that Hezbollah tried to be a medium between the two parties, but the opposition constantly refused and insisted on toppling the regime.³ After two months of the crisis, Hezbollah stressed that there are two conditions framing their stance towards any public movement. These conditions according to Sayyed Nasrallah are:⁴

¹ Andrew J. Tabler, Syria's Turn, The Washington Institute, Policy Alert, 15 March 2011. Available at: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/policy-alert-syrias-turn>

² For example, from the first week, the Syrian opposition representative Mamoun Al-Homsy appeared on the Al Arabiya channel and accused thousands of Hezbollah fighters of entering the "Omiya big Mosque" in Damascus and attacking the protesters there. In response, the head of the media relations office for Hezbollah called the channel and denied these charges, which had already been repeatedly broadcast for many days.

³ Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah repeatedly declared that he personally spoke with the Syrian President at the beginning of the crisis about political reforms and to urge him to talk with the opposition. Al-Assad accepted to do so, whereas the opposition refused. As an example, reference Nasrallah's speech at a ceremony (The Resistance and Liberation Day) in 25 May 2013, available at: <http://www.almanar.com.lb/english/adetails.php?eid=95030&cid=23&fromval=1>

⁴ Sayyed Nasrallah's speech at the ceremony of "The Resistance and Liberation Day" in 25 May 2013

Firstly, the stance of this Arab regime regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and its role in the nation's central issue — Palestine. The second condition lies in the impossibility of any reform in the domestic level of the regime. Accordingly, "we decide our stance, we have clear criteria and standards, and we don't have double or variable standards". Then Sayyed Nasrallah particularly specified the premises of Hezbollah's stance towards the Syrian situation: Supporting the Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian resistance, Syria's opposition to the American-Israeli project, how the situation in Syria is reflected on Lebanon, the resolutions of the "Al-Taef" Agreement, and most importantly, having the public majority clearly standing with the regime. Based on these points, Sayyed Nasrallah stressed the importance of maintaining Syria on three levels: regime, army, and people, by giving the regime a chance to reform. Sayyed Nasrallah also clarified that the Lebanese people should not intervene in the conflict whether negatively or positively, and he then denounced the Western sanctions on Syria.

As the Syrian Crisis plunged even deeper, Hezbollah confirmed its stance, but the crisis was taking two opposite directions. Whenever the regime displayed an inclination towards reform and encouraged dialogue, the opposition became more violent, sought arms from outside the country, declined any dialogue invitations, and used a sectarian rhetoric against the resistance. This is due to the support that the US, the Gulf States, and Turkey provide to the opposition groups through funding, arms, and sectarian media, to the extent that some opposition groups have become fully submerged in the American agenda. Such connections were crystallized in the meetings between the Syrian dissents and Israeli diplomats, and on the social media networks revealing the political tendency of the opposition, especially the one located outside of Syria. The Syrian internal opposition, known as the National Coordination Committee, retains an independent stance, as they don't support foreign intervention, are against any use of violence by either sides, and stress the role of Syria in the resistance project.¹

¹ The National Coordination Committee for the Forces of Democratic Change is a Syrian bloc that constitutes many Syrian parties, groups, and independent personalities from inside and outside of Syria. The Committee is considered a main group in the Syrian opposition, and it was established on 6 November 2011. It includes many important Syrian figures such as Haytham Manna and Hassan Abdel Azim, and there are close relations between Hezbollah and many figures within the Committee, even from before the crisis, which in turn promoted communication and dialogue between the two sides with mutual acceptance.

5. HEZBOLLAH IN SYRIA: A TURNING POINT

Hezbollah kept its stance even after a year and a half of the crisis. During that period, it tried to distance Lebanon from the consequences of the Syrian situation. Accordingly, Hezbollah understood the principle of neutrality adopted by the Lebanese government in which it took part. This principle states that Lebanon should not be a passage or a repertoire of arms and men fighting in Syria. It also states that Lebanon should not take problematic stances regarding the Syrian situation in the international and regional assemblies. Despite the official commitment to this principle, the Lebanese forces conspiring against Syria (March 14th forces) kept smuggling arms and fighters from Lebanon to Syria during the entire period of the crisis.²

The media campaign against Hezbollah became more aggressive as the crisis aggravated. Dozens of satellite channels (particularly Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera) and websites focused on giving the conflict a sectarian dimension while accusing Hezbollah of sending fighters to Syria to fight the opposition. As time passed, a major transformation of the crisis emerged as foreigners and radicals started fighting on the side of the opposition. This was accompanied by horrifying massacres committed by these fighters against religious minorities and pro-regime citizens, in addition to the kidnapping of 11 Muslim Lebanese Shias near the Turkish border who were on their way back from a visit to holy shrines in Iran. This kidnapping case was used as a tool to blackmail and provoke Hezbollah and the entire Shia society, and as of now, nine of these Lebanese are still being held as hostages.

Two serious developments emerged in recent months: the first is the radical groups' attempt to burn down the Holy Shia shrines in Damascus, resulting in a sectarian grudge in the entire region; the second is the Syrian opposition groups attacking Lebanese villages inside Syria that are inhabited by Shia and Christians in particular, in an attempt to ethnically cleanse the region.³ In these villages, one can find members and supporters of Hezbollah, hence, Hezbollah's supporters volunteered

² The most famous attempt is when the Lebanese authorities captured a ship (Lotf-Allah ship) containing tons of weapons at the port of Tripoli in Northern Lebanon which was intended to be sent to the Syrian opposition.

³ Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah talked about this point in a television speech in 28 February, 2013 and asked the Lebanese state to ask Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which support the military opposition, to prevent the opposition fighters from attacking these villages.

to protect these villages as the Lebanese government took no action, despite Hezbollah repeatedly calling for a government intervention to assure the protection of these citizens. In parallel, the regions where the religious shrines are located have witnessed an increased presence of Hezbollah fighters who, due to the religious and emotional value of these holy places, chose to protect them and thus prevent the eruption of major "fetna" (sedition) between Sunni and Shia extremists, as Sayyed Nasrallah has argued.¹

The April 30th speech was critical with regard to the Syrian crisis, as Sayyed Nasrallah announced that "during two years full of American, international, regional, Israeli, and European interventions, we reached a decisive conclusion that the aim of what is going on in Syria is not only taking Syria out of the resistance axis as we said before.....the aim is undoubtedly destroying Syria as a state, the Syrian people, community and army." He directly stated that "Syria has true friends in the region and in the world....these friends will never let Syria fall prey to the US, Israel, and Muslim radicals...this is a fact and not a speculation."²

Before the speech, a website affiliated with Hezbollah published a photo of Sayyed Nasrallah and Ali Khamenei, the religious mentor of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and also a picture of a meeting with Mr. Bogdanov, the assistant to the Russian foreign minister. This meeting came in light of the clearly increasing coordination between Hezbollah and Russia regarding the Syrian crisis.³

A few days after the speech, the Israeli Air Force bombarded several targets inside Damascus for the second time during the crisis. This attack further proved the presence of outside agendas, specifically Israeli-related, and was viewed by Hezbollah as additional evidence revealing the true nature of the so-called "revolution". Moreover, on the Resistance and Liberation Day (25-5-2013), Sayyed Nasrallah declared that "the case is no longer a nation revolting against a regime nor a matter of reforms.....we believe that the armed groups present in specific Syrian provinces, particularly near the Lebanese

border, impose a serious threat on Lebanon." Sayyed Nasrallah added, "Syria is the partisan of the resistance; the resistance cannot stand motionless while its ally is targeted; if we did, we will be idiots". If the resistance did not interfere in Syria, Israel would have waged a war against Lebanon and dictated its conditions after Syria's fall.

At this stage, Hezbollah announced that the conflict in Syria is their conflict and they will intervene whenever it is necessary and possible.⁴ News spread that the Syrian Army, along with Hezbollah, have taken control of "Al-Qusair" city and its entire countryside along the Lebanese borders, depriving the armed militias of a strategic and logistic smuggling passage to and from Lebanon.⁵

With time, Hezbollah's stance regarding the Syrian Crisis has progressively altered as the image of the conflict and the intentions of the players became clearer. This made it possible for Hezbollah to gradually intervene in the Syrian Crisis until they took a major role in the field equation. This intervention aims to establish a balance of power in the battlefield, which may eventually push the "opposition" into participating in the Geneva II negotiations and influence them to stop betting on the possibility of toppling the regime using military force.

CONCLUSION

The opponents of Hezbollah used the Syrian Crisis with partial success to create sectarian tensions aiming to isolate Hezbollah from the Sunni sphere during this important transitional moment. Hezbollah recognizes this dilemma very well, and this is clear in its political efforts (for example, religious conferences, political meetings, media coverage, etc.) and discourse, as almost every speech of Sayyed Nasrallah mentions this point. In response to the Arab events, Hezbollah developed the department of "Arab Relations", which has more resources to be able to react to the massive shifts underway in the Arab countries.

Regardless of the nature of the Syrian Crisis, Hezbollah continues to support Arab uprisings and approach them

¹ Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah declared this for the first time in a television speech on 30 April, 2013.

² Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's speech at the ceremony for the "Al-Nou" Radio station on 9 May, 2013

³ On 19 October, 2011, a delegation from Hezbollah headed by Mohammad Raad (Head of Hezbollah's parliamentary bloc) visited Moscow for three days and met high-level Russian officials, in addition to regular meetings between Hezbollah's officials and the Russian ambassador in Lebanon.

⁴ Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's speech at the ceremony of "The Resistance and Liberation Day" in 25 May 2013. Available at: <http://www.almanar.com.lb/english/adetails.php?eid=95030&cid=23&from-val=1>

⁵ For more information about Hezbollah's motives to fight in Syria, also reference: Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, Hezbollah fighting in Syria to defend Lebanon from bloodbath, Russia Today, 26 June 2013. Available at: <http://rt.com/op-edge/hezbollah-syria-conflict-target-255/>

positively; in other words, the Syrian Crisis and its impacts on Hezbollah did not push it to clash with the people, but it drew a clear line between genuine revolutionary movements and the Syrian Crisis. Hezbollah approaches the conflict in Syria as a political-strategic conflict and not a sectarian or ethnic one. For that, Hezbollah asserts the importance of political reform in Syria as an internal issue, and refuses any external military intervention that only aims to protect and serve the American agenda in the region.

Instead, these transformations presented many opportunities; they overthrew major pro-American regimes without the US being able to bring in new stable regimes, the durability of the Syrian state in the regional balance of power has been highlighted even if it became less effective and less powerful, the presence of national and pro-Arabism parties in the region with close relations with Hezbollah has occurred, and also the positive role of a wide range of emergent moderate Islamic parties and personalities that refuse the sectarian discourse and support the resistance.

Moreover, the current high sectarian tension in the region is directly related to the Syrian Crisis, which means that the sectarian wave will reach its end when the Syrian conflict ends. Consequently, Hezbollah will be able to restore large parts of the sectarian cleft between it and the moderate Sunnis in the Arab world who still believe in the essentiality of resisting Israel.

As stated in this paper, from the beginning of the "Arab Spring" and up to the present day, Hezbollah's position was, and continues to be, based on clear standards that are in coherence with its nature and project; the people's right to freedom, the necessity for political reform and social justice, the priority for dialogue and peaceful means of protest, the refusal of external interventions, and the importance of confronting any factor that might threaten the resistance.

Despite all the changes in the region, Hezbollah continues to assert the priority of its resistance against Israel, and Sayyed Nasrallah emphasizes his hope that the new Arab regimes would take part in supporting the people's choice in resistance, especially among the Palestinian people.¹ Finally, Hezbollah believes that there shall never be freedom, dignity, sovereign-

ty, prosperity, security, and stability in the Middle East under American hegemony and the Israeli occupation, both of which are projected in the dictatorships present in the regimes of various Arab countries.

¹ For example, reference Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's speech at the ceremony of "Solidarity with Gaza" on 19 October, 2012.



Kevork Almassian

Syrian Political Commentator and Writer

THE RISE AND FALL OF NEO-OTTOMANISM IN SYRIA

Kevork Almassian

A region like the Middle East, characterized by constant instability and continuous conflicts, brings new opportunities for influence between rival nations. Turkey is an important regional power looking for a greater role beside Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.

Since the beginning of the crisis in Syria, the statesmen in Turkey were sure that one of the main keys for regional hegemony in the Middle East passes through Syria. In June 2011, a Western diplomat revealed to AFP that Recep Tayyip Erdogan offered President Assad via his foreign minister a plan which stipulates that the Syrian President is to ensure that between a quarter to a third of the ministers in his government are members of the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood. On the other hand, Erdogan will commit to use all his influence to end the rebellion. The plan was considered by many Syrian political analysts as a soft penetration of the Syrian government, in preparation of changing the Arab nationalist character of Syria. The offer was rejected by President Assad, and the AKP government subsequently declared its full support for the "opposition groups". Thus, the formation of the so-called "Free Syrian Army" (FSA) came into being on 29 July 2011, and the Turkish-backed "Syrian National Council" (SNC) was announced on 23 August 2011. These escalatory steps came one month after Erdogan's offer, which breached the UN charter and blatantly violated Syrian sovereignty.

Before going into the reasons and motives of Erdogan and Davutoğlu, the "zero problems policy" is briefly explained in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs website as follows: "Aware that development and progress in real terms can only be achieved in a lasting peace and stability environment, Turkey places this objective at the very center of her foreign policy vision. This approach is a natural reflection of the "Peace at Home, Peace in the World".

However, in order to understand the Turkish policy shift from Zero Problems with Neighbors to Zero Friendship with Neighbors, one should dive into the history of the Ottoman Empire to better comprehend the motives of the neo-Ottoman ambitions of Erdogan and his foreign minister Davutoğlu. As William Faulkner said: "The past is not dead. In fact, it's not even past".

Historically, the Ottomans that came from the Balkans succeeded in extending their influence to Mesopotamia, Egypt, the Red Sea, the Arabian Peninsula, and North and East Africa through Syria. That's why they called Syria the Honorable Levant "Sham Sharif".

Erdogan's Neo-Ottoman dream was revived in light of the so-called "Arab Spring". Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood succeeded during 2011 and 2012 to reach power in Tunisia and Egypt; it was a great political moment for Erdogan to extend his hands deeper into the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood of Syria have paved the way for Erdogan's further meddling in Syrian affairs. The AKP government provid-

ed all financial and logistical facilities to the political and military wings of the Syrian opposition, namely the "Free Syrian Army". Moreover, Turkish intelligence has turned a blind eye to the flow of thousands of foreign mercenaries/terrorists through Turkish airports en route to Syria. It was a policy of state terrorism by Erdogan against his neighbor. However, "When you turn your neighbor into Afghanistan, you will become Pakistan".

By the 11th of May, 2013, two car bombs exploded in Reyhanli, only 5 km from the Cilvegözü border gate with Syria, leaving 46 dead and more than 100 injured. It was the worst terror attack Turkey has witnessed. Tulin Daloglu, a columnist for *Al-Monitor's Turkey Pulse* and a foreign policy analyst, rightly described Turkey's rigid foreign policy as "What is striking, however, is that the Erdogan government does not seem to tolerate any criticism of its Syria policy. Turkey's geography has always been surrounded by deadly risks, and intervening in Syria's domestic affairs was not the smartest thing that Turkey could have done for its own security interests. Unfortunately, Ankara's policies are not so innocent in today's tragedy. Turks now question whether it was worth it to risk Turkish lives by intervening in Syria's domestic politics".

In a recently published book, "Turkish Foreign Policy" by Muriel Mirak-Weissbach and Dr. Jamal Wakim, the authors documented the rise of the AKP government and their Neo-Ottoman project. Since the beginning of the AKP's rule, Ahmet Davutoğlu believed that Turkey was heading towards a leadership role because "it is a modern Islamic state, with a great Ottoman heritage and geostrategic, geopolitical and geo-economic position". Although Davutoğlu denied the allegations that he is seeking the recreation of the Ottoman Empire, he suggested a British-style commonwealth instead. That means if Britain was the successor of the British Empire, then Turkey is the successor of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, Davutoğlu's unofficial Islamic Commonwealth is a devious plan to embrace the "persecuted and insulted" Arab and Muslim populations under Turkey's banner. And when Davutoğlu was asked how Turkey is able to do these changes, he once again referred to Turkey's "great Ottoman history in addition to modernization".

Mirak-Weissbach and Wakim also believe there is a contradiction between Davutoğlu's pledge for equality in international relations and the demand for areas of influence in Turkey's backyard, namely the Middle East.

However, due to several factors, Turkey's Neo-Ottoman tendencies have begun to shrink:

The repercussions of terrorism in Syria have posed serious challenges to the internal stability in Turkey. Erdogan and the architects of his foreign policy began to reconsider their damaged relations, especially with Iran and Iraq, two key states at the doors of the "People's Palace".

Even Turkish President Abdullah Gül urged in his address to his country's ambassadors to recalibrate Turkey's policy towards Syria, saying "I am of the opinion that we should recalibrate our diplomacy and security policies given these facts in the south of our country and given the threat perception of (political) centers around us." Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu was also present during Gül's speech.

The overthrow of President Morsi and the cutting of bridges with Egypt's military-backed interim government, which listed the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.

The resignation of Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani and the passing of the reins on to his son Tamim. The resignation was considered by many strategic analysts as an indicator of Qatar's drift to isolation after its active role during the "Arab Spring", while making Saudi Arabia the spearhead against Iran and Syria.

The Turkish-Qatari backed FSA faded into the shadow of the Saudi-backed Syrian Islamic Front (SIF) and other Salafi and Takfiri groups, most importantly the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS), which has been active in Iraq since the American invasion of 2003 and aims to create an Islamic state in Iraq. It has now expanded its operations to Syria.

The SIF coordinates extensively with al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, which is listed in the American Administration Foreign Terrorist Organizations list. The consequences of adding the al-Nusra Front as a new alias for al-Qaeda in Iraq include "a prohibition against knowingly providing, or attempting or conspiring to provide, material support or resources to, or engaging in transactions with, the al-Nusra Front, and the freezing of all property and interests in property of the organization that are in the United States, or come within the United States or the control of U.S. persons." However, the Americans have no guarantee that these weapons would not fall into the hands of Al-Nusra or ISIS because hundreds of fighters are changing their ranks from FSA to SIF, ISIS, and Al-Nusra.

The SIF continues to coordinate with Jabhat al-Nusra and invaded several safe areas, lately in Adra, where these two groups slaughtered dozens of civilians and shoved them into ovens, according to the survivors. But the U.S. department didn't utter a word regarding these massacres. On the contrary, the American officials tried to open diplomatic channels with the SIF. The U.S. ambassador to Damascus has said to Al Arabiya News Channel that "We are ready to sit with them because we talk to all parties and political groups in Syria". To further elaborate, the SIF wants to create an Islamic State in Syria which is ruled by Sharia law. One of its senior spokesman, Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Suri, framed the SIF as "a comprehensive Islamic front, representing Islam as a religion, a creed, a guiding path, and a conduct". According to the SIF's political charter, it seeks "to construct a civilized Islamic society in Syria, ruled by God's law."

And finally, the high-profile corruption scandal aggravated the political scene and worsened the relationship of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan with his longtime ally President Abdullah Gul. This tension in the Turkish leadership will most likely reshape public opinion in the upcoming local elections in March and the presidential election in August, and might kill Erdogan's dream of becoming the president, after constitutional amendments had given him greater executive powers.

It is obvious to many political analysts that the Neo-Ottoman project and Turkey's policy towards Syria has not been a success for Erdogan and Davutoğlu, and the future will reveal dramatic changes in the Turkish political scene and a gradual U-turn in regional security policies, especially after the Geneva II conference for peace in Syria. With the sharp deterioration of Turkish relations with its neighbors, especially with Syria, some observers believe it is the end of what has been billed as Turkey's transformative diplomacy and the death and burial of the "zero-problems" foreign policy.

In his own words, Mr. Walid Muallem, Syria's foreign minister who headed the government delegation to "Geneva II", rightly concluded during his first speech: "Erdogan's government has recklessly morphed from a zero-problems policy with its neighbors to zero foreign policy and international diplomacy altogether, crucially leaving it with zero credibility."

Senior Turkish intellectuals also criticized the Turkish foreign policy miscalculations, which they believe were in large part due to the transformation of Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's business-friendly 'zero prob-

lems' foreign policy into the much more aggressive 'Neo-Ottoman' foreign policy, including the promotion of NATO or American intervention in Syria.

Turkey and other regional actors tried to change the Middle East in a way that serves their strategic interests under the pretext of freedom and democracy, but instead of pursuing revolutionary and progressive methods, they relied on or turned a blind eye to the radical and backward elements such as the Jihadi groups, who succeeded to quickly spread themselves throughout Syria and impose a real threat to regional and international security.

The war in Syria has transformed from a struggle over power in its regional and international dimensions into a war on terrorism, and it became a burden on the international community. Many critics have expressed their concern and called upon their governments to reshape their provocative foreign policies, especially since the fate of hundreds of Western Jihadis is currently unknown. What would happen if they returned to their countries? What would the Turkish government do if these terrorists sneak into Turkey and conduct more terrorist bombings?

In conclusion, I believe the war on Syria, especially as waged by the AKP government and its intelligence apparatus, was meant to pave the way for Turkish influence over the Middle East via a Syrian foothold. However, the Neo-Ottoman project has collided with many obstacles, such as the undeclared ideological war between Turkey and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), which has enormous influence over the Salafi groups in Syria that are the major and best equipped fighting groups operating against the Syrian army. This conflict was clear in Egypt where Turkey and the KSA challenged each other, stood for different models of statecraft, and promoted opposing values.

The war on Syria is a historical lesson to all statesmen. Political money, petrodollars, and state and non-state terrorism might shake the pillars of a ruling regime and lead to disorder, but in Syria, to be able to convince the vast majority of the Syrian people who stood by their Army, one would have to present a better ruling system that is fair, non-sectarian, comprehensive, and most importantly, independent — the few conditions that are absent from those who claim to be the leaders of the "revolution". Finally, Che Guevara said, "The revolution is not an apple that falls when it is ripe. You have to make it fall." But the "revolutionaries" in Syria wanted to harvest the apple by foreign hands.

SELF-DETERMINATION VS. STATE SOVEREIGNTY — CONTEMPORARY LESSONS FROM THE 1938 MUNICH CONFERENCE

Stevan Gajić

In this essay, I will deal with the historical development of the supremacy of the principle of state sovereignty over the principle of self-determination through the lens of minority rights protection. Using the example of the 1938 Munich Conference, I will attempt to demonstrate why the principle of state sovereignty was so strongly built into the infrastructure of today's system of international relations.

In the first chapter (Legacies of WWI, the League of Nations, and the Question of Self-Determination), I will give a very brief historical overview of the development of minority rights. I will explain how the First World War and its results (the breaking of multinational empires and the treaties of the peace conferences) played a significant role in changing the minority-majority dynamics of post-World War 1 Europe. In the first chapter, I will also contrast two concepts of the understanding of self-determination: Lenin's concept of self-determination that determined the federal composition of what was previously the Russian Empire and Wilson's concept of self-determination that played a crucial role in shaping the map of post-World War One Europe. After this, I will use the example of the Åland Islands to show how the League of Nations dealt with self-determination petitions. I will also say something about the inconsistencies and double standards created by the Versailles system, which under retrospective examination, were among the main reasons for its collapse in the late-1930s.

My second chapter (The Sudetenland Question and Minority Rights as the Vehicle for Territorial Expansion) will be dedicated to the breakdown of the Versailles system and the reasons why minority rights became so important in interstate politics. Using the example of the 1938 Munich Conference that gave legitimacy to the German annexation of the Sudetenland (a part of Czechoslovakia then predominantly inhabited by an ethnic German population), I will also explain how minority rights became a useful vehicle for territorial expansion.

In my concluding remarks (Sovereignty of the State as the Cornerstone of the Post-1945 World Order), I will attempt to explain why state sovereignty became so firmly incorporated in the United Nations Charter. State sovereignty became a guarantee that constant claims for self-determination by countless ethnic groups will never again pose a threat for the system of collective security or bring the world to a state of global conflict.

LEGACIES OF WWI, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, AND THE QUESTION OF SELF-DETERMINATION

The notion of minority rights is, in historical terms, a relatively new concept in international relations, roughly dating back to the first half of the 17th Century. To begin with, the concept was connected exclusively to the rights of religious minorities, rather than ethnic ones; although sometimes the two were overlap-



Stevan Gajić

Researcher of the Institute of European Studies, Belgrade, Serbia

ping, as was the case with the Christians of the Ottoman Empire.¹ The idea was that a minority religion would be protected in a given state, with their rights guaranteed by a foreign power whose majority belonged to the same denomination as the protected minority. "An early example is the Treaty of Oliva of 1660, by which Poland and the Great Elector ceded Pomerania and Livonia to Sweden, guaranteeing the inhabitants of the ceded territories the enjoyment of their existing religious liberties."² A shift in these relations, however, gradually occurred at the Congress of Vienna, and the protection of religious minorities gave way to the protection of national or ethnic minorities.³

The First World War resulted in many changes and brought a completely new spirit into minority-majority dynamics. The map of Europe had significantly changed. The war resulted in the destruction of four authoritarian, multi-ethnic, and multi-confessional empires: the German Reich, the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg Empire, and the Russian Empire. One huge problem arose out of this new European reality once the war was over — what would be the future architecture of international relations and upon what principles would the new European states be created after the destruction of four empires? The jargon of the day was 'self-determination'. This term, as well as the spirit behind it, gave legitimacy to the creation of many new states, which rose from the ruins of the old empires.

However, there were at least two concepts of meaning for this term. The United States' President Woodrow Wilson, the main architect of post-war Europe, promoted one concept, while the other was promoted by the leader of the Russian Bolshevik revolutionaries, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov Lenin. The Bolshevik understanding rested on the assumption that all nations have the right to secede from empires which kept them locked in involuntary unions. The creation of nation states was a bourgeois idea, yet it was inevitable and a prerequisite for the revolution, which was an inevitable historical development. Lenin believed that the nations of the former Russian Empire would actually realise themselves in the new country that was being formed (i.e. Soviet Union): "Secession would occur only in the most intolerable circumstances. By acknowledging the right to secede, the state was in effect declaring to its component nation-

alities that it would not permit conditions to become intolerable."⁴ In reality, only the Finns, and to an extent the Poles, were given this right, whereas all other nations remained in the future country. Not all Bolsheviks shared Lenin's views, however, and some were frightened by the complete atomisation of the former Russian Empire and its destruction along national lines rather than class divisions. Even non-Russian Marxists had alternative views on the question of self-determination; one of those was the famous German Marxist Rosa Luxemburg, who "denied the idea that nationalities should have the right of self-determination and be entitled to establish their own states. The notion of national independence was a bourgeois concern in which the proletariat, being essentially international could have no interest."⁵ Lenin ferociously criticised her for such views: "It is Rosa Luxemburg herself who is constantly lapsing into generalities about self-determination."⁶

It seems that the future course of history has proved Lenin wrong. The Soviet Union was designed as a federation with fifteen republics. All of these had a national prefix, which implied that they primarily belonged to a certain ethnic group, although all were more or less multi-ethnic. Another problem with Lenin's vision of Soviet self-determination was that in reality there had been far more groups than the nominal number of republics. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the federalisation of the country along ethnic lines turned out to be a great problem, which was empirically proven by the series of wars and crises in the post-Soviet space, stretching from Moldova to the Caucasus and Central Asia. Similarly, but in a sense more dramatically, was the case of Yugoslavia, which had also opted for the Leninist version of self-determination after the Second World War, and the parallel socialist revolution undertaken by the pro-communist Yugoslav Partisans.

While Lenin's view had importance only for the territories belonging to the Russian Empire, Wilson's were relevant for the rest of Europe. The United States had started to be involved in the Great War at a crucial moment. The Russian Empire had been knocked out of the war due to the revolution that took place behind its front lines and the separate peace treaty that the Bolshevik government

⁴ Thomas D. Musgrave, *Self-determination and national minorities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 19.

⁵ *Ibid.* p.18.

⁶ Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination," *Lenin Collected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), available from Marxist Internet Archive, accessed 19 September 2010, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/index.htm>.

¹ Patrick Thornberry, *International law and the rights of minorities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). p. 29.

² *Ibid.* p. 25.

³ *Ibid.* p. 29.

signed with Germany at Brest-Litovsk. At the same time, the Central Powers and forces of the Entente were locked in conflict on the Western and Southern (Salonika) fronts, and exhausted by three years of fearsome battles. The United States had entered the war at a decisive moment, bringing fresh troops and turning the war in favour of the Entente. This was precisely the reason why Wilson had the legitimacy to dictate the conditions of peace. Wilson's principles were announced in his famous congressional speech that contained the fourteen points about the world order after the Great War.¹ As a propagator of self-government, Wilson understood self-determination in the way that "each ethnic group should form its own nation-state."² It turned out, however, that this task was virtually impossible to meet, which was the reason why new 'more practical' solutions had to be found.

This solution was brought into being at the Peace Conference in Versailles and all other peace conferences that followed (Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Neuilly-sur-Seine, Trianon, and Sèvres). The principle of self-determination had been established as the guiding principle for these peace conferences, but had never been established as a legal right of any sort. As peoples and ethnic groups had become so intertwined with one another, it was impossible to meet the demands and appetites that each of them had. Because the war resulted in one side winning and the other losing, the principle of self-determination was also not equally applied. Peoples and states that were on the winning side had the advantage at the peace conferences during the negotiating process for the creation of new states, whereas the losers had to face the consequences of their uneasy position and confront the prospect of their territories being taken away from them. Self-determination was by no means equal for all and was therefore not a universal principle. Consequently, it was not a legal, but a political principle. "Self-determination was applied only to the territories of the defeated powers [...] Apart from article 22, self-determination continued in all other respects an essentially political rather than legal concept."³ This was seen again some years after the war ended, in the case of the Åland Islands. The Åland Islands were inhabited predominantly by ethnic Swedes, however they used to be a partly autonomous territory of Finland, which itself previously

belonged to the Russian Empire. Once Finland gained independence, representatives of the Åland Islands appealed to the League of Nations in the hope that it would grant them independence from Finland on the basis of the principle of self-determination. Nevertheless, the League did not grant them independence because it would violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Finland. The independent commission of the League of Nations ruled in favour of Finland, finding that sovereignty of the state, as a legal concept, had supremacy over self-determination, which was after all a pure political guiding principle of the post-World War One peace conferences.⁴

Because of the repeated inconsistencies (and in the view of some nations, the use of double standards) in the application of the principle of self-determination, a sense of injustice and humiliation was felt among many nations, in particular among the peoples that had lost the war. "A number of states were convinced that self-determination had been denied to them at the Peace Conference. This group included Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria [...] Italy was also dissatisfied, feeling that it had not been sufficiently rewarded by the Allies."⁵ This sense of injustice continued to accumulate and grow over the years. Eventually this feeling of bitterness would give birth to extreme ideologies with a strong wish for historical revisionism and a redrawing of the Versailles borders of Europe. This process was especially visible in Germany — the largest and the most powerful of the punished countries.

THE SUDETENLAND QUESTION AND MINORITY RIGHTS AS THE VEHICLE FOR TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

In order to understand the state of German society during the interwar period, we need to recognise the internal and external political position of the country. Once a proud Reich, the pillar of the European system, after the First World War, Germany was a defeated country facing the consequences of the peace treaty that defined its new place in Europe. Besides losing its territory, having had millions of its population killed and maimed (men who would have formed a capable working force), and having its economy ruined, Germany also had to pay heavy war reparations to France. This was not only a difficult burden economically, but a heavy moral humiliation as well. On top of it all, Germany had to witness a part of its territory (the so-called 'demilitarised' Rhineland)

¹ Thomas Woodrow Wilson, "President Wilson's Fourteen Points," The World War I Document Archive, accessed 19 September 2010, http://www.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson's_Fourteen_Points.

² Thomas D. Musgrave, *Self-determination and national minorities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 23.

³ Ibid. p. 31.

⁴ Ibid. pp. 32—37.

⁵ Ibid. p. 57.

being literally occupied by France and—most importantly for this essay—almost ten million ethnic Germans thereby being excluded from its state borders. This was ultimately the trigger for Hitler's regime to start claiming rights for German national minorities in the countries that bordered Germany. One of these cases is particularly significant for the question of minority rights, the limits of self-determination, and the use of minorities as a pretext for territorial expansion. Hitler came to power in 1933, and in just a few years, his regime had built a strong military and industrial infrastructure to support itself, and it even organised the 1936 Olympic Games to demonstrate the acquired power and self-perceived superiority of the National Socialist ideology. In that very year, Hitler's troops entered the 'demilitarised' Rhineland and the Spanish Civil War broke out, both of which therefore provided Hitler with a perfect chance to reveal and test some of the military might that Germany had attained since 1933.¹

With such power in his hands, Hitler started to use the fruits of the Versailles system to get rid of it. The minority treaties established at the Versailles Peace Conference were supposed to protect peoples that had strayed beyond the borders of their national states. The problem with this was that the great European powers had applied the minority protection rights only upon the war's losers and the smaller and weaker newly formed states, whereas these principles were not applied within their own borders. "The major powers refused to include themselves within the minority treaties regime, even though Italy proved to be one of the worst offenders against its own minorities."² Another problem was that the rights of minorities were de-facto being violated because many formerly oppressed peoples now acquired their own national states that contained minorities belonging to the ethnic group of their former oppressors. Finally, it was difficult for the newly formed countries to have trust in their minorities due to the changed power structures and because, in many cases, these people were on opposite sides during the conflict and the atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion between ethnic groups and states vis-à-vis minority peoples was difficult to overcome in such a short period of time. "They were accustomed to privilege and elevated social standing, and found it very difficult to accept their new status as

national minorities in an alien state, governed by peoples whom they considered culturally and intellectually inferior to themselves. Their relationship with the majority was characterised by an attitude of superiority and disdain, which did nothing to foster harmonious coexistence."³

One of the instruments that minorities had at their disposal was to file a petition to the League of Nations if they felt that their individual and collective rights had been jeopardised in any way. This was exactly the argument Hitler had used when he organised the 1938 Munich Conference that would determine the destiny of the Sudetenland and indeed the whole of Czechoslovakia. "Hitler began in 1937 to threaten Czechoslovakia on behalf of its ethnic Germans. At first, these threats were ostensibly to pressure the Czechs in to granting special rights to the German minority in 'Sudetenland' as the German propaganda dubbed the territory. But in 1938, Hitler turned up the heat of his rhetoric by intimating that he intended to annex Sudetenland into the German Reich by force."⁴ Britain was not willing to defend Czechoslovakia in case of a German attack and was blunt about this to Prague, in spite to the fact that it was obliged to do so by the Versailles Peace Treaty. In September 1938, Chamberlain accepted all of Hitler's demands, and so the Nazis were given the green light to occupy Czechoslovakia and feed the appetites of Poland and Hungary who also had national minorities in Czechoslovakia. This was the first time in history that territory of a democratic country—which was on top of that an ally of the World War One victors—had been taken from it by brute force, sanctioned by an agreement of the great powers. Hitler's arguments were convincing, not only because of the legal possibilities created by the Versailles system and the League of Nations, but also because of the absolutely passive position of the World War One allies towards his daring actions. According to Henry Kissinger, "Czechoslovakia was doomed not in Munich, but at London, nearly a year earlier."⁵ After the 1938 Munich Conference, the system of collective security that had been built after World War One had not only failed miserably, but had been completely devastated, which meant only one thing; from that point on, the war upon which the new principles would be established, one way or another, was in effect inevitable. "The victors of World War One had made a punitive peace and, after

¹ Mitrović, Andrej. *Vreme netrpeljivih: politička istorija velikih država Evrope 1919-1939* (The time of the intolerant: political history of the great states of Europe 1919-1939). Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruha. 1974.

² Thomas D. Musgrave, *Self-determination and national minorities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 56.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 311.

⁵ Ibid. p. 309.

having themselves created the maximum incentive for revisionism, cooperated in dismantling their own settlement.”¹

SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATE AS THE CORNERSTONE OF THE POST-1945 WORLD ORDER

After the Second World War ended, one thing was certain — the previous, post-World War One architecture of international organisations had inherent flaws which had eventually caused its demise. The new order had to be designed in such a way that minority petitions for self-determination should not pose threats of either irredentism or separatism, nor cause the violation of territorial integrity and state sovereignty by neighbouring states. This was precisely what the coalition forces sought to accomplish.

Because of the experiences of the interwar period, namely the inconsistencies in application of the principle of self-determination, as well as the selective application of protection of minority rights, the new world order created at the Potsdam Conference by the leaders of the Allies was fashioned in such a manner that the threats to the stability of the world from revisionist politicians and states was minimised. Since the political principle of self-determination had been so biased in favour of the Allies when applied during the peace conferences, political revisionism should have been an expected outcome of the political and economic revival of the countries that lost the Great War. It seems, however, that most of the Allies (excluding France, which had always been very cautious towards Germany) did not see the restoration of their former enemies as an expected and reasonable option. Nevertheless, after the 1938 Munich Conference and the brutal violation of Czechoslovakian sovereignty, it became quite clear that the collective system of security created after the First World War had been broken to pieces. It was also clear that one of the two principles would have to be given undutiful legal supremacy once the Second World War was over.

This did happen at the Potsdam Conference, and so the principle of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of independent states was given the absolute legal supremacy over the never fully legal concept of self-determination. This agreement was reached by the consensus of the triumphant powers. This arrangement was a strong guarantee that nothing similar to the Munich Conference of 1938 could ever happen again. The deal was followed

by concrete, decisive, and brutal action which would seal these guarantees. That action was the expulsion of millions of Germans from Czechoslovakia and the rest of Central and Eastern Europe. The Potsdam Treaty was followed by the formation of the United Nations, the successor organisation to the League of Nations, which was given more powers than the latter and which had more concrete checks and balances, especially from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council who are still the guarantors of that agreement.

In the period after 1945, many new countries were created and became members of the United Nations, however, these newly independent states were, in most cases, formed during the process of decolonisation. They had been granted independence, which had on the whole been initiated by the colonial powers themselves. At the beginning of this process, the imperial powers often opposed the liberation and decolonisation movements. This was especially true in the case of France (most notably in the examples of the wars in Indochina and Algeria, both parts of the French colonial empire). Even France, however, recognised the independence of its former colonies after a certain point. The second wave occurred after the breakdown of communism in Europe. All three socialist federations (Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) collapsed along the lines of the internal borders of their federal units, which have been eventually internationally recognised as independent states.

Nevertheless, the question remains of how long will the Potsdam System, and the ‘frozen conflicts’ precedent witnessed in recent years, function? As was the case in the past, the great powers are again acting hypocritically with regards to contemporary world conflicts and crises. Today—just like Czechoslovakia in 1938—minority rights are the focus of great geopolitical games. In the case of Kosovo, where the interim governmental institutions declared the independence of the province from Serbia, the United States is supporting the principle of self-determination, whereas in almost exactly the same scenario in Georgia, which has two separatist regions (South Ossetia and Abkhazia), they support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia. Once the US made this dangerous precedent, the same double standards were applied by the Russian Federation, which supports Serbia’s territorial integrity, but recognises the independence of Georgia’s breakaway provinces. The conflict of these principles can also be seen inside states. The Chinese government does not recognise any type of autonomy for the Tibetans or Uyghurs, yet at the same

¹ Ibid. p. 314.

time its official policy towards Taiwan is 'One China'. Turkey similarly occupies northern Cyprus, whilst simultaneously suppressing Kurdish separatism in the south-east. The modern world is, in Ulrich Beck's words, a 'risk society'¹ with dozens, if not hundreds, of active and potential separatist movements. It is clear that political interests are prioritised over the principles of international law, both by great powers and smaller national states, all at the expense of the concept of state sovereignty as we know it, which should, of course, not be a surprise.

The policy of double standards was even publicly promoted as being a positive good in some cases. Tony Blair's advisor Robert Cooper, in his bestseller "The Breaking of Nations — Order and chaos in the Twenty — First Century", divides the post-1989 countries into three categories: premodern (where chaos rules, such as in Afghanistan or Somalia); modern ('classic' states with all the prerogatives of a sovereign state i.e. one that has the monopoly of force within its borders and the right to wage wars abroad — according to Cooper only the US is truly a modern state today); and postmodern states (those who gave up their sovereignty in order to belong to a wider community of postmodern states, an example being the countries of the EU, which are postmodern but whose postmodernity is protected by the US, a modern power). For Cooper, a favourable outcome would be for all countries to become postmodern in the future. In fulfilment of that cause, Robert Cooper openly calls for the use of double standards, saying that "for the postmodern state there is, therefore, a difficulty. It needs to get used to the idea of double standards. Among themselves, the postmodern states operate on the basis of laws and open co-operative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of state outside the postmodern limits, Europeans need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era — force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary for those who still live in the nineteenth-century world of every state for itself"². This is a very dangerous line of thought. If we agree that the implementation of double standards led the Versailles world towards WWII, what should we expect from the same behaviour in our time?

Having knowledge of the state of affairs we live in, the real question that has yet to be answered is how much stamina and stability do the modern structures of inter-

national relations and institutions still have? In particular, it must be remembered that a precedent has already been set in 1999 by NATO's bombardment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Since then, the unilateral violation of state sovereignty, without any mandate from the UN Security Council, has become commonplace. This is why I argue that the architecture of post-World War Two international relations doesn't exist anymore. That leaves us to presume that today's order is only a transitional one. Only time will tell what kind of world order will eventually emerge. History teaches us that times of transitions are also times of great armed conflicts, and since it is the global order that I was discussing here, it seems to me that only the results of a global conflict will provide a definite answer.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Beck, Ulrich. *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. London: Sage, 1992.
- Cooper, Robert. *The Breaking of Nations — Order and chaos in the twenty — first century*. London: Atlantic Books, 2004.
- Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.
- Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination." *Lenin Collected Works*. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972. Made available at Marxist Internet Archive, accessed 19 September 2010. <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/index.htm>.
- Mitrović, Andrej. *Vreme netrpeljivih: politička istorija velikih država Evrope 1919-1939* (The time of the intolerant: political history of the great states of Europe 1919-1939). Belgrade: Srpska književna zadru-ga, 1974.
- Musgrave, Thomas D. *Self-determination and national minorities*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Thornberry, Patrick. *International law and the rights of minorities*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Wilson, Thomas Woodrow. "President Wilson's Fourteen Points." *The World War I Document Archive*. Accessed 19 September 2010. http://www.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson's_Fourteen_Points.
- Wilson, Thomas Woodrow. "President Wilson's Address to Congress, Analyzing German and Austrian Peace Utterances." *The World War I Document Archive*. Accessed 19 September 2010. http://www.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson's_Address_to_Congress,_Analyzing_German_and_Austrian_Peace_Utterances.

¹ Beck, Ulrich. *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. London: Sage, 1992.

² Cooper, Robert. *The Breaking of Nations — Order and chaos in the twenty — first century*. London: Atlantic Books, 2004.

MULTIPOLARISM AND GLOBALISM, THE TWO GEOPOLITICAL COSMOVISIONS AND THEIR SPIRITUAL BACKGROUNDS

Felix Alemán

During the so-called Cold War, we lived in a bipolar world. At least, this is what most people think. But how bipolar was it really? There were two superpowers (USA and Soviet Union), with their respective geopolitical areas of influence (West and East), trying to control the world resources and the world population, and competing with each other.

In reality, this bipolar system was an experiment. West ("American") and East ("Soviet") were (since the death of Stalin) not really enemies, but rather two systems working as tools in the service of the same masters. The globalists controlling both of them, were trying to see which of the both systems worked "better" (better for them, obviously) in order to achieve their final goal; total world domination after the destruction of a natural multipolar world and a pluricultural order (of sovereign nations), based on organic communities.

Knowing this, it is not surprising anymore to see how many of the current top-globalists (Wolfowitz, Podhoretz, etc) serving as warmongers for Washington's imperialism, are former Communists from the Trotskyist branch.

During four decades, these two systems were put into work. Both of them are internationalist. Marxist communism even calls itself internationalist, and financial capitalism, based in the power of money, is with no doubt international as well, because capitalists know no borders... and because money has no homeland.

The states where the liberal octopus of capitalism was implemented gave (and gives) to the citizens the illusion of "democracy" (power of the people), the illusion that they are really choosing its representatives. Most of the people living in the "First World" believe this even nowadays, when everything is becoming more and more Orwellian, and our so-called democratic politicians are showing their real puppet nature. But in the capitalist system, where due to the usury of the bankers, money can grow out of nothing, the power is not in the hands of the people, but in the hand of those who control the money... and money is not democratic.

On the other hand, in many Communist countries, some quite interesting phenomenon happened: Orthodox Marxist communism, being anti-traditional, and atheistic; as well as globalist and internationalist (having the same materialistic and octopus-like nature as capitalism), started to develop in different ways in each country, merging the socialist economic system with the character of each nation, of the organic community where it took power. (This did not happen in the capitalist countries, that were and still are under extreme brainwashing and under a huge cultural and social imperialism coming from the USA: with subversive elements such as Hollywood, mass media, destruction of their own language, of their own heritage, etc)



Felix Alemán

Spanish-German antiglobalization activist, sympathizer of Eurasianism, independent author

This was a very natural thing: Communism adapted itself in each country, Communism was absorbed in each country, and not the opposite way, as it was originally planned by the globalists, who wanted to implement an antinatural, cold and rootless dictatorial system upon the world.

The split inside of Communism started already with the power struggle between Stalin —who was more nation oriented— and Trotsky — who preached a globalist borderless communism with his “permanent revolution”). So, for instance, in North Korea, Communism merged with the ancient Korean traditions with its rich culture and its national idiosyncrasy, and the leader Kim Il Sung developed the Juche ideology; a typical Korean kind of socialism. In Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu was a big admirer of the national heroes of the glorious past in the Middle Ages.

So, what originally was a cold, soulless system intending to destroy traditional values as “reactionary”, once implemented in a particular country, was absorbed by the national idiosyncrasy taking its traditions as a way of resistance.

There is an interesting parallelism with Christianity. Many consider Christianity an ancient kind of Communism, and there is some truth about that. When Christianity came to power in Rome, during the first centuries, they prohibited all other religions, the Pagan ones, in the Empire and imposed theirs with dogmatism and violence upon all; they were Universalist, ancient globalists. But after some time, Christianity was absorbed into the nations and developed differently in each parts of the world, sometimes including syncretism with the old Tradition. This can be observed in the Orthodox branch of Christianity and its national churches: there is the Greek Patriarchate, the Serbian one, the Russian one, and so on. In the Russian case, the Czar was the head of State and of the Church, this being equivalent with the Japanese traditional religion Shinto, where the Tenno — the Emperor — was at the same time national and religious leader.

This same phenomena happened with Islam; there is an Iranian proverb that claims “Islam didn’t conquer Persia, but Persia conquered Islam.” Zoroastrianism and Mazdeism had an important role in shaping the Persian Shia current. And in today’s Islamic Republic of Iran, there is a Supreme Leader (Ayatollah Khamenei, who is as well the religious and national leader at the same

time). Also, the Ottoman Caliph in recent times or the Roman Emperor in the ancient past are other examples.

The fact that Communism (like Christianity in the past) was developing in each place according to its traditions was very dangerous for the globalists (Trotskists as well as Liberals). So, the tendency of national-communism had to be stopped.

That’s why they decided to suppress the “Eastern side”, to bring an end to the Cold War and bipolarity and using from now on only the capitalist liberal system as the only acceptable one. The Soviet Union and the countries from the Warsaw Pact were an experiment, and they were not useful anymore because the “masters” behind the scenes realized that it was the capitalist system that was the one better serving their objectives.

This was the birth of the “New World Order” proclaimed by Bush the senior, hoping that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and the other Eurasian nations would be deprived of national sovereignty and enslaved with liberalism. During the 1990s, Gorbachov and Yeltsin tolerated and fomented the plunder of Russian wealth by the oligarchs and international finance but with the beginning of the new century, national sovereignty started to be restored by President Putin, hence why he is being slandered in the West with epithets like “authoritarian”, “dictator”, etc.

The freedom offered by liberalism could be explained very succinctly as follows: It offers the choice between Coca-Cola and Pepsi, or between McDonalds and Burger King. It is nothing more than Consumerism, pure materialism, where profit is everything that matters...

All the countries that did not want to be ruled by this so-called democratic system, or did not collaborate with it, were the few remaining Communist ones like Cuba and North Korea and the Third-Positionists, non-aligned, like Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, or Syria. Globalists decided that they must be taken down, one by one. First of all, this countries were to be mediatically demonized (the concept of “axis of evil” was popularized in this context), threatened, and eventually, as a last step, destroyed by wars in the name of freedom and democracy.

In the particular case of Syria, one fact that is not so well known is that before the crisis started, President Assad was planning to build the Four-Seas strategy, to turn his nation into a trade hub among the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea and the

Caspian Sea. As a sovereign country with a stable currency and a national bank not owned by the Rothschilds, this could have made of Syria a very mighty geopolitical intersection. And in Libya, by the way, Gaddafi tried to introduce the gold dinar, which would have been a real strike against the deceptive international dollar-based economy.

To return to the times of bipolarity:

These two globalist systems, used by USA and its allies (the so-called "free world") on the one side and the Soviets and theirs on the other, were respectively, as we know, capitalism and communism. Both of these ideologies are not opposites as many believe, but "blood-brothers" coming from the same origin, from the same materialistic worldview, from the same *weltanschauung* or cosmovision, which is linear and believes that progress is infinite, without realizing that the natural resources of the world are not infinite.

To put it in other words: Capitalism and Communism are two faces of the same coin.

Returning to spiritual parallelism, it is also possible to claim that Communism was the answer to Capitalism in the 19th century just like Christianity was the answer to Judaism in the 1st one.

Judaism is an ethnic religion. They call themselves the chosen people, and this concept developed negatively in some branches of Judaism, being misused as a feeling of racist superiority and the divine right to rule oppressively all the ones who did not belong to their ethnic religions, the *goyim*. Jesus came to redeem the Jews from the miscarriage, therefore he was killed by the Pharisees, like the Prophets before him. Zionism is a contemporary version of Phariseism. After that, Paul tried to extend the message of Judaism (that there is an absolutist God, a creator separated from his creation, that will recompense you if you love him, and punish you if you don't) to all people in the Roman empire, creating, or inventing, (with the teachings of Christ) a "Judaism for Gentiles". Karl Marx can be viewed as the St. Paul of the XIX Century; teaching the necessity of economic wealth for all, not only for the "elite" of Capitalists.

The difference between Judaism and the other ethnic (Pagan) religions of Antiquity is that Judaism is the first religion (of the ones that still exist today) that considers itself to be the absolute truth, and that all other spiritual paths are wrong, all other ways to the Tradition

are nonsense. It developed from henotheism (believing that Yahweh was the most powerful god but there also existed other gods of the other peoples) to a strict monotheistic jealous submission to Yahweh as the only God. Later, this particularity was "inherited" as well by Christianity and Islam, but only to a certain degree, because like Communism, in secular socio-economical modernity, Christianity and Islam adapted themselves to the different countries when they spread across Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and later the Americas.

In Christianity, two different currents developed in the European Middle Ages: the Guelphs and the Ghibellines. The firsts supported the Vatican and the Pope unconditionally, being religiously very dogmatic and intolerant; while the Ghibellines were nation-oriented and did support multipolarity under the rule of a King or Emperor, which should become symbolic religious-national leader. There is a parallelism with Communism here as well, and we could see Stalin as the Ghibelline and Trotsky as the Guelph.

Concerning Imperium and imperialism, these are two different and actually opposite concepts. While Imperium integrates, composing a continental unity of tellurocratic nature that respects each culture of the different peoples inside it, imperialism is a modern mercantile parody with no boundaries to any soil, with the only "homeland" being money. It does not compose or integrate, but on the contrary, imposes and disintegrates, dividing and conquering by force or by deception, considering itself the only possible system or the "absolute truth".

Nowadays, after the Cold War, there is only one imperialism, an international and mercantilistic one, which is also known as globalism or zionism (modern phariseism).

This imperialism is becoming everyday more powerful and destructive because the masses don't realize what the real danger is and who the real enemies are. Plutocracy and usury (capitalism) are the tools of this system, which to be more effective, works to idiotize the masses (with mass media, TV, Hollywood films, etc) and to split them (for instance Sunni vs Shia in the Muslim world or Christians vs Muslims in the Balkans, but also men vs. women in our already secular western societies, or children vs parents).

In Geopolitics, there are two streams permanently combating each other: Atlanticism or talassocracy (represented by UK & France in the colonial past and now-

days mostly by USA); and Continentalism or tellurocracy, which is the Eurasian concept and used to be represented by the Central Empires in the past and nowadays mostly by a newly rising Russia.

Atlanticism is a globalist geopolitical system, which through commerce — liberalism — eventually wants to impose its system upon all the world — because, as we said before, it believes to be the only truth, the only valid system. Continentalism, on the other hand, believes in a multipolar worldview, not in a unipolar globalistic one, but in a multipolar system with different power blocs, each one with its own area of influence.

One of these power blocs would be Eurasia from the Canary Islands to Vladivostok. An other, for instance, is the Arab world (Nasser and the Baath ideology in Iraq and Syria), while another can be a united Latin America (Perón and Chávez followed this idea). North America is also a bloc, because the USA is a bi-oceanic and continental power which has enough natural wealth by itself and does not need to pillage the resources (oil, gas...) of foreign sovereign countries thousands of kilometres away under the false pretext of "democracy" and of imposing its socio-economical worldview (the globalist one), which is considered by their puppet politicians not only the most desirable one or the most acceptable, but the only one possible, the "absolute truth".

This is the secularist dogmatism of the Kali Yuga.

Continentalism stands for autarchy, full sovereignty, Self-sufficiency, true independence, for conserving the traditional boundaries with nature, spirituality, family, nation. Atlanticism, on the contrary, needs import-export in order to survive, so, it stands for mercantilism, and it is attached to materialism, to mammonism. This is the dangerous breeding ground for the practice of financial speculation and for the demonic practice of the creation of money out of nothing, which enslaves all peoples with usury.

Continentalism wants friendly relations between all peoples and nations. Territorial and political integration should be made by mutual approval, and cultural exchanges are welcome and desirable, but with no interference in internal affairs. Atlanticism, which is controlled by a parasitic "elite" of bankster-crooks, needs to invade and loot foreign nations in order to survive because this is in full accordance with its parasitic nature.

It is important to point out, as Parvulesco said, that we must not integrate Russia in the "EU", but to integrate the "EU" in Russia (which despite the debacle of the 1990s, continues keeping its traditional idiosyncrasy almost intact, what can't be said of the West).

The imperial ideas of German Geopolitician Karl Haushofer, working for an Eurasian Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo axis, should be studied, spread, and developed in order to counteract the imperialist thesis of Angloamerican-Zionist Sphere (Atlanticism), which are always trying to sabotage the traditional commercial terrestrial roads of Eurasia and to split the Eurasian peoples even more by pitting them against each other on a confessional basis or using the so-called "Islamic terrorism" (in reality, Saudi Wahhabi terrorism made by the CIA) as a Trojan horse, with the creation of "Al-Qaeda" as a useful tool against national sovereignty and independence, as we saw in Yugoslavia, Chechenya, Libya, or Syria.

To conclude, Multipolarism and Globalism are the only two real antagonic systems struggling against each other, and NOT capitalism and communism, which were invented as a distraction and as a deception.

HEIDEGGER, LEFT AND RIGHT: DIFFERENTIAL POLITICAL ONTOLOGY AND FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL ONTOLOGY COMPARED

Michael Millerman



Michael Millerman

Ph.D. student of political science at the University of Toronto.

In this essay, I shall engage the post-foundational political thought of the Heideggerian Left (HL) from the position of what I call the fundamental-ontological conservatism of the Heideggerian Right (HR), confining my analysis of the former largely to Oliver Marchart's *Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau* (2007) and the latter to Aleksandr Dugin's *Martin Heidegger: The Philosophy of Another Beginning* (2010).

My thesis is that the HL's partial appropriation of Heidegger's thought leaves them open to a challenge from the Right that both is sensitive to and goes beyond that appropriation. My aim is to provoke a theoretical confrontation between the two positions. My hope is that this presentation of the fundamental-ontological conservatism of the HR will provide a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate about the theologico-political problem in the post-Heideggerian political-philosophical space.

I shall proceed in five stages. First, I offer a definition and brief discussion of the terms "Heideggerian Left", "post-foundationalism", and "quasi-transcendental". Second, I examine the notion of "political difference" and its dependence on Heidegger's distinction between the ontic and the ontological. Third, I introduce the notion of the fundamental-ontological and the corresponding notion of the fundamental-political. This leads, fourth, into a comparison of the HL's and HR's understanding of the "Seyn-event" and to a brief account of *das Geviert*, "the Fourfold", and its importance to the HR. Fifth, I explore the consequences of the previous sections for the so-called "theologico-political question".

THE HEIDEGGERIAN LEFT

As Marchart uses it, the term "the Heideggerian Left" refers to a group of theorists centred in France who, using Heidegger, tried to accomplish two things: (1) a movement beyond scientism, (2) the re-working of Heidegger's thought

into a “progressive direction”¹. The second aim is the one I want to emphasize and examine in this paper. It is important that this progressive “re-working” of Heidegger’s thought was motivated by “an awareness of the dubious if not despicable political inclinations of Heidegger himself”². Wary of his association with the National Socialist regime, these thinkers sought to employ only so much of Heidegger’s analyses as could serve Leftist political opinions and projects³.

Although I shall not pursue a comprehensive disambiguation of the HR position from the Nazi position, for it is practically enough merely to say that the former opposes the latter as a pernicious manifestation of

¹ Marchart excludes the first generation of Heidegger’s students from this definition. Dmitri Yordanov Ginev quotes the following distinction between the Heideggerian Right and Left made by Gianni Vattimo: “Right, in the case of Heidegger, denotes an interpretation of his overcoming of metaphysics as an effort, in spite of everything, somehow to prepare a ‘return of Being’, perhaps in the form of an apophatic, negative, mystical ontology; left denotes the reading... of the history of Being as the story of a ‘long goodbye’, of an interminable weakening of Being. In this case, the overcoming of Being is understood only as a recollection of the oblivion of Being, never as making Being present again, not even as a term that always lies beyond every formulation”. Dimitri Yordanov Ginev, *Critique of Epistemological Reason: Perspectives to Philosophy of Science, Art Criticism, and Multiculturalism* (Sofia: Pensoft Publishers, 2000): 21. Less satisfying is Mandarin’s characterization of the ultimate end of the tendencies he gathers under the name “Left-Heideggerianism”: “to provide a political (and rational) foundation for mysticism in terms of the immanent production of a merely residual, liminal negativity”. On the other hand, when he quotes Negri’s statement that “Ontology becomes the science of the rupturing of being” and comments on it that “ontology is the science of revolution; revolution is the practice of ontology”, he certainly captures something important from the Left appropriation of the revolutionary potential of Heidegger’s work. Matteo Mandarin, “Beyond Nihilism: Notes Towards a Critique of Left-Heideggerianism in Italian Philosophy of the 1970s”, *Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy* Vol. 5 (No. 1 2009): 38, 53.

² Oliver Marchart, *Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007). Smith notes correctly that the Left has on standing in criticizing Heidegger, as a right-wing thinker, for apocalyptic or revelatory themes: “Heidegger was not alone in his willingness to accept an apocalypse as the means to a transition to a novel future. Marx, and an army of neo- and post-Marxists, as well as Nietzsche and post-Nietzscheans, are just a few of Heidegger’s fellow travellers from the past 150 years. Let he who is without sin cast the first stone”. Gregory Smith, “Heidegger’s Postmodern Politics”, *Polity* Vol. 24 (October 1991): 160.

³ For an argument “that ontology had become a shunned concept in traditional leftist discourse because it was tainted by Heidegger and his involvement in German fascism” see Carsten Strathausen, “A Critique of Neo-Left Ontology”, *Postmodern Culture* Vol. 16 (No. 3 2006). Strathausen notes that for “several leading Marxists”, ontology [was] an inherently conservative, if not reactionary concept” (*ibid.*, section 13).

Gestell⁴, I must draw attention to a consequence of the HL’s reworking of Heidegger. It brackets that in him which it finds either actually or potentially objectionable, not on philosophical or ontological grounds, but because of a presupposed link to his “political inclinations”, as though to admit or consider them philosophically would set one on the road to Nazism. In fact, there is a pressing need to consider these bracketed aspects of Heidegger’s thought and to assess their consequences for political theory. Far from lending support to Hitlerism and the principles of the National Socialist regime, they provide the theoretical resources for a fundamental-ontological conservatism, opposite liberalism, communism, and fascism⁵.

POST-FOUNDATIONALISM AND THE QUASI-TRANSCENDENTAL

Post-foundationalism refers to an approach that seeks to weaken the ontological status of “metaphysical figures of foundation” — for example, nature, essence, totality, universality, and so on. The result of this weakening is the rejection not of all such figures, but of those claiming to be ultimate foundations⁶.

On the post-foundationalist account, foundations are plural, contingent, and depend on a decision. Because “no necessary political consequence follows” from the absence of ultimate foundations, “a leftist version of post-foundational thought is in itself a political decision”⁷. Of course, there is a variety of founding political decisions that one could make. Consequently, “[the] post-foundationalist world is a pluralistic world”⁸; and “the practical implication is a fecund flux”⁹. As Marchart puts it, “the pluralisation of grounds and of identities within the field of the social is the result of [the] radical impossibility [of an ultimate ground]”¹⁰. Indeed, “the impossibility of [a singular, present] ground is the necessary condition of possibility for grounds in the plural”¹¹.

Marchart distinguishes post-foundationalism from non-foundationalism and anti-foundationalism. It is not non-foundationalism, because it is not “directed against

⁴ Aleksandr Dugin, *Martin Heidegger: The Philosophy of Another Beginning* (Moscow: Academic Project 2010), pp. 121-126.

⁵ For a more detailed discussion of this “Fourth Political Theory”, see Aleksandr Dugin, *The Fourth Political Theory* (London: Arktos 2012).

⁶ Marchart, *PFPT*, p. 2.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Smith, “Heidegger’s Postmodern Politics”, p. 162.

¹⁰ Marchart, *PFPT*, p. 15.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

attempts at founding politics"¹. Nor does it represent a simple denial of foundationalism, which, as anti-foundationalism, remains wedded by negation to the foundationalist logic. Rather, post-foundationalism accepts the ultimate baselessness of any claim to an ultimate foundation, while nevertheless admitting the necessity to establish contingent foundations through a decision.

Foundations are contingent in at least three respects. They are "temporally contingent in that they are no longer determined by the past, by an immutable Nature, by social origin; they are objectively contingent in that they could always be different; and they are socially contingent in that they [do not] depend on consensus"².

Another important component of post-foundationalism is its notion of the "quasi-transcendental". The term "quasi-transcendental" indicates three things: (1) that the absent fundamental ground is necessarily absent (i.e. supra-historically and hence transcendently so); (2) that the experience and realization of this arises in specific historical and empirical conditions; and (3) that there is a necessity "both to uphold transcendental questioning... and to weaken it from within"³. Although the first of these might give the impression that the absence of a ground serves as a fundamental ground for post-foundationalist political thought, this would only be so if it necessarily grounded a certain politics, which it does not⁴.

In short, then, plurality, contingency, the decision, and the quasi-transcendental are features of the post-foundationalist worldview. They are shared by both the HL and the HR. In the following two sections, I identify the major area of disagreement between them: their key topographical determinant.

POLITICAL DIFFERENCE

As indicated by the title of Marchart's book, the notion of "political difference" plays a central role in the thought of the HL. The HL conceives of this difference by analogy with Heidegger's "ontological difference" between the ontic and the ontological, i.e. between beings (*das Seiende*) and being (*Sein*)⁵. In this section, I focus on Marchart's account of this notion and propose a RH variation of it.

¹ Ibid., p. 3.

² Ibid., p. 27., quoting Niklas Luhmann.

³ Ibid., 29.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 157, 159, 176n1.

⁵ Ibid., p. 171.

According to Marchart, HL theorists interpret political difference as a "founding difference that has to be conceived as negativity", as a result of which "the social⁶... is prevented from closure and from becoming identical with itself"⁷. Thus, in its social connotation, it should be thought of together with such terms as "openness", "difference", "displacement", "deconstruction", "undoing", "undecidability", "play" and "freedom". Opposed to it are primarily the notions of closure, fixity, and self-identity — in short, of whatever can be thought of as analogous to that which was on the receiving end of Heidegger's *Destruktion*.

I'd like to introduce the term "differential political ontology" to designate the ontological difference and the political difference in their interdependence. Differential political ontology risks falling into the trap of what Marchart calls "philosophism"⁸ when it tries to think differential ontology "as such" at the expense of — that is, without — the political⁹. Similarly, differential political ontology risks falling into a kind of "aphilosophism" when it emphasizes the political, or the pair "politics-political", to the exclusion of the ontological difference.

Marchart writes of this interdependence as follows:

...we cannot but think about Being other than in the sense of the political; being-qua-being turns into being-qua-the political. On the other hand, between this ontological realm of 'being' and the sedimented realm of social beings we encounter an unbridgeable chasm, an abyss, which, by dividing the ontopolitical from the ontic side of politics, at the very same time unites them in a never-ending play (and it is this play which in itself is of a deeply political nature).¹⁰

In differential political ontology, then, the difference between politics and the political is itself a political (and ontological) difference. It is where life is lived. The ontopolitical itself is not accessible and remains "out of reach for every ontic politics"¹¹: "[t]he presence of the political as

⁶ Because Marchart is not clear on what exactly he means by "the social" in contradistinction to "politics" and so on, I suggest that we do not pay special attention to his use of the term here, instead reading it as synonymous with the political/politics. (ibid., p. 1).

⁷ Ibid., p. 5.

⁸ Ibid., p. 197.

⁹ Marchart accuses Heidegger of philosophism in this sense. See also Leo Strauss's criticism of Heidegger's excessive attention to the question of Being at the expense of the moral-political problem. Steven Smith, "'Destruktion' or Recovery? Leo Strauss's Critique of Heidegger", *The Review of Metaphysics* Vol. 51 (No. 2 1997): 376.

¹⁰ Marchart, *PFPT*, p. 172.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 175.

the 'ontological' moment of society's institution...can only be inferred from the absence of a firm ground of society"¹. At the same time, "nobody has ever seen 'politics pure and simple' either", because this "paradoxical enterprise that is both impossible and unavoidable" is always bound up with the political². Thus, in discussing differential political ontology, a reference to either term in the pairs "politics-ontics", "political-ontological", and "political difference-ontological difference" should be understood as implying the other.

The following chart depicts five ways of conceiving of the relationship between the political and politics, which Marchart calls "figures of displacement"³:

For Marchart, all five of these figures belong to traditional political philosophy and are guilty, each in its own way, of displacing politics (in Parapolitics, e.g., we see politics displaced from its proper relationship to the political). This displacement is itself political, even if it is not explicitly so. Differential political ontology, for its part, can be depicted as follows:

FUNDAMENTAL-POLITICAL FUNDAMENTAL-ONTOLOGY

In the following section, I develop a RH response to the LH vision of differential political ontology. This section uses certain terms differently from the way in which they are used and understood by the LH. After I set out

Type	Relationship	Example
Archipolitics	Ontological (political) grounds the ontic (politics)	Platonic Political Philosophy
Parapolitics	Ontological (Political) is dispersed into the ontic (politics)	Economic "competition"
Metapolitics	Political difference as illusion arising either from the ontic (e.g. economics) or ontological (e.g. History)	Marxism
Ultrapolitics	The political dominates politics completely (closing the gap between the two)	Schmitt
Postpolitics	The political and politics are "foreclosed"	Habermas

Table 1: Figures of displacement

Differential Political Ontology	Constant ontological moment of the political in a constant play with itself enacted (politics); quasi-transcendental	Marchart / HL
---------------------------------	--	---------------

Table 2: The structure of DPO

Beings (das Seiende)	Politics	Ontic
Sein-Being	Political	Ontological
Seyn-Being	Fundamental-Political	Fundamental-Ontological

Table 3: das Seinde, Sein, Seyn and their correspondences

Approach	Key Topographical Determinant
HL / Differential Political Ontology	The Space Between
HR / Fundamental-Political Fundamental-Ontology	Das Geviert of the Seyn-Event

Table 4: The two approaches and their topographies

¹ Ibid., p. 174.

² Ibid., p. 175.

³ Ibid., p. 161.

the structure of the argument, I turn to a comparison of these central terms.

To amend differential political ontology from the Right, we must take into account the level of the fundamental-ontological, corresponding to Heidegger's *Seyn*. Thus, we stipulate an analogue to the fundamental-ontological, to form a pair corresponding to the pairs "ontic-politics" and "ontological-political". Let us, then, introduce the term "fundamental-political". The modifier "fundamental" should not be thought of as referring to an ultimate fundament, foundation, or ground, but should be thought by strict analogy with *Seyn*, as distinct from *das Seiende* and *Sein*. Thus, whereas the HL operates in the ontopolitical space of differential political ontology, the HR looks to the fundamental-ontological event.

For the Right, the fundamental-ontological event is *Seyn*'s showing itself. *Seyn* shows itself, when it does, as *das Geviert*, the Fourfold. Thus, to understand the fundamental-ontological event, we must take a closer look at the Fourfold. Before we do so, let us clarify the term "*Seyn*" by contrasting the way the HL and HR employs it.

SEYN AND THE SEYN-EVENT

Fundamental-political fundamental-ontology differs from differential political ontology primarily in its understanding of *Seyn*. According to Marchart, Heidegger employs the term "*Seyn*" in order "to differentiate the eventual aspect of *Seyn*-as-difference from the ontological level of being or *Sein*"¹. Thus, *Seyn* names "the event of differencing in-between the ontological and the ontic"². It is the ever-active constituting event of the two poles of differential political ontology. *Seyn* "is nothing completely other than 'being' (or 'beings'), and yet indicates exactly the unsurpassable difference between 'being' and 'beings' — the ground/abyss that opens up in the very event of their differencing" (*ibid*).

That is all that Marchart has to say about *Seyn* in his book. On his account, to understand it as the difference constitutive of differential political ontology is enough. On the other hand, the distinction between *Sein* and *Seyn* is of principal importance for the HR. Dugin, for example, devotes the first third of his book precisely to an explication of it³. I turn now to consider the role that *Seyn* plays for the HR.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 33n2.

² *Ibid.*, p. 172.

³ Dugin, Heidegger, pp. 9-142.

FUNDAMENTAL-ONTOLOGY

The principal way in which the HL and HR disagree about *Seyn* is this: for the former, as we saw, it is the event that is constitutive of the difference between the ontic and the ontological, whereas for the latter, it bursts forth into a new fundamental-ontological domain.

The "fundamental-ontological" must be understood in contrast to the ontological. The ontological is a result of "the first beginning" of philosophy, inaugurated by the pre-Socratics. The pre-Socratics made a leap towards *Seyn* but did not come to it. Their leap was only partially successful. The history of Western metaphysics is the history of that partial success, or initial failure, of the first beginning. A deconstruction or destruction of that history leads us to a "post-foundationalist" position precisely because all traditional candidates for a "foundation" have been "ontological"⁴.

Thus far, the HL and HR agree. However, at this point, the former argues that because all foundations are ontological and everything ontological is destructible, all foundations are destructible. It therefore concludes that there are no ultimate foundations, and emphasizes plurality, contingency, quasi-transcendentalism and decisionism. The HR, on the contrary, emphasizes that because the first beginning was partial and resulted in the history of the oblivion of *Seyn*, the second beginning must not attempt to think being (*Seyn*) through beings (*das Seiendes*) or as ontological being (*Sein*) — nor must it be content merely to remain in the space of difference between them — but must instead let *Seyn* show itself as *Seyn* (fundamental-ontological being-nothing). The HR, that is, is oriented towards another Beginning (*die andere Anfang*), as indicated by the title of Dugin's book.

Thus, if the HL conceives of *Seyn* as constitutive of the pair ontological-ontic (political-politics), to the HR *Seyn* shows itself forth fundamental-ontologically, in the figure of *das Geviert*.

DAS GEVIERT (THE FOURFOLD)⁵

⁴ For a detailed elaboration of this compressed account, see Dugin, *Heidegger*.

⁵ Dugin: "The term 'das Geviert' and its schematic depictions appear in Heidegger's writings at the end of the 1930s in outlines to lectures and books in the cycle connected with the themes of *Seynsgeschichte* and *Ereignis*. Later, in the 1950s, they are developed in the interpretation of **Hölderlin's poetry and in studies of the problems of language.**"

My goal in this section is to distinguish the Fourfold from the topography of differential political ontology and to explain its importance for the HR.

We begin with two possible configurations before commenting on their significance:



Figure 1¹




Figure 2²

As Dugin writes, “We should immediately bear in mind that the given schema represents not a spatial depiction, but the structure of a philosophical and fundamental-ontological topography; this is an image relating to Seyn-being and to thinking about the truth of Seyn-being”³. And again, “[the Fourfold], both as a word and as a sign, is thought of by Heidegger as an expression of the method...of a fundamental-ontological view of Seyn-being itself through the light of its presence”⁴. For Dugin, “[the Fourfold] is a flash that illuminates with a final light the entire structure (Gefüge) of the Heideggerian philosophy. It is the *Lichtung* (illumination, floodedness with light, luminescence) of Seyn-being, opening at the peak of thinking, focused on another Beginning. The introduction of [the Fourfold] is in itself [the event]”⁵.

The content that shows forth in the fundamental-ontological topography of the Seyn-event consists in four domains: Sky (World)⁶, Earth, Gods (the Godly), and Men (i.e., humans). Dugin considers a number of various permutations and arrangements of these four components, beginning with the following:

¹ Dugin, Heidegger, pp. 143-44

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., p. 144. In the brackets, I have replaced the German terms with their English equivalents.

⁶ It should be borne in mind that Sky (ouranos) and World (cosmos) are interchangeable for Heidegger (Ibid., p. 147-48).




Figure 3

In his gloss on this image, Dugin writes: “[The Fourfold] is precisely Seyn-being, which, coming to be realized in Ereignis, introduces war into everything, establishing the tension of the great axes of the world”⁷. These “great axes” are fundamental-ontological force-lines of war. Being as Seyn is war, “because it simultaneously includes ‘yes’ [the event] and ‘no’ [nihilation; i.e. das Nichten im Seyn]”⁸. The separation of the no/nothing/nihilation/destruction from Seyn-being “deprives [the latter] of the possibility of happening, and consequently of beings being born, being born in war and to war”⁹. For Heidegger, this analysis corresponds to Heraclitus’ formula concerning war as the father of things”¹⁰. Consequently, in this orientation, the Fourfold schematizes two major fundamental-ontological battles: the battle between Sky and Earth (ouranogeomachy), and the battle between gods and men (anthropotheomachy).

However, Dugin also discusses various other orientations of the Fourfold. In one, for example, gods and men have gathered together as neighbours, rather than as antagonists, and the major battle is fought between Sky (World) and Earth. In another, Sky (World) and Earth are “betroted” and anthropotheomachy is intensified¹¹:

⁷ Ibid., pp. 148-49.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Figure 4 appears on page 170; figure 5 is my modification of that figure. In both figures, *Ereignis*, the event, is at the centre of the Fourfold, although Dugin also discusses other candidates for the centre of the Fourfold, including *Seyn*, *das Ding*, etc.

The topography of fundamental-political fundamental-ontology (one possible orientation of das Geviert)




Figure 4

The topography of fundamental-political fundamental-ontology (one possible orientation of das Geviert)




Figure 5

Of the second rendering, Dugin writes:

The very symmetry of such a depiction of das Geviert urges us to place God at the top in the singular. It is possible that the absence in Heidegger of precisely such a schema in fact explains his stubborn reluctance to answer even somehow the question concerning "the multiplicity of gods or the availability of the one God". But at the same time he obviously has in mind the prospect of a sole God in the fundamental-ontological system of coordinates, to which his use of the word "God" in the singular and, in particular, in the combination "the last God" (namely "God", not "gods") attests. But Heidegger carefully avoids forcing any speeches about God from the justified apprehension of falling into the old metaphysics and ontological theology, which is tantamount to a failure to philosophize in the space of another Beginning.¹

And further,

In such a rotation of das Geviert, the maximum opposition and confrontation between gods and men, who in the previous version of das Geviert were seen rather as neighbours, is displayed. Here their relations acquire a more hostile character. The gods war with men, attack them, inflict sores and sufferings on them, mock them, despise them. The gods can kill men, laugh at them, turn their lives into hell. Sometimes men begin to storm the light, aerial citadels


¹ Ibid., pp. 165-66.

of the gods, and sometimes they are successful in killing them ("God is dead, you have killed him, you and I", wrote Nietzsche). Compared to men, the gods are deathless, but compared to Seyn-being, mortal, since Seyn-being is the event and carries in itself nothing as the possibility "to nihilate", "to destroy".²

These brief remarks help us to see the way in which the Fourfold can be used to think about the problem of the relationship between man to god (the gods, or the godly) in various ways. Fundamental-ontologically, there is no pressing need to fight for "secular" politics, nor is there the necessary implication of a turn towards "theocracy". The schema of the Fourfold suggests that there can be friendship or enmity between men and gods, without a singular God having to stand at the sole upper peak of the structure that shows forth through the event.

The Fourfold indicates more than just the fundamental-ontological structure of the new beginning. Dugin shows that it can also be used as a map onto which the oblivion of Seyn-being in the history of Western metaphysics can be superimposed in order to reveal the extent of "desertification", or the breakaway from Seyn-being, at each stage of that history. For instance, he marks the Platonic period by the following transformations and substitutions: the Idea covers Sky, Earth is turned to matter, man takes hold of logos and affirms his self-identity rather than having logos taking hold of him in an openness to Seyn-being, and the gods flee. Consequently, the Fourfold looks like this:


Figure 6: The Fourfold after Plato:




Later, we shall meet with the following disfiguration:

² Ibid., p. 167.

Figure 7: The industrial topography of the Fourfold:



Worst of all from the perspective of the HR is the distorted topography of “post-modernity”:

Figure 8: The topography of “post-modernity”¹

To conclude this section, Seyn’s showing forth in the Fourfold should not be thought of as a steady ground or foundation: “To think that Seyn-being is and is always something invariable and eternal is a profound delusion. Seyn-being shows itself in opening (*sich er-eignet*); it is always fresh, is always risked and is never given wittingly” (ibid). It is this contingent opening of Seyn-being in the Fourfold at the new beginning that is the centre of emphasis and attention for the HR.

THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

In the previous two sections, I argued that the HL and HR differ principally in how they conceive of Seyn and the topography of the Seyn-event. Specifically, the HL propose a differential political ontology, whereas the HR advance a fundamental-political fundamental-ontology. In this section, I turn to the question of the implications of these topographies for the theologico-political problem.

¹ These figures and analyses of them, along with a few others, appear on pages 182-203.

There are at least two distinct formulations of the theologico-political problem: (1) the problem of the divine origin of law or of the divine law, and (2) the “return of the religious” and the receding secular². To a certain extent, the second of these may be reducible to the first. Nevertheless, it is helpful to keep them analytically distinct. For instance, a discussion of the first formulation may be found as far back as Plato’s *Laws*. The second formulation, on the other hand, better captures a set of oft-discussed phenomena associated with certain features of modernity, such as secularization, globalization, technology, global capitalism, “religious fundamentalism”, “terrorism”, and so on³. Here I consider only the second formulation, leaving an inquiry into the first for another occasion.

To begin, how does the HL conceive of the problem? Of course, there will be important differences from thinker to thinker⁴. But are there any common features one can identify as belonging to differential political ontology? As a rule, one common feature seems to be that the HL has a commitment to secularism and democracy, whether radical or republican. Let’s look at both of these terms, “secular” and “democratic”, in turn.

First, the HL supports a secular democracy⁵. A non-secular order, on this account, is one that remains bound to the “onto-theological”, i.e. to some purportedly ultimate ontological foundation (e.g. “God” as *Sein*, the soul, etc.). The problem is that as Heideggerians, the HL accepts that Heidegger “destroyed” all such foundations! Thus, what room is there for a Christianity that is merely

² There is also the formulation given by Heinrich Meier, that the problem consists in “the urgent confrontation with the theological and the political alternative to philosophy”. Heinrich Meier, *Leo Strauss and the Theologico-Political Problem* (New York: Cambridge University Press 2006): 4, 1-28.

³ See e.g. the introduction to de Vries and Sullivan, *Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World* (New York: Fordham University Press 2006).

⁴ One major dissimilarity among thinkers of the HL noted by Marchart is that some of them maintain what he calls an “emancipatory apriorism”, according to which differential political ontology automatically implies or serves emancipatory and egalitarian politics. Oliver Marchart, *PFPT*, p. 159. Thus we may say that even if the HL holds an aim in common, how they conceive of the relationship of that aim to the differential political ontology may vary, although at least in the case of Žižek, the aim itself differs: Marchart accuses Žižek of abandoning democratic politics for apocalyptic, Leninist “nonsense”. Oliver Marchart, “Democracy and Minimal Politics: The Political Difference and its Consequences”, *South Atlantic Quarterly* Vol. 110 (No. 4 2011): 971.

⁵ There is scant mention in Marchart’s book of the role of the religious or the secular in post-foundational political thought, however.

"Platonism for the people" if Platonism itself has to go!¹ True, a redefinition of the secular may be called for.² Nevertheless, the HL's commitment to differential political ontology apparently serves a project incompatible with adherence to a "religious" order, the difficulties inherent in the term "religious" notwithstanding.³

Why, then, democratic? Marchart provides the best answer to this question.⁴ In *Democracy and Minimal Politics: The Political Difference and Its Consequences* (2011), Marchart argues that democracy, understood as "the meeting point between a political and an ethical logic", is the regime that relates to the "irresolvable contingency of social affairs" such that "the absence of an ultimate ground of the social...is institutionally accepted, even promoted"⁵. Democratic politics or the politics of democratization is involved in the differential-political-ontological process of founding and instituting itself, on one hand, and constantly subverting itself, "deliberately undermining the very foundation it seeks to institute"⁶. For Marchart, democratic ethics is as such unpolitical, inasmuch as it recognizes its own groundlessness. However, the necessity of ongoing re-founding renders it an "antinomy". This positive account of democracy's inherent self-criticism resembles somewhat Derrida's arguments in favour of "democracy to come"⁷.

Of course, we might fairly ask whether the isomorphism of the democratic antinomy to the "play" of differential political ontology is a good enough reason to be dem-

ocratically oriented⁸; but our own thoughts aside, this reasoning does underlie the HL's democratic politics, at least in some cases.

Matters stand somewhat differently with the HR. Whereas for the HL, the predominant impulse is to "destroy" (onto-) theology and establish a more or less radical form of democracy, in the political theory of the HR, room remains for both a post-deconstructive, fundamental-ontological theology and for pre- and post-deconstructive traditional theologies (and mythologies), with a corresponding politics that is not necessarily "radically democratic". In this section, I shall discuss only "fundamental-ontological theology" and the question of democracy⁹.

By "fundamental-ontological theology", I refer to the study of the "godly" domain of the Fourfold, as it is and in its relation to the other domains thereof. The gods of

⁸ Marchart, after remarking that no necessarily political consequences follow from the political difference, observes that any consequences drawn therefrom "have to stand the less-than-difficult [sic] test of plausibility when confronted with both the philosophical world of arguments and the phenomenal world of politics". Marchart, "Democracy and Minimal Politics", p. 967. Perhaps the most damning criticism of both the HL and the HR concerns the limits of their confrontation with the first of these worlds. In my opinion, the classical political rationalists have the upper hand here, to a considerable extent.

⁹ The leading figure of the HR, Aleksandr Dugin, whose book on Heidegger I am relying on for my characterization of that position, writes as follows about Traditionalism (in the context of which a discussion concerning the role of traditional theology in his political theory would be better suited) and Heideggerianism:

"While studying the philosophy of traditionalism for a long time (see in particular the books 'Absolute Fatherland',

'The Philosophy of Traditionalism', and 'The Radical Subject and its Double'), I did not accent Heidegger's teaching, although it influenced my intellectual formation in the most direct and immediate manner. My views, my worldview, are indebted to the philosophy of Heidegger only slightly less than to the ideas of Guenon. Heidegger is a part of our worldview, our political theory, our philosophy; he is a *sine qua non*. Heidegger is no less fundamental than Guenon. But he is another. A comparison of Heidegger and Guenon must not be carried out too hurriedly. We must thoroughly master Guenon separately, and Heidegger separately. And then — only then! — should we think about in what they overlap (and in what they differ). It is incorrect to interpret one from the other. In my opinion, J. Evola in his "Ride the Tiger" made the mistake of too hurried and superficial an interpretation of Heidegger from traditionalist (generalized, Guenonist) positions, where he presents exceedingly wrongly and in a distorted manner Heidegger's ideas and terminology, and even less soundly, and even naively, criticizes them." [Dugin, Heidegger, p. 134n6].

See also the sections entitled "The Return of Tradition and Theology" and "Myths and Archaism in the Fourth Political Theory" in Dugin, *Fourth Political Theory*.

¹ See e.g. Dugin, Heidegger, pp. 64-91; Jean-Luc Nancy, *Dis-Enclosure: The Deconstruction of Christianity* (New York: Fordham University Press 2008): 151.

² Nancy, *Dis-Enclosure*, p. 5.

³ Jacques Derrida and Gil Anidjar, *Jacques Derrida: Acts of Religion* (New York: Routledge 2002): 40-102.

⁴ We should keep in mind that, for Marchart anyways, although post-foundationalism does not imply democracy, democracy implies post-foundationalism. Thus, the democratic thrust of post-foundationalist political thought might well reflect that a previous commitment to democratic politics has led a thinker to post-foundationalism for theoretical resources, rather than post-foundationalist premises leading a thinker to adopt democratic politics. Marchart, *PFPT*, p. 158.

⁵ Marchart, "Democracy and Minimal Politics", p. 967.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 968. Elsewhere, Marchart writes that: "democracy is to be defined as a regime that seeks, precisely, to *come to terms* with the ultimate failure of grounding rather than simply repressing or foreclosing it". Marchart, *PFPT*, pp. 157-58.

⁷ Samir Haddad, "A Genealogy of Violence, from Light to the Autoimmune", *diacritics* Vol. 38 (No. 1-2 2008): 141n16.

the Fourfold are not onto-theological; they are not of such a status as to be subject to the destruction that was directed by Heidegger against the history of Western metaphysics. Their proper study must be carried out in the context of fundamental-ontology. I do not propose to perform that study here, however, or to give a comprehensive account of the hints and more developed interpretations of the gods given in Dugin's book. Rather, I want to sketch very briefly and tentatively a couple of points for further research on this question.

First, let the point be emphasized that the gods of the Fourfold are not the gods of religion:

*Men, as a rule, relate too rationally and utilitarianly, too "technically", even in their completed and elevated theologies and theosophies, to godliness. The gods of religion turn into mechanisms of punishment or forgiveness, salvation or damnation. They become "human-all-too-human", betraying thereby that they have been replaced. Such gods do not war with man, and men do not war with them for one reason: they are not; they are constituted in isolation from Seyn-being, and consequently the clever technical methods of deft men are able to force them to do everything that is pleasing to men. Such gods are subdued gods, *dei ex machina*.¹*

Because they belong within the topography of Western metaphysics, the gods of religion are "worthless and die together with the fall of metaphysics in contemporary nihilism"². The godliness that shows forth in the Fourfold, on the other hand, is "the godliness connected with Seyn-being" (ibid). Characteristically, the gods of the Fourfold need Seyn-being, impart to the Fourfold a kind of "transparent inebriation", teach men nothing, and as it were "tickle" the world (ibid). But perhaps the most striking statement about them comes from Heidegger's *Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis)*, which Dugin quotes as follows:

Since Seyn-being is a need of the gods, and at the same time it is found only in the thinking over of its truth, and this thinking over, in its turn, is nothing other than philosophy (of another Beginning), the gods need seynsgeschichtliche thoughts, i.e. philosophy. The gods need philosophy not as though they were preparing to philosophize apropos their deification, but philosophy must take place (be, become, sein), if (wenn) the gods will need to enter the element of decision once again and

obtain for *Geschichte* (history as fate) a ground for its es-sent [Wesen]. Seynsgeschichte thought as the thought of Seyn-being will be predetermined by the gods.

It must be remembered that the philosophy of another Beginning is the sine qua non of the HR project. There thus appears to be a direct connection between godliness/the gods in the topography of the Fourfold and the new Beginning urged on by the HR. Inasmuch as Heidegger's philosophy plays a central part in the so-called "Fourth Political Theory" of the HR³, the "theologico-political" threads are evidently very closely intertwined for this school, though, as I have shown, the "theologico" must be considered fundamental-ontologically, as must the "political".

What of democracy? We cannot begin to approach this question without mentioning at the outset that the HR does not share the HL's penchant for absolute inclusion. Instead, drawing on a range of traditions including the conservative revolution, Guenonism, Eurasianism and neo-Eurasianism, they situate the fundamental-ontological moment in the particular *da-Sein* of a people. Nor do they adopt as an axiom that democracy is good and desirable⁴. With this point established, the HR, we can say, reject social-democracy and bourgeois democracy as belong to the discredited and unacceptable political theories of communism and liberalism, respectively.

Instead, they propose a kind of "organic" or "holistic" democracy. Perhaps the most that can be said here to distinguish the democratic vision of the HL and the HR is to

³ Dugin refers to Heidegger's philosophy as "the most profound... foundation for the Fourth Political Theory". That philosophy "may prove to be the central axis threading everything around itself — ranging from the reconceived second and third political theories [communism and fascism] to the return of theology and mythology". Dugin, *Fourth Political Theory*, pp. 28-9.

⁴ Dugin writes that one must take a "critical distance" in relation to democracy in order to create the space to think it through conceptually. Above all, one must refuse to adopt it as a dogma. "Not to believe in democracy does not mean to be its adversary. It means not to be its prisoner, not to find oneself under its hypnotism and suggestion". A political philosophy that takes the goodness of democracy to be an *a priori* forfeits the right to call itself philosophy. These comments are taken from "Deconstruction of Democracy", an article in which the metaphysical foundations of democracy are discussed in the context of eight theses from Plato's *Parmenides*. <http://konservativizm.org/konservativizm/071112131204.xhtml> (accessed 17/11/12).

¹ Dugin, Heidegger, p. 158.

² Ibid., pp. 153-56.

remark on the willingness of the latter to consider the ethnos the subject of political history¹.

CONCLUSION

Post-Heideggerian political thought has been dominated by the influence of the HL. Indeed, for a North American political scientist, it is much easier to name members of the HL than those of the HR. Even for scholars sympathetic to the HR project, there is a lack of material from available from that school. Consequently, HR positions are relatively unknown, undeveloped, and understudied.

In this paper, I have sought to remedy the situation. My approach was to set forth a partial account of the differences between the HL and HR by focusing on one major point of difference — the Seyn-event and its topography — as articulated by one major representative from each school, Oliver Marchart for the HL and Aleksandr Dugin for the HR. Finally, I tried to connect these observations with the “theologico-political problem”.

Principally, I hope to have made a plausible case that the selective use of Heidegger by the HL results in the possibility of employing a certain “remainder” for the creative elaboration of a HR political theory. That “remainder” consists first and foremost in the notions of Seyn, the Seyn-event, and the Fourfold. These provide the elements for a “theologico-politically” novel political theory, committed neither to secularism nor to radical nor republican democracy — and distant, indeed from Nazism. Now that the basic post-foundationalist foundations of this approach have been laid, the necessary work of elaborating it more fully and evaluating its fruitfulness can begin.

¹ See Dugin’s lectures on Ethno-sociology, some of which are available online, in English, at <http://4pt.su/> (lectures on Ethno-sociology read at Lomonosov Moscow State University are available in Russian at konservatizm.org/ethnosoc.shtml).



Shaykh Imran Nazar Hosein

Prominent Muslim scholar from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

TEN MAJOR SIGNS OF THE LAST DAY — HAS ONE JUST OCCURRED?

Shaykh Imran Nazar Hosein

LAST DAY MEANS LAST AGE

The term 'Last Day' in reality stands for the 'Last Age', or the age which would culminate in the end of history—when the true Messiah, Jesus, the son of Mary (not son of God), would return to rule the world from Jerusalem with justice and 'eternal' rule. It would be 'eternal' in the sense that history would end with that event. Life on earth beyond that event, and after Jesus dies a human death and is buried next to Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah Most High be upon them both) in Madinah, would not qualify as history. This would be so since the modern secular rope would have reached its predictable end in total godlessness, and with such a consequent collapse of morals, and of moral consciousness, that people would forget their human status and "would engage in sexual intercourse in public like donkeys". Already it is quite clear (particularly at the time of Trinidad's Carnival) that we are quite close to the fulfillment of that ominous prophecy made by Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him).

So much so then, for the spurious claims of the one-eyed Judeo-Christian western civilization and its 'colored house slaves' around the world. They claim that mankind is witnessing unprecedented progress, that the present is the best of all ages, that the world keeps on growing better and better, and that modern western civilization has rendered all previous civilizations, including Islam, moribund and obsolete!

So much so, then, for the local one-eyed 'house slave' here in my native island of Trinidad who insists that Muslims must remain a part of 'mainstream society' -even when that mainstream is heading for the hell-fire.

When a ship is sinking and you cannot prevent it from sinking, you have to get off that ship, and urge others as well to do so. The ship of the world is now sinking! The evidence is all around us as plainly visible as daylight! But those who are blind cannot see that the ship is sinking. They use their checkbooks, or the barrels of their guns, to impose themselves around the world as leaders. The blind then lead the blind until all are lost and will be drowned like the people of Noah (peace be upon him).

Prophet Muhammad prophesied many more signs of the Last Day other than public 'donkey sex'. Most of these are known as the 'minor' signs. Let us describe some of them (randomly selected) before we turn to the ten 'major' signs in which we venture to include the major underwater earthquake and resultant Tsunami in South East Asia that occurred in late December 2004.

MINOR SIGNS

Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah Most High be upon him) prophesied of the Last Age that:

- “People would follow a way of life other than mine, and give guidance other than mine”...“I fear for my people only the leaders who lead men astray”...“Before the Last Hour there will be great liars, so beware of them”...“When the most wicked member of a tribe becomes its ruler, and the most worthless member of a community becomes its leader, and a man is respected through fear of the evil he may do, and leadership is given to people who are unworthy of it, expect the Last Hour”. All of these warnings have already been dramatically and ominously fulfilled. Around the world today, with but few exceptions, and even here in my native Caribbean island of Trinidad, people, including Muslims, now have the worst leaders. This ominous sign of the Last Day has come to pass, yet there are so many who do not, or cannot see, and they blindly rush as dumb cattle to endorse or to follow such leaders for personal gain, or fear, or due to sheer ignorance; • “Women would arrange their hair to look like the hump of a camel”, and this sign has already occurred, we see it everyday;
- “Women would dress like men”, and we already see them today with trousers, jacket and, perhaps, a tie; and “women would be dressed and yet be naked”, and this prophecy, also, is now fulfilled. When women parade in public “dressed, yet naked”, as they do today, and when Muslims cannot prevent such, they should then seek to flee from such mainstream society rather than to remain a part of it until the women are fully naked and “donkey-like” sexual intercourse is on public display. If they foolishly choose to remain a part of such corrupt and decadent society then they or their children would eventually be ruined by such a society.
- “Men would dress like women”, and already this sign also has come to pass. Almost no one can tell that ‘she’, the so-called ‘crossdresser’, is really a man;
- Homosexuality (and lesbianism) would become commonplace, and that is now happening before our very eyes. Social acceptance and legal protection for this abominable sexual perversion is gaining ground. Indeed those who hold fast to the divine prohibition of such sexual perversion are now demonized as a people who suffer from a disease called ‘homophobia’;
- Children born outside of marriage would become commonplace, in fact marriage itself now seems destined to become obsolete;
- Fornication and adultery would become commonplace, that, also, appears to have already been fulfilled in a modern world in which virginity and marital fidelity are becoming old-fashioned;
- Disproportion in balance of men and women to such an extent that “one man would have to maintain (not marry) fifty women”, that is yet to occur but could be linked to the impact on male sperm production of such things as environmental pollution and genetically modified food;
- Universal consumption of alcoholic beverages, this “mother of all evils” has already become a horrendous plague in which no one is safe from the drunk driver; the unborn baby drinks when his mother drinks and suffers unimaginably for such; people, including Prime Ministers, drink and become drunk, and then behave in public like asses;
- “Religious knowledge would disappear”, since the rightly-guided scholars of Islam are demonized, marginalized, “banned”, or declared to be “great security risks”. Only those scholars who can skillfully skip and dance to the tunes of those who control power are allowed the unfettered freedom to preach a sanitized cosmetic version of Islam acceptable to the godless rulers of the world. Institutions of Islamic learning are forced to submit to the control of those waging war on Islam. If they do not submit, they are shut down. Foreign students are prohibited from studying Islam in certain so-called Islamic Republics;
- “Time would move swiftly—a year passing like a month—a month like a week—a week like a day” etc., and already the perception of swiftly moving time is a universal experience;
- Such prevalence of random killing, murder and violence that “a killer would not know why he is killing and the one who is killed would not know why he is being killed”, and “every age is followed by one which would be worse”—already around the world senseless random killing has arrived and is constantly escalating;
- “Nothing would remain of Islam but the name, and nothing would remain of the Qur’an but the traces (of its writing) (i.e., the Qur’an would not be studied, no one would follow its guidance, it would be recited mechanically etc.); the Masajid (mosques) would be grand structures but would be devoid of guidance; and the Ulama (religious scholars of Islam who represent such people) would be the worst people beneath the sky. From them

would emerge Fitnah (trials) and they would be the centers of Fitnah (since they betray Islam)" — there are many distinguished scholars of Islam who declare that this prophesy, also, has today found fulfillment. The evidence of such is overwhelming. The Islamic Khilafah (Caliphate) has been long destroyed, Zakat is no longer collected and distributed by the state, money itself is now corrupted, the universal Shirk of the modern state has corrupted all of mankind, Riba is universally prevalent, the Hajj would probably soon be abandoned;

- Universal consumption of Riba (i.e, money lent on interest, and transactions which 'rip off' people through deception in business, etc.) Around the world today Riba in modern banking and insurance, as well as in the monetary system, has already taken total control over the market and over economic life. There are some minor signs which have been couched in enigmatic language such as,

- "A slave woman would give birth to her mistress", made possible through a combination of Riba and the modern feminist revolution, and;
- "Naked barefooted shepherds would vie with one another in the construction of high-rise buildings". This is already being fulfilled when wealth is wasted in grandiose and expensive public relations construction projects commissioned by people who hanker for visible symbols of status in a modern world which recognizes the rich as a 'somebody' and the poor as a 'nobody' (see story of the rich man and the poor man in Surah al-Kahf of the Qur'an).

And then there are minor signs which have not as yet occurred such as:

- "The Last Hour would not come until there issues from the land of the Hejaz (which is in Saudi Arabia) a fire which will illuminate the backs of the camels in Busra". But for the exchange of Basra for Hejaz, this prophecy perhaps, anticipates a nuclear attack in or around Iran which would formally launch Israel into the club of nuclear powers. So many of these minor Signs of the Last Day, and so many more not here mentioned, have already occurred, that we can now turn to the major Signs with a clear recognition that we are already living in that Last Age.

MAJOR SIGNS

Hudhayfah ibn Usayd Ghifari, the companion of the Prophet, said,

"Allah's Messenger came to us all of a sudden as we were (busy in a discussion). He asked: What are you discussing? (The Companions) replied: We are discussing (the subject of) the Last Hour. Thereupon he said: It will not come until you see ten signs. And (in this connection) he made a mention of the 'smoke', 'Dajjal', the 'beast', the 'rising of the sun from the west', the 'descent of Jesus son of Mary', 'Gog and Magog', 'sinkings of the earth in three places, one in the east, one in the west and one in Arabia' at the end of which 'fire would burn forth from Yemen, and would drive people to the place of their assembly' (i.e., the place where mankind will be assembled for judgment)."

(Sahih Muslim)

Here, then, are the ten major Signs of the Last Day as prophesied by Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah Most High be upon him):

- Dajjal — the false Messiah or Anti-Christ,
- Gog and Magog,
- Smoke,
- The beast of the earth or land (most likely the holy land),
- The sun would rise from the west,
- Three sinkings of the earth
 - one in the east
 - One in the west
 - and One in Arabia,
- A fire would come out of Yemen and would drive people to their place of assembly (for judgement),
- The son of Mary would descend. Although these signs were not given by the blessed Prophet (peace and blessings of

Allah Most High be upon him) in their chronological order of occurrence I have made an effort to put them in that order, with the ones that have not as yet occurred at the bottom of the list. How did I arrive at the above order? We know from the prophecies of the blessed Prophet that the third major 'sinking of the earth', i.e., the one that would occur in Arabia, would swallow an

army that would be heading south to Makkah. That army would be on its way to attack Imam al-Mahdi, the descendent of Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah Most High be upon him). It was prophesied that he would restore the Islamic Caliphate (or Islamic model of a state) in the Arabian peninsula. It is after that sign has occurred (i.e., the third major earthquake) that the son of Mary would descend from the sky with his hands resting on the wings of two angels, and would kill Dajjal the False Messiah or Anti-Christ. The Qur'an itself has described Jesus (i.e., the return of Jesus) as the 'ilm (which here means the very key to the subject) of the Last Hour:

"And he (i.e., Jesus) shall be a Sign (for the coming of) the Hour (of Judgment): therefore have no doubt about the (Hour), but follow Me: this is a Straight Way."

(Qur'an, Zukhruf, 43:61)

It follows that his return must come chronologically at the end of the list. We also know that the 'fire' from Yemen would follow the third earthquake. And so now that it appears that the major earthquake in the East has occurred, we await four more major signs that still remain to occur. When did the first six 'major' signs occur?

DAJJAL

I have argued in my book, 'Jerusalem in the Qur'an — An Islamic View of the Destiny of Jerusalem', that Dajjal the False Messiah or Antichrist was released into the world in the lifetime of Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah Most High be upon him). He has already completed the first stage of his mission that lasted for "a day like a year", and is about to complete the second stage that lasts for "a day like a month". The third and last stage of his mission (of impersonation of the true Messiah) that would last for just "a day like a week" would, I believe, commence when Israel replaces USA as the ruling state of the world. And that would occur when Israel wages a big war that would result in dramatic territorial expansion "from the river of Egypt to the river Euphrates". Israel would then seize control of the Suez Canal and all the oil of the Arabian Gulf.

By the end of that third stage, Dajjal the false Messiah or Antichrist would have been born into the world of Jewish parents, would have risen to become ruler of Israel and, hence, would have completed his mission to rule the world from Jerusalem. And Allah Knows best!

An entire chapter of the book is devoted to explaining the subject of Dajjal. I am now writing a quartet of books on Surah al-Kahf of the Qur'an, and one of the four books would be entirely devoted to a comprehensive explanation of the subject of Dajjal, the false Messiah or Anti-Christ in Islam Insha Allah.

GOG AND MAGOG

I have also argued in my book that Gog and Magog were released into the world in the lifetime of Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah Most High be upon him). The Qur'an itself has made mention (Qur'an, al-Anbiyah, 21:94-5) of a 'town' which was destroyed by Allah Most High, and the people of the town expelled, and then banned from returning to reclaim their town until Gog and Magog were not only released but, also, had spread out (around the world) in all directions.

"But there is a ban on a town which We have destroyed: that they (the people of the town) shall not return (to reclaim that town as their own); until Gog and Magog are let through (their barrier), and they swiftly spread out in every direction (replicating themselves amongst all the peoples of the world)."

(Qur'an, al-Anbiyah, 21:95-96)

I identified that 'town' to be Jerusalem. And since the Jews have already returned to Jerusalem to reclaim it as their own, it follows that Gog and Magog, like Dajjal, are also close to the end of their mission. And Allah Knows best!

Another entire chapter of 'Jerusalem in the Qur'an' is devoted to explaining the subject of Gog and Magog. In addition, the fourth of the quartet of books on Surah al-Kahf will be devoted to a comprehensive explanation of this subject Insha Allah.

DUKHAN (SMOKE)

This appears to be totality of environmental pollution (not just smog and haze) that is already wreaking havoc on the earth itself and is bringing about global warming with the consequent impact of earthquakes, hurricanes, flooding etc. The modern industrial economy that Dajjal has authored appears to be the greatest culprit of environmental pollution in the world today. In other words, we have been tricked into causing Dukhan (smoke) which in turn spawns global warming and eventual climatic disaster. And Allah Knows best! However, it is im-

portant that we note that there are several Ahadith in Sahih Bukhari that declare the sign of Dukhan (smoke) already appeared in the lifetime of the blessed Prophet.

D'ABBATUL ARD (THE BEAST OF THE LAND OR EARTH)

I have argued in 'Jerusalem in the Qur'an' that the beast of the earth' is, in fact, the imposter State of Israel that now occupies the Holy Land. The learned Shaikh, Safar al-Hawali, holds the view that the 'beast' is the Zionist Movement. And Allah Knows best!

THE SUN WOULD RISE FROM THE WEST

Those who interpret this sign literally assume that the order of nature would be reversed despite the Qur'anic declaration that there can be no change in Allah's creation (of that natural order):

"So set thou thy face steadily and truly to the faith: (establish) Allah's handiwork according to the pattern on which He has made mankind: no change (can there be) in Allah's creation: that is the standard religion: but most among mankind understand not."

(Qur'an, al-Rum, 30:30)

They also do so despite the specific declaration of Prophet Abraham (peace and blessings of Allah Most High be upon him) that his Lord-God causes the sun to rise from the East. Abraham then proceeded to challenge the King to cause the sun to rise from the West if he possessed power greater than Allah's:

Hast thou not turned thy vision to one who disputed with Abraham about his Lord, because Allah had granted him power? Abraham said:

"My Lord is He Who giveth life and death." He said: "I give life and death." Said Abraham: "But it is Allah that causeth the sun to rise from the East do thou then cause it to rise from the West!" Thus was he confounded who (in arrogance) rejected Faith. Nor doth Allah give guidance to a people unjust.

(Qur'an, al-Baqarah, 2:258)

And so they wait for that western sunrise as an event that would literally occur, while ignoring the basic rule that no Hadith can contradict the Qur'an.

But this sign has provoked numerous other non-literal interpretations, all of which agree that it has already occurred. Our view is that the rising of the sun from the West symbolizes an upside-down world in which mankind is led by their noses to a way of life which would be the very opposite of that natural way ordained by Allah. Natural money, for example, so identified in the Qur'an, is derived from precious metals. When such money is in short supply in a market such as Madina's, then a substitute in the form of commodities such as wheat, barley, dates, salt, etc., can temporarily take its place. Around the world today that natural money with intrinsic value has been displaced by artificial money with no intrinsic value and it is used as an instrument of oppression. That upside-down unnatural way of life has already been accepted by most of mankind. In this sense, therefore, the sun is already rising from the West. And Allah Knows best!

THREE SINKINGS OF THE EARTH

Many terrible earthquakes have already occurred in history. They have no relevance to our subject. We are concerned with three major 'sinkings of the earth' that would occur at a specific moment in history, i.e., they would occur at a time that would herald the return of Jesus, the Messiah, the son of Mary, and Messenger of Allah Most High. One would occur in the East, the second in the West, and the third in Arabia. When the third one takes place, the world of Islam would suddenly and dazzlingly reenter the affairs of the Arabian peninsular, as well as of the world, in the same revolutionary way that it did in the lifetime of Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah Most High be upon him). This appears to be the meaning of the last of the major signs (prior to the return of Jesus) mentioned by the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah Most High be upon him), i.e., that a fire would come out of Yemen and drive people to their place of assembly (i.e., for judgment) which is Arafat in Arabia.

THE EARTHQUAKE IN THE EAST

I believe that the recent massive earthquake and resultant Tsunami in South East Asia which has claimed many more than 100,000 lives, is the earthquake of the East mentioned by Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah Most High be upon him) in the ten major Signs of the Last Day. It could thus be the first of three such earthquakes heralding the return of Jesus (peace

and blessings of Allah Most High be upon him). I came to this conclusion because of the following reasons:

Firstly, the prophecy of the blessed Prophet is that a 'khasf' would occur in the East, i.e., the earth sinks down or caves in. A 'Tsunami' is defined as a sea wave of local or distant origin that results from large-scale sea-floor displacements associated with large earthquakes, major submarine slides, or exploding volcanic islands. When this recent displacement of the earth occurred under the sea, and consequently resulted in the massive Tsunami, it ensured that those who have maliciously concealed the Truth time and again in history could not conceal this major Sign of the Last Day. The magnitude of the event, i.e., the severity of the earthquake (9 on the Richter scale) and, more importantly, the massive damage already done and still unfolding, makes it absolutely unique for mankind today.

Secondly, I am impressed by the location of the event — it occurred in that East which is clearly east of Madinah.

Thirdly, and most important of all, I would like to direct attention to the time that it occurred. This was after the liberation of the Holy Land (1917), and return of the Jews to reclaim the Holy Land as their own (1918-1948). It was also after the restoration of a State of Israel in the Holy Land (1948) and the growth of Israel to become a superpower in the world (i.e., the present). Finally, it occurred at precisely that time when Israel is about to wage her big war of massive territorial expansion after which Israel would replace USA as the ruling state in the world. Jesus cannot return until all these things have occurred. It has also occurred at that time when the prophecy of the Prophet concerning the abandonment of the Hajj seems about to be fulfilled. The Hajj would pose a gigantic security threat to the present Saudi ruling elite whenever Israel wages its big war and assumes rule over the world. And it has occurred at just that time when the US dollar has begun its perhaps irreversible decline that might culminate in its collapse. Such a collapse would also bring down all the paper-money in the world and electronic money, controlled by the Jewish-controlled banking system, would then control all the money in the money-system of the world.

This momentous Sign in the East that occurred at the end of December 2004 appears, therefore, to be a sign to mankind warning that dangerous change in the world will soon take place.

It appears to be the first of the three major earthquakes, or 'sinkings of the earth', as prophesied by Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah Most High be upon him), which would herald the return of the true Messiah, Jesus the son of Mary, the Messenger of Allah Most High. If we are correct, and Allah Knows best, then the world has to await only two more such major events before the son of Mary returns to liberate us from the oppressors who now rule the world.

THE SECOND EARTHQUAKE IN THE WEST

When a second massive earthquake (with a sinking down, caving in, or displacement of the earth) eventually occurs in the west, after the recent one in the east, that would further confirm the analysis presented in this essay. All that would then remain to occur for Jesus to descend from the clouds would be the third earthquake in Arabia that would swallow an entire army, and the fire that would come out of Yemen. We are so close to that event that we can already feel the heat of that fire. Although what appears to be the first of the three major earthquakes occurred underwater and resulted in the massive Tsunami in South East Asia, it is not necessary that the second that would occur in the west would be similar. After all, we know that the third and last major earthquake would have its epicenter on land just north of Makkah in Arabia. But it would seem that the mid-Atlantic (rather than the Pacific) may be the location of the major earthquake of the west that is to come. In case the second major earthquake occurs in the mid-Atlantic, the islands of the Caribbean and the eastern coast of USA and Canada as well as South America would be likely to be affected. It could also be a big earthquake in California along the fault.

THE THIRD EARTHQUAKE IN ARABIA

Narrated Aisha: Allah's Apostle said, "An army would invade the Ka'aba and when the invaders reach Al-Baida', all the ground would sink and swallow the whole army." I said, "O Allah's Apostle! How would they sink into the ground while amongst them would be their markets (the people who worked in business and not invaders) and the people not belonging to them?" The Prophet replied, "All of those people would sink but they would be resurrected and judged according to their intentions."

(Sahih al-Bukhari)

Narrated Umm Salamah, Ummul Mu'minin: The Prophet said: "Disagreement will occur at the death of a Caliph and a man of the people of Madina would come flying forth to Makkah. Some of the people of Makkah would come to him, bring him out against his will, and swear allegiance to him between the Corner and the Maqam. An expeditionary force would then be sent against him from Syria but would be swallowed up in the desert between Makkah and Madina."

(Sunan Abu Daud)

It is quite clear from the above prophecy of Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah Most High be upon him) that the third earthquake would take place at the time of the advent of Imam al-Mahdi. But the Imam cannot emerge to liberate the Arabian heartland of Islam until Israel has become the ruling state in the world. And Allah knows best!

THE RETURN OF THE TRUE MESSIAH, JESUS, THE SON OF MARY

Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah Most High be upon him) has spoken extensively and in minute details about the event of the return of Jesus (peace and blessings of Allah Most High be upon him). But that event is so rich and complex that it lies beyond the scope of this paper. However, my book, 'Jerusalem in the Qur'an' has dealt with the subject in some detail, and it is to that book that I now refer the gentle reader.

ONE FINAL WORD

The destiny of Jerusalem is such as to give to Muslims the greatest confidence and hope that Truth will triumph over falsehood and oppression. 'Jerusalem in the Qur'an' was written for precisely this purpose — i.e., to explain to Muslims the strange world in which we live today. It is a world in which the cause of Islam appears to be a lost cause. But having read the book the reader would know, if he or she had not already known it, that the reality is quite different. When they know for certain that it is the destiny of Jerusalem to give a spectacular validation of Islam's claim to truth, Muslims should be able to summon the strength to resist the present war on Islam in which the godless world is making the greatest possible effort to destroy their faith in Allah Most High.

GENDERED IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSNATIONAL CAPITAL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINIAN MIGRANT FAMILIES

Alissa Tolstokorova

INTRODUCTION

Remittances constitute an efficient strategy for fighting situations of adversity, inherent risks, and instability, and may serve as insurance to improve or counter crisis situations. Although they became a sort of "migration mantra" in the discourse on migration, generally acknowledged as a gendered process, the remittances and gender nexus is still under-researched. Meanwhile, it was admitted on the UN level that gender is a key factor when considering the likelihood of remittances being sent and received (IFAD & FAO, 2008) and a key variable affecting the migration project, the type of consumption, investment, and the type of remittances (UN-INSTRAW&IFAD, 2008). Hence, it is true that in search of a framework through which the complexities of global migration may be understood at its best, the connection between gender and remittances emerges as a key factor in this global phenomenon that demands further examination (UN-INSTRAW, 2007).

Hypothesis, theoretical framework, and goal of the research. A priori, based on analysis of media reports from destination countries, I assumed that there will be no mass return migration to Ukraine given that it is easier for migrants to survive the challenges of the global financial crisis (GFC) in recipient societies (Tolstokorova, 2009). Respectively, there are no grounds to expect a decrease in remittances flows. Expert assessments, despite being controversial, partly confirmed this expectation. Thus, in October 2008, it was projected that as a result of the crisis, a large share of undocumented migrants would come back home (Novynar News, 2008). In November that year, their numbers were assumed to reach 3 million throughout 2009 (Mykolyuk, 2008). Yet already in December 2008, this great numbers of expected returnees was questioned (Kovalenko&Laschenko, 2008), and in spring 2009, it was announced that such a number would be unlikely (Faryna, 2009; Rozenko, 2009; Yatsenyuk, 2009). The assessments of the expected total of returnees made public in 2009 diminished twice, being estimated as 1,5 million people (State Committee on Statistics of Ukraine, 2009). Considering the latter possibility, I assumed that remittances would remain resilient. My assumption was drawing from the observation that remittances have a tendency to respond positively to political and humanitarian crises in migrant-sending societies (Savage & Harvey, 2007). The experience of past crises has demonstrated that remittance flows may be counter cyclical with the GDP in recipient societies (IMF, 2006). That is, in the periods of a financial crunch, migrants tend to increase their financial support to families left behind at home so as to compensate for the salient consequences of economic downturn for their transnational households. This is particularly true in reference to developing and transitional societies, where social security systems are weak or even non-existent (ILO, 2010). Furthermore, considering that remit-



Alissa Tolstokorova

Ph.D., Associate Professor, Head of research experts group, International organization "School for Equal Opportunities", Kiev, Ukraine.

tance-receiving societies are usually more vulnerable to the adverse effects of economic meltdowns than source nations, migrants working there have better opportunities to cushion the negative impact of a crisis. Motivated by the sense of altruism as a backbone of the migrant's "moral economy"¹, they start to propel remittances flows to support the households in their countries of origin, thus acting against the economic cycle and increasing the value of remittances during the recession (UN-INSTRAW, IFAD, 2008, p. 20). It was concluded that in such cases, remittances act as an "automatic stabilizer to smooth out fluctuations in the business cycle" (IMF, 2006). Meanwhile, it was observed that the specificity of the current crisis, which originated in developed economies, is that it is migrant workers abroad who are hit the hardest and are among the first to endure its effects (ILO, 2009). In this context, remittances were expected to play a pro-cyclical role (ILO, 2010, p. 69). These observations led to the prognoses that remittances would continue rising, although more modestly, during the GFC (Fix et al, 2009). At the same time, it was also envisaged that the decreasing employment rates among migrants due to the downturn would entail a reduction in remittances (Holmes, 2008). In particular, a World Bank study suggested that migrant transfers to developing economies would decline from \$305 billion in 2008 to about \$290 billion in 2009 (Deen, 2009). The available experience, however, evidenced that the reduction of remittances flows was overestimated, given that money transfers in 2009 remained resilient and reached \$316 billion (Ratha, 2010). Yet, patterns of remitting have changed as long as migrants were reluctant to send money via official channels due to a lack of confidence in the banking systems. In 2010, remittances remained resilient too, especially as compared to private capital flows during GFC, having begun to recover and reaching \$325 billion in 2010 (Martin, 2011). The data of the "World Migration Report 2011" confirmed this claim, contending that "although there was some decline in remittance sending, perhaps reflecting the rise in unemployment among migrant workers, remittances remained resilient, in many cases, because return migration was not as high as expected" (IOM, 2011, p. 56). In February 2012, the director of the Bank's Development Prospects Group commented that despite the global economic crisis that has impacted private capital flows, remittance flows to developing countries have remained resilient, posting an estimated growth of 8% in 2011 (Hunter, 2012). At the same time, a recent UNDP prognosis (UNDP, 2012) warned that remittances might drop in 2012, given that the still unresolved debt crisis in Europe does not point to a positive scenario for

migrant workers who are currently staying or planning to move to the Eurozone. Countries among the most popular destinations for migrants are entering the years of austerity and cuts in public expenditures, and overall economic growth perspectives in the Eurozone are grim and unlikely to improve in 2012. In Russia, which is a key target country for Ukrainian migration, the latest data from the Russian vulnerability database showed a positive result for 2011, albeit with a decline in unemployment and inflation. Should this trend reverse in 2012, it might also impact those countries currently receiving millions of dollars in remittances from Russia (UNDP, 2012), including Ukraine and others.

Additionally, previous crises have demonstrated that the impact of economic upheavals are rarely ever gender-neutral, with women bearing the brunt of adjustment (UNIFEM, 2009). Migrant women are often being hit hardest by the crisis (Oxfam, 2009). Regarding the gendered effect of the crises on the labour markets and employment possibilities, there were prognoses that the financial crisis would be harder for women, and that more women than men worldwide would lose their jobs. This assumption, however, was overridden by the opinion that a specificity of the current recession is that its impact is likely to be more evenly shared by women and men, markedly different to that in the recessions of the early 1990s and early 1980s, because male unemployment rates catch up to women's (Smith, 2009). The research made on the onset of the current downturn, euphemistically called the Lehman Crisis, showed that the caveats of possible decline in remittances and large-scale return migration proved largely ungrounded (Oxfam, 2010a). Regions with highly feminized migration flows were particularly resilient. In some countries, the migrants' total even augmented itself, the increase being mainly female as a result of the demand in the domestic work and service economy remaining strong (Oxfam, 2010a). At the same time, the decline of remittances was mainly due to dropouts in male migration, with salient consequences to remittance-dependant households (Oxfam, 2010b). Reduced remittances have put more pressure on women as principle managers in the families and those responsible for food on the table and children's wellbeing. Therefore, the available scenarios of the possible remitting strategies of migrants in response to a deep economic downturn showcase a magnitude of controversies, calling for their verification by alternative methodological approaches to migratory practices. This explains the goal of this paper, which is to find evidence demonstrating whether the above mentioned ob-

servations are applicable to the Ukrainian context in the conditions of financial crunch, drawing on qualitative gender-sensitive methodology and taking gender «as an analytical concept, rather than just women and subjects» (Bastia & Busse, 2011).

Methodology of the study: The specificity of the modern standpoint on gender research is that it aims to create an alternative methodology and epistemology in the framework of social and economic sciences with the emphasis on the importance of the personality as a subject of knowledge and on social mechanisms that empower his/her access to social practice (Braidotti, 2002, p. 44). It allows for a "more fluid and dynamic approach to the individual within the migration process" (Phizacklea, 2003, p. 29), which is particularly helpful in moving away from more mechanical econometric accounts on the financial dimension of migration which have often pervaded the literature. Therefore, the methodology for a gender-sensitive research on the financial aspects of labour migration should include, together with a quantitative study, also qualitative and interpretative, i.e. "soft", methods of research. They enable a "migrant-centered approach" to the process of economic mobility, inaccessible to traditional econometric methods of study, by presenting narratives that capture the insights, considerations, attitudes, and motivations of its key actors. By doing so, they enable the identification of gender-specific incentives for remitting, strategies and patterns of money transfers, and the impact of earnings made abroad on financial democracy and power relations in the family. Considering the current situation of controversy over statistical data on the remitting behavior of Ukrainian migrants during the financial meltdown, the above potential of qualitative methods of research might be instrumental as a unique, and probably the only, way to access individual experiences and assessments of migrants as key actors in remitting.

The Current paper is grounded on the data of a multi-staged field research consisting of non-participant observation, two focus group discussions, and semi-formal interviews with 41 Ukrainian migrants and members of transnational families (29 females and 12 males).

The interviews were drawn on a semi-structured questionnaire with open-ended questions, covering information on gender patterns of accumulation, sending, receiving, management, and the use of remittances; self-assessment of the socio-economic effect of remittances on the well-being of transnational households

and their benefits in the intra-generational and gender perspectives; the effect of remittances on power relations in the families of labour migrants; and the impact of the economic crises on the remitting patterns. The interviews were taken under the condition that the real identities of the responders would not be disclosed in order to maintain their privacy.

ROLE OF REMITTANCES FOR THE WELLBEING OF UKRAINIAN TRANSNATIONAL HOUSEHOLDS

Despite generally recognizing that remittances play a pivotal role for the promotion of well-being in transnational households, in Ukraine, with its tremendous migration fluxes, statistics on migrants' remittances are fragmentary and data from different sources is difficult to reconcile (Atamanov et al, 2009), while the quality and coverage of the existing data on remittances overall is hardly adequate (IOM, 2008a, p. 23). The IOM Report on Ukraine admitted that there is no analysis yet on the multiplier effect of remittances or on the impact of return migration on the local economies in Ukraine (IOM, 2009).

As was shown elsewhere (Tolstokorova, Ryndyk, 2011), remittances are highly instrumental as a poverty eradication strategy in the families of Ukrainian labour migrants, enabling them to ensure the socio-economic stability and financial security of their households, thus allowing them to escape serious financial constraints which would have been otherwise unavoidable. Earnings sent by family members working abroad make an important contribution to the healthcare security of transnational households and are crucial for securing educational possibilities for migrants' children, providing the ground for their professional realization in the future. Thus, the share of household expenditures coming from remittances may be tantamount to approximately 20% (IOM, 2009, p. 27). According to analysts' data, the average monthly income of Ukrainian transnational households might reach up to 2 billion UAH (around \$385 million), i.e. about 1/3 of the nominal income of the population (Malynovska, 2004, p. 15). The pull of remittances Ukraine receives from its citizens working abroad, by analysts' assessments, may amount to between 0.7% to 25% of GDP (GFK, 2008, p. 5). Thus, according to the National Bank of Ukraine, in 2006 alone, Ukraine received \$5.6 billion of remittances from its migrant workers (taken from Gajducky, 2007). The IFAD statistic for that year was \$8.47 billion (IFAD, 2007, p. 12). Meanwhile, by the estimates of Ukrainian experts, the real sum might reach up to 10-20 billion (taken from

Fedorak, 2007), considering that Ukrainians do not trust the national bank system and prefer unofficial means of credit transfer (Harney, 2011, p. 11; Majdanik, 2010: 123), the so-called "banks on wheels" (TSN, 2011). According to a variety of sources, from one-third to around a half of remittances are being transferred through the bank system and the rest by hand or via intermediaries (Ombudsman of Ukraine, 2003; Majdanik, 2010, p. 121), which poses high risks to senders. By contrast, the foreign direct investments Ukraine attracted throughout the 16 years of its state independence did not exceed \$24 billion (Kyiv Post, 2007). In the most economically disadvantaged regions, as for instance Ternopil and Chernivcy, this contrast is even more remarkable: the ratio between foreign investments and informal migrant remittances into the national economy is nearly 1:40 (Parkhomenko, Starodub, 2005, p. 20).

Furthermore, it should be considered that in Ukraine, as in many other remittance-receiving societies, banking systems do not extend to rural and remote areas. This constrains their capacity to deliver funds to households in these areas and induces migrants originating from there to resort to informal channels of money transfers, which is also connected with risk. For that matter, the lack of secure and accessible means of money transfer is regarded by migrants as one of top challenges they face while working abroad (Open Ukraine, 2008). It is noteworthy that according to a study by GFR Ukraine, whilst the use of most banking services decreased in the crisis period, the use of money transfers increased in contrast. Whereas in 2007 about 7% of Ukrainian population carried out money transfers, by 2010 this figure has risen twice, to around 15%. By the experts' opinion, this increase is connected with the growth of family support in the time of crisis (GFK Ukraine, 2011). This is probably why with the onset of the crisis, Ukrainian remittance-receiving households reported greater financial security as compared to other categories of households (Europe without barriers, 2011, p. 16). Thus, 54.4% of them characterized their economic situation as vulnerable but not catastrophic against 62.4% of families with no migrant workers abroad. Additionally, more of them assessed the impact of the crisis on their family well-being as insignificant: 19.6% vs 15.6%, respectively. As shown by research carried out by Caritas Ukraine (Mykolyuk, 2009), this might owe to the resilience of migrants who, with the onset of the crisis, did their best to preserve employment abroad by all possible means. Information in Ukrainian media (Lejbovych, Teslya, 2008; TSN, 2009; Faryna, 2009) also shows that Ukrainian guest workers appear to be

holding on to their jobs despite the downturn. However, this sometimes goes with a high cost, for instance, working for free for a while to be able to withstand the competition and preserve the job or to work for a lower remuneration. However, even those who forfeited their jobs did not go back home, but moved on to other places with better employment possibilities, for instance, to Finland. This tendency was noted among Ukrainians working in the Czech Republic (Drach & Najibullah, 2009).

GENDER SPECIFICITIES OF REMITTANCES SENDING, RECEIVING, MANAGEMENT, AND USE

Migrants remitting behavior hinges on several factors, including but not limited to gender, age, education, marital status, position in the family, and opportunities in the destination country. Meanwhile, gender not only predefines who migrates, when, where, why, and how, but also affects the amount and frequency of remittances transferred back home, as well as how they are spent (IOM, UN-INSTRAW, 2011, p. 1). Research findings show that women often play a leading role in remitting, as both recipients and managers of transfers from abroad, and as their senders, and for that matter are seen as critical actors in the remittance-to-development paradigm (UN-INSTRAW, IFAD, 2008). Although their remitting patterns vary depending on the country of origin, overall women are found to be more reliable as senders and managers of remittances than men, which is attributed to their better understanding of household needs and the ability to respond to them better, combined with traditional involvement in social structures wherein they have greater responsibilities for household chores (IFAD, FAO, 2008, p. 12). At the same time, men are more likely to be found among non-remitters (Connel, Brown, 2004). On the post-Soviet terrain, the experience of Tajikistan showed that the longer migrant men stayed away from their families, the more likely they were to start a second family. When this happened, remittances gradually declined (International Crisis Group, 2009). Studies showed that men generally remit more than women, which is attributed to the traditionally higher incomes of migrant males due to the occupation gap between women and men (UN-INSTRAW, IFAD, 2008, p. 13). Thus, it was found that the income of Ukrainian women working abroad was lower as compared to that of men. Respectively, remittances sent home by young Ukrainian females amounted to 80.9% of the total sum sent by males (Majdanik, 2010, p. 119-120). Nonetheless, in some countries it is women who send home more remittances than men. The research among labour migrants from

Georgia showed that women sent more remittances home and were better able to support their families because they spared themselves certain conveniences and luxuries while working for remittances. They did not go out during their days off, they called home only twice a month, and they did not buy anything for themselves in order to save as much as they could to send savings back home (Zurabishvili, Zurabishvili, 2010).

Remitting patterns are structured along gender lines too. It was found that men save to take money home, while women more often invest in their new local environs and purchase durable items (Grasmuck, Pessar, 1991). As well, men tend to send remittances in larger amounts and not so regularly, while women send more regularly and respond more positively to calls from the country of origin in periods of crisis. Among Ukrainian labour migrants in the older age groups, no gender differences were found in the patterns of remitting, whereas young migrant females were reported to send transfers home less often than males (Majdanik, 2010, p. 119). Although it may owe to the lower incomes of younger women, it may also suggest their long-term perspectives in the hosting societies and the intention to better integrate themselves to be able to secure a residence permit in the future. For that reason, they spend more on their own needs than on the family back home. This opinion is backed up by data evidencing that women, especially of a younger age group, tend to spend more of their earnings on settlement in the country of work than their male coevals (Majdanik, 2010, p. 116). Additionally, among Ukrainian migrants, 62.3% of males sent money home as compared to 58.8% of females, although women predominate in the countries where from savings are brought mainly in hand (Italy) (IDSR, 2010). This suggests declining ties with their homeland among Ukrainian women.

Women are reported to prevailing being both the senders and receivers of remittances (IDB-MIF, 2004a). Worldwide, they make up half of all remittances recipients (IOM, 2008b). However, in Muslim cultures, remittances earned either by women or men are usually sent to male relatives left behind at home, as showcased by research conducted in Central Asia (International Crisis Group, 2010). In families of migrant men, therefore, despite the wives assuming a great deal of responsibility over the household during their husband's work abroad, they are anyway excluded from financial resources and hence, they are not accorded by the patriarchal society either the power, respect, or social status enjoyed by

men. Men, it was found, spent their remittances irresponsibly, whereas women invest them more efficiently. Empirical research showed that women are more prone to invest remittances in productive enterprises such as tailoring, producing handicrafts, commercial agriculture, and raising cattle (UN-INSTRAW, IFAD, 2008). Some fragmentary data available from research conducted on Ukrainian migrant women shows that their remittances serve more familial, rather than investment, functions (Hormel & Southworth, 2006; Harney, 2009). Men left behind are more often among those not entrusted by migrant women with their remittances. It was found that at the initial stage of the migration process, some women remitted money to their husbands, but as a result of the men's poor management of remittances, they later chose to send money directly to mothers or sisters, but no longer to the men in the family (UN-INSTRAW (2006a; Parreñas, 2005).

Studies have demonstrated that remittances may have gender-specific implications for the familial and parental roles of women and men. Thus, it was observed that remittances are often a way of assuaging a sense of guilt for migrant mothers: when children are in the home country, remittances serve as a way of paying off the responsibility of motherhood and blurring the distance of separation (UN-INSTRAW, IFAD, 2008, p. 17). Generally, men send their earnings predominantly to their parents and wives, tending to send more to the former than to the latter. This situation stems from the fact that when sending to the spouse, they are also sending to the children left behind at home. Women on the other hand have a wider range of people to remit to, such as their parents, children, and siblings, as well as other relatives including spouses or grandparents. One explanation is that most migrant women are single or single mothers and are expected to face certain obligations as mothers, daughters, sisters, wives or a combination thereof (Orozco, 2006, p. 3). However, in order to fully grasp the gendered specificities of sending, it is also important to look at factors such as marital status or age, as there are differences not only between, but also within, genders (IOM, UN-INSTRAW, 2011, p.3). Thus, the parental responsibilities of migrant mothers explain why they tend to send remittances to the person (more often a woman) who takes care of their children (UN-INSTRAW, 2007) to ensure that the money is spent for the benefit of the children and the household (UN-INSTRAW, IFAD, 2008).

Remittances may create new power dynamics, as family members position themselves to compete for resourc-

es. On the other hand, the spatial separation of migrants from their families means that issues of resources use and management are taken outside the confines of the household (Pinnawala, 2008). This leads to the separation of an earner from a manager, and creates spatially separated parallel power centers within the transnational family space, with the manager of income as the center of power in the local family/household space and the earner of the income (the female migrant) as the center of power in the new livelihood space. Hence, gender is an important factor in determining the remitting strategies in transnational families and in shaping supportive social networks to bolster the basis of the financial security and well being of the transnational household.

DISCUSSION OF FIELDWORK FINDINGS

GENDER IMPLICATIONS OF REMITTANCES FOR UKRAINIAN TRANSNATIONAL HOUSEHOLDS

Our fieldwork confirmed the abovementioned observation about women's agency in remitting as senders, recipients, and managers. At the same time, the interviews showed that the responsibility for remittance management in recipient households is transferable throughout the lifecycle of the family. For instance, our responder Olena, an adult unmarried daughter of migrant parents, mentioned that when she studied at school, it was her father who received transfers from her mother working abroad, while the decisions regarding the expenditures were made by her jointly with her brother. As soon as Olena graduated from school and started earning her own living, the remittances henceforward were sent to her. She continued to manage them on a par with her brother until he had left to work abroad following her father. Another responder, Marta, a senior woman managing remittances sent by her migrant daughter, noted that when she worked in Italy in the early 1990s, she sent her remittances to the family as a whole, not to someone in particular, because at that time, all adult members of the household were unemployed and required financial assistance. In the family of Lyudmilla, it was her mother who received and managed remittances sent from Italy by the father of the family. Yet, after the mother and two brothers joined him abroad, the remittances were managed thenceforward by Lyudmilla.

At the same time, some female informants intimated that they entrusted remittances mainly to female family members, since males as remittances users were found to be unreliable. This is because men tend to spend re-

mittances on themselves, while women invest them into the subsistence of a joint household, as testified by Olga's story:

Responder: "You know, it was so frustrating! While working there, I was saving every single penny to send home to the children. Sometimes my roommates invited me to go out, just to relax and enjoy life after hard work. Oh, no! I could not afford it! I had to save money for the children, for their well-being. But when I came home to visit, you can't even fancy how frustrated I was! It turned out that my son was going to his classes at the University only by taxi! And in the evening, instead of studying — friends, beer, hanging around... It turned out that he wasted all the money I sent him and even made lots of debts. Then one day he came to me saying: "Mom, I need money to repay my debts. If you don't give me money, I am in real trouble." So, I had no choice but to give him all the money I brought home to save him from troubles. Luckily, my daughter is of a different order. She spent the remittances very productively. She bought furniture and some electric appliances for the kitchen, also a washing machine, so it was quite a different story then with my son. I understood that I had to entrust my money only to her. (Interview with Olga, a migrant in Russia working as a cleaner, who earlier worked as a senior engineer for municipal services).

It is noteworthy that despite the position of remittances receivers, combined with the reputation of their productive managers and investors, most female remittance managers did not accommodate their relation to the remittances as a promoting factor for their power status in the family. While responding to the question about the impact of remittances on their decision-making agency in the household, many women underscored their irrelevance of financial leadership in the family for kinship relations, as was noted by Marta:

Interviewer: Do you think that you have a stronger power status in the family due to your position of a receiver and manager of remittances?

Responder: You see, my kids are good. Very good. ... They help me a lot. So, I wouldn't say so. Now that the girl is getting older, she helps me when I ask her about it. Yes, they are very good and they treat me well. So, I don't think it depends on money. (Interview with Marta, retired, works part-time, mother to a widowed migrant woman in Italy).

Another responder said that she enjoyed a decision-making position in the household only temporarily while she

was managing the remittances sent to her by the parents of the child she took care of. Yet, once the remitters were back home, they took over the decision-making position in the family:

Responder: Of course, when the child's parents are away from home, it is me who is a boss here. But as soon as they are back — it's them, his Mom and Dad. It is his Mom who is number one again, she is the boss. I have power only when she is away. Once she is back, it's over (Interview with Nina, retired, works part-time, mother to two migrant couples, working in Cyprus and Italy).

Only one woman clearly confirmed her decision-making power in the family due to the position of being a remittances manager:

Responder: Of course it matters! Yes, certainly. I do have more power. No doubt. Because I have the power to control the child's expenditures. I have more power in the family, because it is me who decides how to spend this money (Interview with Ganna, retired, works part-time, mother to a divorced migrant man working in Czech Republic).

The interviews showed that for all the women left behind, the role of remittance managers entailed the necessity to assume the responsibilities of being child-minders to the migrants' dependents. Therefore, in the first place, it entailed additional family responsibilities, however, these surplus obligations were not rewarded by financial or material affluence. Thus, all the women unanimously admitted that although remittances enabled their financial empowerment by improving the economic security of their households, still they alone were insufficient to maintain a decent level of well-being in their families. Even despite migrant parents taking responsibility for the most costly expenditures for children, as for example, clothing, footwear, and other expensive commodities, and although nearly all the female responders pooled remittances (sometimes received from more than one relative) with retirement allowances and earnings from part-time jobs, none of them assessed their level of well-being to be above satisfactory.

At the same time, our participatory observations showed that unlike the females who remain behind in the family, men left behind at home often failed to successfully perform the functions of remittance managers. They tended to spend transfers from abroad on alcohol, hanging out or anti-social behavior, invest them in risky businesses, etc. Thus, as was intimated in the informal conversations

held with civil servants working with family and minors, municipal courts in the small towns of the Western border regions of Ukraine often have to deal with trials initiated by migrant women against their ex-husbands who failed to perform their paternal duties, despite having regularly received money for their children from their migrant wives. Furthermore, as a result of their financial independence and economic agency, migrant women are frequently manipulated by their (ex-)husbands left behind at home. For example, men black mail their (ex-)wives, requiring them to pay penalties for the abandonment of paternal care duties for their children, which are mandatory if mothers want to take their children abroad to countries of work. The rationality behind these collisions is not so much the emotional attachment of fathers to their children, but rather their mercantile intentions to secure "gender dividends" from their wives by making them a "favour" to bear the full financial responsibility for their joint offspring. These instances testify that in transnational families, the gender effect of the "moral hazard" of remittances for family relationships consists in fostering an irresponsible attitude of the left-behind men to their spousal and paternal obligations, entailing the mercantilization of kinship bonds. This confirms a conclusion of my earlier research (Tolstokorova, 2010 a) that although remittances enable migrant women to acquire more financial freedom and self-reliance, they entail neither more fiscal democracy, nor more gender equity in transnational families. The work abroad only increases women's double burden, but does not lead to more financial independence insofar as by assuming the roles of breadwinners they become more bound by their financial obligations to their children, while their husbands use the financial empowerment of their wives as an opportunity to decrease their own contribution into the family budget and to manipulate their spouses. Hence, paradoxically, although women work hard for remittances, remittances do not necessarily work for women. Therefore, the "gender saldo" of migration for women might often be negative and their "gender dividends" of investments into transnationalism might be nil, while their husbands left behind at home may receive good "gender gains" (Bastia, Busse, 2011: 30) without any investments into the family's well-being.

As was discussed earlier (Tolstokorova, 2009 b), one responder noted:

Responder: "Here, in small towns in the South of Ukraine, around 40% of men live on the remittances of their migrant wives and take care of the household. In the West of

Ukraine, their share is even higher, probably over 50%, and since my sister lives in Moldova, I know that there such men make up no less than 70% of the total male population" (Interview with Varvara, retired, a mother of a man working in Russia).

This, however, is not specific to Ukraine, but echoes the findings of empirical studies in other parts of the world how casing that some husbands quit working and lived entirely off remittances in transnational households, while other family members continued working but stopped contributing to the household budget, spending their earnings on themselves (UN-INSTRAW, 2006 b).

This is why UN-INSTRAW raises the alarm about the predominance of "matrifocal households" among migrant families, whereby women bear the main responsibilities for all aspects of the remitting process, generating a family model in which men's involvement becomes less important, entailing the decline and marginalization of their family roles, but increasing the family burdens of women (UN-INSTRAW, 2006 b). My research confirmed this observation, evidencing that transnationalism leads to an expansion of women's roles in the household both for movers and stayers without tangible changes in their status and power position. In doing so, it reinforces gender inequality. Therefore, the general conclusion is that migrant women's financial empowerment in the countries of work does not necessarily translate into gender empowerment at home and may even lead to financial disempowerment if their husbands remain absolved of their responsibilities for the family's welfare.

IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL DOWNTURN ON REMITTANCE FLOWS

Among the senders of remittances in this study, no one reported losing employment as a result of the crisis and respectively terminating the sending of remittances back home. One responder said that in early 2009, she went back home to Ukraine from Italy and was considering whether she had to stay home or return to Rome to resume working there. Her hesitancy was not related to challenges related to her employment in Italy, but rather to the overall worsening of the situation, such as the growing prices in Italy, fewer opportunities to find part-time employment to supplement the principle source of income, etc. However, after a while, she realized that there were no opportunities for her in Ukraine and eventually decided to go back to Italy.

At the same time, many responders intimated that the downturn affected people around them, but not themselves. This testifies to the observation that Ukrainians do not compete on the labour market with native laborers, but successfully compete with migrants of other origins (Mykolyuk, 2009). This follows from an interview with a former extra-class athlete who gave his interview while visiting his family in Ukraine for his 60th birthday. He has been working abroad for over 10 years, first in Russia and then in Portugal. In his interview, he underscored that with the enveloping crises, some people at his Portuguese enterprise were dismissed from their jobs. These were mainly managerial personnel whose departure did not affect the production process:

Responder: At my place it was quite a big deal. Many people were kicked off, but not amongst us foreign workers who do all the hard and nasty work in this sweatshop. It was mainly "white-collar" natives, we call them "Porthoses"¹, who have advisory, consultative, or administrative positions. They were hired when the financial situation was favorable, but once the crises started, there was no need for them anymore. Say, our computer guy was dismissed. A good guy, we missed him. Then one of two deputy managers was kicked off too. They did not want two of them anymore, so only one preserved his job. Then they joined two units into one and dismissed the surplus administrative personnel. But among guest workers like us, nobody was affected (Interview with Victor, a handyman worker at an enterprise in Portugal).

Another man working in the construction sector in Portugal related that in his team of workers, six people were dismissed as soon as the crisis started. Due to that, those who preserved their jobs had their workload nearly doubled. They were glad to have it because their wages increased too, although disproportional as to the increase of the workload, to around €50-60 per week.

Another responder, a male working in Russia, noted that there was turmoil caused by a wave of dismissals amongst people working in the so-called "budget sector", i.e. personnel of public institutions and enterprises financed by the state:

Responder: I was not affected by the crisis. Not at all. It was because I worked for myself, not for the state. My income did not depend on public funding. From my observation, the crises had salient implications for those employed in

¹ It is an allusion to the name of Porthos, one of protagonists of the classical novel "The Three Musketeers" by Alexander Dumas.

the budget sector, who received salaries from the state: teachers, doctors, librarians, etc. When the crisis started, some of them were dismissed from their jobs due to budget constraints. But we in the private sector were not affected. On the contrary, we benefited by the crisis, because many jobs were freed (Interview with Dmitry, a university lecturer and a musician working as a handyman worker in Moscow).

The social tension generated by the crisis in her hosting country was confirmed by Larissa, a woman who had been working with senior citizens in Moscow throughout 2008–2010. She was relatively affected by the financial crunch, since she had to change her employment pattern to respond to the changing situation on the informal labour market of domestic services. However, she did not face a critical situation which could induce her to go back home. Due to that, her remittances remained resilient.

Responder: When they started talking about crisis, there were fears among the guest workers that our employers might face financial challenges and some of us might lose our jobs. It is true that some people were kicked off, say from Central Asia. I had some hard times too, but I was lucky and it ended up well for me. I was taking care of an old woman whose son was my employer. When hard times came, my employer, who was in his sixties, was asked to retire and respectively lost part of his income, having preserved only his retirement allowance. He told me that since he did not work anymore, he could stay with his mother three times a week, and I'd have to stay four other days. I explained to him that in that case, my income would be insufficient to pay for my accommodation and I will have to leave them and go back home. He was not happy about it, because he did not want me to go. Eventually, he found me one more employer so that I could work in two families for the whole week and thus preserve my income level (Interview with Natalya, 57, a doctor, working as a caregiver in Moscow).

Interestingly, seven responders commenced their economic voyages abroad in late 2008–early 2009 when the crisis reached its apex, however, they did not associate the decision to go abroad for earnings with economic hardships stemming from the financial crunch. Rather, both women and men explained it by the transition to a new stage in their family or individual life cycle. For instance, their incentives hinged on such issues as their approaching retirement age and the need to provide for oneself in old age; graduation of the migrants' children from high school and the necessity to pay university fees;

the desire to financially assist the family of adult children expecting a baby; divorce and the necessity to pay alimonies to the ex-spouse and children; graduation from the university and a lack of professional experience necessary to start a career at the labour market in Ukraine, etc. This is how one responder explained her decision to go to work in the care sector in Germany in 2008:

Responder: "I went to Russia when I was in my early 50-s to earn for life after retirement, because my expected retirement allowance at that time was but \$40 -50 per month. What could one afford with this money? It was nothing, yet for a woman in her senior years, it is hard to find a part-time job to have extra income. You are not welcome anywhere, even if you have high qualifications and are still full of energy. Additionally, I had a long-cherished dream to have my apartment renovated, to have a so-called "Euro-repairment", wherefore I had neither time nor money while working full-time. I wanted to have decent life after retirement. This is why when my colleague offered me this opportunity to take her job in Germany for the time she stayed home visiting, I did not hesitate and agreed at once." (Interview with Alexandra, a retired college lecturer, employed in Germany as a caregiver at a private nursing home for the elderly and working part time as a translator, tailor, cleaner, etc).

The instances of job elimination due to the crisis which happened in the migrants' closest surrounding were attributed by them not to the objective absence of possibilities on the labor market, but to the lack of flexibility and adaptability skills of the persons affected, being treated as a prerequisite for survival in the conditions of the permanent labour market volatility:

Responder: Yes, some people left after the crises had started. I think it is not surprising, because they were not ready to work hard, to adjust themselves to possible exigencies, to be patient and resist challenges. They came in search of easy money and adventures. So, once problems arose, they surrendered. You see, when there is a will, there is a way, but when there is no true will, it is hard to find ways (Interview with Alexey, a skilled technician, worked for two years at construction sites in Moscow).

Interviews with members of Ukrainian transnational families confirmed the above observation, evidencing little or no effect of the GFC on migrant households in Ukraine. Of all the responders, only two mentioned having some short-term break-ups in the remitting pattern. In one case, it was due to the deteriorated employment

situation of remitters (a migrant couple working in Cyprus), and in the other case, it was caused by the suspense in wage payments to a migrant worker (a divorced man working in Portugal).

Interviewer: Did the global financial crisis, whereof they speak so much nowadays, make any impact on the regularity or amount of remittances to your family?

Responder: Yes, it did, because for some time there were no jobs for them there... So, they could not send money... And it depends on the availability of jobs and what kind of job they have (Interview with Ganna, retired, works part-time, mother of a migrant couple working in Cyprus).

Yet, in this case, the adverse effect of the GFC may be attributed to the undocumented status of migrants and, therefore, their overall precarious employment situation, not only during the crisis. Due to that, even before the crisis, the pattern of remitting in this family had not been regular, depending on the availability of job placements for remitters.

Responder: No, it did not... Well, maybe just slightly, only at the onset of the crisis. For some time, salaries were suspended, so my son could not send money because he did not receive his salary. But he had to pay for his rent and needed some money for his daily expenditures. So, he did not send money then. But it was not for long. (Interview with Dina, retired, works part-time, mother of a divorced migrant son working in Portugal).

All the other informants in this study reported no tangible impact of the GFC on money transfers from abroad and, therefore, on family well being, given that remittances had been as resilient as before. This may signify that the situation of household members working abroad during the crisis did not change dramatically, as in the families of Olena and Lyudmilla:

Responder (1): No, or probably even if so, then just a little bit. You see, my Mom has worked there for quite some time so she is quite adjusted there and her salary neither increased nor decreased (Interview with Olena, an adult daughter of parents working in Italy and a sister to a migrant man who emigrated to the US).

Responder (2): No, I cannot say that I felt any changes. Both Mom and Dad work where they had worked before. Although it was quite an issue there. My mom said that many of our people, and even Italians themselves, lost their jobs. So, there were few well-paid jobs left and many

people had problems with employment. But my parents managed to preserve their jobs somehow. They are well adjusted there and they were not affected. (Interview with Lyudmilla, a recent university graduate, a daughter of migrant parents and a sister to two migrant brothers, all of whom work in Italy).

Hence, to be able to respond to the volatility of the labour market during the global recession, Ukrainian migrants developed multidimensional coping strategies enabling them to remain competitive in the conditions of the current economic downturn. At the same time, their experience showed that the stance of "a dramatic impact of the economic crisis on migration and migrants", particularly on women, although indeed true, is somewhat exaggerated. Current research confirmed the conclusion applicable to other FSU countries too, particularly that "a theoretical worst-case scenario is clear but unlikely" (International Crisis Group, 2010, p. 14). It showed that due to their perseverance and endurance, Ukrainian transmigrants managed to turn the above stance into a "migration myth" which does not mirror the migratory reality of the GFC, whose adverse effect they successfully managed to mitigate. As followed from the interview with members of transnational households, due to that, remittance-receiving households in Ukraine did not experience particular financial hardships even during the turmoil of the financial crisis.

CONCLUSIONS

The results of the current study allow one to concur with the opinion that Ukrainians perceive remittances as an "entrepreneurial" or "innovative" tool well fit with neo-liberal market ideology (Harney, 2011: 11). They also confirmed an earlier observation (Tolstokorova, 2010 b) that Ukrainian migrant workers are well aware of the emerging challenges exerted by the global economic downturn and manage to develop gendered strategies of mobility to respond to them. This explains why remittances remained resilient and members of transnational families living in Ukraine were more financially secure than non-migrant families during the financial crisis. It was mainly due to the remitters' individual survival skills of being "sophisticated economic optimizers" that they managed to preserve their employment abroad and did not allow the resilience of financial transfers to tangibly decrease. The study generally showed that although Ukrainians do not compete with natives on the labour market, in times of labour market crisis, they manage to compensate

the shortage of labour with a higher adaptability than natives or migrants from other countries are able to do.

However, this conclusion could be predefined by some of the objective limitations of our study that might limit the theoretical value of obtained findings, but at the same time encourage a further search for new ways of information gathering and generating. Our key concern was that the subject matter of the project, i.e. the financial dimension of the transnational family space, especially if seen through a gender lens, is a specific field of study involving very delicate, vulnerable aspects of the life of migrant households. It is connected with the issues of privacy, confidentiality, and the complicated interpersonal relationships in the family which are not always consciously conceptualized by informants, and for that matter, are not readily intimated to outsiders. It was brightly illustrated by the deeply hesitant tone of a female informant who responded to a question about the impact of remittances on power relationships in the family in the following way:

Responder: You see, I had never thought of it before. Yet, now that you've asked me.... I tried to give it a thought. And you see... I am not sure what to answer. Probably no.... I don't think that... Well, at least not much... No, I don't know... Although, probably yes. Well, probably just a little bit. As a matter of fact, I am not sure. (Interview with Olena, an adult daughter of parents working in Italy and a sister to a migrant man employed in the US).

Similar observations were made in the course of a nation-wide sociological poll carried out in Ukraine in 2008 (Nasellenya Ukrainy, 2010: 110). In that study, among younger interviewees, every fifth person from a younger age group (18,3%) avoided speaking on this issue while in the older age group, nearly a quarter of responders (25,5%) did not answer the questions regarding the average monthly income abroad.

Hence, to obtain more specific findings for this study, the research might encompass innovative methods of gathering information, for instance, via communication by ICQ or SKYPE programs, or particular internet blogs and web-pages, which might provide responders greater freedom for expressing opinions and sharing their experience, while at the same time enabling them to preserve confidentiality.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that gender equality policies and gender mainstreaming as such are

essential tools to understand labour market processes and to develop effective responses in both good and bad economic conditions (Smith, 2009, p. 3). But the prerequisites for mainstreaming gender into migration policy and management are political will and the unified efforts of all the stakeholders involved. These efforts, however, might be futile without a broader organizational change, placing gender in the focus of societal transformations and aiming beyond merely adding female-specific projects at the margins. Nowadays, gender must be acknowledged as a cross-cutting issue relevant to all areas of governance and policy-making. At the same time, the current political context should realistically be considered in policy designs pertaining to employment. Specifically, in the conditions of profound political and economic chaos in Ukraine exacerbated by the global financial crisis, when all sectors of society are pierced with corruption and state institutions are being transformed into a sort of business or corporation promoting the interests of big capital, there are no grounds for illusions about the possibility for governmental support for the implementation of these tasks. Therefore, the focus should be on self-reliance and the personal initiatives of individuals and groups, mainly on the grassroots level, aimed at fostering social justice in the family, community, and society at large.

REFERENCES:

- Atamanov, A., Luecke, M., Mahmoud, T. O., Mogilevsky, R., Tereshchenko, K., Tourdyeva, N. A., Uzagalieva, A., Vavryshchuk, V. (2009). Income and Distribution Effects of Migration and Remittances: An Analysis based on CGE Models in Selected CIS Countries. CASE Network Reports, No 86, pp. 28-29.
- Bastia, T., Busse, E. (2011). Transnational migration and changing gender relations in Peruvian and Bolivian cities. *Diversities*, Vol. 13, No 1, pp. 19 – 33.
- Braidotti, R. (2002). ATHENA and Gender Studies. *Gender Studies in Europe (Studi di genera in Europa)* / Ed. Passerini L., Lyon D., Borghi L. European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, pp. 31-55.
- Connel, J. & Brown R.P.C. (2004). The remittances of migrant Tongan and Samoan nurses from Australia. *Human Resources for Health*, Vol. 13, No 2.
- Deen, T. (2009). Migration: Financial Crisis Eroding Remittance Lifeline. IPS NEWS (April, 17, 2009) <http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?id-news=46545>
- Drach, M. & Najibullah, F. (2009). Ukrainian Workers Unconvinced By Czech Repatriation Offer. Radio Free Europe. Radio Liberty, February, 19, 2009 http://www.rferl.org/content/Ukrainian_Workers_Unconvinced_By_Czech_Repatriation_Offer/1496121.html
- Europe Without Barriers (2011). Documents security and migration policy: Assessments and recommendations of international working groups for Ukraine]. Kyiv.

- Faryna, O. (2009). Despite economic crisis, Ukrainians keep working abroad. *Kyiv Post*, April, 23 [http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/40161/\(in Ukrainian\)](http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/40161/(in%20Ukrainian)).
- Fedorak, Z. (2007). Nashi sered chuzyh [Ours among aliens]. *Status. Ekonomichni novyny* [Status. Economic News] Retrieved September 20, 2007 from <http://status.net.ua/material?id=496429> (in Ukrainian)
- Fix, M., Papademetriou, D.G., Batalova, J., Terrazas, A., Yi-Ying Lin, S., Mittelstadt, M. (2009). *Migration and the Global Recession*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Gajducky, A. (2007). Mighraciny capital v Ukrajin: Pryhovanareal'nist' [Migratory capital in Ukraine: A concealed reality]. *Dzerkalotyzhnyia* [Mirror of the Week], Kyiv, 15 (644). April 27, 2007 <http://www.dt.ua/2000/2020/56473/> (in Ukrainian).
- GFK Ukraine. (2008). The Contribution of Human Resources Development to Migration policy in Ukraine. (Draft). Kyiv. Retrieved January, 12, 2009 from [http://www.etf.europa.eu/pubmgmt.nsf/%28getAttachment%29/A00CF64FCA5D200BC12574B90055DB51/\\$File/NOTE7WBHPM.pdf](http://www.etf.europa.eu/pubmgmt.nsf/%28getAttachment%29/A00CF64FCA5D200BC12574B90055DB51/$File/NOTE7WBHPM.pdf)
- GFK Ukraine (2011). Money transfers – anti-crisis banking service. Kyiv.
- Grasmuck, Sh., Pessar, P.R.(1991). *Between Two Islands: Dominican International Migration*. Berkeley, Oxford: University of California Press.
- Harney, N. (2009). The East gets its Mediterranean port: Ukrainians in Naples, Italy. Paper presented at the National Identities in Eurasia II-conference, Wolfson College, University of Oxford, July 10-12, 2009.
- Harney, N. (2011). Migrant strategies, informal economies and ontological security: Ukrainians in Naples, Italy. *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, vol. 32, issue 1 /2, pp. 4-16.
- Holmes, S. (2008). Migrant workers under pressure. *BBC World Service* (December, 16, 2008) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/7774180.stm
- Hormel, L. & Southworth, C. (2006). Eastward bound: a case study of post-soviet labour migration from a rural Ukrainian town. *Europe-Asia Studies*. Vol. 58, No 4, pp. 603-623.
- Hunter, L. M. (2012). Rural Migrant Remittances May Protect Forests. *Population Reference Bureau WebUpdate*, February 17, 2012: <http://www.prb.org/Articles/2012/migrant-remittances-and-environment.aspx>
- IDB-MIF (2004a). *Sending money home: Remittances to Latin America from the US*. Washington, DC.
- IDSR (2010). *Naselennya Ukrainy. Trudovamigracia v Ukrajin* [Population of Ukraine. Labor Migration in Ukraine]. Kyiv: M. V. Ptukha Institute of Demography and Social Research.
- IFAD (2007). *Sending money home. Worldwide remittances flows to developing and transition countries*. International Fund for Agricultural Development. Rome.
- Retrieved January, 12, 2008, from <http://www.ifad.org/events/remittances/maps/brochure.pdf>
- IFAD, FAO (2008). *International Migration, Remittances and Rural Development*. By Vargas-Lundius, R., Lanly G., Villareal, M., Osirio, M. Rome: International Fund for Agricultural Development, Food and Agriculture Foundation of the United Nations.
- ILO (2009). *The global economic crisis and migrant workers: Impact and response*. By Ibrahim Awad. Geneva: International Labour Office.
- ILO (2010). *Making Migration a development factor: the case of North and West Africa*. International Labour Office, International Institute for Labour Studies. Geneva.
- IMF (2006). *Business cycles and workers' remittances: How do migrant workers respond to cyclical movements of GDP at home?* Working Paper WP/06/ 52. By Sayan, S. Washington, DC.
- International Crisis Group (2010). *Central Asia: Migrants and the economic crisis*. Asia Report No°183. January 5, 2010.
- IOM (2008a). *Migration in the Black Sea Region: An Overview*. Geneva.
- IOM (2008b). *World Migration Report 2008: Managing Labour Mobility in the Evolving Global Economy*, Geneva.
- IOM (2009). *Migration in Ukraine: A Country Profile 2008*. Geneva.
- IOM (2011). *World Migration Report 2011*. Geneva: International Organization for Migration.
- IOM, UN-INSTRAW (2011). *Gender, Migration and Remittances*. Geneva.
- Kovalenko, N. & Laschenko, O. (2008). "Robocha syl": Chy zmusyt' ekonomichna kryza ukrajinskyh zarobirtchan povernutysya dodomu ["Wok force": will economic crisis enforce Ukrainian guest workers to come back home?], *Radio Liberty*, December, 11. Online URL at: <http://www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/1358834.html> (in Ukrainian).
- Kyiv Post (2007). Migrant labor brings in \$8.4.bn. October 25, 2007, p.1.
- Lejbovyh, M., Teslya, N. (2008). *Trudovyemigrantyneperesidyatkryzisvstolice* [Labour migrants will not sit over the crisis in the capital city]. December 12, 2008 <http://www.hr-ua.com/articles/2443/>
- Majdanik, I. P. (2010). *Ukrajinska molod' na rynkah praci zarubynyh derzhav*. Kyiv: M. Ptukha Institute for Demographic and Social Research.
- Malynovska, O. (2004). *International Migration in Contemporary Ukraine: Trends and Policy*, *Global Migration Perspectives No. 14*, Global Commission on International Migration, p. 15. Online URL at: <http://www.gcim.org/attachements/GMP%20No%2014.pdf>
- Martin, Ph. (2011). *Remittances and the Recession's Effect on International Migration*. Website of Population Reference Bureau. May, 2011. Online URL at: <http://www.prb.org/Articles/2011/international-migration-recession-remittances.aspx>
- Mykolyuk, O. (2008). *Robotu - dlyavsih* [Employment - for all], *Den' [Day]*, № 216 (in Ukrainian).
- Mykolyuk, O. (2009). *Gotovnist' do migracii* [Readiness to migration]. Online daily "V kurse" [In the course]. July, 29, 2009. Online URL at: <http://vkurse.ua/ua/analytics/gotovnost-k-migracii.html> (in Ukrainian).
- Novynar News (2008). *Sviotovakryzapoverne v Ukrainuchastynugastabajteriv* [World Crisis will get a part of migrant workers back to Ukraine] October, 27, 2008 <http://novynar.com.ua/politics/41604> (in Ukrainian).
- Open Ukraine (2008). *Doslidjennypotrebukrajinskyhmigrantiv* [Research of Ukrainian migrants' needs]. http://www.openukraine.org/doc/.../CSI_main_results-UA.doc
- Orozco, M. (2006). *Gender and remittances: Preliminary notes about senders and recipients in Latin America and the Caribbean*. High-level panel on "The Gender Dimensions of International Migration". United Nations. Commission on the Status of Women. 50th session. New York.
- Oxfam (2009). *Paying the Price for the Economic Crisis*. Oxfam International Discussion Paper. By Emmett, B.

- Oxfam GB (2010a). *Women Paying the Price: The impact of the global economic crisis on women in Southeast Asia*. By Praparpun, Y.
- Oxfam (2010b). *The Global Economic Crisis and Developing Countries*. Oxfam Research Report. By Green, D., King, R., Miller-Dawkins, M.
- Parkhomenko N., Starodub, A. (2005). *Ukrains'ka trudova mighracia do krajin Evropejskogho Sojuzu u dzerkali sociolohgii* [Ukrainian labour migration to the EU countries as mirrored by sociology]. Kyiv: CFCEPU, Institut Spraw Publicznych, PAUCI (in Ukrainian).
- Parreñas, R. S. (2005). Long distance intimacy: class, gender and intergenerational relations between mothers and children in Filipino transnational families. *Global Networks*, No 5 (4), p. 317–336.
- Phizacklea, A. (2003). *Gender Actors in Migration*, In: *Gender and Ethnicity in Contemporary Europe*/ Ed. J. Andall, Oxford: Berg.
- Pinnawala, M. (2008). *Engaging in Trans-local Management of Households. Aspects of Livelihood and Gender Transformations among Sri Lankan Women Migrant Workers*. *Gender, Technology and Development*. Vol. 3, No 12, pp. 439–459.
- Ratha, D. (2010). Remittance flows to developing countries remained resilient in 2009, expected to recover during 2010–11. *World Bank Blogs*. April, 23, 2010. <http://blogs.worldbank.org/peoplemove/remittance-flows-to-developing-countries-remained-resilient-in-2009-expected-to-recover-during-2010>
- Rozenko, P. (2009). *Proгноzy pro masovepovernennya v Ukrajinu zarobitchan u naslidok svitovoi kryzy e perebilshennyam* [Prognoses about mass return to Ukraine of migrants as a result of crisis is an exaggeration]. *Sport Ukrinform*, March, 24, 2009. Online URL at http://www.sport.ukrinform.ua/news/p6020/?PAGEN_2=630 (in Ukrainian).
- Savage, K., Harvey, P. (2007). *Remittances During Crises: Implications for Humanitarian Response*. London: Overseas Development Institute. Online URL at: <http://www.odi.org.uk/projects/details.asp?id=396&title=remittances-during-crises-implicationhumanitarian-response>.
- Smith, M. (2009). *Analysis Note: Gender Equality and Recession*. EGGE – European Commission's Network of Experts on Employment and Gender Equality issues – FondazioneGiacomoBrodolini, 2009.
- State Committee on Statistic of Ukraine (2009). *Zovnishnya trudova migracia naselennya Ukrainy: Zvitpro rezultaty obstezhennya trudovoj imigracii* [External Labour Migration in Ukraine: Report on the results of examination of Kvour migration]. Kyiv: (in Ukrainian).
- Tolstokorova, A. (2009a). *Financial Crisis and Migration Myths* <http://www.un-instraw.org/grvc/es/opinion/the-financial-crisis-and-migration-myths>
- Tolstokorova, A. (2009b). *Costs and Benefits of Labour Migration for Ukrainian Transnational Families: Connection or Consumption?* *Les cahiers de l'URMIS. Circulation migratoire et insertions économiques précaires en Europe*, No 12, <http://urmis.revues.org/index868.html>
- Tolstokorova, A. (2010a). *Where Have All the Mothers Gone? The Gendered Effect of Labour Migration and Transnationalism on the Institution of Parenthood in Ukraine*. In: *The Anthropology of East Europe Review* (AEER), "Gender in Postsocialist Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union", Vol. 28, No 1, 2010, pp. 184–214.
- Tolstokorova, A. (2010b). *Care Economy and Current Crises: Consequences and Costs for Ukraine*, In: *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs*. Vol. XIX, No. 2, pp. 40–64.
- Tolstokorova, A. & Ryndyk, O. (2011). *Çokaci, azkazanç: hibelerin, Ukrayna liailele rinyok sulluk lamücadele sinin vesosyoekono miksürdürü lebilir liginin sağlan masiüzerin dcinsiyete dayalietskisi* [Much Pain, Few Gain: Gendered implications of remittances for poverty alleviation and socio-economic sustainability of Ukrainian transnational families]. *Proceedings of the International Symposium on Poverty Alleviation Strategies: Experiences and new Ideas*, Istanbul, Turkey, October 13–15, 2010 (Eds.) MahmutKardaş, NevzatFıratKunduraci, Orhan Bilge, Ersin Kaya, Sümerİncedal, pp. 259–270 (in Turkish).
- Tharmalingam, Sarvendra (2011). *Remittance practices and transnational social spaces of Tamils and Somalis in Norway*. *Nordic Journal of Migration Research* (NJMR), 1 (3), pp. 166–175.
- Thompson E.P. (1971). *The moral economy of the English crowd during the eighteenth century*, *Past & Present*, vol. 50, pp. 76–117.
- TSN (2009). *Uryad zaperechue, shcho ukrains'ki migranty masovo povertajutsya dodomu* [The government denies that there is a mass return of Ukrainian migrants back home] <http://tsn.ua/ukrayina/uryad-zaperechuye-shcho-ukrayinski-zarobitchani-masovo-ver-tayutsya-dodomu.html>
- TSN (2011). *Schoperedajut' dodomuzarobitchany* [What do guastar-baitens send home?]. September 7. Online URL at: <http://tsn.ua/ukrayina/shcho-peredayut-dodomu-ukrayinski-zarobitchani-video.html>
- UNIFEM (2009). *Making Economic Stimulus Packages Work for Women and Gender Equality*. Working Paper. Bratislava.
- UN-INSTRAW (2006a). *The Development potential of remittances: A gender perspective*. Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.
- UN-INSTRAW (2006 b). *Gender, Remittances and Development: The case of women migrants from Vicente Noble, Dominican Republic*. Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.
- UN-INSTRAW (2007). *Remittances. Working Paper Four*. Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.
- UN-INSTRAW, IFAD (2008). *Gender, Remittances and Development: The Case of Filipino Migration to Italy. Final Abbreviation Fieldwork Report*. By Ribas-Mateos, N. Santo Domingo: United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
- UNDP (2012). *Remittances in Europe and Central Asia: between the Euro crisis and Russia's growth prospects*. *Development and Transition Newsletter*, February, 13, 2012. Online URL at: <http://europeandcis.undp.org/senioreconomist/show/9BC4249F-F203-1EE9-B78FC634499EC270>
- Yatsenyuk, A. (2009). *Masovogo povernennya trydovyh migrantiv v Ukrajinu, vyklykano gokryzoju, ne vidbudetsya* [Mass return of migrants to Ukraine, ensuing the crisis, will not take place] *FinanceUA*, March 10, 2009 (in Ukrainian).
- Zurabishvili, T., Zurabishvili, T. (2010). *The Feminization of Labour Migration from Georgia: The Case of Tianeti*. *Laboratorium*, No 1, pp. 73–83.

(Endnotes)

- 1 The concept of "moral economy" introduced by Thompson (1971) is used here to denote "the phenomenon of the nature of the moral obligation of immigrants towards their family and the country of origin with regard to remittance practice (Tharmalingam&Sarvendra, 2011).

Journal of Eurasian Affairs
Volume 1, Number 1, 2013
ISSN 2307-8286
<https://eurasianaffairs.net>
info@eurasianaffairs.net

International "Eurasian Movement"
Russia 121087, Moscow, Bagrationovskiy proezd 7, buil. 20 «B», office 405.
Tel.: + 7 495 514 65 16
Fax.: + 7 499 271 10 15