
Pitirim Sorokin – Sensate, Ideational, and Idealistic Cultures



Introduction

The sociologist Pitirim A. Sorokin (1889–1968) is a remarkable figure whose works and theories deserve greater recognition today. Few social scientists in the 20th century had keener insight into the nature and dangers of modern materialistic culture, and into what may be done to produce a more benevolent and humane world.

One reason for his unique insight was Sorokin's personal experience. Not merely a conventional 'academic', he began his career directly involved in the tumultuous transitions from Tsarist Russia, through the provisional government, to communism. He was at the center of it: a poor young man of Komi extraction struggling to gain a university education; an opponent of the Tsarist regime; a newspaper publisher; a leading intellectual; an official in the transitional government – and, when the Bolsheviks prevailed, first imprisoned and subsequently released by Lenin¹; then, witness to, and documenter of, the terrible Russian famine of 1921. Sorokin didn't merely speculate about the principles of cultural dynamics and transition; he saw and lived them.

That his work is underappreciated today reflects several factors. One is certainly that our universities are still dominated by the very materialistic mentality that Sorokin so carefully analyzed and strongly criticized. In certain respects, Sorokin himself perhaps did not help matters. His writing, while splendid and lucid overall, not infrequently lapses into dogmatism and moralizing. It is also sometimes repetitive, with a tendency to belabor the obvious. Then again, his sheer prolificness as a writer poses certain problems: unless one is prepared to read his large corpus of writings in their entirety, it can be hard to know precisely what his complete views on a topic were.

Fortunately, in this last respect we are aided by the fact that, while several of his works might be considered masterpieces, his *Social and Cultural Dynamics* stands above the rest as his *magnum opus*. In

¹ While in prison, Sorokin saw many of his comrades executed, and expected death by firing squad himself daily for several weeks.

this work we may see clearly formulated and expressed many of his most important and characteristic contributions.

Social and Cultural Dynamics not only developed an overarching *theory* of human culture, its variations, dynamics, and transitions – which would be achievement enough. But, more, it *supported* its theory by an unprecedented cross-cultural and trans-historical empirical study, which used every available indicator to analyze and chart the histories of cultures around the world. So, for example, we find, within the multi-volume work, hundreds of pages devoted to the development of art in various cultures, to the vicissitudes of philosophy, to forms of government, the history of wars, and so on.

This empirical study is so extensive that, even allowing for certain limitations in its methods, it is nevertheless a singular achievement; one which we should pay close attention to. There is much to learn from it, even if we restrict our attention to the most obvious conclusions the data permit.

Social and Cultural Dynamics was originally published in four volumes from 1937 to 1941. In 1957, Sorokin produced a one-volume condensation of the work, which contained the essential findings and conclusions. Mostly, this constituted an abridgment, extracting material from the original volumes. He did not, as one might have hoped, use the opportunity to rephrase his arguments in ways that might have promoted their understanding by a wider audience. Further, the abridged work itself comprises over 700 pages – a potential obstacle for many would-be readers.

This being the case – an important writer, whose writings remains somewhat inaccessible to the greater number of those who would profit from them – it occurred to me to make these study notes, which excerpt and organize some of the more passages from *Social and Cultural Dynamics*. In particular, we are concerned here with obtaining a clear understanding of Sorokin's typology of cultural mentalities, as this is essential for understanding his theories and overall relevance for today.

Cultural Mentality Types

Sorokin recognized in the history of human culture a dialectic played out between two opposing *mentalities* or worldviews. He called these the *Sensate* and the *Ideational* mentalities. It is vital that we clarify these terms.

By *Sensate* we could equally well substitute the word *Materialistic*. This is the worldview in which the sensory, material world is considered the ultimate or only reality, and sensory experience is seen as the foundation of all valid human knowledge and source of all happiness.

Sorokin's term for the opposite pole, *Ideationalism*, is of his own coinage. More conventional terms for this mentality might be *Spiritualism*, *Immaterialism*, or *Psychism*. This worldview holds that true reality is immaterial, and that the realm of material or sensory experience is either unreal, illusory, unimportant, or, in some cases, even evil. Accordingly, for the *Ideationalist*, the goals of human life are exclusively spiritual and moral; the material world cannot bring happiness – its attractions and allurements are to be avoided or denied.

Within the *Sensate* mentality Sorokin distinguished three main varieties: Active Sensate, Passive Sensate, and Cynical Sensate. Within the *Ideational* mentality he distinguished two main forms: Active Ideational and Passive Ideational.

Along with these more-or-less undiluted mentality types are numerous cultural forms that mix *Sensate* and *Ideational* elements. Of particular importance among these is what Sorokin termed the *Idealistic* mentality (not to be confused with the *Ideational* type). Indeed, it is one of Sorokin's principal innovations here that he formally distinguished between the *Idealistic* and *Ideational* mentalities. Other writers (e.g., Orestes Brownson in 1836) often tended to use the term 'idealism' in an ambiguous way that glosses over a distinction between two fundamentally different worldviews. Sorokin, then, is here like a mathematician or physicist who adds a new term to a previous model, and in so doing greatly improves its accuracy and explanatory power.

What, then, is *Idealism* or the *Idealistic* mentality according to Sorokin? He definitely does not mean the idealism of, say, Berkeley,² which holds that all reality is mental – that is a form of *Ideationalism*. For Sorokin, *Idealism* is precisely the *reconciliation* of the *Ideational* and *Sensate* mentalities. It holds that both the immaterial and material realms are real, and that both are necessary for man's happiness, and both important for the flourishing of human culture.

The operative word here, 'Ideal', makes explicit reference to Plato's well-known theory of Forms (or Ideals; from the Greek word *Eide*). This theory holds that there exists an immaterial realm of eternal patterns or Forms, which are instantiated or expressed in the real world. We are here not concerned with the garden-variety Forms of such things as horses, trees, chairs, or triangles. Rather our concern is with the special Forms that correspond to such things as Truth, Beauty, Goodness, Justice, and Virtue. The *Idealistic* mentality recognizes these as eternal verities. And it also recognizes that these verities are expressible here on earth. Because of this, the material world has definite and absolute spiritual and moral value. Further, man himself has a unique dual nature, with one foot, as it were, in both the spiritual and the material realms, the eternal and the temporal. It is in terms of this unique nature that man finds his greatest meaning and happiness in life. (For more discussion of the meaning of Idealism in this sense, see Uebersax, 2013). Sorokin believed that previous *Idealistic* phases in human history have been brief – such as during the Classical period of Ancient Greece – but also tremendously productive.

Sorokin also mentioned a second specific form of mixed mentality, which he termed the *Pseudo-Ideational*. This is a pattern of mental helplessness found in people amidst great oppression. It deserves our attention today, because, if Western societies continue to become oppressive for greater numbers of people, one would expect this mentality to become proportionately more common.

The West, according to Sorokin, is currently in the end stages of a centuries-long *Sensate* or materialistic phase. This has run its course, and a change is imminent; but *when* change will occur is unclear: unfortunately, it is characteristic of an over-ripe worldview to hold on desperately until perhaps some social, natural, or environmental catastrophe forces a cultural restructuring.

Nevertheless, Sorokin's message is fundamentally optimistic, because it suggests that there is some lawfulness to transitions of human culture. In the past, such transitions have happened without man's conscious involvement. Now, however, we are in a position to understand, and just possibly, to foster and steer them. It is within our power, or potentially so, to intentionally direct our society to a new *Idealistic* era.

This aim would be promoted by more people understanding Sorokin's theories, and it is to that purpose that these study notes are directed. These supply key passages that explain Sorokin's main cultural mentality types. Special attention, however, is given to the *Idealistic* mentality, both because this is

² In truth, the idealism of Berkeley would be better called 'idea-ism', for it has nothing to do with Ideals; see below.

perhaps the mentality least obvious and familiar to people today, and also because it is arguably the cultural mentality we should consciously strive to achieve today.

I plan to write more about the relevance of Sorokin's theories – and particularly about the importance of *Idealism* – for today's cultural crises. For now let it suffice to mention that there are many useful parallels between Sorokin's vision of *Idealistic* culture and the theories of the well-known humanistic psychologist, Abraham Maslow (1968, 1971). Basically, what *Idealism* is to Sorokin, a *Being*-based culture is in terms of Maslow's theories. There are also important connections between Sorokin (and Maslow) and American Transcendentalism which deserve further exploration.

Notation. All passages are from *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (1957). Following each passage, the source page(s) are indicated, enclosed in brackets ([]). Braces ({ }) amidst passages indicate where a new book page begins. I have also enclosed in brackets occasional words and explanatory comments that help supply the context. (In a few places, Sorokin himself placed comments in brackets; I hope that it will be clear from context which comments are his and which are mine.)

Preliminary Definitions and Considerations

Many systems of logically integrated culture are conceivable, each with a different set of major premises but consistent within itself. Not all ... [possible systems], however, are likely to be found in ... actual existence [as]... comprehensible unities.

We can begin by distinguishing two profoundly different types of the integrated [i.e., internally integrated or coherent] culture. Each has its own mentality; its own system of truth and knowledge; its own philosophy and *Weltanschauung*; its own type of religion and standards of "holiness"; its own system of right and wrong; its own forms of art and literature; its own mores, laws, code of conduct; its own predominant forms of social relationships; its own economic and political organization; and, finally, its own type of *human personality*, with a peculiar mentality and conduct. The values ... [of these] cultures are irreconcilably at variance [with one another] ...; but within each culture all the values fit closely together, belong to one another logically, often functionally.

Of these two systems one may be termed *Ideational* culture, the other *Sensate*. And as these names characterize the cultures as a whole, so do they indicate the nature of each of the component parts.

The probability is that neither the Ideational nor the Sensate type has ever existed in its pure form; but all ... [distinct] cultures have in fact been composed of divers combinations of these two pure logico-meaningful forms. In some the first type predominates; in others, the { p. 25 } second; in still others both mingle in equal proportions and on an equal basis. Accordingly, some cultures have been nearer to the Ideational, others to the Sensate type; and some have contained a balanced synthesis of both pure types. This last I term the *Idealistic* type of culture. (It should not be confused with the Ideational.) [pp. 24–25]

Since the character of any culture is determined by its internal aspect — by its *mentality*, as we agreed to call it — the portraiture of the Ideational, Sensate, and [Idealistic and other] Mixed types of culture begins properly with the delineation of the major premises of their mentality. As a starting point let us assume that these major premises concern the following four items: (A) *the nature of reality*; (B) *the nature of the*

needs and ends to be satisfied; (C) the extent to which these needs and ends are to be satisfied; (D) the methods of satisfaction.

A. *The Nature of Reality.* ... On one extreme is a mentality for which reality is that which can be perceived by the organs of sense; it does not see anything beyond the sensate ... milieu (cosmic and social). Those who possess this sort of mentality try to adapt themselves to those conditions which appear to the sense organs, or more exactly to the exterior receptors of the nervous system.

On the other extreme are persons who perceive and apprehend the same sensate phenomena in a very different way. For them they are mere appearance, a dream, or an illusion. True reality is not to be found here; it is something beyond, hidden by the appearance, different from this material and sensate veil which conceals it. Such persons do not try to adapt themselves to what now seems superficial, illusory, unreal. They strive to adapt themselves to the true reality which is beyond appearances. Whether it be styled God, Nirvana, Brahma, Om, Self, Tao, Eternal Spirit, *l'elan vital*, Unnamed, the City of God, Ultimate Reality, *Ding* {p. 26} *für und an sich*, or what not, is of little importance. What is important is that such [a] mentality exists; that here the ultimate or true reality is usually considered supersensate, immaterial, spiritual.

It is evident that the mentality which accepts the milieu in its sensate and material reality will stress the satisfaction of the sensual bodily needs. ... [The mentality which sees] it as a mere appearance will seek the satisfaction mainly of spiritual needs through an interaction with the ultimate reality. Those ... [which] occupy an intermediate position will be sensitive to needs partly sensate and partly spiritual.

B. *The Nature of the Needs and Ends to Be Satisfied.* Needs may be viewed as purely *carnal* or *sensual*, like hunger and thirst, sex, shelter, and comforts of the body generally; [or] as purely *spiritual*, like salvation of one's soul, the performance of sacred duty, service to God, categoric moral obligations, and other spiritual demands which exist for their own sake, regardless of any social approval or disapproval; or [else] as *mixed* or *carnal-spiritual*, like the striving for superiority in scientific, artistic, moral, social, and other creative achievements, partly for their own sake and partly for the sake of human fame, glory, popularity, money, physical security and comfort, and other "earthly values" of an empirical character.

C. *The Extent to Which These Needs and Ends Are to Be Satisfied.*

[Here Sorokin briefly makes the point that cultures vary in the extent to which they require or expect needs to be satisfied.]

D. *The Methods of Satisfaction of Needs.* ... We can divide [these] ... roughly into three main classes:

(1) Modification of one's milieu in that manner which will yield the means of satisfying a given need: for instance, one suffering from cold can start a furnace, build a fire, put on a warm fur coat, etc.

(2) Modification of self, one's body and mind, and their parts — organs, wishes, convictions, or the whole personality — in such a way as to become virtually free from a given need, or to sublimate it through this "readjustment of self." ... {p. 27} ...

(3) Modification partly of milieu and partly of self. ...
[pp. 25–27]

Each of the types of adaptation discussed implies logically a different conception of self, or the "ego," and its relationship to other forces and agencies.

[p. 32]

1. Ideational Culture

In the terms of the above four items ... [the] major premises [of Ideational culture] are these: (1) Reality is perceived as non-sensate and nonmaterial everlasting Being (*Sein*); (2) the needs and ends are mainly spiritual; (3) the extent of their satisfaction is the ... [most or highest level possible]; (4) the method of their fulfillment or realization is self-imposed minimization or elimination of ... physical needs... . These major premises are common to all branches of the Ideational culture mentality. But, on the basis of variations under (4), it is possible to distinguish two fundamental subclasses [i.e., Ascetic Ideational and Active Ideational cultures; see following sub-sections.]
[p. 27]

... [T]he whole intellectual, moral, and psychosocial *Gestalt* of the Ideational mentality is profoundly different from the Active Sensate.

(a) *Ideational truth and its criteria cannot be identical with Sensate.* What is truth or science for one is often prejudice, ignorance, error, heresy, blasphemy, for the other.

(i) Ideational mentality implies the acceptance of the validity of the inner experience — divine inspiration, mystical union, revelation, pure meditation, ecstasy, trance — as the ultimate basis and source of truth... . {p. 34}

(ii) The Ideational wisdom, knowledge, mentality, seems to be marked by idealism, spiritualism, quietism, religiosity, organicism, mysticism, indeterminism, qualitativism.

(iii) An Ideationalist is prone to interpret the whole external world according to the patterns and traits of his inner experience. As a result, he spiritualizes the material world, even in its inorganic part; he dissolves it in the inner experience....

Values

(b) Similarly, and for similar reasons, *the moral, social, and other values should be different in these mentalities.* Since an Ideationalist is indifferent to the external world and is centered at the inner, always "immaterial," or supersensate world, and since his ideal is to repress his sensual and material needs as much as possible, the external values of material character which can give but a transient satisfaction of sensual needs have no, or little, value for him. He seeks to be independent of them and self-sufficient. He wants to live in the eternal, imperishable world. His values are of an inner and immaterial character....

In regard to *all values*, as has been pointed out, an Ideationalist places more emphasis on the long-time, permanent values than on those that are immediate, transient, short-lived. His standpoint gravitates to the philosophy of Being, everlasting, unchangeable, enduring. ...

(c) In the field of moral values *the Ideational mentality tends to be associated with the values which are absolute, eternal, and everlasting.* Ideational moral systems, whatever their secondary traits, are marked {p. 35} first, by indifference to, or contempt of, or a low evaluation of, the external empirical world and its material values. ("My kingdom is not of this world.") ...

(d) Logically, *aesthetic value*, art, likewise cannot be identical in the Ideational and Sensate culture mentalities. They should be as profoundly different as are the other values. So far as the *style* of art is concerned — whether it be in painting, sculpture, music, literature, drama, architecture — in the Ideational mentality it is symbolic, its physical exemplars being merely the visible signs of the invisible world and inner values. ... Ideational [art] is the handmaid of religion, absolutistic ethics, eternal values.

...

(e) [*Social and practical values*] ... {p. 36} ... In this respect, the Ideational mentality differs from the Sensate once again. An Ideationalist is either quite indifferent to all these illusory and transient values, or is even inimical to them as the sources of the disturbances of the peace of mind and of the perdition of the human soul. In a thoroughgoing Ideational society, wealth or any other Sensate value cannot become dominant but at best will be tolerated only as turpitudinous. The most successful dealers in wealth do not have much chance to become the bearers of prestige, the leaders, the evaluators, the assessors of men, objects, and values, in such a society.
[pp. 33–36]

Ethics

Ideational ethics [can be called] the system of *absolute principles*.
[p. 417]

According to the Ideational *ethics of absolute principles*, the supreme objective of life is a realization of the highest value — for instance, union with God, salvation of soul, truth, goodness, beauty, for their own sake, regardless of whether or not such a realization leads to an increase of happiness.
[pp. 416–417]

1.1 Ascetic Ideationalism

A. *Ascetic Ideationalism*. This seeks the consummation of the needs and ends through an excessive elimination and minimization of the carnal needs, supplemented by a complete detachment from the sensate world and even from oneself, viewing both as mere illusion, nonreal, nonexistent. The whole sensate milieu, and even the individual "self," are dissolved in the supersensate, ultimate reality.
[p. 27]

(1) Since the Ascetic Ideational mentality strives toward the ultimate, supersensory reality, lasting, eternal, unchangeable, and not toward the everchanging and ephemeral Sensate reality, it associates itself either with indifference to, and a detachment from, the physical environment ("What is the use of trying to adapt oneself to that which is merely illusory?"), or a reluctance to change it ("Only fools try to write on waves."), or with a contempt for it. Hence [ataraxia](#), self-sufficiency, apathy [i.e., not indifference, but the Greek virtue of *apatheia*], imperturbability, indifference, Nirvana, and insensibility to temporal existence, to its pains and pleasures, sorrows and joys, life and death, are traits common to all shades of such a mentality — from the Hindu, Buddhist, Taoist, Sufist, Jainist, Zoroastrian, Greek, Roman Ascetic "Primitive" Ideationalism, Cynicism, Skepticism, and, in part at least, Stoicism, to Ascetic Christianity, and to all other varieties of the Ascetic Ideational culture mentalities.

(2) The above attitude leads logically either to a repression of bodily needs, or to a detached indifference to them as if nonexistent.

(3) The attention is turned to the principle of Being, [and] views reality as everlasting and unchangeable Being (*Sein*), in contradistinction to ever-changing Becoming (*Werden*); the ultimate reality remains eternally the same, unchangeable even in its manifold modifications. Only illusions and appearances change. Empirically viewed this mentality is thus static in its essence: static in its philosophy, in its *Weltanschauung*, in its choice of values and behavior. *Time*, in the sense of "before and after," "past, present, and future," "long and short," measured by empirical units, either does not play any role in such a mentality, or it becomes identical with the eternal, ultimate reality and, as such, is "punctuated" only by the changes in the distance of the Ascetic Ideational mind from total engulfment by, or union with, this everlasting Being. ... {p. 30} ...

(4) The Ascetic Ideational mentality facilitates *man's control of himself*, especially of his bodily senses, of his emotions, feelings, wishes, lusts. ... [Its] character ... has been frequently demonstrated by the almost miraculous repression of vital needs in the asceticism of Hindus, Buddhists, Taoists, Christians, Jainists, Sufists, not to mention the numberless ascetics affiliated with smaller sects. ... {p. 31} ...

(5) The Ascetic Ideational mentality is mainly of an "introvert" nature (directed upon self and its analysis and modification). ...

(6) The Ascetic Ideational mentality, on the one hand, opens wide the mental eyes and ears to grasp, register, and understand the essence of Soul, Mind, Ultimate Reality, God, the Devil, Good, Evil, Salvation, Eternal Value, Consciousness, Conscience, Justice, and so on. One is plunged into this intangible realm....

(7) ... The Ascetic Ideational mentality tends to dissolve the self in the universe of impersonal and immaterial reality. ... {p. 33} ...

(8) The above being true, it is logically inevitable that the Ascetic Ideational mentality will require and stimulate *cognition of inner, psychical, and mental processes* ... from the most elementary psychological processes of sensation, perception, recollection, representation, thinking, emotions, wishes, volitions, etc., to the most sublime and subtle experiences of ecstasy, trance, mysticism, suggestion, and hypnosis, and others like "reunion with the absolute," "revelation," "divine inspiration," etc.; from the simplest ideas about immaterial phenomena to the most difficult conceptions of ultimate reality, the human soul, immortality, God, truth, justice, value, and others which are the concern of the humanitarian sciences, i.e., ethical systems, religions, law, aesthetics, philosophy, and education. Since an Ideationalist is, so to speak, everlastingly brooding over such matters, since the knowledge and the understanding of them are essential for him in his attempt to modify, control, or dissolve his inner self, it is obvious that all this should lead to an increase of the Ideationalist's direct experience in these fields of immaterial phenomena. Hence it will not be surprising later when we discover inductively that the periods of predominance of Ideational mentality always have led to a domination, in human knowledge, of theological, ethical, and other systems of thought which deal with these immaterial and sublime problems. On the other hand, such cultures and periods have regularly been marked by a stagnation and regress of the natural sciences and other disciplines dealing with the external, sensate, material phenomena.
[pp. 30–33]

Historical Examples

A. Hinduism (Brahmanism) and Buddhism. ... {p. 44}

In all these systems ultimate reality is considered to be immaterial, hidden beyond the reach of the senses. It is Being, eternal and everlasting, having none of the properties of the sensate and material world.

The world of external sense perception is considered, therefore, to be unreal, unstable, transient, illusory — māyā.

The highest mentality of these systems contains these four elements:

- (1) Ultimate reality is spiritual, toward which one must strive by throwing off the illusion of personality and by being absorbed in the Ultimate.
- (2) Needs are purely spiritual.
- (3) The extent of their satisfaction is maximal.
- (4) The method of satisfaction consists in a complete mastery of all sensate needs, even to the point of the annihilation of their very source — that is, a complete modification (dissolution) of self, social, psychological, and biological.

The philosophy of Hinduism and Buddhism is that of Being, not Becoming; it develops a high ability to control the self; its ideal of activity is entirely introvert, even to the point of advocating the relinquishing of sensations, contact with the external world, the disregard of the testimony of the "six entrances," and the assumption of a superhuman attitude of indifference to the whole external and material world. Of values it recognizes only the eternal, everlasting, and imperishable, rejecting all the transient and temporary as pseudo values. Likewise, its truth is not that of the senses, but is revealed in the mystic way, through intuition, meditation, revelation. Its truth is not relative; it is absolute. Absolute and eternal also are the moral and other values. They have nothing to do with relativistic and conditional utilitarianism, hedonism, positivism, eudaemonism, or any other empirical and transient values.
[pp. 43–44]

E. Early and Ascetic Christianity and Other Ascetic Mystic Groups. To the Ascetic Ideational type belong many branches of the Graeco-Roman currents of mentality: some Orphics, Cynics, Stoics, Gnostics, and Mystics; early and Monastic Christianity ...; and a great number of ascetic and mystical systems which in one way or another have existed, during all historical periods...

This mentality is not a curious pathological or exceedingly rare case, but a form set forth and endorsed by, and incorporated in, the ideologies and practices of most of the world religions of the past and present and by innumerable smaller groups and sects, in comparison with which all the rationalistic, positivistic, scientific, intellectual, Sensate ideologies that have had historical existence are, in their diffusion and influence, as a flickering candlelight to the sun. In other words, contrary to the opinion of most of the contemporary scholars and scientists, who are inclined to underestimate the role played by this mentality, it has been one of the most widespread, one of the most persistent, one of the most influential; it has played a major part in the vastest cultural systems that have shaped and conditioned the minds of hundreds of millions of human beings. No scholar who studies the psychosocial reality, as it is, can ignore or pass by this form of mentality and culture.

[p. 45]

[He also discusses Jainism, Taoism, and Sufism as examples of Ascetic Ideationalism, pp. 44–45.]

1.2 Active Ideationalism

B. *Active Ideationalism*. Identical with general Ideationalism in its major premises, it seeks the realization of the needs and ends, not only through minimization of the carnal needs of individuals, but also through the transformation of the sensate world, and especially of the sociocultural world, in such a way as to reform it along the lines of the spiritual reality and of the ends chosen as the main value. Its bearers do not "flee from the world of illusion" and do not entirely dissolve it and their own souls in the ultimate reality, but strive to bring it nearer to God, to save not only their own souls but the souls of all other human beings. The great spiritual reformers, like the early Christian Apostles and such popes as Gregory the Great and Leo the Great, may serve as examples of the Active Ideational mentality.

[p. 27]

Active Ideationalism and the Idealistic mentalities occupy an intermediate position between the two extreme standpoints. Active Ideationalism, ... [besides] the philosophy of Being and Eternal Value, or Eternalism, admits some, though subordinated, Becoming; some interest in the affairs of this world; some empirical activities; and some temporal values, subordinate to, and, as it were, a shadowy reflection of, the Eternal. ... {p. 32} ...

Both [the Active Ideational and Idealistic mentalities] imply internal and external worlds, the Active Ideationalist paying more attention to internal and immaterial reality than the Idealist.

[pp. 31–32]

Historical Examples

In a way it is the tragic and immanent destiny of the Ascetic Ideational culture system to turn into the Active Ideational. As soon as the Ascetic initiators attract the attention of other men, they begin to acquire followers. As the number of followers increases, an organization appears; and with it the pure Ascetic attitude — the attitude of complete indifference toward, and noninterference in, the affairs of the empirical world — becomes impossible. An "organization" or an "institution" is a phenomenon of this world. It requires management, direction, guidance, and the administration of many needs and relationships which are purely empirical. Thus, any Ascetic current, as soon as it grows in influence, becomes an organization; as soon as it becomes an organization, it necessarily becomes more and more Active Ideational; and the more Active, the more rapidly it grows. Such is the inevitable chain of transformation.

One can see this in a great many cases. As soon as Brahmanism, or Buddhism, or Jainism, or Christianity, or Taoism, or, to take smaller groups, St. Francis of Assisi, or other hermits and ascetics, began to attract followers an organization appeared. Immediately the empirical world with its needs, affairs, relationships, pains and pleasures, sorrows and joys, poverty and property, sympathies and antipathies, became involved, and made pure Ascetic Ideationalism impossible for most members of the organization, and for the organization itself. The only form possible at this stage, when the moral powers of the current are still very strong and the demoralization of the stage of decay is as yet absent, is the Active Ideational. It stands

for constitutions, rules, laws, and bylaws; often for empirical punishments and rewards, promotions and demotions, praise and blame; for the appearance of rulers and the ruled; in brief, for an organized network designed to enforce empirically the moral standard of life among the members of the organization as well as among outsiders. "The salvation of one's own soul turns into the salvation of the souls of others." The transcendental and the other-worldly phenomena return to the empirical world and are more and more entangled by it.

... [One may see in this] the history of the growth of Brahmanism, Buddhism, Christianity, or Taoism, or of a religious order or center, or of a settlement which grew about some hermit or ascetic, or of many a minor current of mysticism. Everywhere you will find this transformation from Ascetic to Active Ideationalism. When we read about the activities of St. Paul, the great organizer of Christianity, we notice at once (from his Epistles) how he had to busy himself with worldly matters, and how the empirical world caught him more and more in its web. He had to give instructions to the brethren about this and that, censure them for some things, warn them of others, prohibit some activities, {p. 47} encourage others; and most of the matters in which his flock involved him, from riots and politics to property and wealth, were of this world.

And the more that Christianity grew in that period, the more that this transformation progressed. It is true that the Ascetic aspect remained very strong during the earliest centuries of its history; but its Active aspect grew rapidly, especially from the time of its legalization (after A.D. 313 and 321). More and more Christianity had to enter into world affairs, and into affairs for the salvation of mankind as a whole.

What has been said of Christianity may be said of any other system which was Ascetic at its beginning. ... [T]he history of [Taoism,] Buddhism and Sufism offers further examples. This means that the Active Ideational type of mentality has always been widely spread in such systems when they entered the stage of attracting a large following and assumed an organized or institutionalized form. It is their destiny (until they become demoralized and lose their vigor and spirituality, and fall into the snares of the Sensate mentality).

The Active Ideational culture mentality can come to existence also directly, without passing through the Ascetic stage. Many groups have always been emerging in that direct way. As an example we may take the system of mentality of Mih-Teich in China — the system that was perhaps the most powerful in the fourth and third centuries B.C. It was rigidly organized as a sect. It attempted actively to transform the empirical world; it fought luxury, degeneration, egotism, anger, greed, by all means, including especially the compulsion, and autocratic enforcement, of its prescriptions. Logically moving along this line, the doctrine came to its culmination: to the *compulsory* introduction and maintenance of universal solidarity and love.

[pp. 46–47]

2. Sensate Culture

The Sensate mentality views reality as only that which is presented to the sense organs. It does not seek or believe in any supersensory reality; at the most, in its diluted form, it assumes an agnostic attitude toward the entire world beyond the senses. The Sensate reality is thought of as a Becoming, Process, Change, Flux, Evolution, Progress, Transformation. Its needs and aims are mainly physical, and maximum satisfaction is sought of these needs. The method of realizing them is not that of a {p. 28} modification within the human individuals composing the culture, but of a modification or exploitation of the external world. In brief, the Sensate culture is the opposite of the Ideational in its major premises.

These traits are common to all varieties of the Sensate culture mentality. But on the basis of the variation in the fourth item [i.e., D. *The Methods of Satisfaction of Needs*] it is possible to distinguish three main varieties of this type [i.e., Active Sensate, Passive Sensate, and Cynical Sensate mentalities].
[pp. 27–28]

In contrast to Ideationalists, "Epicureans" [i.e., Sensatists] view the whole inner life, its processes, and all spiritual and immaterial phenomena, as either ignorant delusion or aberration or a peculiar by-product ("function," "effect," "resultant") of purely physiological processes in the nervous system or in any other part of the body... an "Epicurean" mechanizes and materializes even the spiritual, immaterial self.
[p. 32]

The Sensate mentality implies the validity of perception, [and it] rests entirely, or mainly, on man's external sense organs.
[p. 33]

The Sensate mentality, knowledge, science, is characterized by materialism, empiricism, mechanisticism, determinism, quantitativism.
[p. 34]

An "Epicurean," ... materializes and externalizes the inner experience.
[p. 34]

Values and Aesthetics

Its [i.e., the Sensate mentality] criteria of value are the fitness of a given external object, of the way of handling it, and of specific forms of extrovert activity to satisfy mainly sensual needs. ... [The Sensatist] does not want to seek imperishable, everlasting values. Such values are nonvalues to him, being almost useless for the satisfaction of his manifold needs. Life is short, and in this short life the sensual needs are transient — a good meal has its value only when one has an appetite and can enjoy it. Love and sex again are of value only when they can be enjoyed; for an old or impotent man they are of no value at all. Therefore, why miss a chance when it comes and can be enjoyed, why seek for something eternally lasting, since such a thing either does not exist, or, if it exists at all, provides a much smaller measure of enjoyment than the incessant series of pleasures which follow from the satisfaction of all wishes at the moment of their greatest intensity?
[p. 34]

The Sensate mentality implies and is associated with an opposite type of moral code. It chooses and emphasizes predominantly the sensate, empirical, material values. *Eudaemonism, hedonism, utilitarianism, sensualism; the morals of "Carpe diem," of "Wine, women, and song"* — these are forms established by the Sensate mentality. Man should seek pleasure and avoid pain; utility is positive, disutility is negative. The maximum pleasure for the greatest number of beings, this is in essence the motto of Sensate moralists.

The second characteristic of the moral systems of a Sensate culture type is that they are never absolute, but are always relativistic, varying "according to circumstances and situations." They can be modified, have no sacred, unalterable, eternal imperatives.

The third quality of the Sensate [moral] code is that it has little to do with any transcendental or supersensory values, and either mocks at such values, ignores them, or mentions them only to repudiate them and to bolster up its own principles.

... in the Sensate culture art must be sensate in form; "naturalistic," in the sense that its intention is to reproduce objects in a shape which imitates closely that in which they appear to our organs of sense. As to the *subjects* and the *aims* and *purposes* of art, ... Sensate art deals with those materials which serve and help to increase the sensate happiness of man. ...

The same difference appears in regard to *social and practical values*. A [Sensate] regime ... will approve anything that increases the sum total of Sensate enjoyment; and that leads to man's control over nature and over other men, as the means of satisfying ever-expanding needs. Of a special importance in such a state of society is the search for material objects which under the circumstances are particularly efficient in bringing satisfaction. As one of the most efficient means has always been *material wealth*, in a Sensate society it is the *alpha and omega* of comfort, of the satisfaction of all desires, of power, prestige, fame, happiness. With it everything can be bought, everything can {p. 36} be sold, and everything can be gratified. Therefore, it is quite comprehensible that the striving for wealth is inevitably one of the main activities of such a culture, that wealth is the standard by which almost all other values are judged, that it is, in fact, the supreme value of values. *Pecuniary value thus becomes the measuring stick* of scientific, artistic, moral, and other values. Those who are excellent moneymakers are the *leaders* of such a society. Those who are wealthy are its *aristocracy*. They are simultaneously public leaders, high priests, moral examples, kings who ennoble others, the Four Hundred which is envied, if not deeply esteemed. Under these conditions, writers, artists, scientists, ministers, public officials, and men of the professional classes hope and act mainly to write a "best seller," to obtain the best-paying position, to have the highest scale of remuneration, and so on. If arms and force, not money, are the means to maximum happiness, then these instruments are the supreme arbiters of value, instead of money.
[pp. 35–36]

A. Within any society the Active and Passive Sensate mentalities probably occupy more prominent positions in the adaptation of the rich and privileged classes than in that of the poor....

The reasons ... are obvious. The rich and the privileged classes have more means (wealth) at their disposal for the satisfaction of their needs and therefore can indulge in more of such satisfaction than the poor. They have greater power to modify the external world and their social environment than the poor. Therefore, they do not practice giving up their fancies and needs, modifying themselves instead of their milieu to the extent to which the poor classes must. Hence the greater "Epicureanism" of the rich.
[p. 42]

Ethics

Sensate ethics can be called the *ethics of happiness*....

To the *Sensate ethics of happiness* belong all hedonistic, utilitarian and eudaemonistic ethical systems which regard sensate happiness as the supreme value and make everything else a means for its

achievement and quantitative and qualitative increase. All that leads to that is good; all that hinders it is evil; such is the criterion and the supreme value of such systems.

Though similar in this respect, various systems of ethics of happiness differ from one another in several secondary specifications. According to these specifications they can be divided into three principal subclasses. First is the *eudaemonistic* subclass which considers, as the supreme objective, happiness of the *whole system of life*, in which pleasure and joy shall outweigh pain, suffering, and grief. Not happiness as a mere *Carpe diem*, as merely grasping as many singular and fragmentary pleasures as possible. In accordance with that, eudaemonism means by happiness not merely the sum total of sensual pleasures but also — and rather — nonsensual pleasures, more refined, more noble, more lasting, and less fragile. In this sense it is neither mainly nor predominantly sensual and carnal, nor is it aimed at the passing moment only. It has a longer perspective of time in its evaluation of pleasure, and for this reason views happiness as a conscientious system of living and not as a mere hunt for transient enjoyment.

The *hedonistic* branch of the ethics of happiness differs from the eudaemonistic in that it views as the supreme objective of life separate or singular pleasures. The more such pleasures are caught, the greater the happiness, the greater the goodness of life. Accentuating these {p. 417} pleasures, hedonism has to be and in fact is more "sensual" and carnal than eudaemonism. The ideal of the "*Carpe diem*" or "Wine, women, and song," cannot be styled eudaemonistic... It does not stress the continuance of the pleasures and happiness, and does not give any premium to long-time values as compared with short-time ones, as does, in a sense, eudaemonism.

Finally, *utilitarianism* is also a form of ethics of happiness. Being nearer to the eudaemonistic system than to the hedonistic, especially in the works of the English utilitarianists, it differs from both in that it puts an emphasis on the *means* of obtaining happiness (on what is useful for the achievement of happiness) rather than on what the happiness itself is.

Eudaemonism, hedonism, and utilitarianism can be either individualistic or egotistic, when the happiness of only a given individual is considered, regardless of its effects upon the others; or social, when not so much the happiness of a given individual as that of a group is regarded as the supreme objective. The social forms of the ethics of happiness can have also various — more broad and less broad — forms, according to whether the happiness of the nearest group (for instance, of a certain family only) or a larger group (possibly the whole nation) or a still larger group (for instance, the whole of mankind) is the objective. Farther on, as mentioned, various systems of eudaemonism, hedonism, and utilitarianism can be and are ... carnal and sensual [in varying degrees]. Between the extremes there is always a series of the intermediary forms. Such are the main forms of the Sensate ethics of happiness.
[pp. 416–417]

2.1 Active Sensate Mentality

A. *Active Sensate Culture Mentality* (Active "Epicureans"). Sharing with other forms of Sensate mentality all the above four premises [See above, 2. Sensate Culture, par. 1], it seeks the consummation of its needs and ends mainly through the most "efficient" modification, adjustment, readjustment, reconstruction, of the external milieu. The transformation of the inorganic, organic (technology, medicine, and the applied disciplines), and the sociocultural world, viewed mainly externally, is the method of this variety. The great executives of history, the great conquerors, builders of empire, are its incarnation.
[p. 28]

[T]he Active Sensate mentality ... sees only the empirical reality. Full of appetites and vigor, it wants to change the surrounding sensate environment to meet its needs. The empirical reality is ever changing, is ever in a flux; consequently, the adaptive activities must also vary incessantly.

Therefore, this mentality is inseparable from a dynamic, evolutionary, progressive principle. From the earlier representatives of this mentality, from Heraclitus and Lucretius to the modern Evolutionists, devotees of Transformation, Progress, Dynamism, Movement, Mobility, Revolution, {p. 31} Incessant Change, and Adjustment, the dynamic principle has regularly been an integral part of the theories and practices of the followers of the Active Sensate mentality. Here the time category plays a most conspicuous part, and Time perspective is an indispensable trait of a mentality which is historical par excellence.

Likewise, in their practical activity, when it is integrated consistently with the Active Sensate mentality, the eternal panacea of such theorists is "readjustment"; *readjustment by all means, at all times, at all cost.* ...

The Active Sensate mentality leads to *man's control of the external world*, so far as its material and sensate aspects are concerned (since any externality is apprehended mainly as a material and sensate phenomenon or process). ...

[F]ull-blooded, energetic "Epicureans" [i.e., Active Sensate types] always have been the main transformers of the external milieu, whether it involved pioneering in the wilderness, or the organization of business empires, metropolitan centers, political or other organizations.
[pp. 30–31]

The Active Sensate mentality and its adaptational activities by definition are of an "extrovert" nature (pointed toward the transformation of the sensate milieu). ...

... an Active Sensate mentality ... dissolves the inner life and inner world into [the] external. In contrast to Ideationalists, "Epicureans" view the whole inner life, its processes, and all spiritual and immaterial phenomena, as either ignorant delusion or aberration or a peculiar by-product ("function," "effect," "resultant") of purely physiological processes in the nervous system or in any other part of the body. ...

The Active Sensate mentality implies a corporeal conception of self which makes it inseparable from the body; a skeptical or irreligious or disrespectful attitude toward nonmaterial forces and agencies; individual {p. 33} pride and self-reliance and a care of the body and its well-being, because it is looked upon as identical with self and personality.

... , the Active Sensate mentality is naturally associated with, logically requires, and stimulates man's knowledge of the external, material world. Thus, in a society or culture which at a given period is predominantly Sensate we must expect a successful development of natural sciences and a blossoming of man's knowledge of the material, external world and of the technical inventions for its control.
[pp. 32–33]

In the period of vigor and ascendancy the Active Sensate form prevails among the rich.
[p. 42]

Historical Examples

This type of mentality is quite familiar to us. As we shall see, it pervades our contemporary culture. We find it in the behavior of most of the secular "executives" of history, be they great rulers, conquerors, organizers of political and business empires, efficient rebels against various "spiritual" limitations and bonds. It is very widely spread, especially now, among businessmen, energetic professionals, scientists, scholars, laborers, "practical" ministers of the liberal "Social Gospel" — especially revolutionaries, and all those human groups which seek a "full, rich, beautiful, and active life"; who want their cups filled to the brim with sensate experience; who enjoy overcoming obstacles of an empirical nature, of transforming the environment in all its aspects; who enjoy and seek power over inorganic, organic, and psychosocial Nature; who delight in taming rivers, cutting canals, turning wilderness into civilization, {p. 48} hunting, breeding, changing, or exterminating animal and plant organisms, creating artistic, scientific, or other sensate values, fighting for political position, for superiority, fame, glory, wealth, comfort, and other values of this world.
[pp. 47–48]

2.2 Passive Sensate Mentality

B. *Passive Sensate Mentality* (Passive "Epicureans"). This is characterized by the attempt to fulfill physical needs and aims, neither through the inner modification of "self," nor through efficient reconstruction of the external world, but through a parasitic exploitation and utilization of the external reality as it is, viewed as the mere means for enjoying sensual pleasures. "Life is short"; "*Carpe diem*"; "Wine, women, and song"; "Eat, drink, and be merry" — these are the mottoes of this mentality.
[p. 28]

Passive Sensate mentality is imbued with a still more pointed, extreme philosophy of Becoming ("The past is no more; the future may never be; the present is all that we can be certain of"), with its *Carpe diem*, with decisive preference for the values of the given moment rather than any lasting, future values.
[p. 31]

The Passive Sensate mentality does not imply either of these controls [i.e., self-control or control of environments]; it seeks only an uninhibited satisfaction of individual lusts from the given milieu. ...

The Passive Sensate mentality implies a generally narrow tendency to view everything in terms of sensual pleasure and its opposite. With such a view much of the content of reality is missed.
[p. 32]

In the period of decay of this class [i.e., the rich and privileged] the Passive Sensate form dominates.
[p. 42]

This type is also very familiar to us in contemporary examples of both groups and individuals practicing it. It is found, in greater or lesser frequency, in practically all societies and virtually at all times. ... The [literary] formulas of such a mentality have long existed and have been frequently repeated with a monotonous lack of variation in detail. Here are a few typical examples.

Look upon this [the coffin with the mummy of the deceased], then drink
 and enjoy yourself; for when dead you will be like this. ...
 Follow thy desire, so long as thou livest.
 Do what thou wishest on earth...

This is the old Egyptian expression of this type of mentality. It is difficult to find a more poignant example of the Passive "Epicureanism"! ...

As for Greece and Rome, the philosophical systems of vulgar Epicureanism (not that of Epicurus which is much nearer to a combination of our Active Sensate mentality with partly Active and partly Ascetic Ideationalism) are at some periods, as we shall see, widespread. The {p. 49} works of many poets like Catullus, Horace, Ovid, epitaphs on tombstones, give a rich variety of examples of the formulation and practice of this mode of adaptation. ...

This kind of formulation of the Passive Sensate mentality has never died and finds its expression in thousands of ideologies, moral systems, and so on, the mottoes of which are the same: "Enjoy life, for it is short!"; "Wine, women, and song"; or, as in the present-day advertising: "Unhappy? — Buy a Chevrolet!" [pp. 48–49]

2.3 Cynical Sensate Mentality

C. Cynical Sensate Mentality (Cynical "Epicureans"). The civilization dominated by this type of mentality, in seeking to achieve the satisfaction of its needs, uses a specific technique of donning and doffing those Ideational masks which promise the greatest returns in physical profit. This mentality is exemplified by all the Tartufes [Note: from *Tartufe*, a hypocritical character in a Molière play] of the world, those who are accustomed to change their psychosocial "colors" and to readjust their values in order to run along with the stream. [p. 28]

Cynical Sensate mentality is somewhat similar to the Passive Sensate. But, being obliged to exert themselves to get what Passive "Epicureans" receive as gifts, the devotees of this type of mentality have to resort to hypocrisy as their technique, and in this lies their principal difference from Passive "Epicureans." [p. 31]

It is also probable that the occupation of the clergy tends to bring into its behavior some of the Cynical Sensate type, and perhaps to an extent greater than for many other groups. Even those clergymen with the strongest leaning toward the Sensate must keep up appearances, otherwise they would lose their positions. Hence, hypocrisy, Elmer Gantryism, the putting on of the masks of decency, of Ideationalism, spiritualism, religiosity, and so on, which do not correspond to the inner Gestalt and to some of the outward actions of the persons involved. [p. 43]

Concrete Illustrations

As we shall see farther, the Cynical Sensate form has not been endorsed *openly* by any great system or group. But, in fact, in a limited way, it enters the mentality and conduct of almost all human beings who do not always tell the whole truth, who follow the rules of courtesy and good education and often do not say what they think. In brief, those who are to some extent "liars," "hypocrites," "diplomats," "well-educated persons," "good mixers," "very pleasant and nice," "very courteous, polite, and polished men," [Note: the modern term "politically correct" might be placed here.] and so on, all share, to some extent, in this type of mentality and conduct. Almost all adult human beings, in a slight or a great degree, are given to uttering falsehoods of the nature just indicated.

There are, of course, individuals and groups for whom this is the main form of culture mentality: "professional liars," so to speak, and those persons who are too ready to adapt themselves. "Flatterers" at courts, among the rich people, in business, in literature, in science, in the professions, exist everywhere. When a reviewer or critic praises a work which he thinks is bad but which he cannot afford not to praise in order to keep his job or to be praised in return; when the same is done by a scholar, a poet, an artist; when an employee is flattering to his employer; when these and other persons prefer not to say anything in spite of having a firm negative opinion, not desiring to "spoil the good relationship," and so on; all these are acting according to the Cynical Sensate mentality. And though such individuals have seldom composed a special class, they have nevertheless been present in every society.
[p. 51]

3. Idealistic Culture

All the other culture mentalities represent in their major premises a mixture of the Ideational and Sensate forms in various combinations and proportions. With one conspicuous exception they are, therefore, eclectic, self-contradictory, poorly integrated logically.

Idealistic Culture Mentality. This is the only form of the Mixed class which is — or at least appears to be — logically integrated. Quantitatively it represents a more or less balanced unification of Ideational and Sensate, with, however, a predominance of the Ideational elements. Qualitatively it synthesizes the premises of both types into one inwardly consistent and harmonious unity. For its reality is many-sided, with the aspects of everlasting Being and ever-changing Becoming, [i.e.,] of the spiritual {p. 29} and the material. Its needs and ends are both spiritual and material, with the material, however, subordinated to the spiritual. The methods of their realization involve both the modification of self and the transformation of the external sensate world: in other words, it gives *suum cuique* [Note: "to each its own"] to the Ideational and the Sensate.

[pp. 28–29]

The Idealistic, the only perfectly integrated and logically consistent form of the Mixed mentality, is not very frequently met with. Probably at all periods and in all societies there have been individuals and groups who have been its bearers, but they are the minority among the mass of those who represent the other varieties of the Mixed mentality. Moreover, as we shall see, though there have been periods in the history of several cultures when the Idealistic mentality became dominant, such periods were comparatively few and short in their duration. ...

Despite the comparative infrequency of this type of Mixed mentality, its contribution to cultural value is qualitatively of a very high order. ...

All persons and groups who are "sensible," and "reasonable," {p. 50} who enjoy the life of this world but at the same time "give to God what belongs to God," perform their duties, do not go to extremes of sensualism or asceticism, are "good citizens," "honest men," who take good care of their bodies and at the same time do not entirely forget about their "souls" and the nonmaterial values, are the bearers of this form of mentality.
[pp. 49–50]

Historical Examples

Among the great systems of human conduct Confucianism best embodies this culture type. ...

Free from ascetic elements, this system at the same time represents a remarkable combination of the Ideational and Sensate; its main purpose being to indicate the empirical mean, to keep the balance, or, in its own language, to preserve "the state of equilibrium and harmony," meaning by this the state "when those feelings [of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy] have been stirred, and all in their due measure and degree." "This harmony is the universal path in which all human actions should proceed." When it exists "all things [are] nourished and flourish."

Thus Confucianism defines itself, its main objective, and the conduct which it recommends, in such a way as to associate itself with our Mixed [i.e., Idealistic] type. It recommends a proper gratification of all the important sensate needs but in due measure and degree, and with necessary limitations which are imposed by social duties, the general welfare of the people, and the commands of Heaven.
[p. 50]

Art, Architecture, Literature

A. *Idealistic Style*. Exemplified most strikingly by the Greek art of the fifth century B.C. and the religious art of Europe in the thirteenth century, the Idealistic style is simultaneously Ideational and Visual. It is visual in the form in which it renders its subjects, but not entirely: as we shall see, it ignores on principle the profane, the incidental, the negative aspects of visual reality and adds the noblest, the sublimest, the most beautiful and typical values, which are not apparent in the objects perceived visually. It idealizes, modifies, typifies, and transforms visual reality in conformity with its ideals and ideas. To this extent it is not Visual, but Ideational. The same is true of the subjects represented. They are carefully selected and in most cases are either of the nonempirical kind, or of the half-empirical — typical, generalized in their nature. Nothing vulgar, debasing, ugly, unmoral, eccentric, can be the subject of such an art. If negative values are chosen for depiction, even these are beautified, are used mainly for stressing, by means of contrast, the positive values. If an individual is represented in portraiture, he is typified according to the idealized type. In all these respects the Idealistic art presents a marvelous balance and "organic" union of the elements of the Ideational and of the Visual style with some slight domination of the Ideational. Thus it is a specific form of the Mixed style. It has, of course, its own gradations and degrees with respect to the amount of dominance of, or the closeness of approach to, one or the other of the two opposed styles. But in its sublimest form the Idealistic maintains a steady balance between the two.

... The Idealistic treatment does not show anything of decay, senility, death, imperfection, even of a purely human excess of emotion and passion. Even mortals are depicted as immortal, or noble, or sublime, or as an idealized type.
[p. 90]

The choice of the Idealistic art with regard to subject matter and treatment is determined by the nature of the *ideal value*, not entirely separated, however, from the empirical world, as it is in the Ideational art. All that is foreign to this value is unimportant for such an art and is passed over by it. The nonidealistic phenomena, especially, or the phenomena which are contrary to the ideal (unless they can be made to serve, by contrast, for the augmentation of the glory of the ideal value) are out of place in such an art. It *passes by the prosaic, the debased, the defective, the common, the earthly*. It does not see the baby as a baby, the old man as senile, the woman as womanish; what it sees is some general and perfected type of man. Therefore its babies are grown up; its old men are youthful; its women are manly — there is no sex in them.

[p. 95]

[In Greece during] the seventh and as late as the first half of the sixth century [B.C.], the Ideational wave seems to have been rising higher. The geometrical and other forms of the Ideational style predominate: the subjects, as they are exemplified by the Chest of Kypselos and the throne of Apollo at Amiklae, become almost exclusively religious and mythological. Of the previous refined Visualism there remains little, if anything, either in technique or in the content of art. Art becomes quite "conventional" and "formal" — terms which mean in most of the cases what I style Ideational. {p. 106}

Beginning with the sixth century, especially the latter half, the first signs of a shift from the Ideational toward the Visual style appear in sculpture as well as in painting. An effort to render subjects somewhat more visually seems to have taken place in the Athenian school of sculpture and to a less degree in the school of Samos (Theodorus, Rhoikos, Smilis, Telekles) and of Chios (Melas, Mikkiades, Archermos, Bupalos, Athenis). The same seems to be true of the vase painting of the schools of Corinth, of Sikyon, and especially of Athens (Eumaios. *c.* 600–590 B.C.; Kimon of Kleonae, *c.* 520–500 B.C.). However the art still remains predominantly Ideational, though the Ideationalism is progressively declining before a growing Visualism. But soon the descending curve of Ideationalism and ascending curve of Visualism cross each other and produce a marvelous blending in the form of the *sublime Idealistic art* of the fifth century B.C. It has all the perfections of the mature Visual technique. At the same time its "soul" is still in the Ideational — religious, ethical, and nonsensate — world. We are in the age of the "predecessors" of Phidias: of Aegelas of Argos (*c.* 520–516), of Myron, of Onatas (*c.* 480), of Kalamis, of Pythagoras of Rhegion, and others. The culmination point of the period — and of all time — in sculpture was Phidias (500–432 B.C.), the first sculptor to produce ideal embodiments of the highest moral qualities of which a Greek could conceive, such as majesty, wisdom or beauty. He was the first sculptor who combined the idealism with the perfect mastery of his material, thus producing a completer harmony than was attained by any before or since.

Then comes Polycleetus (*c.* 440–410 B.C.), not to mention others like Agorakritos, Alkamenes, Kolotes, Kallimachos.

The subjects of the sculpture of the fifth century are gods, heroes, or ideational entities like Victory, Nemesis, and so on. In this sense the art is Ideational. But the perfect technique is Visual. Hence it unites in itself both styles in an unrivaled form, and gives what I call the Idealistic art.

Greek painting of the fifth century is Idealistic. The culmination of the fifth century painting was Polygnotus (*c.* 475–430 B.C.). He is rightly styled the Phidias of painting.

In view of the exceptional perfection of this Idealistic art of the fifth century, it is advisable to outline its characteristics a little more substantially. Such an analysis should help us to understand several typical traits of the Idealistic style. A few quotations from specialists will help us in this purpose.

This Idealism of the Greek painting and sculpture of the fifth century shows itself first in an excellent knowledge on the part of the artists of {p. 107} human anatomy and the means of rendering it in its ideal or perfect form, in the type of the persons represented, in their postures, in the abstractness of the human type; there are no concrete portraits, no ugliness, no defective traits or types; before us are immortals or idealized mortals; old age is rejuvenated; the baby is depicted as grown up; the women have little that is specifically womanish and appear like perfect athletes; there are no concrete landscapes. The postures and the expressions are free from any violent or debased or too human emotion and distorting passion. They are calm, serene, imperturbable like the gods. Even the dead shine with the same calmness and serene beauty. All the statues have a "Greek" profile; not because the Greeks were such [Note: i.e., looked like this], as Winkelman thought, but because it was the profile thought to be perfect. The *chevelure* is simple but perfectly ordered; the drapery is perfectly adapted to the body, simple and marvelous in its orderly beauty. Eyes are natural and perfect, and shine with calmness and serenity; the lips and mouth are ideally cut; the postures are dignified and idealized.

This Greek art was deeply religious, patriotic, instructive, moralizing, educating. It was created not only for its own sake, but also as a means for such instruction and education. It was not separated from, but was the partner of, religion, of civic and social morality.

From the same spirit comes its collective and in a way anonymous character. "Temples and their art were the expression of the popular beliefs and were the collective work of all the citizens." After the Persian wars, it was necessary to thank the gods for the victory, for peace, for prosperity; and "the whole Athenian people wanted to devote themselves to that national work which was to honour the gods and their own country." There was a universal *élan*, ardent and enthusiastic desire to exalt the religion and the country. Hence all tried to participate in the creation of the great national monument — the art of the fifth century. There was this idealism, there was unanimity, there was exaltation; hence the unity, harmony, and marvel of the art of that period.

The period of pure Idealism in Greek art was short. Though it remained Idealistic throughout the fifth and a part of the fourth century, nevertheless, after Phidias and Polygnotus the Ideational stream continued to become thinner, the Sensate ampler. The marvelous balance of the Idealistic art was then more and more lost and this led to a gradual decline of the purity of the Idealistic style.

In sculpture, the first signs of a contamination of the pure Idealism of Phidias appear already in the works of Polycletus (active c. 440–410) with his idealization of the body (mainly athletes) rather than of the soul. ...

{p. 108} ... Toward the end of the fourth century Idealism is over and the rising tide of Visualism definitely triumphs. Beginning with that period we have the Hellenistic sculpture, which is clearly and conspicuously Sensate or Visual, with all the traits of such an art. A similar change took place in painting during the fourth century.

[pp. 105–108]

If now we turn to architecture as a whole, its early stage *before the fifth century B.C.* was simple Doric, externally; and internally the grand buildings were temples, devoted to the worship of deities and other superempirical purposes. In other words, it was predominantly *Ideational*, according to the *internal as*

well as external criteria of Ideationality. Internally it was a temple, "not a civil but a religious building." "It served the gods and the dead." "Luxury and beauty were entirely reserved for the gods."

Externally this Doric architecture was simple even in details. It was free from any colossalism. The Greek artist of that period "saw beauty not in material grandeur or riches but in proportion and simplicity"; likewise he "did not care for rare and glittering materials, such as gold, silver, and precious stones."

In brief, just as painting and sculpture before the fifth century were pre-eminently Ideational, the Greek architecture was also Ideational in that period.

The fifth century was the Idealistic period in Greek painting and sculpture. And it seems to have been *Idealistic also in architecture*. The Parthenon is its evidence and incarnation. Internally it was still devoted to God but also to the civic virtues, and, to a degree, to the noble empirical values. Externally, this manifests itself in a marvelous harmony and proportion between the Ideational otherworldliness and visual beauty. Hence, its greater decorativeness and visual appeal as compared with the preceding period. It is larger in size. It is more ornamented. Instead of an almost complete lack of decorative elements "now, in the design of the Parthenon, all the metopes of the external Doric order were filled with sculpture, and a continuous Ionic frieze was added around the cella."

Since about the middle of the fourth century, the balance line in the rising tide of Visualism and falling tide of Ideationalism seems to have been passed. From that time on, the architecture becomes, with minor fluctuations and reactions, more and more Visual, like the Greek, the Hellenistic, and then the Roman painting and sculpture. Again a change takes place in the inner character of the buildings as well as in their externality: both become more and more Visual. From the inner standpoint, side by side with temples, the princes' palaces, the theaters, public civic buildings, triumphal arches, aqueducts, mansions of the potentates and other secular buildings, "for every variety of purpose which public and private life on a scale of magnificence demanded," became more and more the incarnation of the grand architecture. It {p. 154} begins to serve less and less the gods and the dead and more and more the empirical needs of the powerful, the rich, and the privileged. It ceases to be symbolic and becomes Visual in its beauty or ugliness.

"Luxury, love of the colossal and grandiose, pompousness and theatrical display, the very things Greek art had once avoided, now appeared."
[pp. 153–154]

[Note: Here Sorokin is discussing a later cycle than that referred to above.]

This increasing tide of Visualism [of eleventh and twelfth century European architecture] finally manifested itself in the emergence of the Gothic of the twelfth and of the thirteenth centuries — the style which is a marvelous balance of the Ideational and the Visual elements and is neither one nor the other but a straight Idealistic style, like the Idealistic sculpture and painting of the same centuries. Its course of development from the early to the late "flamboyant" Gothic of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, which evolved into the baroque and the late baroque, or the rococo, is a steady rise of Visualism, which with the late "flamboyant" Gothic became dominant and in the baroque reached its great heights.

Like many another great style, "Gothic architecture, continually on the strain for improvement, arrived in the sixteenth century at the point where it seemed nothing further could be done." It had "exhausted its resources." "From the end of the fourteenth century up to the Renaissance, the flamboyant Gothic did not produce any new principle ... but brought only a taste for complexity."

Its course was run; in the rising tide of Visualism it could not continue; either a new architectural style had to be created, or there had to be a return to one previously abandoned. This latter happened to be the Renaissance form of architecture.

[p. 156]

Literature of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries

Just as in the various fields of art the first observable emergence of a mildly Sensate form took place in the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries, and led to the Idealistic style in painting, sculpture, architecture, and — somewhat later — music, so also is it with literary work during this same period. *In literature also these are transitional centuries of an Idealistic mixture of the declining Ideationalism and the reawakening Sensatism. The Idealistic character is manifest in all the main aspects of what is styled here Idealistic art, namely, in the inner content of the literature, in its external forms, and finally in the character of the art and literary criticism of the period.*

A. *Inner Traits.* As to the *inner content* of the literature of these centuries, it now represents, first of all, *a mixture of religious with secular topics*, though the secular is still predominantly *heroic*, and still does not deal with the banal, everyday events and personages, and still less with the vulgar, negative, low, debased, pathological aspects of empirical life. {p. 197} This mixture is one of the inner characteristics of the Idealistic art.

[pp. 196–197]

Ethics

C. Finally, the Idealistic ethical system occupies an intermediary position {p. 416} between ... [the Ideational and Sensate] systems.

(1) Its aims are simultaneously transcendental and earthly: service to God (the absolute ethical value), which leads, at the same time, to the real eudaemonistic happiness of those who do that.

(2) Its main principle is absolute; its subordinated commands are relative and therefore changeable.

(3) It gives its main principles as the commands of God or of some other supersensory supreme authority; its secondary principles as the commands of reason and of the human bearers of it.

... Idealistic ethics is ... the ethics of absolute principles somewhat diluted, mixed with the finest form of *eudaemonistic* ethics as a variety of the *ethics of happiness*. [pp. 415–416]

Between the noblest systems of eudaemonism and that of the ethics of principles, the difference becomes often imperceptible. One is merged organically with the other, in the form of the Idealistic system of ethics, which is simultaneously absolutistic and — in part — relativistic, transcendental, and at the same time eudaemonistic.

[p. 417]

Philosophy

(1) The total spectrum of mentality (in the field studied) of Greece before the fifth century B.C. appeared to be predominantly Ideational. The system of the religious rationalism was overwhelmingly dominant, and empiricism only as a minor force was present; neither skepticism, mysticism, fideism, criticism, nor even idealistic rationalism existed. It was the period of certitude in the Greek mentality, the age of the certitude of faith; the age of calm serenity and untroubled simplicity.

(2) The fifth century, especially its second part and also the first two-thirds of the fourth century B.C. were marked by the domination of the *idealistic rationalism* or the *truth of reason*. The system of truth of "scholastic intellectualism" (the truth of the autonomous and dialectic reason in contradistinction to religious rationalism) occupied about 40 per cent of the field; truth of faith was still recognized in the form of Plato's "divine madness" or Aristotle's theology; empiricism was not only present but was also comparatively strong; even skepticism, mysticism, and fideism existed, although each was comparatively weak.

All the three truths harmoniously coexisted, and more than that, all were organically blended into one system of truth; namely, idealistic rationalism, giving *suum cuique* to the truth of faith, of reason, of senses. The main governor, if not *de jure* then *de facto*, was [dialectics](#), through which and upon which was based the evidential power of even the truth of faith. The mental spectrum was marvelously balanced and free from any extremism. None of the negative or desperate current (skepticism, fideism, mysticism) tended to be dominant. All these characteristics are evidences of the domination of truth of reason in that period.

In the light of such a spectrum of the Idealistic system of truth, and in the light of the data concerning all the main branches of art of the fifth and fourth centuries, their culture and mentality appear to be idealistic.

[p. 249]

The indicators for the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. show a considerable change in the spectrum of the epistemological mentality which is now the spectrum of the Idealistic theory of truth.

If rationalism, the most powerful of all the currents of the period, is considered separately, it can be seen that it preserves all the earmarks of the Idealistic system of truth. The systems of truth of Anaximendros, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Herakleitos, Parmenides, Hippasos, Zenon, Anaxagoras, Archytas, Archelaos, Philolaos, Aeschines, Kratilos, Melissos, Eukleidos, and others have these earmarks. Naturally this comes in a most perfect form in the systems of truth of the greatest leaders of the period, namely, Socrates(469–399 B.C.) and his greatest pupil, Plato (427–347 B.C.). {p. 258}

What are its essential traits from the standpoint of our problem? Reduced to a brief formula they are as follows: There are three degrees of knowledge and truth, three sources and ways of cognition: first, through the organs of senses is obtained a knowledge of the ever-changing empirical world and phenomena which gives a very uncertain truth. All the empirical sciences based on observation through organs of senses give this inferior and unlasting truth. Plato disdainfully terms such a knowledge mere "opinion." The second form or degree of knowledge is based partly upon the data of the organs of senses and partly upon the logical laws of human intelligence which uses and fashions the raw material of the organs of senses according to its own laws; for example, mathematics, geometry, and human logic itself. Their verities are mainly those of the human mind or intelligence, and their certainties are much greater than those of the truths of senses. Finally, the third and the most sublime form of knowledge is "divine

intuition," or "divine contemplation," or "divine madness," which in an act of pure and sublime contemplation, divine inspiration, or mystic experience and revelation, goes beyond the empirical appearances, beyond even human logic, to the everlasting ultimate reality — the eternal Being — identifies itself with it and merges into it. not only from without but from within, and thus achieves complete, eternal, and certain knowledge — the supreme and absolute truth. This sublime, divine, or mystic form of truth cannot be imparted by teaching or training because it is the gift of the gods, and only those who have this spark can grasp it.

It is not incidental also that for an allusion of the most sublime verities, Plato uses — and is forced to use, as an Ideationalist — a poetic-symbolic language, images, and terms. The Platonic system of truth and knowledge, then, embraces all the three main forms of truth— the truth of "divine madness or revelation," the truth of reason or intelligence, and the truth of senses. It also combines them, giving *suum cuique*, into one coherent whole, in which empiricism is assigned an unimportant but a real place and divine contemplation is given the highest place. All this is shaped through and by the finest dialectic of human mind. Such a system is *idealistically rationalistic*, par excellence.

Besides Plato and the Platonic school, not to mention other rationalists of the period studied, idealistic rationalism was professed also by the other powerful school, the Peripatetic, whose great leader was Aristotle (384–322 B.C.). In spite of the fact that the elements of the truth of senses played a much larger part in the Aristotelian theory of truth than in the Platonic (that is also significant as an expression of the further increase of scientific discoveries and inventions and of a growing "sensualization" of the Greek culture as we pass from the fifth to the fourth centuries B.C. and from the first part of the fourth century to its second part), as a whole {p. 259} the Aristotelian theory of truth is a variety of the same idealistic rationalism, embracing in its organic synthesis the elements of all the three systems of truth. The truth of the senses is given much more importance than in Plato's system; the truth of reason or logic, with its categories and the *Nous* (though here lies one of the dark points of the Aristotelian logics), is not derived from perceptions but organizes perceptions of the senses into knowledge; and finally the truth of theology or metaphysics is the ultimate and supreme knowledge with God, to which it leads and whose existence it states.

These two schools were the great schools of the time and as such typify the dominant system of truth of that period.

In the field of the thought they both can be styled the Phidias and the Praxiteles. They possess the same traits, play the same role, and give the same type of creations as Phidias and Praxiteles in sculpture; as Polygnotus in drawing; as Pindar, Aeschylus, and Sophocles in literature and music.
[pp. 257–259]

[The brief but immensely productive Idealistic culture in Greece gave way to several centuries of increasing Sensatism. Following this, with the consolidation of Christianity, Europe entered a new Ideational phase, which lasted many centuries before gradually giving way to a new Idealistic culture.]

The years from the end of the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries are the Age of the Idealistic Rationalism, quite similar to that of the age in Greece of the fifth and the fourth centuries, but not a continuation of the preceding system of the truth of faith with mere subservient truth of reason. We are now in a very different mental atmosphere and this atmosphere is that of the idealistic rationalism in the sense given to that term above. The Scholastic philosophy of these centuries with its climax in the thirteenth is not a system of truth of faith but that of idealistic rationalism as a harmonious blending together, into one system, of the truths of faith, of reason, and of senses. It is similar in that respect to the idealistic rationalism of Plato and Aristotle. Such is the thesis contended.

What are its evidences? The curves of the movement of scientific discoveries and of empiricism show that they reappeared again and began to grow. Since the truth of faith and that of reason are present also, all the three systems are now on the stage, functioning together. ...

Everyone who is acquainted with the Scholastic philosophy of the period, as it is given by its greatest creators like Albertus Magnus (c. 1193–1280) and his still greater disciple St. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) cannot fail to observe that the Scholastic system of truth was exactly the system of idealistic rationalism. Its essential tenets are: there are practically the three kinds of knowledge — sensory, intellectual, {p. 269} and superintellectual or divine. Any cognition begins with the sensory perception (as with Aristotle), but to become knowledge and truth as *adequatio rei et intellectus* the sensory data are, so to speak, transformed by the intellect, which has a power to render a material object immaterial, and especially by the active intellect which brings out the universal or the intelligible in the object or thing perceived. Thus (omitting many details already presented) the co-operation of both sources and forms of truth — the sensory and the intellectual — is evident. For a knowledge of most of the empirical phenomena these two forms of truth and of sources are sufficient. But there are the superempirical phenomena which cannot be perceived either by the senses directly or cannot be apprehended by human reason and logic. They can be known only by the grace of God, who reveals such truths to mankind through prophets and in other ways. This form of truth is the most supreme and sublime of all forms of knowledge.

The sense always apprehends the thing as it i., except there be an impediment in the organ or in the medium. [It can do so because] sensible objects exist actually outside the soul.

Sensory cognition is occupied with external, sensible qualities, but intellectual knowledge penetrates to the very essence of the things.

Certitude of knowledge varies in various natures.... Because man forms a sure judgment about a truth by the discursive process of his reason: and so human knowledge is acquired by means of demonstrative reasoning....

As to the divine knowledge or the truth of faith, practically almost the whole of the *Summa contra Gentiles* and also many parts of the *Summa theologiae* — particularly the latter section of the second part devoted to Faith, and to the Gratuitous Graces as well as the many other parts — are but a systematic development of the theory of the existence of such a truth. Here is its essence.

In the things which we hold about God there is truth in two ways. For certain things that are true about God wholly surpass the capability of human reason; for instance that God is three and one; while there are certain things to which even natural reason can attain, for instance, that God is, that God is one, and others like these, which even the philosophers proved demonstratively of God, being guided by the light of natural reason.... That certain divine truths wholly surpass the capability of human reason is most clearly evident... since our intellect's knowledge originates from the senses: so that things which are not objects of sense cannot be comprehended by the human intellect, except in so far as knowledge of them is gathered from sensibles.... Accordingly some divine truths are attainable by human reason, while others altogether surpass the power of human reason.

In the next chapters St. Thomas demonstrates {p. 270}

that those things which cannot be investigated by reason are fittingly proposed to man as an object of faith. Divine Wisdom Himself, Who knows all things most fully, deigned to reveal to

man the *secrets of God's wisdom* . . . the truth of His doctrine and inspiration, [foretold by] the manifold oracles of the prophets.

In the *Summa theologiae* this truth of faith he styles exactly by this term "truth of faith"; and under the name "wisdom" separates it from intellectual-sensible knowledge, indicating again and again that this "divine wisdom" or "truth of faith" has much greater certitude than knowledge of intellect and is supreme in comparison with it.

From the foregoing discussion, the skeleton of St. Thomas's theory of knowledge is clear and there is no doubt but that it is idealistic rationalism in my meaning of the term. The three forms of truth are all harmoniously blended. Not to leave any uncertainty, St. Thomas again and again stresses that this "truth of faith" in no way contradicts the sensory-intellectual truth but supplements it and leads it to the higher level of the divine wisdom.

It is impossible for the aforesaid truth of faith to be contrary to those principles which reason knows naturally.

And vice versa:

Those things which are naturally instilled in human reason cannot be opposed to this truth [of Christian faith]. The truth of reason is not in opposition to the truth of the Christian Faith.

Such is this system of the idealistic rationalism. It is a European variety of the system of the Platonic-Aristotelian idealistic rationalism.
[pp. 268–270]

Eternalism, Temporalism, And Mixed Theories

A further general principle which underlies — implicitly or explicitly — many scientific, philosophical, religious, and ethical theories, and which likewise conditions a number of more special ideologies, beliefs, and convictions, is the principle of Eternalism as against Temporalism.

As to the classification of the main solutions of the problem, the three main classes into which all the solutions fall are: (1) The *ideology of Being*, or *eternalism*, which stresses that the true ultimate reality is an unchangeable super- or all-time Being. Any change or any Becoming is either pure illusion or something secondary. (2) The *ideology of Becoming*, or *temporalism*, according to which the true reality is an incessant change, a never-ceasing flux, where any moment differs from another, with its "earlier-later," "before-after," and other time references. (3) *Synthesis*, or *reconciliation of both eternalism and temporalism*, according to which the true reality has both these aspects. ...

The reduction of change to Being has consisted in attempts to show that Becoming (or its equivalents) is either nonexistent or unreal, or represents nothing but a specific aspect of Being. ... {p. 304}

... In many variations, this philosophy of Being, either in its application to true reality generally, or to the ultimate reality only, has been going on throughout the whole history of philosophy and human thought from the remotest past to the present time.

The opposite effort, to reduce the category of Being to that of Becoming, is represented by the philosophy of *Becoming*. It claims that everything is in the state of incessant Becoming, change, flux; that Becoming or process is the only reality, and there is no unchangeable and everlasting permanency whatsoever. ...

The third solution of the problem has been to give direct or indirect recognition to both categories, and an allotment of some room to each. The forms of this solution have been divers. ... {p. 305}

... [One form of this third solution] is represented by those theories, in all fields of science and philosophy, which claim that the "form" of a class of phenomena is constant while the content is ever changing. Here the form is in the realm of Being, the content in that of Becoming. ...

In the special field of human relations, there are hundreds of concrete examples of ...[this] same solution. The Greeks viewed "nature " as the realm {306} of immutability, and man-made norm as that of change. When the Romans thought that the *jus civile*, *jus Quiritum*, and *jus honorarium* were all changeable, while *jus naturale* and *aequitas* were unchangeable, eternal, immutable, valid for all times and for all peoples, they again gave *suum cuique* to Being as well as to Becoming.

With a slight variation and under the name of either "the eternal law" (St. Thomas Aquinas and others) or "natural law" or "divine law," almost all theorists about law and morals have admitted or stressed the unchangeable and everlasting Being in this field in contradistinction to the "positive law" and concrete codes of laws, mores, prescriptions, which are changing in time and in space.
[pp. 303–306]

Individual and Society

[In terms of how social reality is construed, the Sensate–Ideational bipolarity is paralleled by contrasting views of (A) *singularism* or individualism, where the individual is the supreme concern and society is seen as nothing more than a collection of individuals; (B) *universalism* or collectivism, where society as a whole is understood as an organic reality, and the welfare of this greater organism the supreme value; and a third orientation, *mystical integralism*, which reconciles these two.]

C. *Sociological Mystic Integralism*. The third current in the field is mystic integralism. ... it thinks that society and the individual both are real; the individual is the singularistic incarnation of the societal reality; {p. 340–244 = tables; p. 345}

society is the *universalia* of all the individuals, permeating all of them; it is the condition without which the individual is impossible. Like entelechy it permeates all of them and is the generic essence of every individual. Therefore the synthesis of individualism and universalism is achieved by this current, not mechanically, not through addition of the value or reality of the individual to that of society, but intimately, mystically, internally, in the sense that the genuine realization of the individuality of every singular person is obtained through free creative effort of the person, the effort which aims to realize the absolute and universal values for their own sake, for the pure love of them. Since these absolute and universal values are incorporated in superindividual culture and society, their realization is at the same time realization of the aims of society and of its values. When the individual makes such an effort, he expresses through it the societal *universalia* and objectivizes the reality as well as the value of society. Such a harmony or coexistence of the individual and societal reality is somewhat mystic in its nature. It mystically pre-exists the individual as a singularistic person. Such is the essence of the ontological position of the mystic integralism. Ethically, it logically claims that both the societal and the individual values are inseparable; that they are the same but represent two different aspects of the same value; that, consequently, both the individual and society are the absolute value and this value is the same; therefore neither the individual nor society can be relegated to a secondary or derivative value, and neither of them can be used as the mere means for some other purpose.

In this harmonious and ideal form, the mystic integralism attempts to solve the problem. In view of the specific difficult traits and mentality of this integralism — which, like mysticism generally, is accessible only to a relatively few persons — its representatives have been less numerous and the current less ample than those of its two other rivals.

[pp. 339, 345]

[Note. This part of Sorokin's theories deserves more attention than it has received. Such a 'mystic integration' of the individual and society is a prominent feature of American Transcendentalist writers, especially Emerson and Whitman.]

4. Other Mixed Cultures

[Sorokin goes on to describe Idealistic and other Mixed (i.e., mixing Sensate and Ideational elements) cultural orientations. The Idealistic culture is the only Mixed culture that is fully integrated. Other Mixed cultures represent only "low-grade", "highly eclectic", or even sometimes internally contradictory combinations of Sensate and Ideational elements."]

Since the major premises of such mentalities are eclectic, sometimes even irreconcilable, the mentalities as a whole are also eclectic and sometimes self-contradictory. Thus the logic of such a culture type is often nonlogical or illogical.

[p. 49]

B. Pseudo-Ideational Culture Mentality. Another specific form of the Mixed type is the unintegrated, Pseudo-Ideational mentality... . Here needs and ends are predominantly of a physical nature. They are only moderately satisfied, and the method of satisfaction is neither an active modification of the milieu to any appreciable degree, nor a free modification of self, nor a search for pleasure, nor successful hypocrisy. It is a dull and passive endurance of blows and privations, coming from the outside, as long as these can be borne physically. This minimization of spiritual and carnal needs is not freely sought, it is imposed by some external agency (*via absoluta*). It is the result of helplessness to resist. The oppressive power is so overwhelming that, after several unsuccessful attempts to oppose it, there remains to those oppressed no energy to try to free themselves and to adapt themselves physically and spiritually to a better order. Given an opportunity, a Pseudo-Ideationalist may easily plunge into Passive, Cynical, or even Active "Epicureanism." The life processes of slaves under dire and cruel conditions, of many prisoners, of subjects under the cruel regime of their rulers, of some primitive people who live in a condition of misery and privation, of groups stricken by a great catastrophe bringing with it utter ruin, of sensate persons stricken by an incurable malady — these offer examples of this type of mentality.

[p. 29]

Finally, an enslaved Pseudo-Ideationalist is here, as in other points, a creature of the circumstances rather than their master.

[p. 31]

Of all the types of mentality existent among the poor and disenfranchised classes, the Pseudo-Ideational type is perhaps the most prevalent; it is less frequent among the rich and privileged. ...

For similar reasons the poor and the subjugated groups are more exposed to the Pseudo-Ideational mentality than the rich. Their circumstances do not permit them to be Active or Passive "Epicureans." As a whole they are not capable of lifting themselves to the high level of [Ascetic?] Ideationalism. Neither have they an opportunity or possibility of elevating themselves to the level of Active Ideationalism. Hence they have to be content with whatever the circumstances give them, and this is not enough to permit their developing a full Sensate mentality and behavior.

[p. 42]

[T]he Pseudo-Ideational type has also existed at all times, in all societies, to a greater or lesser degree. All those who have been obliged to live in hard conditions, not because they chose them but because these conditions were imposed on them, either by other human agencies or by nature; all those who have had to bear their unfortunate lot, whether through their own fault like many imprisoned criminals or through the fault of the circumstances like slaves and serfs, the conquered, the subjugated; all those who have had, because of need and against their desire, to accept employment of a nature or under circumstances distasteful to them; all these are included under the Pseudo-Ideational type. Their number has always been legion.

[p. 51]

Final Remarks

Enough of contrasts for the present. Table 1 will make plain at a glance by its arrangement in tabular form the results of this examination of the several types of culture mentalities.

The preceding pages outline the profound differences of various types of mentality, as they fall generally under the heading of Ideational or Sensate. Based on divergent major premises, they likewise differ throughout, if the implications of the premises are consistently carried through. A consistent adherence to these implications makes each type of mentality logical and integrated (according to the same canon of logic), in spite of their contrast.

[p. 36]

The above discussion has made clear the nature of each type of mentality in its essentials. It demonstrates that each type has existed in the empirical cultural world and is composed of exactly the characteristics {p. 52} that are given to it in our abstract delineation. To this extent our first task is done. The classification of culture mentalities as proposed in the present work has thus shown itself a fruitful way of ordering the infinite chaos of cultural phenomena, at least in their inner aspect, into a few comprehensible systems. When the major premises of each of these systems are understood, all that is necessary is a logical unfolding of the rich content of each premise, uncovering all the detailed implications that are in it.

Thus the logico-meaningful reading of culture shows its "heuristic" value. It permits us to cast the logical net of relationship out over an enormous number of fragments of cultural phenomena often quite widely separated from one another; to establish a definite connection between them; and to find the proper place and the proper meaning for each fragment in the system.

We now have a grasp of one of the key principles for the study of the logical integration of cultural phenomena. The analysis of each type of mentality is far from having been exhaustive, but it has been sufficient to enable us to plunge into the main task of this work: a study of sociocultural fluctuations. Let

us, therefore, pass to a preliminary delineation of the principles involved in the study of fluctuation and change, or the dynamic aspects of cultural phenomena.
[pp. 51–52]

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