

# Modernization without Westernization:

## Comparative Observations on the Cases of Japan and China and their Relevance to the Development of the Pacific Rim

Stuart D. B. Picken

### Introduction

Although the modernization of Japan and China are separated by almost a century, both countries came to accept the necessity of change in the interests of national security and their own long term survival in a potentially hostile international environment. Their approaches to the problem, however, show a marked contrast, particularly with regard to their understanding of the relationship between modernization and westernization. Japan accepted the need for importing certain western values, and indeed, did so to the extent of becoming manipulated by the western powers. This aspect of the process led to negative side effects on Sino-Japanese relations that have remained ever since, and perhaps, at least indirectly, forced Chinese thinking to move in a totally different direction, based on the premise that “westernization” as a vehicle for introducing modernization, could be dispensed with in favour of values and processes that were derived from the Chinese tradition. This was the first explicit Asian conceptual separation of the two processes, a distinction that is echoed in the late 20th century writings of Lee Guang Yao of Singapore (Lee Kwan Yew, *Forty Years of Political Discourse*, Singapore: United Press, 1995), Mathahir Mohamad of Malaysia (Mathahir Mohammad and Shintaro Ishihara, *The Voice of Asia: Two Leaders Discuss the Coming Century*, Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1995). The rejection of convergence theories of culture, and the use of slogans such as Deng Xiaoping’s “Socialism with a Chinese Face” can be more easily understood in light of this position. It also helps in the understanding of the complexity that characterizes some features of Japan’s international relations in Asia, Asian suspicions of Japan, and Japan’s own dilemmas about the 21st century.

In stark contrast to this strand of thinking is the long-held western assumption that westernization, meaning the adoption of western standards and values is the core of modernization, and that the backward nations of Asia and elsewhere should appreciate the benefits that it brings. While perhaps not so strongly advocated in the early 21st century as it was half-a-century earlier, much of the hubris it generated remains, and consequently a great deal of western understanding of Asian development remains inadequate and unbalanced.

This paper will consider the background to the modernization of Japan and China, paying attention to relevant historical aspects, and with special reference as to how these factors influenced the manner in which modernization was understood and pursued in each case. The results will be considered in the light of the growth of the concept of the Pacific Rim and the academic theory of dual structure.

### I: Japan: A Nation in Search of Cultural Identity

While it is generally recognized that the material culture of ancient Japan was higher than many early observers thought (according to Sir George Sansom Sansom, *Sir George History of Japan*, Tokyo: Tuttle Edition, pp. 15–18), there is no doubt that encounter with China dazzled the Japanese to a remarkable extent. The peak of this early infatuation was probably reached in the Japanese acceptance of the “Chinese Dream” of a Pax Buddhica (according to the work of

Professor Antonio Forte in his paper presented at the Korean Academy of Social Sciences Colloquium at Seoul in 1987), signified in Japan by government undertaking the casting of the Great Buddha and the construction of the Todai-ji in Nara (the great eastern temple). It was to be the world's largest Buddha housed in the world's largest wooden building. This was part of a process that led to the development of a uniquely Asian structure of international relations, namely a circle of independent satellite kingdoms, unified by Buddhist culture and values under the loose cultural hegemony of China. These kingdoms included what later came to be defined as Thailand, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia. Japan aspired to be associated with this group, and as an application for membership built the temple. The motivation would appear to have been to help preserve the stability of the region. To the Chinese, it was rather more an emphasis on Chinese supremacy. The Great Regulator, the world's first mechanical clock set up in Laoying was to be the measure of time for this unified world. The Hall of World Government was built to reinforce that idea.

While it is doubtful if Japan saw the world order quite in this way, China, in view of Japan's acceptance of Buddhism, may be forgiven for thinking that it did. At any rate, it was this order that the West disrupted, with Japan's help, or (as others might suggest as an alternative interpretation) that Japan disrupted with western encouragement, at the time of the Meiji Restoration of 1868, when Japan embraced a new set of concepts from the West, namely the 19th century version of the concept of the nation state with a powerful military bolstered by a strong economic and industrial base. This was embodied in the slogan of the time "Fukoku Kyōhei (富国強兵)" As an island nation, it was not difficult for Japan to come to terms with this and from almost this point forward, Japan became culturally and politically isolated from the Asian order. Some evidence for this argument is found, for example, in Korea's rejection of Japan's claims that the Emperor Meiji (tenno, or huangdi, 天皇 in Chinese) had been restored to his rightful position, and that national identity had been confirmed. Korea had a king (oh 王), as did Japan. Only China had an Emperor.

Historical events from then onwards may be viewed in the light of this scenario, with Japan joining the western powers in the colonization of Asia, as an equal partner, after the Anglo-Japan Alliance had been forged in 1902. It is often commented that when the west began slowly to disengage from Asia, Japan continued. This is hardly true either, since it took America's bitter experience in Vietnam and Deng Xiaoping's intransigence over Hong Kong to convince the West that the colonial age was indeed finally at an end.

Japan never fully embraced western values in domestic matters such as law and social structure, certainly not until after the post-World War II Constitution had been promulgated, but appeared to do so early on in matters of international relations. In other words, running with the west rather blinded Japan to her own Asian heritage, which early in the Meiji period the country was willing to sacrifice as the price of survival. If anything, Japan of the 21st century has to re-learn what that Asian heritage actually means. Japan's late 20th century "tilt towards Asia", as it has been described, in terms of trade and diplomacy, is based on a complex perception of past, present and future, and it is by no means clear what this will mean or how it will play itself out. Japan's fundamental ambiguity towards her western allies and her Asian neighbours stems from this historical matrix.

## **II: China: A Civilization in Search of Nationhood**

For all her almost five thousand years of continuous civilization and history, nationhood has always proved to be elusive to China. Oddly enough only two peripheral races, the Mongols and the Manchus came even close to the unification of China into a sense of nationhood. The modernization of the West was enhanced and facilitated by the existence of the ideal of the nation state, a concept that can be traced back to the 14th century, that was in turn strengthened

by the religious Reformation of the 15th and 16th centuries, and finally confirmed after the Thirty Years War in 1648. The significance of the absence of such an idea in Asia is often overlooked. Consequently, after Japan had modernized and developed, it is not surprising that the Little Dragons came next. Singapore (a former British colony), Hong Kong (a Crown Colony until 1997) and Taiwan (a Japanese possession until 1945), shared the common character of being an artificially created mini-nation state with a colonial master who installed a civil service. Korea, a Japanese possession until 1945, still often defines its identity by hostility to Japan was also a successful entrant into the modernizing process, culminating in the 1988 Olympics Games being hosted by Seoul.

China, did not even begin to link culture and nationhood until 1949, and in contrast to Japan's post 1868 open policy to the west, Mao Zedong closed the doors completely in 1949 to consolidate national identity in the Peoples' Republic of China. He used Marxism, a western ideology generated from the class conflicts of an industrial society as an ideology to transform a rural culture into an industrial one. While this raises the whole question of Mao's "communism" it must be prima facie clear that he was not implementing western-style communism, in spite of his leaning towards Russia from which he elicited nothing of value. China's revolution was that of rural peasants rising against the landed gentry rather than the downtrodden industrial masses, the workers of the world uniting to cast off their chains. China, under Mao, was thus first to explicitly reject the western model of westernization as a device for development, creating instead an ideological swing that eventually spread through Asia's emerging economies. Deng's slogan, "Socialism with a Chinese face" was a formula designed to re-inforce the meaning of that swing. To be modernized does not necessarily mean to copy the west in a slavish manner, which the Japanese are often accused (unfairly, I think) of doing. Every Asian nation perceives the West differently. Some see the West as benign. Others see it as an evil that must be tolerated in the interests of survival. The net result of the century-plus influence of western ideas is now an Asia that can say "No" to the west. Various publications in the 1990s saw confrontation as the outcome. At most, while keeping good relations with western nations, Asian nations merely wishes to be free to pursue their own agendas. The so-called Asian financial crisis of 1997 may perhaps be read as a symbol of the change of mood. The rude and arrogant handling of the problem by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), subsequent criticisms that led to its reform, and further studies which showed that the flight of capital from Asia started in New York marked a turning point in history. It is unlikely if Asia would ever accept that kind of treatment again.

### **III: Modernization Versus Westernization: A Revisionist View**

The convergence theories of modernization that were developed in the 1960s (Eisenstadt et al.) were a useful early attempt to explain what was happening world-wide since the Industrial Revolution in the United Kingdom. They were Europa-centric in essence, and saw western values as eventually unifying all human civilization, almost like a secular version of 19th century Christian missions world-wide. Eisenstadt withdrew from this position at a lecture at the International House of Japan (IHJ) in Tokyo in 1987. The greatest weakness of the theory was that it contained so many hidden assumptions, most of which were totally questionable.

First and foremost was the assumption that the West, because of its technological advance, can be considered in some way superior to Asia, and that Asia can only learn from the west, if indeed that it at all possible. This, of course betrays an enormous ignorance of history, and of the fact that China was a developed civilization when the Romans were trying to create some order amongst the barbarian tribes of central and northern Europe. The antiquity of China is too easily ignored by the Western world with its 400 years of modern history, a small window of time compared to

China's 4,000 plus years. In spite of travel, education, and media, perceptions are still distorted and ignorance about Asia permits incorrect views to persist.

Secondly, it ignores the fact that almost every invention and innovation that created the modern West had a corresponding prototype developed in China centuries before. Paper for printing, the clock, the compass, raised highways and many other features of an industrial civilization can be cited. One question that frequently arises from this is the obvious puzzle: "If that is the case, why was there no industrial revolution in China?" Many reasons have been cited for its absence. One of these is cultural. The primary values in Chinese society are the moral ones derived from Confucianism, which stresses the primacy of the good in its many social forms. The kind of philosophical empiricism that is associated with Aristotle, and that later reappeared in the 17th century West has no apparent parallel in China, although almost every other school of philosophy that was developed in the West has some counterpart in the Chinese tradition. That China was inventive is beyond doubt. That China did not apply its inventions remains the enigma. The mixture used to make Chinese fireworks was transformed into gunpowder in the West, an application that led to the creation of many kinds of weapons, and even provided a model for the jet engine.

China's massive feats of civil engineering, such as the Great Wall are perhaps analogous to similar feats by the Romans. Marco Polo on his deathbed was asked to recant and deny his tales of the wonders of China, which he refused to do. The 30 meter arched viaducts in Toledo, Spain, still standing, are testimony to the scale of Roman building. But like the Chinese, they did not show much interest in speculative scientific matters. The Romans adapted technology for war, a fact that has left an enormous influence on the development of the West.

Third, it ignores the imperialism that the west acquired from the age of Rome that showed itself in the political ambitions and impositions of the Papacy and the instinct for colonizing that was its byproduct. Witness the unbridled savagery with which western nations plundered South America in the 15th century and Africa in the 19th century in the name of either religion or advancing these nations' wellbeing. In reality, Japanese colonialism, which was no less harsh in many respects, nevertheless left Korea and Taiwan with education and infrastructure, foundations upon which modern economic development came to be built.

They also ignored the enormous diversity within Asian civilization, and took a superficial and ideological view of the development of Asia, understanding little of the actual dynamics of the processes by which changes had come about. Almost everything in Asian history came to be dated, in effect, from Japan's defeat in 1945, with little attention being paid to the previous century, in which the major changes had already taken place. This was a convenient device by means of which to ignore the existence of western role models for Japanese colonial entrepreneurship, and some very positive western support (for example, in the cases of Taiwan and Korea) for Japanese colonization of parts of Asia. Japan as a nation was left in 1945 to bear condemnation for everything that was wrong in Asia, (a condemnation massively exacerbated by the dreadful undisciplined behavior of the Japanese military), including the brunt of Asian criticism, which united Asia and the west in their condemnation of Japan as militaristic and aggressive.

Now that history has moved on in time upwards of fifty years since 1945, it is perhaps possible to reflect again on the scenario depicted above, in light of a process that began not fifty years ago, but one hundred and fifty years ago, in 1853, with the arrival of Commodore Perry in Tokyo Bay. That first real encounter between Japan and the West in 300 years stimulated forces that set in motion Japan's drive towards modernization. Catching up with the West was the principal concern, but even then, the model was used selectively rather than slavishly, and even after a military occupation from 1945 to 1952, Japan did not become westernized to the degree that what was Japanese was eliminated. Had that been the case, problems such as accessing the Japanese market, the Strategic Impediments Initiative (SII) of 1989 to

1990, and other similar strategies would not have been necessary. Now that we can speak of modernization and westernization as being different, the meaning of this for the development of the Pacific Rim may be considered.

#### **IV: The Impact of the Growth of the Pacific Rim**

Thus far, it sounds as though Asia can be left to sort itself out in Asian terms, and to some extent this is true. However leaving matters simply at that could lead to xenophobic reaction to criticism of the West, and a failure to recognize that is not an either/or issue. The West has been progressive, in some respects less than it thinks, and Asia has great cultural resources, far more than the West can judge. The scenario of a purely Asian trade block, centred on Japan (or China) would be as unwise to assume as it would be dangerous for world stability if it could exist. Rather, it is the Pacific Rim which seems to be the reality that will bring modernized nations of Asia and the western-rooted nations of the Pacific into a great structure of economic inter-dependence. This vast circle of nations and cultures are fated to share linked destinies within the coming years, described by some as the Pacific Age. A brief review of the development of the concept helps to set the historical circumstances into perspective.

The term Pacific Rim has been evolving for over twenty years, as a collective concept referring to the socio-economic activities being conducted by those nations located in the Pacific Ocean, or having coastlines on it. Early on, the trade within East Asia, and links between East Asia and the West Coast of the U.S.A. were the relationships which began to define it (1960s). During the 1970s, with the growth in civil aviation, and the production of Boeing 747 aircraft with long range capability, regional growth expanded to include Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and subsequently South Korea, referred to as the “Little Dragons” or little tigers. These were following upon Japan as the first major Asian nation to develop a successful modern economy.

The remarkable growth of Japan stimulated interest Asia, forcing Western corporations and governments to take notice. Japan was the target, but very quickly, interest grew in other Asian nations. From the late 1970s to the mid 1980s, the enormous financial markets began to grow and to mature, particularly in Singapore, Hong Kong and Tokyo. Further interest was stimulated by tourism, with Japanese travelling all over Asia, Americans and Europeans visiting Japan and other Asian nations on business.

The fuller concept of Pacific Rim will be defined with the history of its evolution, but its evolution is now becoming complex. Firstly, key latecomers have emerged. Secondly, their presence, has had the effect, for example in Japan, of sparking a second wave of development. This in turn has led to Japan becoming the most important developed nation in the region.

First came Australia, when it laid to rest the smouldering remains of World War II hatreds, and accepted its place as an Asian nation. It always had been an exporter to Japan of natural resources, but began openly to embrace an Asian role. It is still criticized by some Asian leaders as a puppet of the West, but it has been involved in Indonesia, and has an immigration policy that permits Asians to settle in the country. While the majority of the population may be of western origin, the country has clearly declared itself to be looking towards Asia.

Then came Deng Xiaoping’s “socialism with a Chinese face”, economic reform, and experiments with a mixed economy. Whatever may be said of Deng, there is no doubt that China will continue to move forward at a dramatic pace. Whether or not it was wise to start a space program is a major question. That it shocked the world is beyond doubt. Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, which had been struggling with change, tried to create better climates for investment, and gradually began to implement changes that led to growth.

To cope with these new centres of economic growth, Japan moved swiftly from having only two international airports to having several more, including two in Kyushu, picking up on the ancient trade routes between Japan and the Asian mainland. Thus Japan embarked upon stimulating regional growth and development.

The West Coast of the U.S.A. and Canada had long links with Asia, going back a century. Japanese emigrants had settled in Hawaii and California since the Meiji period, and sizeable Chinese communities had grown up in San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Vancouver, mainly because of the major railroad projects of the late 19th century, linking east to west and north to south. This was less a Pacific Rim exchange, than simply people going to the land of opportunity, particularly after the 1849 Gold Rush in California. The fact that some were Asian held no special meaning at the time.

These Asian communities have now become major symbols of coming change. U.S. involvement in Korea, Vietnam as well as Japan, after 1945 brought thousands of Asian brides into North America. Relatives inevitably followed, and interest began to grow in Asia, with programs of Asia Studies springing up, particularly in the West Coast, but also in other less likely parts of the country. Canada was jolted into this scenario very quickly after the announcement by former British Prime Minister Thatcher that the U.K. would voluntarily return the entire Hong Kong Colony to China, on schedule, in 1997. Thousands of Hong Kong residents made their way to Canada, particularly the West Coast, and while some returned to Hong Kong, many remained.

However, the emergence of China has been the most important factor of change since the rise of Japan. China now has over a quarter of a million people studying abroad, many in the U.S.A. The latest wave of Chinese emigrants to the U.S. are not labourers or restaurateurs, but the equivalent of middle class business people, who have a sense of Asia and the West. What will be their long term influence may be hard to gauge, but since Chinese retain their culture more than Japanese, and since living links are not severed, it can be predicted that it will be substantial. This can also be translated also into Asian terms, since there are large expatriate Chinese communities all over Asia, some extremely wealthy. These too, have North American links. What is becoming clear is that the Pacific Rim is where East and West will have the greatest interaction, with modernized but not necessarily westernized nations and western nations meeting.

## **V: Pan-asianism and the Asia-pacific Region**

Regional Pan-Asian identity is being promoted again, but Asians will soon discover that Asia on its own may quickly slip back into the complacency and feudalism which has always been its characteristic mode, and which made it an easy prey for western colonialism since the 18th century.

Post-colonialism must be investigated, but in view of existing links, not without taking the West into account, at least in commercial terms. The same pluralism that has grown in the west will develop in Asia, and amongst Asians, more slowly, perhaps, but it will emerge. Commercial interchange and investment will assure this. Once this phase of self-revaluation is over, the setting for the final stages of the Pacific Rim's development will be complete. Signs are that it is coming already. Peru under former President Fujimori led the assault for Japanese investment in that region. Japan maintains links with Chile, Ecuador, Columbia, Venezuela and Panama beyond the mere diplomatic, and it should not be forgotten that there are many Japanese in Brazil. Any map of airline arterial routes will say more about the Pacific Rim than any theory.

While the U.S.A. still maintains a strategic presence in Asia, the general long term view, held by most Asian and many American observers is that the U.S. military presence will be gone from Asia in a generation. Even the Philippines, a U.S. 19th century colony, is now base free. But it would be wrong to think of the Pacific Rim becoming merely Asia

centred. North and South America, from the fishing waters of Alaska to the resources of Chile will travel to Asian markets, and Asian goods and services will flow back. On its own, the Pacific Rim, with China and Japan plus the Americas will constitute a massive economic block. All of this implies a strategic shift of economic balance from the Atlantic to the Pacific. This is not to say that the United States and the European Union do not make up an important block. Indeed they do, but the sheer diversity of the Pacific Rim will pull together vastly more diverse nations in trade and other forms of exchange. “Colonialist” thinking about Asia has been unacceptable since the last decade of the 20th century, but “post-colonialism (without the West)” is equally unbalanced and undesirable. Implementing mechanisms of self-correction in thinking about Asia and the West seems to be the philosophical challenge of the present. We live in an age of transition, in which sometimes, short and long term trends cannot easily be separated. We could call this the Computer Age, and think that putting computers into schools is the thing to do. It may be, but it is micro, and technological. The macro-parameter should be our first concern, and the Pacific Rim concept provides that parameter.

The emergence of China following the massive growth of Japan are the two pivotal factors of the last fifty years. This is where the need for comparative awareness, and self-corrective thinking is needed on all sides of the Pacific. With Japan showing more interest in Asia than in the past, its “Tilt towards Asia” as it has been called may also be seen simply as a return to older trade routes. However, these also include Pacific Rim destinations, and therefore the region in question is more diversely characterized. Some further comment about modernization and westernization in light of the dual structure theory is appropriate before coming to the closing part of the paper.

## **VI: Modernization, Westernization and the Dual Structure Theory**

According to exponents of the theory, an industrializing nation cannot completely shake off its historical past, which thus forces it to have a dual structure, retaining part of its pre-industrial agricultural heritage. Stating the point in economic terms, it means that such a nation has both modern capitalistic and pre-modern capitalistic sectors that coexist. The Japanese government’s Economic White Paper of 1957 pointed out that this was one feature of the Japanese economy, and one that Japan should try to change to complete the modernizing process. In the case of Japan this is seen in the wide gap between the few major enterprises in each sector and the large number of small and medium-sized enterprises. To cite an extreme example, we might examine the construction industry. This sector contains over 550,000 companies, of which only five are major, namely Obayashi Gumi, Takenaka Komuten, Shimizu Kensetsu, Taisei Kensetsu, and Kajima Kensetsu. The rest range from second tier corporations like Kumagai Gumi to family carpenter businesses. These small firms remain because their roots go so far back. This would be clear grounds for saying that Japan was modernized but not totally westernized. The dual structure theory may apply more widely in Asia in the future since Asia still has a strong rural economy throughout the region. This is perhaps one respect in which complete westernization is an impossibility. In terms of more general data, 68 percent of all Japanese enterprises have fewer than 200 employees, and 34 percent have fewer than 20. The comparative figures in the United States are 40 percent and 16 percent, and in the United Kingdom, the same as that in the United States. There is much debate as to whether or not this actually creates a dual structure economy, or that it is merely a phase of development. It may be this, however, that will serve to distinguish between the western and non-western models of modernization. This would appear to be a question that only history will solve in time.

## Concluding Observations

Returning now to the Pacific Rim question, the key issue to the entire scenario of the Pacific Rim, is what form China's next stage of modernization will take. And here, the problem lies in how to evaluate the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and his successors. One view sees him as having carried China beyond Mao's communism to an authentic Chinese Socialism. Repression of dissidents becomes justified as part of a necessary program to prevent the break up of the nation in the way that the U.S.S.R. disintegrated on the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Another view sees Deng as failing to carry through the work of Mao, and by tampering and tinkering with Mao's system, experiments with a market economy in various regions, he is in fact paving the way for a return to feudalism. The party elders attack on Zhao Ziyang, according to some observers finds a neat parallel in the 1880s, when Empress Cixi attacked Emperor Guangxu for his 100 days of reform.

It may be that only Mao saw that technological transformation and economic development required radical political and social change, and only then could modernization take place. Deng's legacy appears to suggest that China could modernize and confront the West on its own terms. Hence sending a man into space proves that China is equal to the West. But that kind of thinking was the mistake of the late Qing dynasty, and the reason for the failure of the May 4, 1991 Tianenmen Square movement.

The Japanese of the Meiji period were clearly aware early on that the West could only be confronted on western terms, which does not mean become 'western', but upon modernizing the nation's central institutions in such a way that growth and development became possible. Japan's modernization and development were thus carefully managed, and sovereignty now lies with the people, although Japan is not quite a social democracy in the western sense. The separation of modernization from westernization has been taking place conceptually in Asia for a long time, but is this what the Chinese leadership is thinking? If it is, there is hope. If not, then they may prove to be the poorest generation ever, poised to take China on that final leap forward, but, in the end, yielding to the endemic feudal mentality that haunts Chinese history, of being a government that is remote, insensitive, authoritarian, and self-serving. More than just the fate of China hangs upon the outcome of the present scenario.

Of hope, Mao Zedong wrote that we can say that it neither exists nor does not exist. The world did not come into being with roads, but when many people walk one way, a road comes into being. So it is with hope. So it may be with the new Asia and the world of the Pacific Rim.

## Modernization Studies

The following are useful discussions of the historical aspects of the modernization period of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Materials and arguments discussed are drawn from these sources.

Moulder, Frances W., *Japan, China and the Modern World Economy* (Cambridge: University Press, 1977)

Morinosuke Kajima, *The Emergence of Japan as a World Power, 1895-1925* (Tokyo: Tuttle, 1968)

Black et. al, *The Modernization of Japan and Russia* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1975)

Ed. Marius B. Jansen, *Changing Japanese Attitudes towards Modernization* (Princeton: University Press, 1965)

Craig and Reischauer, *Japan: Tradition and Transformation* (Boston: Mifflin, 1973)

William W. Lockwood, "Japan's Response to the West: The Contrast with China," *World Politics*, Vol. IX, Part I, October 1956, pp. 37-54.

While it may be argued that these studies are not recent, a paper by Emily S. Rosenberg entitled "Spreading 'The American Dream' to Asia" (*International House of Japan Bulletin*, Vol. 15, No. 1, Winter 1995, pp. 1-6), discusses image of Asia as a subordinate

learning from its master as an early model of modernization.

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Rostow, W. W., *Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge: University Press, 1960)

Sainai, I. Robert, *The Challenge of Modernization: The West's Impact on the Non-Western World* (1964)